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ABSTRACT
Essay I:
Intra-Industry C ontagion  a n d  C om petitive  Effects 
A ssoc ia ted  with C orporate  Liquidation A nnouncem ents: 
D oes Shareholder G o v e rn an ce  Influence the  Results?
J. Terry Ray 
Old Dominion University, 1998  
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung
This essay extends earlier research by investigating the role shareholder 
governance may play in the abnormal stock returns of the liquidating firms’ 
competitors. The empirical model used for analyzing the abnormal returns 
includes variables to capture the influence of: leverage, Tobin’s q, the Herfin­
dahl index. Book Equity-to-Market Equity ratio, the level of institutional stock  
ownership, and the level of stock ownership by insiders.
The conclusion is leverage of the liquidating firm as well as its compet­
itors is the major factor affecting the stock returns of the competitor firms. 
Additionally, there are significantly negative returns for the rival firms when  
institutional investors held more than 21% of the liquidating firm’s equity.
Essay II:
Investors’ Pricing of E xchange  Rate Risk in 
U.S. Firms tha t File for Bankruptcy
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand
The thesis of this essay is those firms that file for bankruptcy are more 
sensitive to changes in the exchange rate, as well as changes in the overall 
economy, than other firms. Using the 48-m onth period preceding the bank­
ruptcy announcement, we examine the relationship between abnormal returns 
and changes in: 1) the economy, and 2) the foreign exchange rate.
Applying a couple of filters to the data resulted in a significant relation­
ship for changes in both the industrial production index — our proxy for the 
economy — and foreign exchange rate for years three and four preceding the 
bankruptcy announcement, but not years one or two. One may conclude that: 
1) financially weakened firms are sensitive to changes in the foreign exchange 
rate and industrial production index, or 2) not ju st the financially weakened, 
but all firms are sensitive to changes in these two economic barometers. In 
either case, when it becomes obvious that bankruptcy is a strong likelihood, 
the forthcoming bankruptcy overshadows other economic influences.
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Intra-Industry Contagion and Competitive Effects 
Associated with Corporate Liquidation Announcements: 
Does Shareholder Governance Influence the Results?
I. Introduction
A corporation is an  artificial, legal person or being, created by governmental 
grant, that for m any purposes is treated as a  natural person. Unlike a 
natural person, a  corporation is unique in that it is  generally considered to 
have an indefinite life — it is  immortal. If we weigh the issuance of the 
corporate charter as the m ost significant event in  the life of a  corporation  
(its birth), then liquidation (corporate death) is certainly the second m ost 
significant event.
Surprisingly, there is a  dearth of literature focused on corporate 
liquidations; the majority o f the extant research into corporate financial 
distress h as concentrated on reorganizations. Moreover, with one exception, 
the research that has addressed liquidations has b een  related to the bank­
ing industry, not industrial firm s. This lack of attention to liquidations has 
left a void in  the corporate finance literature. This research addresses this 
oversight and provides som e empirical analysis that, while certainly not 
filling the abyss, renders a contribution toward reducing it.
1
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When a firm files for protection from its creditors under the provi­
sions of corporate bankruptcy law, there are two possible avenues it m ay  
take: either Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Under the provisions of 
Chapter 11, the firm seek s the bankruptcy court’s protection while it 
reorganizes. The presum ption is the firm h a s identified the problems 
responsible for its financial distress, and has a  viable plan for correcting 
these problems. Thus, assum ing the firm can develop a plan for repaying 
its creditors — in whole or in  part — that is acceptable to the creditors’ 
committee, the firm will continue operations and emerge from the bank­
ruptcy proceedings. On th e  other hand, if the firm is unable to develop an  
acceptable plan for repaying its creditors, the creditors can force the firm 
into liquidation. Therefore, w hen a  firm announces it is filing for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy, it is not know n whether the firm will successfully reorga­
nize or will be forced to liquidate. Consequently, a  firm announcing that it 
is filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy is similar to a doctor announcing a 
patient is chronically ill w ith a  life-threatening condition; at the time of the 
initial diagnosis it is not known whether the patient will recover or die.
The second type o f  bankruptcy, Chapter 7, is where the firm’s 
managers, or possibly the firm’s creditors, do not consider it likely that 
m anagement can restore the operation to a profitable basis. Hence, they  
decide that liquidation of the firm is the best alternative. In this situation  
the firm ceases to exist and its assets are liquidated; after all other claim  
holders are paid under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, the share-
2
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holders of the comm on stock receive the residual, if any, from the liquida­
tion proceeds. In our doctor-patient analogy, th e  diagnosis would be a 
terminal illn ess instead of sim ply life-threatening.
As already mentioned, the majority of the research into corporate 
bankruptcies has focused on corporate reorganizations. Specifically, the 
prior research, with some exceptions, has concentrated upon firms filing for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. A preponderance of this research has examined 
the market’s  reaction at the tim e of the bankruptcy announcem ent.1 In 
addition, other research has investigated intra-industry contagion and 
competitive effects related to Chapter 11 bankruptcy announcem ents. While 
the act of seek ing  the bankruptcy court’s protection during a corporate 
reorganization is a significant event, and investigating the m arket’s reaction 
to this event is informative, lim iting the research to the announcem ent 
period leaves m any unanswered questions.
The literature, to cite a couple of these unansw ered questions, has 
not examined: 1) whether there is a  reversal to the docum ented contagion 
and competitive effects when a firm successfully em erges from bankruptcy, 
or 2) are the effects exacerbated w hen the Chapter 11 firm subsequently  
announces it will liquidate?
^lark and Weinstein (1983), using data from 1938 through 1979, found large, nega­
tive abnormal returns during the month a bankruptcy occurs with most of the losses dur­
ing the three trading day interval surrounding a bankruptcy filing. Kim and Papaioannou 
(1994), using data from 1970 through 1990, documented abnormal returns consistent with 
Clark and Weinstein’s results. Additionally, Russel and Branch (1994) obtain similar 
results using bankrupt firms from the period of January 1984 through June 1993. On the 
other hand, Morse and Shaw (1988) found negative abnormal returns for firms filing for 
bankruptcy before implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, but they 
observed average abnormal returns very close to zero for firms filing after the 1978 Act.
3
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These unansw ered  questions arise from the fact that a  Chapter 11 
filing does n o t  have a  definitive outcome. That is . at the tim e of the 
announcem ent the m arket does not know w hether th e  firm will successfu lly  
emerge from bankruptcy (such as Toys-R-Us), or will fail to develop a 
satisfactory reorganization plan and be forced into liquidation by its 
creditors (Lionel, for example). Thus, limiting our research to th e  market’s 
reaction to the announcem ent of a  Chapter 11 filing does not reveal a  clear, 
complete picture.
In addition, we are leaving ourselves exposed to the possibility of 
obtaining contradictory resu lts associated with potential contagion and 
competitive effects. These contradictory results are m anifest in the fact that 
at the time th e  firm announces its bankruptcy filing the m arket m ust 
assess the firm ’s probability for successfully em erging from bankruptcy. 
This, in turn, requires the m arket to forecast how  th e  competitors will be 
affected given th e  firm in  question either liquidates or successfu lly  emerges 
from bankruptcy —  an  exercise in  conditional probability.
Appropriately, the purpose of this research is  to redirect the focus 
from investigating the m arket’s reaction to an announcem ent with an 
uncertain outcom e to exam ining the market’s reaction to an announcem ent 
with a more definitive outcom e. Firms announcing a  liquidation decision  
provide the event that satisfies the more definitive outcome criterion.
Furthermore, it h as been suggested that, sim ilar to the emotional 
effects experienced by relatives of its hum an counterpart, corporate death
4
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m ay generate financial effects transm itted to other firms within their 
respective industries. An adjunct consideration that m ay serve to confound  
these results is the role agency relationships may play in  these intra­
industry effects. Summarily, the contribution of this research is an investi­
gation and analysis of these industry-related effects associated  with corpo­
rate liquidations, and extending the analysis to exam ine specific firm  
characteristics and the extent to which shareholder governance may exert 
an influence on the results.
There are two philosophies that dominate the thinking with respect 
to the financial effects corporate bankruptcies/liquidations may have on  
other firms w ithin their respective industries. One, d iscu ssed  by Meltzer 
(1967) related to h is investigation into banking regulations, is that bank­
ruptcy is contagious within the industry. As articulated by Lang and Stu lz  
(1992), there are a couple of argum ents that provide the foundation for th is  
contagion philosophy. One argum ent supporting th is philosophy is the  
liquidation of one firm cau ses its custom ers and suppliers to be skeptical 
of other firms in the industry irrespective of their financial position; there­
fore, the other firms suffer economically. Another argum ent supporting the  
contagion philosophy is that one firm’s liquidation announcem ent conveys 
adverse cash flow information that is common to all firms in the industry. 
Clearly, for the contagion effect, w e expect other firms w ithin  the industry  
to experience a negative m arket reaction when one firm announces it is 
filing for liquidation.
5
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The second philosophy — a  contrapositive of the first — perhaps best 
described by Altman (1983), is that although econom ic conditions 
exogenous to the firm m ay contribute to its failure, in alm ost all cases the 
fundamental b u sin ess failure problems lie within the firm itself. This line 
of thought elim inates consideration for the contagion effect and suggests 
there should be no negative reactions felt by other firms in  the industry 
w hen one firm announces it is  filing for liquidation. In fact, Titman (1984) 
and Altman (1984b) su ggest an  opposite effect could occur — potential 
customers of the firm facing bankruptcy (Chrysler in Titm an’s  and Altman’s 
examples) would buy from a competitor (Ford).2 Thus, they present the 
argument for w hat h as been  referred to as the competitive effect. Therefore, 
for the competitive effect, as suggested by the Chrysler-Ford example, we 
expect other firms w ithin the industry to experience a  positive market 
reaction when one firm announces it is filing for liquidation.
For this analysis, we adopt Lang and Stulz’s (1992) methodology for 
investigating intra-industry contagion and competitive effects. However, 
instead of focusing on Chapter 11 announcem ents as did Lang and Stulz, 
our analysis concentrates on corporate liquidations, w hich is consistent 
with the focus of this research. We extend their analysis by incorporating 
a factor to represent how  well the other firms w ithin the respective
2 A. Bennett (1981) quotes Lee Iacocca as saying “. . . when Chrysler applied in
January for the latest $400 million installment of its $ 1.2 billion of federal loan guarantee,
its share of new car sales dropped nearly two percentage points because potential buyers
feared the company would go bankrupt. That cost Chrysler $200 million in lost sales."
6
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industries are managed. We also exam ine the influence shareholders 
governance m ay have on the resu lts. The hypotheses to be tested  are:
1. Whether there is an  intra-industry contagion effect 
associated with a firm’s  liquidation announcem ent. Does 
the market interpret the liquidation announcem ent as 
firm-specific, or is the announcem ent an indication of 
industry-wide problems?
2. Are there intra-industiy competitive effects em anating  
from a firm’s liquidation announcem ent? That is, does 
the liquidation of one firm provide benefits to th e  other 
firms in the industry by redistributing wealth from the  
liquidating firm to its competitors?
In keeping with the m ethodology employed by Lang and  Stulz, we use 
the Herfindahl index, a m easure of industry concentration, to classify the 
respective industries as either competitive or concentrated. They, Lang and 
Stulz, found a negative market effect for industries with high leverage and 
intense competition. Conversely, they found a positive m arket reaction for 
industries with a high degree of concentration (limited competition) and low 
leverage. Given that their sam ple data included only six firm s that su bse­
quently liquidated, we would expect the contagion and com petitive effects, 
if they exist, to be more pronounced for our sample of corporate liquida­
tions, assum ing they exhibit sim ilar leverage, industiy-concentration char­
acteristics, and comparable total liabilities.
7
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In addition to u sin g  the Herfindahl index to classify  the industries of 
the liquidating firms, w e u se  an  approximation for Tobin’s q to classify  each  
of the competitor firms. The purpose is to determine if  the contagion and  
com petitive effects are a  function of the market’s perception of how  well the 
competitor firms are m anaged. A priori, we expect the contagion effect to be 
present with poorly m anaged competitors and the competitive effect to 
appear in  well-managed competitors.
Following the analysis of the contagion and competitive effects, we 
address the issue of the role agency relationships and governance m ay be 
playing in the preceding resu lts. That is, we refine the classification of the  
sam ple data to including categorizing the firms by certain agency character­
istics. With respect to the issu e  of how agency relationships and governance  
m ay influence the in tra-industiy  results, there are a t least two different 
perspectives one may u se  for classifying the competitor firms.
The first, is that w hile corporate managers are the agents o f  share­
holders, typically no single shareholder exerts sufficient influence over 
m anagem ent. Thus, m anagem ent is the agent for a faceless m ass and  m ay  
not take their fiduciary responsibilities as seriously as they should. Tem­
pering this extreme is the role being taken more aggressively by external 
holders of large blocks o f stocks — pension funds, for example. Here we 
find the external blockholders coercing directors and m anagem ent to be 
more cognizant of the shareholders expectations, and th ese  holders o f large 
blocks of stock, in effect, force management to be m ore accountable for
8
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their actions. For this perspective o f the agency relationships and govern­
ance issue, we should expect, assum ing all other factors are the sam e, 
firms with concentrated holdings o f stock  ownership to experience a larger 
competitive effect than other firms whose stockholdings are distributed  
am ong many sm all shareholders.
The second vantage point is that debtholders m ay be partially 
substituted for the stockholders; th is gives rise to an additional agency  
relationship of managem ent-debtholders. Here, through indenture agree­
m ents, debtholders m ay relieve shareholders of som e of the burdens associ­
ated with certain monitoring functions. That is, the debtholders presumably  
will enforce the indenture agreements which limit m anagem ent’s ability to 
perform in ways that do not m axim ize the value of the firm. While we can  
formulate expectations about the results of market’s reaction associated  
with concentrated holdings of stock, the role debt m ay play is more complex 
and m ay produce opposing results dependent not only upon the level of 
debt in the firms’ capital structure, but also upon the firm s’ positive net 
present value investm ent opportunities.
Examples of som e of the m ore subtle underlying issu es  that con­
tribute to the results m ay be found in  the firms’ choices for leverage that 
we classify at this time as the indefinite categories of reasonable and 
excessive. For firms in  the former category, debt may, as postulated by 
Jen sen  (1986), function as a control mechanism that am eliorates potential 
agency problems; these firms m ay be less likely to liquidate. However, if
9
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they do liquidate, it m ay be a m anifestation o f industry-wide problems — 
not sim ply firm-specific problems. For firms in  the latter category, leverage 
may exacerbate the agency problems. In this situation we m ay find: 1) the 
managers not wanting to liquidate b ecau se  they are enriching them selves 
at the stockholders/debtholders expense and liquidation would end their 
self-serving opportunities, or 2) conversely, managers at other similarly 
leveraged firms, after enriching them selves and devaluing the company, 
m aybe motivated to liquidate in anticipation of purchasing the firm and /or  
its assets a t a  distressed price. Consequently, it  is not possible to postulate  
congruous results for the agency relationship associated with debt.
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II. Background
In this section  we lay the foundation and construct the infrastructure that 
supports our investigation and analyses. First, we discuss the principal 
concepts that are cogent to the thesis of th is research. These concepts 
include: the contagion effect, the competitive effect, agency relationships, 
financial ratios traditionally used  for identifying financial d istress, the 
Herfindahl index, and Tobin’s  q.
In addition to discussing th ese  concepts, the second portion of this 
section  reviews the major contributions to the literature that are relevant 
to this research. This literature review focuses upon the corporate valua- 
tion-consequences related to: Capital Structure, Debt, Bankruptcy, and  
Liquidation; Industry-Related Contagion and Competitive Effects; and  
Corporate Value and Concentrated Stockholdings.
The final portion of this section  sum m arizes the relevant empirical 
research and presents the im plications for th is study.
a. Principal Concepts
The Contagion Effect Briefly, the contagion effect is characterized as a 
negative change in the value of other firms —  that is, competitors — w hen  
a financially distressed firm announces it is filing for liquidation. A s stated
11
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by Lang and  Stulz, it “is the change in  the value of com petitors that cannot  
be attributed to a wealth redistribution from the bankrupt firm.”3
T his negative change in  value m ay be based on the fact, or perhaps 
simply th e  m arket’s perception, that all firms within a given industry hold  
similar portfolios of investm ents. Since the market is unable to observe the  
performance of these portfolios directly, they m ust rely upon the firm s’ 
financial conditions, or the inform ation the firms’ provide about their  
financial condition — either individually or collectively — as an indicator of 
the perform ance of these portfolios. Ergo, the market interprets the liquida­
tion announcem ent of one firm a s an indication of the poor performance of 
the firms’ investm ents and, therefore, the liquidation announcem ent is a  
harbinger o f the financial d istress afflicting all firms in the industry.
Correspondingly, contrary to Altm an’s argument, all firms within an  
industry m ay  be exposed to com parable economic factors that affect their  
cash flows —  the commercial airline industry, for example. The information 
that one airline is encountering cash  flow problems due to higher fuel and  
other operating costs, or that it h as reduced fares in an attem pt to attract 
more passengers, may serve as a  signal that the airline industry as a whole  
is engulfed in  a financially challenging period. This perception of financial 
distress m ay be a self-fulfilling prophecy in  that vendors m ay tighten their  
credit policies for firms in the industry and /or potential custom ers m ay  
seek su b stitu tes for the products/services offered by the troubled industry.
3Lang and Stulz (1992), p. 47.
12
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The Competitive E ffect In a  more positive perspective, one firm’s  liquidation 
does not necessarily convey a  signal o f bad new s for the other firms in the 
industry. According to Titm an and Altman, new s of financial distress may 
cause customers to migrate to the other firm(s) in the industry. The rival 
firms thereby capture revenue and m arket value from the liquidating firms.
In Titman’s  and Altm an’s exam ples using  the automotive industry, 
this migration may be due the custom er’s  concern about service work that 
should be performed under warranty, th e  future availability of replacem ent 
parts, and trade-in value o f the vehicle to nam e a few potential concerns. 
It is important to note the automotive industry is obviously a concentrated  
industry with relatively few firms — that is, limited competition. According 
to Lang and Stulz, this is an  essential ingredient for the competitive effect, 
because in  perfectly competitive industries shareholders of existing firms 
cannot earn abnormal returns from an increase in  demand. It follows that 
the m agnitude of the competitive effect should  be inversely related to the 
num ber of firms in  the industry. Thus, th e  larger the number of firms in an  
industry, the lower the degree of the com petitive effect.
Agency Relationships: In general, this is a  relationship that exists between  
a person, or group of persons, identified as the principal, and a second  
person, or group of persons, referred to a s  the agent. Typically, the agents 
conduct business on behalf of the principals. In the context of a  corpora­
tion, the shareholders are the principals and the firm's directors and 
managers are the agents. Introducing confusion  to the issue, in  the corpo-
13
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rate setting, the directors and m anagers also m ay be shareholders, which  
in certain instances could present a conflict of interest. Irrespective of the 
potential conflicts of interest, it  is the responsibility of the directors and 
managers to m aximize the shareholders’ value.
Problems m ay arise in  agency relationships when m anagers own only 
a fraction of the total shares o f the firm. This limited ownership m ay create 
an environm ent wherein the m anagers’ primary focus is on enriching them ­
selves instead  of maximizing th e  shareholders’ value, because the majority 
owners bear m ost of the cost. The m anagers m ay enrich them selves via 
unnecessary perquisites such  a s  u se  of com pany cars and planes, traveling 
first c lass, membership in clubs, and m unificent expense allowances. A 
typical argum ent is that m anagers m ay be able to enrich them selves at the 
shareholders’ expense because it is too difficult and expensive for the 
shareholders to monitor the m anagers’ activities.
One com m on measure u sed  to motivate managers to maximize the 
value o f the firm is to include debt in the firm’s  capital structure. Through 
the u se  and enforcement of indenture agreements, the debtholders hold the 
managers accountable for their actions. Thus, debtholders assum e certain 
responsibilities and perform som e o f the monitoring functions that were 
previously the domain of the shareholders. In effect, management becom es 
the agent for both the shareholders and the debtholders.
Financial Ratios: Lang and Stu lz’s (1992) research into the contagion and 
competitive effects used, in addition to a  threshold level of liabilities to
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qualify firms for their sample, the firm s’ degree of leverage to segregate 
firms into different groups. A financial ratio, in itself, is not necessarily a  
meaningful num ber — it m ust be com pared with som ething else before it 
becomes usefu l. The two basic types o f comparative analysis are: 1) trend 
analysis, and 2) com parison with other firm s in  the sam e industry or other 
hom ogeneous grouping. We are not u sin g  financial ratios in  th is study for 
the purpose of conducting com prehensive financial analyses of the respec­
tive firms, nor are the ratios intended to b e  used  for developing discrim inat­
ing characteristics associated with predicting bankruptcy. The objective is 
to use those ratios other researchers have found to b e  important, and 
examine the exten t to w hich they m ay b e usefu l for identifying competitor 
firms exposed to contagion/com petitive effects.
There are five broad groups o f financial ratios: leverage ratios, 
liquidity ratios, activity ratios, profitability or efficiency ratios, and market 
value ratios. The leverage ratios m easure the extent to w h ich  the firm has 
been financed b y  debt w hile the liquidity ratios provide a  m easure of the 
firm’s ability to m eet its maturing short-term  obligations. Beaver (1966) 
docum ented th a t the current ratio w as th e  first ratio used  to evaluate credit 
worthiness (circa 1908). The activity ratios show  how effectively the firm is 
using its resources, and profitability ratios reflect m anagem ent’s overall 
effectiveness as show n by the returns generated on sales and investm ents. 
Finally, the m arket value ratios are a  com bination of accounting and stock  
market data th at reflect how  the m arket values the firm’s  performance.
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Beaver (1966, 1968), in h is investigation into financial ratios as 
predictors o f failure, found that failed firms not only have lower cash  flow 
than  comparable non-failed firms, but failed firms also have a  sm aller 
reservoir of liquid assets. Moreover, although failed firms have less capacity  
to m eet their financial obligations, they tend to incur more debt than the 
non-failed firms. Of the s ix  ratios Beaver tested, he found the “C ash Flow 
to Total D ebt” w as the b e st  indicator of financial distress.
Altm an (1968, 1983) com bined the use of various financial ratios and  
m ultiple discrim inant analysis to develop a model for predicting financial 
distress. From his earlier work, that included five separate ratios, he found 
Working Capital divided b y  Total A ssets provided the m ost usefu l data for 
predicting financial distress. His later research, which w as constructed  
around seven  ratios, improved upon the financial distress predicting ability 
o f h is original model. However, it is not possible to determine from this 
recent m odel which ratio, or ratios, provide(s) the greatest contribution.
O hlson (1980), working with a  group ofnine different ratios, conclud­
ed that four, and perhaps possib ly five, were useful for predicting financial 
distress. According to his resu lts, the m ost significant ratios are: Size; Total 
Liabilities divided by Total Assets; Working Capital divided by Total A ssets 
(or used  in  conjunction w ith Current Liabilities divided by Current Assets); 
and Net Income divided by Total A ssets (or Funds Provided by Operations 
divided by Total Liabilities).
D am bolena and Khoury (1980) took a slightly different approach  
toward investigating financial ratios that provided advance information
16
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about potential financial distress. They were concerned with not just the 
ratios, but whether th e  ratios were stable or volatile over time. Their best 
m odel was limited to five ratios.
Fama and French (1995) found two variables — size, or market equity 
(ME) and the book equity to market equity ratio (BE:ME) — are significant 
factors in explaining variation in stock  returns, and these two variables are 
related to profitability. They found th at high BE:ME is an  indicator of 
persistent poor earnings while low BE:ME is a  reflection o f strong earnings.
This study u ses  the leverage ratio and the book equity to market 
equity ratio to classify the competitor firms. We com pute these ratios for 
each of the competitor firms and their respective industries. Each competi­
tor firm is then classified as either high/low-leverage and high/low-BE:ME  
relative to their industry averages and industry m edians, respectively.
The Herfindahl Index: The heart of th is research is not the firms that 
announce their liquidation, but the competitors of the liquidating firms. 
Hence, we require appropriate indices for classifying these competitor firms 
and their respective industries. One o f the indices we u se  is the Herfindahl 
index to classify the industry of the liquidating firm and its competitors.
Used as a m easure of industry concentration, the Herfindahl index 
is the sum  of the squared fractional output rates for all the firms in an 
industry. A high index is indicative o f a sm all number o f firms within an  
industry, or that the total output of the industry is concentrated in a few
17
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firms. A  low index reflects a  total industry output that is distributed am ong  
m any firm s in  the industry inferring there is a  high degree of competition.
The Herfindahl index has been used  in a  wide range of research into 
econom ics and finance-related issu es. Cowling and W aterson (1976) u se the  
Index in  their investigation into price-cost margins and  market structure. 
Copeland and Weston (1988) report the current Departm ent of Justice  
merger guidelines (1982 and 1984) rely upon the Herfindahl index to reflect 
not only the degree of concentration, b u t also as an indicator of inequality  
among firms. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) used the Index in  their investiga­
tion into horizontal mergers. D ickson (1992) used  th e  Herfindahl index as 
an adjustm ent factor for the Cobb-Douglas production function and to 
m easure the effect of industry concentration on industry cost in his  
research into the problems related to aggregation o f co sts  by industry.
Lang and Stulz (1992), in their investigation into contagion and com ­
petitive effects, u sed  sales—as a m easure of output—to compute the index. 
To be con sisten t with their methodology, and to allow m eaningful compari­
sons betw een the results o f the two studies, we follow their methodology. 
To wit: w e u se  n et sales, exclusive of the liquidating firm s, to compute the  
Herfindahl Index for each industry. A high index is one for a specific ind us­
try that is  above the m edian index value for all industries. Similarly, a low  
index is one that is below the m edian value for all industries.
Tobin’s  q: While w e are using  the Herfindahl index to classify industries, we  
use Tobin’s q to classify the individual firms within their respective indus-
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tries. This is the ratio o f  the market value o f  a  firm’s debt and equity to the 
current replacement co st o f its assets. In other words, the ratio reflects the 
current market value o f the firm divided by  its replacement costs.
Typically, Tobin’s  q m ay be used to represent diverse characteristics 
of a  firm. Four of th ese  characteristics are: a n  indication of the ability of the 
firm to generate abnorm al profits over a  period of time; a m easure of the 
firm’s  managerial performance; a  reflection o f the firm’s level of investm ent 
activity (a high q is associated  with underinvestm ent while a low q  is  associ­
ated with overinvestment); and to capture th e  value of intangible a sse ts  (for 
example. Research and Development, Advertising, Goodwill, etc.).
Tobin’s q is sim ilar to the m arket-to-book ratio, but with several 
notable differences. First, the numerator of the ratio includes all the firm’s 
debt and equity securities, not ju st the com m on stock. Second, the denom ­
inator includes all the firm’s  assets, not ju s t  its net assets. In addition, 
these assets are reported at their replacem ent cost — not the original 
acquisition cost.
These variables present a couple of dilem m as in the estim ation of this 
ratio. A major problem is  estim ating the replacem ent costs (the denom ina­
tor). It is difficult to estim ate the market va lu e  of the firm’s assets because  
they are not normally traded in the m arket place. The second problem is 
estim ating the value o f long-term debt (in the numerator). According to 
Lindenberg and Ross? the difficulty of obtaining the market value of debt
4LIndenberg and Ross (1981), p. 11.
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is b ecau se  a substantial am ount of the bond trading is not done on the 
floor o f the exchanges; consequently, the published exchange data does not 
fully reflect investors’ valuations. In our methodology section, we explain  
an alternate approach to estim ating Tobin’s  q that eliminates the problems 
of estim ating the market values for the long-term debt and existing a ssets.
The u se  of Tobin’s q  for this analysis is a  reflection of the market’s 
perception of how well the firm is managed. We use it to classify the com ­
petitor firms into two groups: poorly m anaged and well managed. A poorly 
m anaged firm is one w hose q is below the industry median, and a well- 
m anaged firm is above the industry median. Although prior research has 
produced contradictory results related to industry concentration and the 
q ratio, our implementation of q is not affected by industry concentration; 
the degree of concentration applies to each industry as a whole, we identify 
firms as either high or low q relative to the other firms within their 
respective industries.
b. Previous Relevant Research
Supporting the objective of this research, which is to analyze the effects 
upon competitors when a  firm announces it is liquidating, and then extend  
this analysis to investigate the influence agency relationships may have, we 
first exam ine the theory/evidence that casts som e light on: 1) the path that 
leads to corporate liquidation, and 2) the firm-specific characteristics of the 
competitors that contribute to the positive and negative financial effects
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R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
experienced by the competitors w h en  firms liquidate. Accordingly, we begin  
with a  review of previous research that paves the w ay for, and at the  
extreme even encourages, a  philosophy that endures the possibility of corp­
orate liquidation — a survey o f capital structure, debt, bankruptcy, and  
liquidation. The second portion o f the review of relevant research is a stu dy  
of the industry-related contagion and  competitive effects. We complete the 
perusal of previous research with a n  examination of the corporate valuation  
consequences related to the distribution of equity holdings.
Capital Structure, Debt, Bankruptcy, an d  Liquidation: In sim plest terms, the  
primary source of corporate bankruptcy/liquidation is too much debt. 
There are various theories of capital structure that encourage the employ­
m ent of debt to the extent that th e  recommended level of debt skirts the  
threshold of excessiveness. This survey of capital structure is limited to the  
salient literature that establishes a  solid argument for u sin g  debt to finance 
corporate investments and how leverage may influence the value of a firm. 
A discussion of capital structure is  pertinent at this point to establish the  
framework for our method of u sin g  leverage to classify the sample data.
Briefly, we categorize the theories related to capital structure into 
three groups: 1) capital structure does not matter — the value of the firm 
does not depend upon the proportions of debt and equity used to finance 
the firm; 2) capital structure is relevant to determining the value of the  
firm — the higher the proportion o f debt, the higher the value of the firm;
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and 3) employing debt in th e  capital structure increases the value of the 
firm, but too m uch debt also reduces the firm ’s  value.
The theory that capital structure is  irrelevant was developed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963). There have been su bseq uent studies  
that support this theory including Baron (1974), butStiglitz (1974) — using  
financial intermediaries and the arbitrage opportunity argum ent— provides 
the m ost general proof of the theory.
Opposing the irrelevance theorem Eire th ose  who stress th e  advan­
tages of debt and argue a high degree of leverage is necessary to m axim ize  
the value of the firm. These authors include Scott (1977), Brennan and  
Schwartz (1978), and Kim (1978). Others, su ch  as Jensen  and M eckling 
(1976), suggest debt introduces added value-enhancing benefits to the  
shareholders by relieving them  of some of th e  monitoring burdens.
The last group is exemplified by Baxter (1967) who presents the view  
that a  high degree of leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy w hich  
increases the riskiness of the firm’s future c a sh  flows. Consequently, excess  
leverage can reduce the total value of the firm. There are other authors who 
have noted that bankruptcy costs may provide an  economic rationale for an  
optimal capital structure.5 They suggest a n  optim al capital structure is 
reached through the tax advantages of debt being counterbalanced by the  
expected value of bankruptcy costs. Thus, according to the “The Static  
Tradeoff Hypothesis,” a  firm attains an optim al debt-equity com bination
5Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Castanias (1983), and Myers (1984).
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when the present value of th e  debt-induced tax shield  is equal to the 
present va lue of expected bankruptcy costs.6
For th e  final verdict as to w hich theory dom inates and how  to view 
leverage for classifying the data, we look to the em pirical evidence. The 
evidence to date does not support the theory of irrelevance.7 Moreover, 
given the m ixed results associated  with changes in  the value of the firm 
arising from leverage increasing transactions, the empirical data neither 
conclusively support nor unequivocally reject the claim  that increasing
6Haugen and Senbet (1978) counter this rationale by arguing the magnitude of the 
bankruptcy costs related to capital structure decisions cannot be sufficient to offset the 
tax advantages of debt, because the bankruptcy costs must be trivial or nonexistent if we 
assume that capital market prices are competitively determined by rational investors. 
Miller (1977) also criticizes these earlier authors for what he considers the use of 
unrealistically large marginal bankruptcy costs to offset the expected corporate tax savings 
of debt. Miller uses a horse and rabbit stew analogy, where the horse represents the tax 
savings of debt and the rabbit is the expected bankruptcy costs, to argue the bankruptcy 
costs are insignificant compared to the debt tax shield. (In support of Miller, Kim, 
McConnell, and Greenwood (1977) did not obtain evidence supporting a bankruptcy cost 
effect. Additionally Masulis (1980), consistent with the results of Kim, McConnell, and 
Greenwood, found no evidence of a large expected cost of bankruptcy.) In Miller’s analysis, 
the supply of debt is perfectly elastic.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) provide a rebuttal to Miller’s argument of perfect 
elasticity for the supply of debt by introducing the consideration of non-debt tax shields 
(depreciation, investment tax credits, etc.) into the analysis. They reason these non-debt 
tax shields may be substituted for debt tax shields. They concede that to the extent a firm 
can fully use all its debt and non-debt tax shields (for the current year as well as carry­
back to prior years), the supply schedule for debt is perfectly elastic. But, at a point where 
the firm has unused tax shields that it must carry forward to future tax years, the supply 
schedule for debt loses some of its elasticity and begins to bend upward. Thus, to the 
extent the firm must defer some of its tax benefits, it requires compensation in the form 
of a premium (a lower interest rate) for its debt. Accordingly, they conclude a unique 
optimal capital structure will often exist in this tax environment, where at the margin, the 
corporate tax advantage of debt exactly offsets the personal tax disadvantage of holding 
debt.
rThere is evidence that straight debt offerings produce non-positive market reactions 
(Eckbo (1986), Kim and Stulz (1988), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986)). In addition, we 
have Dann and Mikkelson’s (1984) finding of a negative reaction (significant at the .10 
level). For empirical research that focused exclusively on capital structure-changing 
transactions we have the studies by Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood (1977) and Masulis 
(1980); they found leverage increasing transactions produce positive market results.
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leverage enhances the value of the firm. Although earlier research did not 
produce resu lts supporting the Static Tradeoff Hypothesis that is a  central 
tenet for the optimal capital structure theory, subsequent research h as  
found evidence of significant bankruptcy costs.8
At th is point, the review of theory and empirical research present u s  
with w idely diverging thoughts and  results regarding capital structure. 
Opposing Modigliani and Miller’s proposition of irrelevance, we have two 
separate lines of thought that share the common them e that including debt 
in the capital structure enhances the firm’s  value. One group suggests the  
value o f the firm increases m onotonically with increases in  leverage while 
the other group presents argum ents for an optimal capital structure.9
8In contrast to the findings of Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood and Masulis, support 
for the position of sufficiently large bankruptcy costs can be found in the research of 
Castanias (1983), Altman (1984b), and Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1994). Using a 
sample more heavily weighted toward smaller firms than the data sets used in earlier 
research, Castanias concludes that ex ante default costs are large enough to have a 
substantial impact on the leverage policy of the firm.
Altman also obtains strong evidence that bankruptcy costs are not insignificant as 
suggested by Haugen and Senbet (1978), Miller (1977), and others. He found in many 
cases they exceed 20% of the value of the firm measured just prior to bankruptcy — and 
even in some cases measured several years prior to bankruptcy. These bankruptcy costs, 
on average, ranged from 11% to 17% of the value of the firm up to three years prior to the 
bankruptcy.
Additionally, Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1994) found the mean direct costs 
of bankruptcy for liquidations and reorganizations are higher for their sample of firms than 
those reported in earlier studies of both large and small firms. They found, for reorgan­
izations, the direct costs are positively related to size of the firm (using reported assets or 
total disbursements as a proxy for size), time spent in bankruptcy, and the complexity of 
the case (based upon the number of the creditors).
9Baumol and Malkiel (1967), Brennan and Schwartz (1978), DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), Castanias (1983), and Myers (1984). This argument for an optimal capital structure 
does not necessarily suggest uniformity across industries — there may not be an optimal 
capital structure within an industry. For example, referring to Pilotte’s (1992) research, it 
may be that well-managed (underinvested) firms can justify and support a higher debt- 
equity ratio than overinvested firms in the same industry.
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Notwithstanding the conflicting theories or the conflicting results of 
the extant research, there are possible explanations we ca n  draw from this 
web of confusion. One plausible explanation for obtaining seem ingly contra­
dictory results from the empirical research is the lim itations inherent in the 
u se of linear m ethodologies to analyze nonlinear relationships. The combi­
nation of theories and empirical resu lts suggest the relationship between  
leverage and firm value is nonm onotonic, at a m inim um , and highly 
probable that it is nonlinear. It is, therefore, possible that w ith  more robust 
analytical techniques and refined classification /segm entation  of the data 
we would obtain a higher degree of consistency  among th e  researchers and 
their empirical resu lts.
Stepping beyond the constraints o f linear m ethodologies, Figure 1 is 
a graphical representation  
that show s the sim ilari­
t ie s  an d  d iffe re n c es  
betw een the two groups of 
theorists that contend  
debt increases the value  
of the firm. (The size, 
shape, and relative place­
m ent of the these curves 
were arbitrarily chosen  
and were not intended to
Leverage
Figure 1 . Leverage and the value o f  the firm.
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suggest definite relationships betw een  firm value and leverage when they  
do not exist.) The point Ve represents the possible value o f an  all equity firm 
while the points Va and Vb represent the possible values for all debt firms. 
The curve Ve-V a show s the value o f the firm increasing monotonically with  
increases in  leverage. This is con sisten t with the Existing A sset Signaling 
and Wealth Transfer hypotheses, and the theories o f Scott (1977) and  
Brennan and Schwartz (1978). Furthermore, the em pirical evidence from 
the research o f  Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood (1977) and  Masulis (1980) 
appear to support the general sh ap e  of this curve.
In contrast, w e have the curve Ve-V b, where the value of the firm 
increases w ith  leverage until it reaches the point V'U; further increases in  
leverage beyond the level V  result in  a  decrease in th e  value of the firm. 
This decrease in  value may be attributed to increased volatility of earnings 
as suggested by  Lev (1974), an d /or  increasing costs o f bankruptcies that 
are not offset b y  the tax benefits o f debt as suggested by  C astanias (1983), 
Altman (1984), and Ferris, Jayaram an, and Makhija (1994).
With th e  uncertainty regarding the appropriate level(s) of debt, the 
relevant costs of bankruptcy, and allocation of equity ownership, it is not 
surprising there is even more obfuscation  w hen we attem pt to extend the 
discussion  from bankruptcy to corporate liquidation. T hat is, given that 
liquidation is u su a lly  an  extreme action  of last resort related to corporate 
bankruptcy, the lim ited research into th is phase of corporate activities 
should be expected. Although there h a s been very little research into corp-
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orate liquidations, Titman, Shleifer, and Vishny provide contributions to the  
development o f a  theoretical framework related to capital structure.
Titman (1984) presents the introductory work for developm ent of 
capital structure and corporate liquidation theory. He suggests the selection  
of an appropriate capital structure serves as a bonding m echanism  su ch  
that the incentives are aligned to ensure the firm im plem ents the ex ante  
value-m axim izing liquidation policy. He explores a new frontier by suggest­
ing that liquidation costs (the increased costs that are borne by the firm’s 
customers), along w ith the conflicting incentives of bondholders and stock ­
holders, are relevant to the theory of an optimal capital structure.10
The crux o f Titm an’s argum ent is “If the customers and other a ssoci­
ates of a  firm rationally assess its probability of liquidation, the firm will 
indirectly bear the imposed liquidation costs ex ante.”11 This argument is 
based upon the presum ption that th e  price a consumer is willing to pay for 
durable goods declines as the probability of the manufacturer’s liquidation  
increases, thus reflecting the custom er’s anticipation of an  increase in 
expected m aintenance costs. Titm an further explains that a  firm’s capital 
structure controls its future liquidation decision that, consequently, affects 
the terms of trade at which the firm m ust transact b u sin ess with its 
custom ers, em ployees, and vendors. Hence, any increase in the firm’s level
10Altman (1984b) follows Titman’s lead and develops the argument for the competitive 
effect as previously discussed.
1 hitman (1984), pp. 138-139.
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of debt is associated w ith an increased probability of bankruptcy and 
liquidation; this is accom panied by a deterioration in the term s of trade. It 
is th ese  less favorable term s of trade that introduce another cost of debt 
financing that is relevant to the firm’s capital structure decision.
In summary, Titm an suggests the fact that liquidation m ay impose 
costs upon the firm’s custom ers and b u sin ess associates d ictates an opti­
m al capital structure. Additionally, Titman’s argument allow s the optimal 
capital structure to vary am ong industries.
Approaching the relationship between corporate liquidation and  
capital structure from a different path, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) consider 
the liquidation value of a  firm, and the level of debt the firm can  carry, to 
be a  function of the firm’s  “asset redeployability.’ That is, som e assets are 
more versatile than others (these others they refer to as illiquid assets) and 
m ay be used  effectively in  a wider range of revenue producing activities. 
Thus, they are more redeployable than the illiquid assets and  will likely 
comm and a  higher price, relative to their “highest and b est u s e ” value, in 
the event of a  firm’s financial distress and forced liquidation. For example, 
commercial land is more redeployable than a  steel mill. Therefore, these  
redeployable assets support a  higher level of leverage than illiquid assets.
Shleifer and Vishny draw several conclusions from their research that 
include the following: optim al debt levels are a function of a s s e t  illiquidity 
(or a sse t redeployability), the optimal leverage of a firm depends upon the 
leverage of other firms in the industry (there m ay be an optim al debt capac-
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ity for the industry even if there isn ’t one for the individual firms), a sse t  
liquidity changes over time, and optim al debt levels also change over time.
If, as th is survey of the subject suggests, capital structure is relevant 
not only to determ ining the value of a  firm, but also ensuring the firm’s 
long-term viability, and if m anagem ent is striving to m axim ize the value of 
the shareholders wealth while avoiding bankruptcy/liquidation and its 
attendant costs, w hat is the optim um  debt-equity com bination? Baum ol 
and Malkiel (1967) provide us the w isdom  we seek: . the tax  advantages
of bond financing and the near zero transaction costs incurred in undoing 
leverage m ake it desirable for th e  firm to employ as m u ch  debt as is 
consistent w ith considerations o f financial prudence.”12
The operational phrase up on  which we should focus is “financial 
prudence.” Obviously, it is easier to determine retrospectively the fine line 
separating financial foolishness from financial prudence —  or, too m uch  
debt from ju s t  enough — particularly if, as Shleifer and V ishny conclude, 
optimal debt levels change over tim e. Unfortunately, m anagers do not have 
this luxury of m aking capital structure decisions ex post. They rely upon  
the best information presently available about future b u sin ess conditions 
when they decide not only to pursue certain investment opportunities, but  
also decide w hether to use retained earnings, debt, equity, or som e com ­
bination to finance these investm ents. If managers could predict the future  
with 100% accuracy, then the problem s associated with bankruptcies and
l2Baumol and Malkiel (1967), p. 571.
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liquidations w ould be greatly dim inished. We should  n ot judge managers 
too harshly for their inability to predict the future, b eca u se  economists do 
not always reach a  consensus about the current sta te  o f the economy.13
If we presum e that m anagem ent is striving to m axim ize the value of 
the shareholder’s  wealth by m aintaining an optimal capital structure, and 
then, due to changes in the econom ic conditions, there is a  shift in the 
optimal debt-equity combination (to a  lower level o f leverage) a la Shleifer 
and Vishny, it is reasonable to conclude financial stress is only a short step 
away. Moreover, if other firms in  the industry were at, or above, the optimal 
capital structure before the change in economic conditions, then we would 
expect a fertile environment for widespread financial d istress (that is, the 
contagion effect). Constructing a  sim ilar argument, if  there are other firms 
in  the industry operating at less than the optimal capital structure before 
economic change, it is conceivable they would benefit from this change (the 
competitive effect).
It is not practical at this time, due to the previously discussed  
limitations of linear methodologies, to attempt estim ating the optimal 
capital structure for each industry. We can, however, com pute the average 
leverage for each  industry and u se  this average as a  point of reference 
similar to the point V'L' shown in  Figure 1. Using th is approach we com­
13For example, in early November 1992, during the presidential election, economists 
were not in agreement whether the U.S. economy was still in a recession or had begun to 
recover. It was not until after the election that there was a consensus the recession had 
ended several months earlier. We now consider the recession to have ended in March 
1991 — approximately 20 months before the presidential election.
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pare each of the competitor firms in the sam ple with the industry-average 
for leverage to determine if the individual firms are above, or below, the 
industry m ean. Having established the framework for u sin g  leverage to 
classify the competitor firms, we now proceed with a review o f the research 
into the intra-industry contagion and competitive effects.
Industry-Related Contagion and Competitive Effects: The period in the 
United S tates’ history referred to as “The Great Depression”14 provides the 
data for som e of the earliest research into contagion effects. This research, 
including the work of Meltzer (1967) and B em anke (1983), focused  on the 
ubiquitous failures within the banking industry and provides u s with an 
introduction to the contagion effect. In addition, Aharony and Swary (1983) 
examine the contagion effects associated with bank  failures, b u t using data 
from the 1970s. Also looking at data that began with the Great Depression  
and continued through 1955, Warner (1977a, 1977b) investigated bank­
ruptcy within the railroad industry. Working w ith data that is m ore current, 
1970 through 1989 and 1970 through 1990, Lang and Stu lz (1992) and 
Kim and Papaioannou (1994), respectively, exam ine contagion and compet­
itive effects associated with corporate bankruptcy within the industrial 
sector. Finally, Akhigbe and Madura’s (1995) research investigates the 
intra-industry effects of voluntary corporate liquidations.
l4From October 29, 1929, the crash of the New York stock markets, until December 
8, 1941 when the U.S. entered into World War II.
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Warner’s (1977a) investigation into bankruptcies in the railroad 
industry and the pricing of risky debt also exam ined the stock  returns for 
competitors. Using selection  criteria of Class I railroads that both initiated  
and terminated voluntary bankruptcy proceedings betw een 1930 and 1955, 
Warner obtained a sam ple of 73 bonds on 20  separate railroads.15 It is 
interesting to note th a t while the average railroad bankruptcy took more 
than 12 years to settle, the longest took more than 20  years —  none of the  
bankrupt firms liquidated completely. He finds significantly negative 
returns in the m onth a firm files for bankruptcy. He su ggests one explana­
tion is that the m arket did not anticipate that the railroad would file for 
bankruptcy at that tim e. Warner states: “Particular bankruptcy announce­
m ents do not appear to be associated with adverse industry returns. These  
findings also suggest that bankruptcy had no ‘contagion effect’ since the  
other railroads do n o t appear to be adversely affected by a railroad’s 
bankruptcy petition.”16
Lang and Stu lz (1992) were the first to investigate specifically the  
intra-industry contagion and competitive effects associated with industrial 
firms filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Their 58 firm sam ple w as restricted  
to firms with liabilities in excess of $120 million. (They focused on large 
bankruptcies to lim it their analysis to announcem ents with a potential 
industry-wide effect.) Their resu lts found evidence of value consequences,
l5A Class I railroad was defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission as one with 
revenues (in some pre-bankruptcy period) greater than one million dollars per year.
l6Wamer (1977a), p. 262.
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both contagion and competitive effects, for their intra-industry competitors. 
For their overall sam ple the resu lts were consistent with those expected for 
the contagion effect. However, their subsam ple of industries w ith low  
leverage and a low  degree o f com petition (as m easured by  the Herfindahl 
index) produced evidence o f th e  com petitive effect. They contrast th is w ith  
their subsam ple o f industries w ith  high leverage and high degree of com pe­
tition that exhibited the contagion effect.
Kim and Papaioannou (1994) extend Lang and Stu lz’s research to 
consider another industry factor —  resource mobility (asset redeployability 
as discussed by Shleifer and Vishny) — that may w eaken any extant com ­
petitive effects. Relaxing the constraint for at least $120  million in liabili­
ties, their findings, contrary to the resu lts of Lang and Stulz, reveal that 
industries w ith a  low degree o f com petition realize greater value losses than  
industries with a  h igh degree o f com petition. In essence, they  find stronger  
evidence (than Lang and Stulz) supporting the contagion effect and obtain  
no evidence in support of the com petitive effect.
Akhigbe and Madura (1995) essentially  follow Lang and Stulz’s  m eth­
odology for investigating the intra-industry effects, bu t addressing volun­
tary liquidations instead of bankruptcies. Their overall resu lts, sim ilar to 
those obtained by Lang and Stu lz  as well as Kim and Papaioannou, reveal 
significant negative price valuations associated with the contagion effect. 
Their results also support the findings of Kim and Papaioannou in that the  
valuation effects are more unfavorable in  industries with: 1) more growth
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opportunities, and 2) higher leverage ratios. Interestingly, their results 
again agree with Lang and Stu lz bu t not Kim and Papaioannou in their 
finding th a t the valuation effects were more favorable for rivals (that is, the 
competitive effect) w hen the liquidating firms had m ore monopoly power.
Corporate Value a n d  Concentrated Stockholdings: It is  only within the past 
few years that we have w itnessed large holders of b locks of stock exercise 
their m uscle for the purpose o f motivating m anagem ent to pursue their 
primary m ission: maximizing the shareholders’ value. In reporting on an 
upcoming AT&T Corporation an n u al meeting, Lublin (1996) revealed that 
more than a dozen pension funds intend to “w ithhold votes for the re- 
election o f certain AT&T directors as a  protest against the multimillion 
dollar com pensation awarded la st year to Mr. A llen,” AT&T’s CEO.17 Cer­
tainly proxy fights for the purpose of gaining control of a  corporation are 
not new, b u t typically, in the past, the initiator o f  the power play was 
pursuing corporate control w hich w as not necessarily in the interest of all 
shareholders. Although the proxy fights of yesteryear are still with us, they 
now are joined by groups of shareholders whose m otive is to enrich all 
shareholders through improved corporate governance.
R ecent research into this new  wave of shareholder activism includes 
the work o f Wruck (1989) who d isclosed  the market reacts positively with 
average abnorm al returns of 4.5%  related to the announcem ent of a private 
sale of equity associated with a  change in concentration of firm ownership,
17Lublin (1996), p. A3.
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and Wahal’s  (1996) survey of the n in e m ost active pension funds, although  
producing sim ilar results for a su b se t of the data, does not produce the  
overall positive results one might expect given Wruck’s finding. Nesbitt’s
(1994) stu dy focused on the long-term stock-price performance of com pan­
ies targeted by CalPERS, the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System, for increased corporate governance. Smith’s (1996) analysis of  
shareholder activism  by institutional investors found significant positive 
stock price reactions for successfu l targeting actions and significant nega­
tive reactions for targeting actions th a t were unsuccessful. McConnell and  
Servaes (1995) present several findings related to the value of the firm and  
allocation o f  equity ownership between managers and outside shareholders, 
and the ownership of stock by institutional investors. Finally, Shome and  
Singh(1995) analyze the valuation consequences of external blockholdings.
The im plication of Wruck’s (1989) study is the market perceives 
increased concentration of firm ownership as a signal the blockholder will 
be in a position to exercise greater corporate governance, which, on average 
produces a positive reaction. That is , the market anticipates the block­
holder will enforce closer alignment of management and shareholders’ 
interests, b u t in som e cases, as the resu lts reveal, the increase in concen­
tration m ay be a  hindrance to the alignm ent of interests. Wruck obtained  
a positive m arket reaction to a  change in  concentration when the ownership  
concentration w as either low or high, bu t a negative reaction w hen the  
concentration w as in a middle range.
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Wahal (1996) discovered that 40% of the proxy proposals to change 
corporate governance structures introduced by p en sion  funds were adopted  
by the target firms. A lthough Wahal’s abnormal returns were significantly  
positive for a  subset of firm s subject to nonproxy targeting, the overall 
results for the targeting announcem ent abnorm al returns were not signifi­
cantly different from zero. A possible explanation for these results is that 
the market, w hen the b lock  formation is announced, anticipates the proxy- 
targeting action and th is  is incorporated into the market reaction  
docum ented by Wruck. Additionally, the fact that som e firms responded to 
the blockholders’ request w ithout a proxy initiative, m ay have been  inter­
preted by the market as additional information n o t anticipated at the time 
of the block formation announcem ent, hence the supplem entary abnorm al 
returns. Additional findings include the fact that long-term  abnorm al stock  
price performance of targeted firms was negative before and after the target­
ing experience.
Nesbitt (1994) reports the collective ownership of the U.S. equity 
market held by institutional investors passed the 50% level in 1993, and  
they accounted for 80% o f all shares traded, suggesting they primarily were 
trading am ong them selves for the purpose of enhancing returns or m anag­
ing risk. It is because o f their growing im portance as stock owners that 
institutional investors have found them selves in  a  position that enables 
them  to influence corporate behavior to the benefit of all shareholders. 
Hence, this increasing level of shareholder activism  observed over the past
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eight years. N esbitt found the com panies targeted by CalPERS had per­
formed below the averages by 66% for the five-year period prior to its 
initiative. After its involvement, the targeted companies outperformed the  
S&P index by 41% for the subsequent five-year period.
Sm ith (1996) followed-up N esbitt’s study and investigated the value  
to the shareholders resulting from CalPERS’s initiatives. For the five-year 
period of 1 9 8 9 -1 9 9 3 , 72% of the targets either adopted the proposed 
governance structure resolutions or m ade changes sufficient to warrant a  
settlem ent. Sm ith found a significantly positive stock price reaction for the  
su ccessfu l targeting events and significantly negative reaction for the 
u n su ccessfu l events. Overall, CalPERS’s activism increased the value of its 
holdings by $19  m illion while its estim ated costs were only $ 3 . 5  m illion  
over the five-year period.
McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995)—examining the relation between 
Tobin’s q, debt, and equity ownership for high and low-growth firms —  
found a negative relationship betw een corporate value and leverage for 
high-growth firms, b u t a  positive relationship for low-growth firms. When 
analyzing the relationship between q and  percentage of com m on stock held 
by inside owners, they found a significantly positive relationship, but a  
significantly negative relationship for the squared value o f the percentage 
of inside ownership; suggesting a curvilinear relationship betw een q and the 
fraction of shares held by inside owners. In addition, they obtained a signif­
icantly positive relationship between q  and the fraction o f shares held by
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institutional investors. Collectively, these results im ply that the allocation 
of equity ownership matters.
Shome and  Singh’s (1995) investigation into the stock  price reaction 
associated w ith n ew  external block formations found, on  average, positive 
gains to the blockholder. Although they obtained positive results, they 
caution the resu lts do not provide any evidence that blockholders play a 
valuable role in  lim iting managerial discretion over free c a sh  flow. But, they 
conclude, the valuation  increases in target firms m ay b e  due to “potential 
synergy gains from future takeovers an d /or  from reducing potential oppor­
tunistic m anagerial behavior.”18
c. Implications for this Research
The empirical research into the competitive and contagion effects has 
produced mixed resu lts. Although we consistently find evidence supporting  
the contagion effect, as well as contradictory evidence, Lang and Stulz and 
Akhigbe and M adura are the only researchers who find an y  evidence of the 
competitive effect d iscussed  by Titman and Altman. Considering that Lang 
and Stulz used  a  filter of $120 million in  liabilities and found the competi­
tive effect present only in highly concentrated industries (indicative of 
oligopolistic industries with high barriers to entry) su ggests the competitive 
effect is an isolated phenomenon while the contagion effect m ay be more 
pervasive. This conclusion  is reinforced by Akhigbe and Madura’s finding 
of a competitive effect w hen the liquidating firms had m ore m onopoly power.
18Shome and Singh (1995), p. 12.
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U sing the $120 m illion in  liabilities as a  criterion for inclusion in  
their sam ple produced only s ix  firms that eventually liquidated in Lang and  
Stulz’s  study. Since the heart of this research is corporate liquidations, w e  
deem it necessary to relax the criterion for $120 m illion in liabilities to 
qualify for the sample. As a  result, we expect to find evidence of the conta­
gion effect sim ilar to Kim and Papaioannou’s results, and  no support for the 
competitive effect. Moreover, elim inating the $120 m illion in liabilities as a 
threshold to qualify for our sam ple, w e expect any industry-wide effects 
present in  th is research to b e  less pronounced than Lang and Stulz’s.
W ith respect to our exam ination of the extent to which agency gov­
ernance issu e s  may be contributing to the contagion/com petitive results, 
we exam ine the allocation o f equity ownership in the liquidating firms as  
well as the competitor firms. The rationale for looking a t the distribution of  
equity in  the liquidating firms is to investigate if either insider or institu­
tional ownership may be playing a role in  liquidations arising from agency  
problems.
For competitor firms, w e expect insider ownership to be more posi­
tively correlated with the abnorm al returns for low-growth competitors than  
for high-growth competitors. We draw th is inference from the relationship 
between m arket valuation and insider ownership explained by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Stulz (1988), and M cConnell and Servaes’ 
(1990, 1995) because there is a  convergence of interest among managers 
and shareholders for lower levels (approximately 35%-40% from McConnell
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and Servaes) of insider ow nership/low er levels o f growth opportunities. 
W hen insider ownership exceeds th is level, the relationship between insider  
ownership and market value is negative (a curvilinear relationship), w hich  
they claim is explained by the entrenchm ent hypothesis.
Equally important is the inference that com petitor firm s whose share­
holders include institutional investors should experience a more positive 
effect than firms w ithout the concentration of voting power —  particularly 
for firms with high growth opportunities [that is, h igh  q). The basis for this  
expectation is the research of Shom e and Singh (1995) and  Park and Song
(1995). Although Shom e and Singh found no evidence that blockholders 
play a valuable role in limiting managerial discretion over free cash flow, 
they suggested the value increase they obtained m ay  b e due to reducing 
potential opportunistic managerial behavior. Additionally, Park and Song  
using  an unconditional com parison between firms w ith  outside block­
holders and firms w ithout them  found an improvement in  performance that 
w as limited to block firms.
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III. Data
The sam ple analyzed by th is study is limited to firms announcing their 
voluntary liquidation, due to financial distress, during the years 1975 
through 1994. The initial sam ple of announcing firms w as obtained from 
the 1995 COMPUSTAT® II Industrial A nnual Research F ile .19 This source 
produced a  sam ple of 128 firms in  83 industries, according to their 4-digit 
SIC code, announcing their liquidation. The sample w as then  filtered by 
verifying th e  liquidation announcem ent date in  The Wall S tree t Journal, this 
step reduced the sample to 70  firms. This refined listing o f firm s is provided 
in Appendix A. Using data from the Research File, we com puted the follow­
ing characteristics for each of the firms in  Appendix A:
• h igh /low  Herfindahl Index for the liquidating firm’s  industry. We 
code the industry as “0 ” if it is competitive (that is, th e  total sales for 
the industry are spread among a relatively large num ber of firms), 
and “1” if the industry is concentrated (total sa les lim ited to a rela­
tively few firms). We determ ine th is relative value by  comparing the 
Herfindahl Index for the industry with the median ind ex  of all indus­
tries for the liquidation year. An industry index greater than the
I9A code of "03" in Footnote Slot No. 35 indicates liquidation was the reason a firm 
was deleted from the file.
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median value indicates a concentrated industry; conversely an 
industry index le ss  than  the m edian value indicates a  competitive 
industry. The Herfindahl Index for each industry (as identified by 
four-digit SIC code) for the years 1975—1994 is provided in  Appendix 
B. The com putation of this index is d iscussed in the methodology 
section that follows.
• high/low  Tobin’s  q: A  firm with a low q (lower than the m edian value 
for all firms in that industry) is coded as “0” while a high q firm is 
coded as “ 1.” Appendix C provides the industry values of Tobin’s q 
computed u sin g  the approach presented in  the methodology section.
• h igh/low  BE:ME ratio: A firm with strong earning’s potential -  a low 
BE:ME ratio —  is coded as “1” while a  firm with w eak earnings 
potential is coded as “0 .” A firm with strong earnings potential is one 
whose BE:ME ratio is less than the m edian value for its respective 
industry. The industry median values for the BE:ME ratio are pro­
vided in Appendix D.
• h igh/low  leverage: A firm with a high level of leverage (higher than  
the average leverage for all firms in the industry) is coded as “0 ” while 
a low-leverage firm is coded as “1.” Appendix E provides the industry  
averages for leverage during the years of 1975-1994.
In addition to the data obtained from the COMPUSTAT® File, we also 
used  data produced by D isclosure Incorporated (formerly CDA, Inc., former­
ly Computer Directions Advisors, Inc.) to classify each of the firm s accord-
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mg to the percentage of their equity held by insiders and institutional 
investors. For 1991 and later years, the information w as extracted from  
Compact Disclosure. For the years prior to 1991, Spectrum 3  and Spectrum  
6 provided the data for institutional and insider, respectively, equity  
holdings?0
Table I, on the following pages, presents the characteristics of each
of the firms announcing their liquidation. This list is sorted according to
SIC and the announcem ent date. While there was data to classify the
degree o f competition for each o f the industries except “firm 067” w hose SIC
is 8050, it is particularly interesting to note there was insufficient data to
compute Tobin’s  q for any of the liquidating firms.
With respect to the BE:ME ratio, m ost of the firms had a w eak
earnings potential, but we find seven  of the liquidating firms had a  low ratio
(that is, the firms were coded a s  ” 1”) suggesting a strong earnings potential.
One possible reaction to this inform ation m ight be: “Why would a  firm with
20The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 established the requirement for institutional 
investment managers exercising discretion over accounts with combined equity assets 
exceeding $100,000,000 to file quarterly reports. Form 13F, with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Equity holdings less than 10,000 and  $200,000 in principal value 
and market value are exempt from the reporting requirements. Consequently, institutional 
equity holdings that do not meet these criteria are neither included in the Spectrum  3 
report nor are they reflected in the classification of the firms. Furthermore, Spectrum  3  was 
first published in 1978; as such the data to classify firms according to institutional equity 
holdings are not available for the years 1975 -  1977.
Officers, Directors,and 10% principal stockholders (“insiders") of all companies 
having securities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission are required 
to file periodic reports detailing initial equity ownership (Form 3) and all subsequent 
transactions (Form 4). Spectrum 6, published semi-annually as of June 30 and December 
31, is a listing of all insiders owning 1,000 shares ($25,000 principal amount), or more. 
Insiders whose holdings are less than this threshold are not included in Spectrum 6, nor 
are they reflected in our firm classifications. Spectrum 6  was first published in December 
1980: the data to classify firms according to insider holdings are not available for the years 
1975 -  1979.
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nQn n j n
Tobin's q
MQf, M |  II
BE:ME Ratio 
”0 "  " I* 1
Leverage
MQfl ft J H
Insider Institutional 
Stock Owners Stock Owners
KQf. ii j n  iiqii n j n
firmOOl 1220 08 /31 /79 ✓ ✓ ✓ / ✓
firm002 1311 05/21 /76 / ✓ ✓
firm003 1311 03/22 /77 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm004 1311 07/12 /89 / ✓ ✓
firm005 1311 10/22/86 / ✓ ✓
firm006 1531 09 /26 /80 / / ✓ /
firm007 2086 09/26 /78 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm008 2100 06/22/81 / / / ✓
firm009 2200 09 /19 /79 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
flrmOlO 2300 03/16/81 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firmOl 1 2340 07/27 /84 ✓ ✓ S / ✓
firm012 2400 11/26/75 / ✓ /
flrm013 2400 04 /16 /80 / / / ✓
flrm014 2451 03/06 /89 / ✓ / ✓ /
firmOl 5 2510 04/18 /75 / ✓ /
flrmO 16 2510 08/19 /83 / ✓ ✓ / ✓
firmOl 7 2670 12/24/81 / ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firmOl 8 2670 01 /29 /86 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firmOl 9 2721 03 /30 /76 / ✓ /
firm020 2741 02/10 /77 ✓ /
firm021 2911 05/22 /75 ✓ ✓ /
firm022 2911 03 /03 /76 / ✓ ✓
firm023 2911 05/27 /79 / ✓ ✓ ✓


















Characteristics for th e  Liquidating Firms
Announce- Total Herfindahl Insider Institutional
Liquidating ment Number Index Tobin’s q BE:ME Ratio Leverage Stock Owners Stock Owners
Firms SIC Date of firms "0" ii j n "O'! "j" "0" n j n n0" njn iiQn n j n "O" it j n
firm025 3350 09/17/81 ✓ / / 7 ~ 7
firm026 3350 03 /08 /84 / ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
flrm027 3443 06 /02 /77 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm028 3541 01/03 /86 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firm029 3572 02 /24 /84 / ✓ / / ✓
flrm030 3585 02/04 /83 ✓ ✓ ✓ / /
firm031 3663 12/05/79 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firm032 3674 07/10 /79 ✓ ✓ /
flrm033 3713 07/19 /78 ✓ ✓ /
flrm034 3714 09/05/85 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firm035 3827 03/17 /75 ✓ ✓ ✓
flrm036 3851 08 /28 /80 ✓ ✓ / ✓
flrm037 3944 05/08 /78 ✓ ✓ /
flrm038 4210 06/27/75 ✓ ✓
firm039 4210 04/09 /79 ✓ /
flrm040 4400 05/08 /75 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm041 4512 11/29/91 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ /
flrm042 4522 07/31 /78 ✓ ✓ ✓ /
flrm043 4832 01/19 /79 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm044 4833 03/30 /82 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firm045 4833 03 /21 /84 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firm046 5040 12/09/75 ✓ ✓ ✓
flrm047 5080 12/31/76 / / /


































Stock Owners Stock Owners
I1QI1 n 1H nQK MJtl
firm049 5190 01/10 /77 ✓ ✓
firm050 5211 12/01/86 ✓ / ✓ ✓
firm051 5331 11/25/87 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm052 5900 12/19/75 ✓ ✓
firm053 5961 09/15 /83 ✓ / / ✓ ✓
firm054 6021 05 /15 /75 ✓ / ✓
firm055 6311 03/31 /83 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ /
firm056 6512 06/09 /78 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
flrm057 6512 03 /14 /85 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm058 6552 04/14/81 ✓ / / ✓ ✓
firm059 6798 09/24 /85 / ✓ / ✓ ✓
firm060 6798 02 /16 /90 / ✓ / / ✓
fimi061 6799 01/19 /79 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
flrm062 6799 09/01 /83 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm063 6799 12/01/83 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
firm064 7350 03 /14 /78 ✓ ✓
firm065 7359 10/30/78 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
flrm066 7372 03/27 /79 ✓ ✓ ✓
firm067 8050 07 /15 /75
firm068 8060 01/27 /77 ✓ ✓ /
firm069 8071 06/22 /93 / ✓
firm070 9995 02/04/88 ✓ ✓ ✓ s ✓
Overall 70 44 25 6 2 7 50 11 15 13 7 26
strong earnings potential liquidate?” A closer inspection reveals th at each  
of these seven  firms is in a  concentrated industry. The implication a t  th is  
point is  th e  relatively high m arket equity for each of these firms is attribu­
table to the limited number o f firms in  the industry for which the m edian  
BE:ME ratio w as calculated. (Unfortunately, we cannot examine the effect 
on rivals w hen  a liquidating firm h as a  low BE:ME ratio, because, as show n  
in Table II, we were unable to construct portfolios for any of these seven  
liquidating firms [020, 033, 038 , 039 , 043, 052, and 064].)
The next step was to form portfolios of competitors using the 1995  
COMPUSTAT® Annual File. For a firm to qualify for inclusion in a portfolio 
of competitors, there had to be sufficient data in the COMPUSTAT® File to 
allow com putation of: the Herfindahl Index, Tobin’s q, the BE:ME ratio, the 
Leverage ratio, and the Trading Volume Index. Furthermore, there had to 
be sufficient daily return data in  the CRSP (Center for Research into S ecu r­
ity Prices) File, to allow the com putation of abnormal returns.
Table II, on the following pages, presents a summary of the character­
istics for each of the portfolios. The im posed constraint of requiring COMP­
USTAT® data to compute all the classification characteristics resulted in  no 
qualified firms for portfolios 020 , 033 , 038 , 039, 043, 046, 049, 052, 064, 
and 067 . In effect, this reduced the num ber of liquidation announcem ents 
from 70  to 60. For the rem aining 60  liquidation announcem ents we formed  
portfolios ranging from one to 79  competitors for a total of 649 competitors. 
Using CRSP  data and the m arket m odel (see the Methodology Section), we
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portfOOl 1220 08/31 /79 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 7.0000
portf002 1311 05 /21 /76 22 22 0 11 11 9 13 13 9 0 0 2 15 6.5455
portf003 1311 03 /22 /77 24 24 0 12 12 12 12 13 11 0 0 2 16 7.4167
portf004 1311 07/12 /89 28 28 0 16 12 14 14 11 17 15 10 8 16 6.3214
portf005 1311 10/22/86 36 36 0 19 17 20 16 16 20 10 19 10 20 5.3889
portf006 1531 09/26 /80 11 11 0 5 6 5 6 7 4 7 3 2 8 4.9091
portf007 2086 09/26/78 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.0000
portf008 2100 06/22/81 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.0000
portf009 2200 09/19/79 3 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 2 4.3333
portfOlO 2300 03/16/81 3 0 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 4.0000
portfO 11 2340 07 /27 /84 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 3.0000
portf012 2400 11/26/75 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 10.0000
portfO 13 2400 04 /16 /80 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 0 10.0000
portfO 14 2451 03/06 /89 5 5 0 2 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 3 3.2000
portfO 15 2510 04/18/75 5 5 0 3 2 3 2 3 2 0 0 1 4 4.8000
portfO 16 2510 08/19/83 5 5 0 2 3 3 2 3 2 1 4 2 3 5.4000
portfO 17 2670 12/24/81 6 6 0 3 3 3 3 2 4 1 3 2 1 3.8333
portfO 18 2670 01/29 /86 6 6 0 3 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 2 3 4.1667
portfO 19 2721 03/30 /76 3 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 3.6667
portf020 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
portf021 2911 05/22 /75 26 26 0 11 15 12 14 11 15 0 0 14 8 8.1154
portf022 2911 03/03 /76 27 27 0 12 15 12 15 13 14 0 0 14 9 8.4815
portf023 2911 05/27 /79 25 25 0 12 13 12 13 15 10 3 15 14 8 9.2800




















Summary of th e  C haracteristics for the Portfolios of C om peting Firms
Announce­ Total Herfindahl Insider Institutional Trading
ment Number Index Tobin’s q BE:ME Ratio Leverage Stock Owners Stock Owners Volume
Portfolio SIC Date of Firms "0" n| n I I Q I I  •» | «• "0" I t  J  I t "0" ft Jit "0" I t  | II  H Q t l rt|ti Index
portf025 3350 09/17/81 4 4 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 2 ~ 2 1 ~ 3 2 2 3 ~ o F ~ 2 5.5000
portf026 3350 03/08 /84 3 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3.3333
portf027 3443 06/02 /77 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2.5000
portf028 3541 01/03 /86 3 3 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 3 3 0 6.3333
portf029 3572 02/24 /84 3 3 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 8.0000
portf030 3585 02/04 /83 3 3 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 5.3333
portf031 3663 12/05/79 7 7 0 2 5 1 6 3 4 0 0 3 4 7.2857
portf032 3674 07/10 /79 14 14 0 7 7 7 7 5 9 0 0 5 4 6.3571
portf033 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
portf034 3714 09/05 /85 24 24 0 12 12 13 11 12 12 3 17 15 5 5.9583
portf035 3827 03/17 /75 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 5.0000
portf036 3851 08/28 /80 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 9.0000
portf037 3944 05/08 /78 2 0 2 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2.0000
portf038 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
portf039 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000
portf040 4400 05/08/75 3 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 5.0000
portf041 4512 11/29/91 14 14 0 7 7 7 7 5 9 1 11 9 3 8.2857
portf042 4522 07/31 /78 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 7.0000
portf043 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
portf044 4833 03/30 /82 3 0 3 2 1 2 1 0 3 0 3 2 1 7.3333
portf045 4833 03/21 /84 5 0 5 2 3 2 3 3 2 0 4 4 1 6.0000
portf046 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
portf047 5080 12/31/76 4 4 0 3 1 2 2 3 1 0 0 1 3 4.0000



















Summary of th e  C haracteristics for the Portfolios of C om peting Firms
Announce­ Total Herfindahl Insider Institutional Trading
ment Number Index Tobin's q BE-.ME Ratio Leverage Stock Owners Stock Owners Volume
Portfolio SIC Date of Firms "0" n j n ”0" n j n "0" n j n "0” MJtt "0" n j n "0" n j n Index
portf049 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000
portf050 5211 12/01/86 5 5 0 2 3 3 2 1 4 1 4 4 l 8.2000
portf051 5331 11/25/87 9 9 0 5 4 5 4 2 7 1 6 5 2 7.6667
portf052 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000
portf053 5961 09/15 /83 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9.0000
portf054 6021 05/15/75 43 43 0 22 21 21 22 27 16 0 0 10 17 5.4186
portf055 6311 03/31 /83 16 16 0 7 9 7 9 5 11 3 6 3 9 5.1250
portf056 6512 06/09/78 3 3 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 0 1 2 6.3333
portf057 6512 03/14/85 4 4 0 1 3 1 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 4.0000
portf058 6552 04/14/81 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 2 3.5000
portf059 6798 09/24 /85 32 32 0 15 17 15 17 16 16 8 12 7 13 4.0938
portf060 6798 02 /16 /90 72 72 0 27 45 37 35 35 37 5 42 22 26 4.1111
portf061 6799 01 /19 /79 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 9.0000
portf062 6799 09/01 /83 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 5.0000
portf063 6799 12/01/83 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 3.5000
portf064 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000
portf065 7359 10/30/78 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 8.0000
portf066 7372 03 /27 /79 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6.0000
portf067 /  / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000
portf068 8060 01 /27 /77 3 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 3.6667
portf069 8071 06 /22 /93 4 0 4 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 0 4 6.5000
portf070 9995 02/04 /88 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 5.0000
Overall 560 528 32 264 296 266 294 266 294 79 184 191 244 5.9482
cn
O
computed the abnormal returns for all firms for which sufficient daily 
return data  were available. This additional requirement for com puting the 
abnormal returns reduced the final sam ple down to 560  firms.
Reviewing the information from Table II, we find:
• For the Herfindahl Index, there are only 32  firms for the concentrated  
industries, b u t 528 for the competitive industries. Earlier research 
su ggests firms in  the concentrated industries should experience posi­
tive abnorm al stock returns (that is, the competitive effect) associated  
w ith  a  liquidation announcem ent w hile the firms in  the competitive 
industries should experience negative abnormal stock  returns (the 
contagion effect).
• There is a  fairly even distribution of firms for Tobin’s  q —  2 6 4  firms 
w h ose q values are below the industry m edian and 2 9 6  firm s above 
the m edian. Since the q ratio m ay be considered to represent how  
w ell a  firm is managed, w e expect the high-q firms (coded as “1”) to 
have a  positive stock price reaction to the liquidation announcem ent 
and the low-q firms to have a zero or negative price reaction.
• For the BE:ME ratio we also find an approximately even distribution  
of firm s. There are 266 firms with a high BE:ME ratio (coded as “0”) 
and 2 9 4  firms with a low  ratio. The implication from Fama and 
French’s (1995) research is the firms with a low BE:ME ratio should  
experience a nonnegative stock price reaction b ecause they have a 
strong earnings potential, and the high BE:ME ratio firm s should  
have a nonpositive reaction because of persistently poor earnings.
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• With respect to the Leverage ratio, there are 266  firms w hose leverage 
ratios are above the industry average (coded as “0 ”) and 294  firms 
below the industry average. If, according to Shleifer and Vishny  
(1992), the optimal leverage of a firm depends upon the leverage of 
other firms in the industry, then we sh ou ld  expect those firms whose  
leverage is below the industry average (assum ing the industry as a 
whole is operating with the optimal leverage) to be better positioned  
to exploit market opportunities presented w hen competitors liquidate, 
even if it  requires taking on  additional debt. Conversely, firms w hose  
leverage is already above the industry average do not have the sam e  
degree of flexibility. That is, firms w hose leverage is above the in d u s­
try average may not have the flexibility o f choosing between debt or 
equity to finance new  investm ent w ithout paying a premium. Conse­
quently, the expectation is nonnegative retmms for the lower lever­
aged firms and nonpositive returns for the higher leveraged firms.
• We selected the breakpoints for classifying the insider and institu­
tional equity holders by reviewing the cum ulative abnormal returns 
for the three-day announcem ent period interval (discussed in the  
Methodology Section). The abnormal returns for the insider equity 
holders generally were increasing from zero per cent through 28% of 
the total outstanding shares, decreasing from 29% through 38%, 
increasing from 39% through 60%, decreasing from 61% through  
86%, and increasing above 86%. These results are consistent with
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earlier stu d ies (McConnell and Servaes [1990, 1995]) that suggest a  
non-linear relationship between insider holdings and firm perform­
ance, b u t with more than one change-in-sign. Considering the major­
ity of the observations — 184 of 263  — were for insider equity hold­
ings of 28%, or less, we elected to divide the sample into only two 
categories; there are not enough firms in  the sample to warrant 
further subdivision. For those firms w hose insider equity holdings did 
not exceed 28% (coded as “1”), we expect nonnegative returns, and 
nonpositive returns for firms with insider equity holdings above 28% 
(79 firms coded as “0 ”). For a comparison, w e refer to McConnell and 
Servaes who suggested a  breakpoint o f approximately 35% - 40%.
For the institutional equity holders we also observe a non­
linear pattern. In this instance w e observe increasing abnormal 
returns from zero percent through 21% of equity holdings (244 firms 
of 435  total), decreasing abnormal returns from 22% through 33% 
(71 firms in  this range), and vacillating abnormal returns above 33% 
of outstanding shares held by institutional investors. Again, electing  
to segregate the sam ple into only two categories, we coded those  
firms with. 21%, or less, of their equity held by institutions as “ 17 and 
the other firms for w hich data were available as “07 The implication 
is firms w ith 21%, or less, of their equity held by institutions should  
experience nonnegative abnormal returns, and institutional equity 
holdings above 21% (191 firms) should  be associated with non­
positive abnorm al returns.
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• The Trading Volume Index denotes whether the stocks in  a given 
portfolio are thinly or heavily traded. We are concerned with the 
trading volum e of the competitor firms because using daily returns 
introduces potential b ias and inconsistency into the parameter esti­
m ates. (See footnote 22  in the Methodology section for a d iscu ssion  
of this problem). Using the COMPUSTAT® data for com m on shares  
traded on the NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ stock exchanges, w e gene­
rated Appendix F that breaks the trading volume into ten groups for 
each year. To achieve the goal of perfect balance, indicating a repre­
sentative cross-section of firms with respect to stock trading volume, 
the ideal Trading Volume Index w ould be 5 .5000. Although it is not 
reasonable to expect each portfolio to be perfectly balanced, we 
should expect the overall index for all the portfolios to fall w ithin the 
range of 4 .5 -6 .5 . For this sam ple o f 560  firms in 60 portfolios, the 
overall Trading Volume Index is 5 .9 4 8 2  indicating sufficient balance  
to preclude any concerns about bias in  our parameter estim ates.
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IV. Methodology
The methodology u sed  for the analysis of the data supporting this research  
employs tech n iq u es/m eth od s that have been used extensively in a variety  
of academic research published  in the finance literature. These m eth od s/ 
techniques include: E stim ating the Market Model, Com puting the Herfin­
dahl Index, and E stim ating Tobin’s  q. The final portion of this section  
presents the empirical m odel for the macroanalysis of the data.
a. Estim ating th e M arket Model
In financial research w e often are concerned with the m arket’s reaction to 
a specific, well-defined event — a firm announcing its liquidation is the  
event of interest for th is research. An event study, to determ ine if security  
holders realize abnorm al returns related to a specific event, is one o f the  
m ost frequently used  instrum ents for this research. An abnorm al return is 
an observed return th at is  different from the expected return if no event 
had occurred. For th is research we u se  the market m odel to estim ate the 
abnormal returns b ecau se  it h as been used extensively and  is accepted as 
a valid technique for event stu dy research.21
21Recent finance-related research using the market model, for other than corporate 
bankruptcy event studies, includes: Asquith and Mullins (1986), Bartov and Bodnar 
(1994), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990), Chan, Martin, and Kenstnger (1990), Dannand
(continued...)
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A literal interpretation of the m arket model is: the return on any  
security is a linear function of the m arket return plus a random  error term  
that is independent o f the market. In mathematical term s, it is  a bivariate 
m odel that u ses ordinary least squares (OLS) to estim ate the unknown  
parameters. Equation (1) presents the mathematical relationship for the 
m arket model:
•Rid = ot£ + + eu, i = I, 2, . . .  N, (1)
where,
1?  ̂ = the rate o f return for security i, or firm £, on event day d (data 
obtained from CRSP), 
a £ = the intercept coefficient for security i, 
p£ = the slope coefficient for security i,
R ^  = the rate of return for the CRSP equally weighted ind ex  on event 
day d,
£w = the error term  for security i on event day d.
Note that a£ and (5£ are parameters th at vary from security to security and 
8^ is a  random error term . Briefly the assum ptions of OLS are:
• The relationship between and R ^  is linear, as described in 
Equation (1).
^(...continued)
Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986), Fama, Fisher. Jensen, and Roll (1969), Ferreira (1994), 
Gibbons (1982), Jensen and Pugh (1991), Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood (1977), Kim 
and Stulz (1988), Linn and Pinegar (1988), MacKinlay (1987), Mikkelson and Partch (1985 
& 1986), Patell (1976), Pilotte (1992), Tang and Singer (1993), Tehranian, Travlos, and 
Waegelein (1987), and Varma and Chambers (1990). In addition, relevant corporate 
bankruptcy-related research using the market model includes: Aharony and Swary (1983), 
Brown, James, and Mooradian (1993), Clark and Weinstein (1983), Dhillon, Noe, and 
Ramirez (1994), Johnson (1989), Kim and Papaioannou (1994), Lang and Stulz (1992), 
Russel and Branch (1994), and Warner (1977a).
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• The s are nonstochastic variables w hose values are fixed.
• The error term, eM, has zero expected value and constant variance for 
all observations. That is, E(et) = 0  and E(ef) = a2.
• The error term s, e£, are statistically independent. That is, E(z£j) = 0, 
for i * j .
• The error term s are normally distributed.
As was indicated in the data section  of this paper, we u se  daily stock  
returns for the investigation into the intra-industry effects of liquidation  
announcem ents. Using daily returns typically engenders three potential 
problems for the u se  of OLS to analyze th e  data. These problems are bias, 
inconsistency, and  inefficiency of the parameter coefficients. Fortunately, 
the results o f earlier research allow u s  to u se  OLS with confidence to 
estim ate the param eter coefficients w ithout concern with respect to bias, 
inconsistency, or inefficiency of the coefficient estim ates.22
22Looking first at the issue of bias and inconsistency, research has identified two 
sources for this bias and inconsistency. According to the arguments presented by Scholes 
and Williams (1977), Dimson (1979), and Fowler and Rorke (1983), one source of bias is 
nonsynchronous data (sometimes referred to as thin trading). We have nonsynchronous 
data because the trading activity for the individual securities is not coincidental with all 
the trading activity that is used to compute the market returns. With most securities, we 
can characterize the trading activity as discrete, with stochastic time intervals, and with 
prices that reflect actual trades. It is this discontinuity in the trading of the individual 
securities that results in the errors in variables problem. For securities that are traded less 
frequently, the coefficient estimates are biased downward while the coefficient estimates 
are biased upward for the more frequently traded securities. Each of these authors 
developed techniques to adjust the coefficient estimates for this bias.
Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1983a, 1983b) document price 
adjustment delays as a second source of bias in estimating the coefficients for the market 
model parameters. They cite three factors contributing to the price adjustment delays: 1) 
the lag of transaction price adjustments behind quotation price adjustments (Fisher effect);
2) specialists/dealers impeding quotation price adjustments for the purpose of complying 
with exchange stabilization obligations or compensating for inventory imbalances: and
(continued...)
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To estim ate the market model parameters, a  and p, we use the period 
from d  = -2 0 0  to d  = -30 . These event days d  are relative to the date w hen  
the firm announced its liquidation, where d  = 0 is the announcem ent date.
^ ( . . .  continued)
3) individual traders who trade only periodically due to information, decision, and 
transaction costs. They conclude that price-adjustment delays longer than one trading day 
exist. Building upon the work of Scholes and Williams and Dimson, Cohen, Hawawini. 
Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb develop a more robust methodology that adjusts the 
coefficient estimates for both nonsynchronous data and price-adjustment delays.
Given these two sources of bias and the alternate methods for adjusting the 
coefficient estimates, we must select a methodology that will minimize, if not eliminate, the 
bias and inconsistency. For the answer, we turn to the research of Mclnish and Wood 
(1986). They reason these two sources of bias are related because “prices cannot adjust 
to reflect a changed market equilibrium without a transaction occurring." They, Mclnish 
and Wood, test the effectiveness of these proposed beta-adjustment methodologies using 
actual data. They constructed five portfolios with known true betas, and compared the 
results of these alternate beta estimating techniques with OLS.
The five portfolios were similar except for trading frequency. They ranged from 
portfolios with infrequently traded securities to portfolios with frequently traded securities. 
To be completely successfully in eliminating the bias, the procedure used to adjust the 
estimate of beta for each of the portfolios would have to result in a coefficient of 1.0. 
Although all the proposed methods resulted in beta spreads — the difference between the 
high and low beta estimates (in the respective portfolios) for each method — narrower than 
OLS (as much as 29% less), none were successful in eliminating the bias. Of primary 
interest for the research at hand is their finding that the mean beta estimates (for the five 
portfolios) were 1.0 for OLS, Scholes and Williams, and Dimson, but the mean beta esti­
mates for Fowler, Rorke, and Jog and Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb 
were biased upwards. Therefore, assuming the industry portfolios we use are composed 
of a cross-section of firms — that is, not dominated by firms whose securities are traded 
either frequently or infrequently — the resulting OLS estimates should be unbiased.
Further support for using the OLS estimates for the market model is provided by 
Levinsohn, MacKie, and Mason (1990). They conclude that estimating abnormal event-day 
returns with OLS typically generates consistent estimators when the event affects a small 
fraction of all firms in the market.
We now turn our attention to the potential problem of inefficient estimators arising 
from the autocorrelation of data that occurs in time-series data. Autocorrelation, or serial 
correlation, occurs when the errors in one time period carry forward to future time periods. 
That is, we violate the assumption that the error terms are statistically independent 
(EfejEjJ = 0). Brown and Warner (1985), using simulation procedures with actual stock 
return data, investigated the distribution of excess returns and the empirical properties 
of the test statistics. As expected, they found small — but statistically significant — excess 
market model returns (-0.027 and -0.071 for the New York and American stock exchanges, 
respectively) attributable to serial correlation. Interestingly, after adjusting for autocorrela­
tion, they found no dramatic changes in their results. They conclude although there is 
evidence to suggest the test statistic Is improved by using procedures to adjust for 
autocorrelation, the improvements are small and apply only in a couple of special cases. 
These special cases are when the study uses data primarily from the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) or there is a clustering of event days.
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Then, using equation (2), we determ ine if  there were abnorm al returns for 
the other firm s in  the respective industries related to the firm’s liquidation 
announcem ent and estimate the daily abnormal returns for the period from 
d  = -1  to d  = 1 — a  three-day interval.23 The definition of an abnormal 
return for security  i on event day d, (AR^), is: AR^ = R^ — R^, where is 
estimated u sin g  the parameters from the market model a s  follows:
R(d = + PfRmd (2)
The daily average abnormal return (ARd) for each event day d, for N  firms, 
is a  simple average computed as follows:
ARd = ~jy~LARid (3)
The expected value of ARd is  zero for no abnormal performance. To 
evaluate w hether ARd is statistically different from zero, we calculate t- 
statistics u sin g  the average standardized abnormal return  (ASAR). The 
ASAR  is the average of the abnorm al returns (ARd) divided by the sam ple 
standard deviation for each security, s t, as show n in the following equation:
ASARj = (4)
We calculate the sam ple standard deviation for each security, s (, from the 
jRia over the 171-day trading period d  = -2 0 0  through d  = -3 0 , inclusive, 
and standardize each  abnormal return for security i during the three-day
23Clark and Weinstein (1983) document that although we can obtain a precise 
announcement date (bankruptcy filing date in their study), there is ambiguity about when 
the news of each announcement was publicly released and the market’s response. Using 
a window one day before the announcement date through one day after the announcement 
date compensates for the ambiguity related to the actual announcement.
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event period by dividing it by s t. Finally, the t-statistic to te s t  the hypothesis 
that the average standardized abnorm al return equals zero is:
t(ASARd) = ^ i ^  (5)
Given the ambiguity associated with when the new s of the each
announcement was publicly released prompting the market’s response, typ­
ically we are interested in  the cum ulative abnormal returns over two, or 
more, days. For this research we calculate the cumulative abnorm al returns 
(CARj) for each firm t and the cum ulative average abnorm al return [CAAR) 
of a  group of N  firms for the three-day announcem ent period of d  = -1  
through d = 1 as:
CAR, = l A R u  (6)d=~l
CAAR = T A R d (7)d=-l a
As with ARd, the expected value for CAAR is zero for no abnormal 
performance. To test the significance of the abnormal returns for a group 
of firms, the average standardized cum ulative abnormal return (ASCAR} is:
ASCAR ASARd (8)d=-l a
and the corresponding t-statistic is:
tfA S C ^  ■  V l T f d . i d .  +  lJ 1 &  (9)
To determine if differences in the cumulative abnorm al returns 
between two distinct groups of firms are statistically significant, we calcu­
late the mean differences of cum ulative average abnorm al returns 
(MDCAAR) for the three-day announcem ent period in the following manner:
MDCAAR = CAARX -  CAAR^ (10)
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where the subscript ux n represents one group of firms and the subscript “y " 
represents the second group.
The t-statistic to test the hypothesis that the difference in the  
abnormal returns between the two groups equals zero is:
where Nx and Ny represent the number of firms in the respective groups,
b. Com puting the Herfindahl Index
There are a couple of approaches for com puting the Herfindahl Index (H). 
One m ethod converts the relative output for each industry to a  percentage 
from its fractional equivalent (through multiplying each value by 100).24 
Thus, for a  given industry o f five firms with the respective outputs of 15%, 
15%, 19%, 22%, and 29%, w e would compute H  as:
Similarly, if  the industry consisted  of 1,000 firms with the output evenly  
distributed among these firms, . 1% each, we would com pute H  to be:
Given two extremes for the num ber of firms in an industry — either one  
firm or an  infinite number of firms — this method results in an index for 
each industry that is w ithin the following range: 0 < H  < 10,000.
24Copeland and Weston (1988), pp. 688 -  689.
ASCAIL -  ASCARj
( 11 )
H  = 2(15)2 + (19)2 + (22)2 + (29)2 = 2,136
H  -  l ,0 0 0 ( .l)2 = 10
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While this m ethod is acceptable, w e prefer to use the m ethod that 
produces an industry index in  the following range: 0 < H <  1 .0 . This is the 
m ethod used by D ickson  (1992), Farrell and  Shapiro (1990), an d  Lang and 
Stulz (1992). (Referring to the first example, the index would b e  computed 
as follows: H  = 2(.15)2 + (.19)2 + (.22)2 + (.29)2 = .2136.) Therefore, using net 
sa les as a proxy for ou tp u t (O), we first com pute the total ou tp u t (sales) for 
an industry (as defined by the four-digit SIC).
0 Sjc = i = 1, 2, . . . N, (12)
where,
Oslc = the total ou tp u t (sales) for the industry
0 £ = the outp ut (sales) for firm i.
From these data  w e then compute th e  Herfindahl Index for each 
industry in the following manner:
We compute th is  index for each year and for all SICs (industries) in 
COMPUSTAT. This en su res the determ ination o f either high or low  concen­
tration25 for each industry  is based upon all available information, and if 
there is a  change from the prior year in the num ber of firms in  a n  industry, 
or its concentration, th e  index for the industry concentration is b ased  upon 
the current year’s data. Appendix B is a  table listing all SICs in  COMPU­
STAT and their Index for each year.
25Classifying a specific industiy as either high or low concentration is relative to the 
median ffac of all industries for a given year. Thus, a  highly concentrated industry is one 
whose index is higher than the median Herfindahl Index for the year in question.
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c. E stim ating Tobin’s q
Given the definition of Tobin’s q as the ratio of the m arket value of a  com­
pany’s  debt and equity to the current replacement c o st o f its assets, we 
write the literal equivalent of the m athem atical form ula as:
Q m arket value o f  d e b t and eauitu  
estim ated  replacem ent cost o f a s s e ts
Considering the previously d iscu ssed  difficulties in calculating 
Tobin’s q  according to the formula, there have been various studies that 
attempted to identify proxies for the firm characteristics the formula pur­
ports to m easure. Pilotte (1992), for example, found a  significant positive 
relationship between q  and the abnorm al returns for debt offerings. (He 
notes this contrasts w ith Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) finding no signifi­
cant relationship betw een announcem ent period abnorm al returns and the 
q ratio for equity offerings.) He also found a significant positive relationship 
between a  firm’s  P /E  ratio and the abnorm al returns. This similarity in the 
relationship for q to abnormal returns and abnormal returns to the P /E  
ratio weakly suggests the P /E  ratio m ay be used as a  proxy for Tobin’s q. 
Solt and Statm an (1989) found a positive relationship between Tobin’s q 
and the price-eam ings ratio, and therefore conclude th e  P /E  ratio serves 
as a proxy for growth opportunities.
U sing the P /E  ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s q, or a  firm’s  growth oppor­
tunities, is  not w ithout its problems. For example, if a  firm has negative 
earnings, the P /E  ratio is m eaningless and not published in the Wall Street
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Journal Furthermore, if  a  firm has extremely low earnings, fractions of a 
cent per share, the resulting P /E  ratio may be unrealistically high. There­
fore, using the P /E  ratio as a  proxy for Tobin’s q  m ay not provide the 
precise m easurem ent of a  firm’s under-/overinvestm ent characteristic 
necessary to differentiate accurately between the two groups.
Chung and Pruitt (1994) provide a procedure that overcomes the 
traditional obstacles for estim ating q in terms of data  requirements and 
computational effort. Their procedure relies upon data that is available from 
the COMPUSTAT industrial file. Using OLS and the period of 1978 -  1987, 
they compare their approximation for q with the more theoretically correct 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) procedure for com puting q. While Chung and 
Pruitt’s approximation typically overestimated the value for q (as deter­
mined from the Lindenberg and Ross procedure) w hen  looking at randomly 
selected firms, the coefficients for their approximate q ranged from a low of 
0.917 to a h igh of 0 .993, and in  seven of the ten years studied, the coeffi­
cients exceeded 0 .940. Moreover, the R2 value for their regressions was 
never lower th an  0.966. That is, at least 96.6% of th e  variability in q was 
explained by Chung and Pruitt’s approximation.
Given the difficulties associated with the other m ethods for comput­
ing or estim ating q, and considering the precision and consistency of Chung 
and Pruitt’s procedure, we u se  their methodology for approximating q for 
each of the firms in the sam ple. Their formula for approxim ating q is:
.. MVSP + PS + DEBT
q =  y a -------------- i 14'
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where,
MVSP = the product of a firm’s  share price and the num ber of common 
stock  shares outstanding,
PS = the liquidating value o f the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, 
DEBT = the value of the firm’s  short-term  liabilities net of its short­
term  assets, plus the book value of the firm ’s long-term debt, 
TA = the book value of the total a ssets of the firm.
We com pare the approximate q for each  firm w ith  the m edian q value 
for its respective industry (using all firms in  COMPUSTAT) to determine if 
a given firm is above, or below, the industry median. Appendix C provides 
the industry-m edian value of q com puted using C hung and Pruitt’s  
procedure.
d. Em pirical Model
Although th e  abnorm al returns estim ated from the m arket model may be  
employed to te s t  for significant differences between various subsets of the  
sample, u sin g  equations (10) and (11), one also m ay u se  the abnormal 
returns to construct a  m athem atical model to test w hether certain firm- 
specific characteristics are causing the abnormal returns. As a precursor 
to the em ploym ent of equations (10) and (11) to test for the magnitude and  
significance o f the differences of the respective su b sets of the competitor 
firms, we first u se  the OLS model show n in equation (15) as a  complemen­
tary tool to identify the firm-specific characteristics related to the abnormal
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returns. T hus, equation (15) identifies the variables of significance and 
equations (10) and (11) provide the additional details.
The firm -specific characteristics, previously discussed in  the data 
section, are: Leverage, Tobin’s  q, the Herfindahl Index, the B ook Equity to 
Market Equity ratio, the fraction of com m on stock  owned institutional 
investors, and  the fraction of com m on stock  owned by corporate insiders 
(officers and directors). The form ulation of the m odel is:
CARf = + %2Ql + + + ^5^ic + 6̂̂ 21 + U£ (15)
where,
CARj = Cum ulative Abnormal Return — for event days - 1 ,0 ,  and 1 — 
for firm i computed u sin g  equation (6).
Lt = Leverage rating for firm I Lt = 0  for firms whose leverage ratios 
are above the industry m ean and “1” for firms below  the indus­
try m ean. From this form ulation w e expect positive coefficients 
for L, signifying th at competitors with lower th an  industry- 
average leverage experience nonnegative abnorm al returns 
w h en  a firm announces its liquidation. (For the liquidating 
firm s, 50 of the firms were above their respective industry’s 
average for leverage and only 11 were below the industry 
average.)
Qf = Tobin’s  q rating for firm t  Qt = 0  for firms w hose computed q 
valu es are below the m edian value for the industry and “1” for 
firm s above the industry m edian. Similar to L, w e expect the
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coefficient for Q to be positive. That is, underinvested firms —  
firms w hose q value is greater than the industry median — are 
better poised to expand their capacity if  necessary to take 
advantage of the liquidation announcem ent than their over- 
invested brethren. (There was insufficient data to calculate the 
q ratio of any of the liquidating firms.)
Ht = Herfindahl Index rating for firm fs industry. Ht = 0 for firms 
whose industry ratings are below the m edian value for all 
industries (that is, a  highly competitive industry), and “1” for 
firms whose industry ratings are above the m edian value for all 
industries. If the competitive effect is present, we expect to 
obtain a positive coefficient for H.
Bt = Book Equity to Market Equity rating for firm I Bt = 0 for firms 
whose ratios are greater than the industry m edian and “1” 
otherwise. If, as Fama and French (1995) found, a  low BE:ME 
ratio signals strong earnings, and if investors appropriately 
consider this information at the time o f the liquidation 
announcement, the coefficient for this variable also should be 
positive. (There were seven  liquidating firms w ith a low BE:ME 
ratio, but each of these firms w as in a concentrated industry 
according to their industry’s Herfindahl Index.) Furthermore, 
there were insufficient data in COMPUSTAT/CRSP files to form 
portfolios of competitors for these seven firms.
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S K = The fraction (decimal equivalent) of common stock owned by  
institutional investors o f  firm L Firms whose institutional 
ownership of equity did n o t  exceed 21% were coded as “ 1,” and  
the rem aining firms were coded as “0 .” Based upon the pre­
sum ption that institutional ownership implies an increased  
level o f shareholder governance, we expect to obtain a  nonneg­
ative coefficient for this variable.
S2£ = The fraction (decimal equivalent) of common stock owned by  
corporate officers and m em bers of the board of directors of firm 
L Firms with insider ownership of 28%, or less, were coded as 
“1” and the other firms a s  “0 .” Given the results of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Stulz (1988), and McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) that su ggest a curvilinear relationship between  
value (or q) and insider ownership, and inferring similar resu lts  
hold for the abnormal returns, we do not expect to obtain  
statistically  significant resu lts  for the overall sample. However, 
for th e  su b set of competitors whose insiders own 28% or less 
of the com m on stock w e expect to obtain a positive coefficient, 
but a  negative relationship w hen the insiders own more than  
28% o f the common stock.
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V. Empirical Results
a. The Verdict on Contagion and C om petitive E ffects
Our initial objective is to determine w hether contagion a n d /o r  competitive 
effects em anate from liquidation announcem ents and m anifest themselves 
in the abnorm al returns of the com petitor firms. We m ake th is determina­
tion by using  equation (7) to com pute the cumulative average abnormal 
return of the 5 6 0  rival firms for the three-day anno u n cem en t period, and 
equation (9) to compute the t-statistic for these data. For these 560  
competitor firms, we have a cum ulative average abnorm al return of -. 11% 
(the cum ulative average abnormal returns were positive for 248  firms, and 
negative for 3 1 2  firms). This negative abnorm al return, w hich  is the sum  
of contagion and competitive effects and is significant a t the .05 level (t- 
statistic = -1 .9918), indicates that overall there are intra-industry contagion 
effects associated  with corporate liquidation announcem ents. That is, for 
the overall sam ple, the data have spoken and it is the consensus that 
contagion effects dominate any com petitive effects that m ay be present.
Having established the presence of the contagion effect, it is useful 
to compare th ese  results with earlier research investigating this effect. 
Table III, on th e  following page, provides th is comparison. Although there
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are som e variations in  the sam ples and their associated abnorm al returns, 
there is the consistency of significantly negative abnorm al returns in each  
of the studies that reinforces the pervasiveness of contagion effects. This 
overall agreement bolsters the argument that the m arket interprets bank­
ruptcy and liquidation announcem ents as a signal of problems more appro­
priately classified a s industry-wide rather than  firm-specific.
Table III















This research Liquidation -.11% .05 60 47
Akhigbe-Madura (1995) Liquidation -.23% .10 91 59
Kim-Papaioannou (1994) Bankruptcy -2.32% .os3 92 -
Lang-Stulz (1992) Bankruptcy -.85% .01“ 59 41
a. Although the presentation of the previous studies' results allowed us to compare the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the three-day announcement period, they do 
not permit a  direct comparison of the significance levels for the overall three-day period. 
Consequently, the significance level shown is an approximation.
Although th ese  results reveal the presence of the contagion effect for 
the overall sample, they do not eliminate the possibility of the competitive 
effect for certain segm ents of the sample. In the earlier studies, Lang and  
Stulz and Akhigbe and Madura detected the presence o f competitive effects, 
bu t Kim and Papaioannou did not. Both Lang and Stulz and Akhigbe and  
Madura report the competitive effect w hen the announcing firms (either 
bankruptcy or liquidation) were in less competitive (that is, more concen­
trated) industries, or the liquidating firm had m onopoly power, respectively.
Using the Herfindahl index to differentiate the competitive from the 
concentrated industries, we computed the abnorm al returns and t-statistic
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for the 32  competitors in concentrated industries. (If the liquidating firm is 
in  a concentrated industry, th en  its intra-industiy rivals also m ust be in 
the sam e concentrated industry.) Our results do not support the earlier 
research of Lang and Stulz or Akhigbe and Madura. Specifically, the 
average abnormal return for the 32  rivals w as 1.01% (12 positive and 20  
negative), but the t-statistic w as insignificant (0.94333).
We attribute this contradiction in resu lts to the criterion Lang and 
Stulz used  for qualifying their announcing firms and the m ethod employed 
by Akhigbe and Madura for determ ining m onopoly power. As previously 
noted, Lang and Stulz required the announcing firm to have liabilities in 
excess o f $120 million to ensure the presence o f industry-wide effects. We 
did not impose this constraint upon our sample. Accordingly, it is possible 
the liquidating firms in our sam ple would have less im pact on intra­
industry rivals than the bankruptcy-announcing firms of Lang and Stulz’s 
research. This reasoning is reinforced by the m agnitude and significance 
of the abnormal returns for the contagion effect show n in  Table III for Lang 
and Stulz compared with the resu lts of this study.
Akhigbe and Madura u sed  the market value of the liquidating firm 
relative to other firms in the industry to determ ine m onopoly power. They 
acknowledge the limitations o f this method and also u se  sa les to estimate 
monopoly power obtaining sim ilar results with both  m ethods. Interestingly, 
Lang and Stulz and our research used sales to com pute the Herfindahl 
index, b u t interpret its use  differently than Akhigbe and Madura. Whereas,
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we u se  sa les as a proxy for output in  the com parison of industries to 
determ ine whether an industry is competitive or concentrated, they u se  
sa les to compare firms w ithin  their respective industries. We credit th is  
disparity associated with th e  competitive effect obtained by Akhigbe and  
M adura to the different perspective they used for exam ining the data.
b. T esting the Empirical M odel
With resolution of the question  about contagion and competitive effects 
behind us, we now turn our attention to the factors th at m ay be contribut­
ing to these results. To exam ine the specific factors of interest, we u se  the  
empirical m odel presented a s  equation (15). Testing our full model presents 
a dilem m a because it requires u s  to discard the m ajority of our sample due  
to the lim ited data available to classify the Insider and Institutional equity  
holding variables. To skirt this impediment and capture the m axim um  
inform ation from the data, in  addition to the full m odel we also test three 
variations of it. Table IV, on page 73, presents the resu lts of these tests.
Before discussing the different variables o f the model, we should  
determ ine if there is a potential for bias in our coefficient estim ates. To 
identify whether the coefficient estim ates are b iased as a result of either  
th in  or heavy trading of th e  individual stocks, w e com puted the Trading 
Volume Index for each iteration of testing. The index, show n at the bottom  
of Table IV, reveals the sam ples used  for each of th e  tests  are within the  
m oderate range for the trading volum e (that is, w ithin the range of 4 .5 0 0 0
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Results of Estimating the Empirical Model: 












Herfindahl index (H) 
BE:ME ratio (B) 
Institutional equity (S,) 
Insider equity (S2)




















No. of Observations 560 435 263 245
Trading Volume Index 5.9482 6.2253 5.6654 5.8449
Probability > F 0.1181 0.1934 0.0618 0.0747
R2 0.0060 0.0056 0.0212 0.0227
v i
00
-  6.5000). Accordingly, we conclude none of the resu lts are biased due to 
the relative volum e of trading for the firms in each variation of the model.
A review of Table IV reveals the only variable that is significant, for 
either the full m odel or any variations thereof, is leverage; it is positive as 
theorized. Competitors with leverage less than their respective industry- 
averages realize positive returns upon a liquidation announcem ent while 
the more highly leveraged rivals experience negative abnormal returns.
Considering the presence of the contagion effect, which su ggests  
industry-wide rather than firm-specific problems, the significant coefficient 
for the leverage variable is a m anifestation of the m arkets’s agreement with  
Baxter’s (1967) argum ent that a  high degree of leverage increases the prob­
ability of bankruptcy which increases the riskiness o f the firm’s future cash  
flows. These results also are consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) 
conclusions that: 1) the optimal leverage of a firm depends upon the lever­
age of other firms in  the industry (there may be an optimal debt capacity  
for the industry even if there isn ’t one for individual firms), and 2) optim al 
debt levels m ay change over time.
In addition to Leverage, for each of the model variations there is one 
other variable (but n ot the sam e in  all variations) that falls ju st outside the 
critical value for statistical significance at the . 10 level. In Variation I it is 
the Herfindahl index (p-value = 0.1454), Institutional equity (p-value = 
0.1358) in Variation II, and BE:ME ratio (p-value = 0 .1302) in Variation III.
From the results shown in  Table IV, our conclusion is the allocation  
of equity in the competitor firms, either insider or institutional ownership,
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is not a  factor in determining the m arket’s reaction to a voluntary corporate 
liquidation announcem ent. While th ese results may answer the question  
from the rival’s perspective, it does not provide any insight w ith respect to 
distribution of equity in the liquidating firms. It is to this viewpoint that we 
shift our attention.
c. The Liquidating Firms’ C haracteristics and the Market’s R esponse 
for th e Com petitor’s Stock
Notwithstanding the outcome of the empirical model that indicates leverage 
is the only characteristic (of the ones we examined) of the rival firms that 
contributes to the market’s  reaction to a  liquidation announcem ent, these  
results tell u s nothing about the characteristics of the liquidating firm that 
may influence the market’s  reaction for the rival firms. Appropriately, we 
extend our analysis to investigate whether the characteristics o f the liquid­
ating firms m ay affect the results.
Table V, on the following page, presents the results of this analysis. 
The cum ulative average abnormal returns and t-statistic for each  category 
were com puted, as before, u sin g  equations (7) and (9), respectively. To com ­
pute the difference between two categories with the accom panying t-statis­
tic, we u se  equations (10) and (11), respectively. In addition to Leverage, 
which —  as w as the leverage of the rivals — is a significant factor in 
explaining the abnormal returns of the competitors, the other significant 
factors of the liquidating firms are: Herfindahl index, and percentage of
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Table V 
Characteristics of the Liquidating Firms and  the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of the Competitors

































































































"0" 50 478 222 256 -0.07% -1.28017 -
Leverage ••r 11 82 26 56 -0.38% -2.11433 .05
Difference Between "0” and 1": 0.31% 1.46354 -
"0" 0
Tobin’s q •T’ 0
Difference Between "0" and ’ 1":
"0" 44 528 236 292 -0.18% -2.28350 .05
Herfindahl index ”1" 25 32 12 20 1.01% 0.94333 -
Difference Between "0" and ' 1": -1.19% -1.46184 -
"0" 62 560 248 312 -0.11% -1.99180 .05
BE:ME ratio "i" 7 0
Difference Between "0" and ' 1”: -0.11% -1.99180 .05
"0” 7 68 23 45 -0.72% -2.66380 .01
Institutional Equity ,.r 26 200 94 106 0.21% 1.00637 -
Difference Between "0” and ' 1": -0.93% -2.80810 .01
’O’’ 15 67 26 41 -0.50% -0.99678 -
Insider Equity 'T 13 170 74 96 0.04% -0.74741 -
Difference Between ’’0" a n d ' 1": -0.54% -0.44681
equity held by Institutional investors. Although the BE:ME ratio for the 
liquidating firm appears as a significant factor, because we were unable to 
form portfolios for the seven liquidating firms with a low BE:ME ratio (coded
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as “1”), the h igh BE:ME ratio category (coded as “0 ”) contains all 5 6 0  o f the 
rival firms. Consequently, w e do not view this result w ith  the consideration  
it might otherw ise deserve. Additionally, there are no data in the table for 
Tobin’s q, b ecau se  — as d iscu ssed  in  the Data Section  — there were insuf­
ficient data in  COMPUSTAT to compute this ratio for an y  of the liquidating  
firms. Finally, the percentage of equity in the liquidating firm held by 
insiders w as not a  factor in  explaining the abnormal returns of rivals.
These resu lts suggest the m arket is less alarm ed w hen a firm w hose  
leverage is above the industry average (coded as “0 ”) liquidates than  it is 
when lower leveraged firms liquidate. It is as though the market interprets 
the liquidation o f the higher leveraged firms as expected events, con se­
quently there are no significant abnormal returns for the competitor firms 
because the m arket has already compensated for the event. In contrast to 
the rival firms for which the abnormal returns were positive w hen their 
leverage was less  than their respective industry's average, the abnormal 
returns of the rivals are significantly negative w hen it is a lower-leveraged 
firm that announces its voluntary liquidation.
The significant results associated with the liquidating firms that are 
in competitive industries — their Herfindahl index is coded as "0” — is con­
sistent with the verdict for contagion effects obtained for the overall sam ple. 
That is, w hen a firm in a competitive industry liquidates, the m arket’s 
negative reaction reflects its interpretation of the event as the revelation of 
an industry-wide, rather than firm-specific, problem.
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An interesting resu lt is the abnormal returns of the rival firms 
associated with the liquidating firms’ institutional ownership of equity. 
W hen institutions held 21%, or less, o f the liquidating firm’s  equity (coded 
as “1”), the abnormal returns for the competitors w ere nonnegative. But, 
w hen institutions held more than 21%, the com petitors experienced signif­
icantly negative abnorm al returns. Furthermore, the difference between the  
two groups was significant. An interpretation for these resu lts is the m arket 
does not expect institutions collectively holding 21% or less of a firm’s  
equity to exert sufficient governance over a  firm to prevent its demise. Con­
versely, when the collective ownership of equity by institutions is greater 
than 21%, the market presum es the firm is better-m anaged as a result o f  
the institutional oversight; their subsequent liquidation is an indication 
that even the better-m anaged firms are susceptible to the problems con­
fronting the industry.
Perhaps one of th e  more perplexing questions related to these results 
is their contradiction o f Akhigbe and Madura’s conclusions. They, conclude 
(as reported in Akhigbe and Madura’s Table 8) th a t Tobin’s q of the 
liquidating firm is a significant variable in  explaining the abnormal returns 
of rival firms related to liquidation announcem ents, b u t Leverage of the  
liquidating firm is not a  significant variable. Our resu lts for both Leverage 
and Tobin’s q challenge this conclusion. Notably, for our sam ple, is the lack  
of data in COMPUSTAT required to calculate Tobin’s  q  for the liquidating 
firms. Since the two stud ies have overlapping periods for the sample of
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liquidating firms, it  is  puzzling that they  had sufficient data to compute the 
q ratio when th is research did not.
d. R evisiting M cConnell and Servaes’ Theory on Insider Equity and 
Low-Growth Firm s
As a final exercise, we examine McConnell and Servaes’ (1990, 1995) 
supposition that insider ownership should  be more positively correlated 
with abnormal returns for lower-growth than higher-growth competitors. 
Focusing on the com petitors’ abnormal returns, the market returns for low- 
growth firms (Tobin’s  q = “0 ”) with insider ownership greater than 28% 
(Insider equity = “0 ”) were non-negative (0.0025), but not significant. For 
the high-growth firms (Tobin’s q = “1” and Insider Equity = “0 ”) abnormal 
returns were non-positive (-0.0041) and insignificant. The decisive measure 
is the difference betw een the two groups: it w as positive (0.0065) at the . 10 
level of significance. We interpret th ese  resu lts as consisten t with their 
theory.
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VI. Summary and Conclusions
The overall sam ple of 560 rival firms experienced abnormal returns of 
11%, significant at the .05  level, arising from  the announcem ent of a 
voluntary corporate liquidation. These results are consisten t with earlier 
stud ies that docum ented the existence of intra-industry contagion effects 
w hen a firm announces either its bankruptcy or liquidation. W hen we 
continued w ith the analysis to consider only th o se  firms in  concentrated 
industries, we were unable to substantiate th e  presence of competitive 
effects that som e, but not all, o f the previous stu d ies observed.
Classifying our sam ple of liquidating firm s, as w ell as their intra­
industry competitors, according to several characteristics allowed refining  
the analysis to focus on specific factors contributing to these contagion  
effects. The characteristics u sed  were: Leverage, Tobin’s q, the Herfindahl 
index, the Book Equity-to-Market Equity ratio, th e  percentage of equity held  
by institu tional investors, and  the percentage of equity held by inside  
owners.
Looking first at the com petitors, the only factor that was significant 
in explaining their abnormal returns was their Leverage. Rivals whose lever­
age w as less than their respective industry’s average experienced positive
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abnorm al returns, as was theorized, while the more highly leveraged com­
petitors experienced negative returns. This suggests the m arket considers 
the lower leveraged rivals to b e  better positioned to exploit an y  opportuni­
ties th a t m ay arise from the liquidation.
Shifting our attention to the characteristics of the liquidating firms, 
several factors emerged as significant in  explaining the abnorm al returns 
of the competitors. They are Leverage, the Herfindahl index, and the per­
centage o f equity held by institutional investors. For the insignificant 
factors, w e note: 1) there were insufficient data available from COMPUSTAT 
to estim ate Tobin’s q for any o f the liquidating firms w hich stymied any 
further analysis; 2) there were insufficient data from COMPUSTAT and/or  
CRSP to construct portfolios o f competitor firms for those liquidating firms 
w hose BE:ME ratios were below  their respective industry-m edian values; 
and 3) there were no significant returns for the competitor firm s related to 
the level o f equity held by insiders of the liquidating firms.
For the liquidating firms, there is a  reversal in the role leverage plays 
in explaining the abnormal returns of the competitors. That is, instead of 
the positive abnormal return that w as found for the com petitors whose 
leverage w as less  than the industry-average, there is a  negative abnormal 
return for the rivals when the liquidating firm’s leverage is  le ss  than the 
industry-average. The abnormal returns were nonpositive w h en  the liqui­
dating firm s’ leverage was above their industry’s average level suggesting 
the m arket w as not surprised b y  the their liquidation announcem ents.
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With respect to the Herfindahl index, we find significantly negative 
abnormal returns w hen the liquidating firm, as well as its competitors, is 
in a competitive industry while the returns were nonnegative for the firms 
in concentrated industries. These resu lts are consistent with the overall 
finding of significant contagion effects and no significant competitive effects.
Finally, w e found a  significantly negative return for the rival firms 
when institutional investors held m ore than 21% of the liquidating firm’s 
equity. W hen the institutional investors held 21% or less of the liquidating 
firm’s equity, the competitors experienced nonnegative returns.
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Firms Announcing their Liquidation
Firm Announcing Liquidation SIC Date Firm Announcing Liquidation SIC Date
AMERICAN BIOMEDICAL CORP 8060 0 1 /2 7 /7 7 HOUSE OF RONNIE 2300 03/16 /81
AMERICAN CONTROLLED INDS 2670 0 1 /2 9 /8 6 INTERPOOL LTD 7350 0 3 /1 4 /7 8
AMERICAN MFG CO 2200 0 9 /1 9 /7 9 1NTL INCOME PROPERTY INC 6798 0 2 /1 6 /9 0
AMERICAN MUSIC STORES INC 5900 1 2 /19 /75 KAISER INDUSTRIES CORP 3312 0 4 /2 1 /7 7
AMERICAN RECREATION GROUP 5040 1 2 /0 9 /7 5 KEYSTONE INDUSTRIES INC 3443 0 6 /0 2 /7 7
AMERIFIN CORP 6799 0 9 /0 1 /8 3 KIRBY INDUSTRIES INC 4400 0 5 /0 8 /7 5
AMTERRE DEVELOPMENT 6512 0 6 /0 9 /7 8 LEAR PETROLEUM PARTNERS -LP 9995 0 2 /0 4 /8 8
ANTA CORP 3350 0 3 /0 8 /8 4 LEISURE LODGES INC 8050 0 7 /1 5 /7 5
APCO OIL CORP 2911 0 3 /0 3 /7 6 LODGE & SHIPLEY CO 3541 0 1 /0 3 /8 6
AUSTRAL OIL INC 1311 0 3 /2 2 /7 7 MANSFIELD TIRE & RUBBER CO 2400 0 4 /1 6 /8 0
BARBER OIL CORP 1220 0 8 /3 1 /7 9 MCKEON CONSTRUCTION 1531 0 9 /2 6 /8 0
BAYUK CIGARS INC 2100 0 6 /2 2 /8 1 MERCHANTS INC 4210 0 4 /0 9 /7 9
CANAL-RANDOLPH CORP 6512 0 3 /1 4 /8 5 MICROWAVE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 3674 0 7 /1 0 /7 9
CHC CORP 2741 0 2 /1 0 /7 7 MIDWAY AIRLINES INC 4512 11/29/91
COBURN OPTICAL INDS INC 3827 0 3 /1 7 /7 5 NATIONAL CSS INC 7372 0 3 /2 7 /7 9
COLUMBIA CORP 2400 1 1 /2 6 /7 5 OKC CORP 2911 0 7 /2 7 /7 9
CONROY INC 2510 0 8 /1 9 /8 3 OVERSEAS NATIONAL AIRWAYS 4522 0 7 /3 1 /7 8
CONSOLIDATED ENERGY PRT -LP 1311 0 7 /1 2 /8 9 PANEX INDUSTRIES INC 2340 0 7 /2 7 /8 4
CONSOLIDATED REFINING 3350 0 9 /1 7 /8 1 PASCO INC 2911 0 5 /2 2 /7 5
COOK UNITED INC 5331 1 1 /25 /87 PENTON INC 2721 0 3 /3 0 /7 6
COTT CORP 2086 0 9 /2 6 /7 8 R H MEDICAL SERVICES 3851 0 8 /2 8 /8 0
COWLES COMMUNICATIONS 4833 0 3 /3 0 /8 2 RAYMOND INDUSTRIES INC 3572 0 2 /2 4 /8 4
DAMON GROUP INC 8071 0 6 /2 2 /9 3 REEVES TELECOM CORP 4832 0 1 /1 9 /7 9
DE JUR AMSCO CORP-CL A 5080 1 2 /31 /76 ROSSMOOR CORP 6552 04 /14 /81
DYNEER CORP 3714 0 9 /0 5 /8 5 SARGENT INDUSTRIES INC-DEL 3713 0 7 /1 9 /7 8
ENERGY OIL INC 1311 1 0 /22 /86 SILVERCREST CORP 2451 0 3 /0 6 /8 9
GABRIEL INDUSTRIES INC 3944 0 5 /0 8 /7 8 SOUTHERN CALIF FIRST NATL CP 6021 0 5 /1 5 /7 5
GENERAL GROWTH PROP 6798 0 9 /2 4 /8 5 ST JOHNSBURY TRUCKING CO 4210 0 6 /2 7 /7 5
GENERAL INTERIORS CORP 2510 0 4 /1 8 /7 5 STRATFORD OF TEXAS INC 5190 0 1 /1 0 /7 7
GOLD MEDALLION CORP 5122 0 6 /05 /81 TANNETICS INC 3585 0 2 /0 4 /8 3
GROSS TELECASTING 4833 0 3 /2 1 /8 4 TELECOR INC 7359 10/30 /78
GULF UNITED CORP 6311 0 3 /3 1 /8 3 TENNA CORP 3663 12/05/79
HANDYMAN CORP 5211 12/01 /86 UNITY BUYING SERVICE 5961 0 9 /1 5 /8 3


















The Herfindahl Index by Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94




1000 0.4593 0.4470 0.4227 0.3979 0,4216 0.3917 0.4194 0.4447 0.4459 
1040 0.4080 0.4571 0.3878 0.4461 0.3858 0.3493 0.3748 0,3274 0.2940 
1090 0.5289 0,5792 0.6830 0.5052 0.5385 0.6517 0,6674 0,6460 0.8478 
1220 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
1221
1311 0.4480 0.4104 0.4027 0.3813 0.4070 0,3897 0.3830 0.4527 0,4569
1381 0.1863 0.1821 0.1729 0.1577 0.1572 0,1617 0.1530 0.1517 0.1551
1382 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7350 0.7749 0.8403 0.8788
1389 0.8058 0.8114 0.8161 0.8733 0.9079 0.8990 0.8846 0.8869 0.8948
1400 0,4150 0.3861 0.3710 0,3563 0.3540 0.3590 0.4081 0.3875 0.4008
1531 0.1581 0.1588 0.1558 0,1543 0.1518 0.1514 0.1631 0.1579 0,1403
1540 0.3965 0,3902 0.3777 0,3652 0.3764 0,3695 0.3681 0.3699 0,3716
1600 0.4578 0.4485 0.4446 0.4343 0.4307 0.3789 0,3500 0,3469 0.3329
1623 0.2927 0.3009 0.3778 0.3408 0.3297 0.3304 0,3345 0,3190 0,3422
1700 0.4843 0.4406 0.4785 0.5741 0.5898 0.5938 0.5987 0.5491 0.5075
1731 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2000 0,2252 0.2185 0.2208 0.2169 0.2113 0.2018 0.1943 0,1848 0.1764
2011 0.3457 0.3684 0.3486 0.3876 0.4274 0.4168 0.3983 0,3722 0.3837
2013 0.4271 0.4311 0.4190 0.4175 0.4314 0.5543 0.6613 0.7879 0.7930
2015 0.3736 0.3678 0.3568 0.3517 0.3679 0.3666 0,3775 0.5645 0.4728
2020 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2024 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9426
2030 0,4671 0,4615 0.4549 0.4520 0,4539 0,4547 0,4553 0,4453 0.4366
2033 0.5101 0.5097 0.5077 0.5120 0.5293 0.5269 0,5218 0.5441 0.5447
2040 0.2175 0,2172 0.2183 0.2174 0.2177 0.2129 0.2131 0.2126 0.2131
2050 0.4406 0.4244 0.4100 0.4178 0,4173 0,4156 0.4116 0.4010 0.3958
2052 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2060 0.3255 0.3420 0.3568 0.3587 0.4026 0.3970 0.3951 0,4213 0.4290
0.4369 0.3749 0,4124 0,3856 0.3767 0,3818 0,3844 0.3819 0.3424 0.3403 0.3494
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000
1.0000 0.6100 0.6184 0.5727 0.5834 0,5421 0.5778 0.5923 0.6599 0.3790
0.4553 0.3108 0.3170 0.3870 0,3314 0.3391 0.3341 0.3221 0.3038 0.2988 0,3165
0.2915 0.2179 0,1156 0.1121 0.1005 0,1046 0.1036 0.0945 0.0970 0.0877 0.0869
0.9157 0.9704 0.9295 0.9625 0,9366 0.9665 0.9686 0.8944 0.8595 0.8417 1,0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6201 0.5803 0,5479 0.5113 0,5076 0.3360 0.2668 0.2710
1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0,3831 0.3195 0,3843 0.3297 0.3801 0.3482 0.3234 0.1737 0.1419 0.1149 0.1364
0,1594 0.1369 0,1444 0.1395 0.1221 0.1137 0.1123 0.1102 0.0948 0.0998 0,1021
0.8051 0.8091 0.8126 0.6879 0,6272 0,3890 0.3680 0.2734 0.2688 0.7046 0.6501
0.8902 0,8993 0.8958 0.8910 0.8901 0.8622 0.7457 0,7336 0.7428 0,7170 0,7423
0.2886 0,2839 0.2688 0.2375 0.2411 0.2207 0.2545 0,2543 0.2216 0.2023 0,1916
0,1255 0.1048 0,0812 0.0768 0.0851 0.0883 0,0918 0,0970 0.0880 0.0850 0,0773
0.3683 0.3783 0.3843 0.3993 0,4064 0,4058 0.3992 0.3677 0.3654 0.3717 0.6007
0.3384 0,3250 0,3240 0.3034 0,3186 0,3351 0.3342 0.2814 0.2410 0,2515 0.3331
0.3405 0,3154 0.2712 0.2396 0.2560 0.3318 0.3325 0.2428 0.1758 0.2406 0.2422
0.4538 0.3164 0.3696 0,3558 0.4191 0.4617 0,3869 0,3341 0,3137 0.3344 0.3816
1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
0.1727 0.1559 0.1552 0.1576 0.1548 0,1741 0.1617 0.1641 0.1676 0.1648 0.3515
0,3779 0.3785 0,3898 0.3838 0.3985 0,4314 0,4467 0,4579 0.4545 0.4633 0.6771
0.5826 0.6436 0.5316 0,4463 0.4058 0.4529 0.4898 0.4847 0.5104 0.6074 0.4395
0.4530 0,4418 0,4522 0.3521 0.3248 0.3406 0,4203 0,3756 0.3589 0.3628 0.4039
1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.5421 0.6104 0.5887 0,6295 0,7137 0,7409 0.7588 1,0000
0.7450 0.5224 0.4748 0.4390 0.4025 0.3959 0.4217 0.3730 0.3831 0.4047 0,4160
0.4348 0.4332 0.4423 0.4369 0.4363 0.4319 0.4384 0.4464 0,4461 0.4418 0,8205
0.5398 0.5304 0.5009 0.5028 0,5043 0.5117 0.5096 0.5204 0.5196 0,5546 1.0000
0,2022 0.2058 0.1995 0.1974 0.1945 0,1966 0,1986 0.1976 0,1985 0,1837 0,2264
0,3884 0.3840 0.3927 0,4006 0,4108 0,4096 0.4059 0,4070 0,3307 0,3471 0.5055
1.0000 0.9046 0.8788 0,8019 0,7471 0,7213 0,7076 0,6848 0.6616 0.8470 0,8448























2090 0.4556 0.3628 0.3965 0.3767 0.4036 0.4271 0.4670 0,4866 0.4784 0,4680 0.4839 0.4876 0.4813 0.5101 0.5035 0,5193 0.5281 0.5385 0.5591 0.6422
2100 0.5600 0 .5585 0.5486 0.5426 0.5330 0,5148 0.5088 0 .5040 0.5304 0.5646 0.5477 0,5370 0.5156 0,5127 0.5075 0.5012 0,5020 0.5001 0.5021 0.7730
2111 0.5124 0,5271 0.5312 0.5202 0,5475 0.5538 0.5860 0.6062 0,5803 0.5715 0,6176 0.6273 0.6108 0.5633 0,5154 0,4905 0,4983 0.4954 0.4928 0.5430
2200 0.7802 0.7700 0.7839 0.7476 0.7093 0.7281 0,7225 0.7006 0.7079 0,7023 0.6840 0.6664 0.6685 0,5920 0.5133 0.5211 0,4642 0,3638 0.3610 0.3538
2211 0.2655 0.2640 0.2615 0.2579 0.2606 0.2517 0.2552 0.2370 0.2184 0.2821 0,2245 0.2168 0,2033 0,2045 0.2033 0,2031 0,1764 0,1694 0,1660 0.1851
2221 0.6014 0.8244 0.7706 0.7428 0.7886 0.7684 0.7760 0.8904 0.8350 0,7789 0,4257 0.4251 0.3959 0,4167 0.4186 0.3819 0.3754 0.3548 0.3636 0.3984
2250 0.4379 0.4533 0.4079 0.4326 0.4351 0,4600 0.4591 0.4838 0.4794 0.5318 0.5495 0.4138 0.4201 0.4327 0.4646 0.4967 0.5227 0.5291 0.5201 0.5512
2253 0.2666 0.2687 0.2814 0.2942 0.3045 0.3242 0,3304 0.3338 0.3565 0.3592 0.3723 0.3787 0.3323 0.3461 0.3643 0.3671 0.3846 0.3093 0.3244 0.3669
2273 0.5124 0.5197 0.5151 0.5098 0.5070 0.5000 0.5001 0.4074 0,4017 0.4177 0.4348 0.4218 0,3745 0.3752 0.3776 0.4078 0.3701 0,3752 0.3650 0.3323
2300 0.6777 0.6545 0.6181 0.6255 0.6372 0.6216 0.6340 0.6465 0,6583 0,5559 0.5653 0.5560 0.5377 0,5264 0.5227 0.5108 0.4438 0,3144 0.2398 0.2296
2320 0.1857 0.1898 0.1943 0.1957 0,1978 0.1945 0,2039 0,2064 0.2262 0.2168 0.2450 0,2346 0,3196 0.2908 0.2790 0.3074 0.3081 0.3432 0,3460 0,5168
2330 0.6679 0.6605 0.6966 0.6647 0.6208 0.6773 0.5503 0.4965 0,4648 0.3891 0.2294 0.2273 0.2284 0.2033 0,2097 0,1988 0,2116 0.1808 0,1801 0.2817
2340 0.9345 0.9222 0.9412 0.9397 0.9504 0.9536 0.8986 0.8990 0.8859 0.8666 0.8513 0.8336 0.8355 0.7751 0.6838 0.6970 0,7081 0,7333 0.7507 0,7955
2390 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.8537 0.8359 1,0000
2400 0,2967 0.2935 0.2959 0.3029 0,3019 0.3008 0.3065 0.3110 0.3141 0,3107 0.3148 0,3162 0.3163 0.3144 0,3134 0.3266 0.3244 0.3181 0,3199 0.3152
2421 0.6430 0.6042 0.5529 0.5281 0.5159 0.5340 0.5423 0.5349 0.5195 0.5090 0.5097 0.5045 0,4715 0.4851 0.4177 0.4047 0.3949 0.3889 0.3669 0.3437
2430 0.3216 0.2729 0.2793 0.3027 0.3176 0.3005 0.3010 0.2961 0.3486 0.4568 0.2664 0.2757 0.2468 0.2432 0.2641 0.2604 0.2622 0.2555 0.2627 0.4810
2451 0.4623 0,4646 0.4698 0.4648 0.4527 0.4349 0.4263 0.3676 0.3658 0.3410 0.2994 0.2363 0.2118 0.2296 0.2150 0.1999 0.1994 0.2050 0.1963 0.2325
2452 0.5771 0.6417 0,6949 0.7203 0.7889 0.8145 0.8381 0.8894 0.8235 0.7727 0,7497 0.6677 0.5591 0.5105 0,5000 0.5043 0.5133 0.5359 0,5707 0.6350
2510 0.5145 0.4871 0.4763 0.4571 0.4405 0.4716 0,4746 0.4351 0.3941 0.3661 0.3309 0.3064 0,3163 0.2680 0,2827 0.2819 0.2854 0.2803 0,2658 0,3627
2511 0.6007 0.6104 0.6115 0,6202 0.5734 0,5608 0.5660 0.5886 0.5725 0.5021 0.4750 0.4252 0.3954 0.4433 0,4201 0.2867 0,2744 0.2854 0.2187 0.2125
2520 0.5594 0.5206 0.5053 0.5005 0.5009 0.5032 0.5068 0.5068 0.5239 0,5224 0,5163 0.5172 0,5197 0.5198 0.5171 0,5159 0.5168 0,5131 0,5095 1,0000
2522 0.5752 0.5613 0.5949 0.6049 0,5843 0.5753 0.6173 0.6116 0.6314 0,6482 0,6750 0,6834 0,6897 0.6843 0,6969 0.7278 0.7120 0.7418 0,7419 1,0000
2531 0.5593 0.5344 0.5336 0.6054 0.7139 0.7157 0.7243 0.7298 0.6819 0.6303 0.6667 0.7374 0.7312 0,7491 0.5260 0,5666 0,5731 0.5979 0.5470 0.5126
2540 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2590 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.7326 0,7152 0.6939 0,7189 0.7041 0.7465 0,7757 0.7753 0.8131 0.8373 0,8266 0,8335
2600 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,8103 0.8070 0.7916 0.7616


















The Herfindahl Index by Industry for 1975-1994
oto
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2621 0.1166 0.1158 0.1125 0.1109 0.1078 0.1059 0.1010 0.0939 0,0906 0.0898 0.0923 0,0900 0.0935 0.0949 0.0995 0.1066 0.1091 0.1145 0.1133 0,1170
2631 0.2690 0.2701 0.2672 0.2573 0.2544 0.2558 0.2572 0.2626 0.1959 0.1655 0.1585 0.1672 0.1878 0,1735 0.2010 0,2081 0.1786 0.1753 0.1644 0.1678
2650 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8616 0,8428 0.8220 0,8410 0.8200 0.8356 0,8019 0.8284 0.8213 0.8203
2670 0.2472 0.2381 0,1981 0.2072 0.2081 0.2223 0.2162 0,2293 0,2288 0.2256 0,2281 0,2307 0.1919 0.2110 0.2352 0.2628 0.2318 0.2321 0.2296 0.2365
2673 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2711 0.1710 0.1731 0.1724 0.1791 0.1761 0.1673 0.1671 0.1629 0.1389 0,1380 0.1323 0.1165 0.0973 0.0980 0.1118 0.1129 0.1316 0,1229 0.1176 0,1163
2721 0.3356 0.3226 0.3235 0.3266 0.3255 0.3254 0.3226 0.3425 0.3459 0.3482 0,3505 0.3627 0.3777 0.3868 0.3376 0.2892 0.2737 0.2475 0.2276 0.2753
2731 0.5535 0.5513 0.5498 0,5460 0,5497 0.5585 0.5551 0.5484 0.5347 0.5305 0.5234 0.5162 0,5388 0.5278 0.3420 0.3491 0.3486 0.3507 0.3524 0.4121
2732 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
2741 1.0000 1.0000 0.9792 0.9662 0.9204 0.8724 0.8246 0.8217 0.8967 0.9084 0.9270 0.9407
2750 0.3803 0.3447 0,3514 0.3967 0.4297 0.4095 0.4168 0.4285 0.4314 0.4169 0.4109 0.3848 0,3627 0.3247 0.3023 0.2981 0.3071 0.3071 0.2963 0.3147
2761 0.4229 0.3965 0.3926 0.3613 0.3416 0.3481 0.3365 0.3203 0,2956 0.2872 0.2702 0.2485 0.2309 0.2362 0.2391 0.2430 0.2224 0.2125 0,2004 0,2000
2771 0,5207 0.5167 0.5000 0.5015 0.5185 0.6108 0.6723 0.5960 0.5964 0.6240 0.6110 0.6176 0.5940 0.5473 0,5242 0.5238 0,5359 0.5480 0.5307 0.5856
2780 0.6169 0.5945 0.5996 0.6005 0,5940 0.5926 0,5867 0.5896 0.5734 0.5573 0.5676 0.5949 0.5936 0.6099 0.6178 0.6171 0.5434 0.5064 0.4710 0.5029
2790 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2800 0.1727 0,1762 0.1846 0.1784 0.1857 0.1921 0,1917 0.1905 0,1902 0.1642 0.1766 0.1343 0.1408 0.1350 0,1334 0.1397 0.1378 0.1276 0.1351 0,1551
2810 0.3646 0.3557 0,3691 0.3990 0.3670 0.3740 0.3612 0.3369 0,3338 0.3213 0.2606 0.2805 0.2528 0,2495 0,2504 0.2631 0.2010 0.2076 0.2114 0.2081
2820 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9867 0,9831 0.9811 0.9757 0,9600 0.9595 0,9574 0.9511 0.9480
2821 0.4471 0.4474 0.4511 0.4577 0.4411 0.4333 0,4251 0.4064 0.4040 0,3915 0.3747 0.3363 0.2695 0.2520 0.2650 0.2750 0,2768 0 .1870 0.1875 0,2058
2833 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2834 0.0963 0.0966 0.0976 0.0973 0.0955 0.0943 0,0951 0.0951 0.0943 0.0923 0,0917 0.0769 0.0753 0.0731 0.0756 0.0719 0.0705 0.0643 0.0644 0.0713
2835 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0,9910 0.9890 0.9730 0.9149 0.8995 0,8824 0.8572 0.7779 0.7746 0.5094 0.3865 0.4010 0,3988 0.3740 0.3866 0.6703
2836 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 0.9973 0.4908 0.3219 0.3882 0.2218 0.2250 0.2172 0.1838 0,1932 0.2618 0,3090 0.3410 0.3457 0.3540
2840 0.4609 0,4617 0.4710 0.4736 0.4825 0.5000 0.5036 0.5167 0.6310 0.6226 0.6088 0.6285 0.6537 0.6219 0,6302 0.6658 0.7156 0.7239 0.7423 0.7200
2842 0.6537 0.6714 0.6626 0.6836 0.5203 0.5257 0.5437 0.5779 0.5887 0,5900 0,5308 0.5109 0.4881 0.4762 0,4580 0.4781 0.4978 0.4886 0,4715 0,9017
2844 0.4687 0,4912 0,4874 0,4795 0.4626 0.4675 0.4574 0.4262 0.4129 0.4019 0,3951 0,3824 0.3497 0.3364 0.3291 0.3306 0.3135 0.3158 0.3126 0.3905
2851 0.4151 0.4223 0.3910 0.3912 0.3826 0.3696 0.3589 0.3492 0.3534 0.3546 0.3409 0.3636 0.3411 0,3519 0,3373 0.3350 0.3150 0.2949 0.2867 0.3331
2860 0,5275 0,5275 0.5210 0.4824 0.4404 0.4059 0.3892 0,3565 0.3435 0,3558 0.3568 0,2868 0.2296 0.2113 0,2156 0,1860 0.1480 0.1359 0.1273 0,1280
2870 0.8874 0.8668 0.9065 0.8654 0.8688 0.9167 0,9427 0.9173 0,6673 0.7058 0.8902 0.9151 0.7670 0.6146 0.6154 0.6011 0.5249 0,5166 0,4833 0.4742
2890 0,2474 0.2451 0.2309 0.2251 0.2164 0.2009 0.1984 0.1949 0.2028 0,1948 0.1956 0.1994 0.1912 0.1810 0.1815 0.1721 0,1612 0.1604 0.1217 0.1371
2891 0.5410 0.5372 0.5352 0.5290 0.5190 0,5144 0.5181 0.5165 0.5485 0.5398 0.5479 0,5473 0.5320 0,5249 0.5269 0.5194 0,5176 0.5188 0.5240 0.5220


















The Herfindahl Index by Industry for 1975-1994
o
CO
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2950 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7844 0.6852 0,5705 0.5639 0.5662 0.5898 0.5659 0,5525 0,5577 0,5612 0.5295
2990 0.5150 0.5212 0.5354 0.5440 0.6231 0.6381 0,6578 0,5610 0.5608 0.5589 0.5718 0.5751 0.5824 0,5923 0.5979 0.6277 0.6616 0,6972 0.9673 1.0000
3011 0.8895 0.8711 0.8797 0.8790 0.8750 0.8638 0.8644 0.8565 0.8630 0,8522 0.8469 0,8249 0.8169 0.8105 0.7926 0.7881 0.7711 0.7657 0.7438 0,7247
3021 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8417 0.8977 0,9253 0.9217 0.9119 0.8034 0,5969 0,4508 0.4542 0.4328 0.3886 0.3869 0.4189 0.4078 0.3617 0,7564
3050 0.5649 0.5318 0,4650 0,5431 0.5229 0.4708 0.5040 0.4658 0.4532 0.4472 0.4106 0.3893 0.3667 0.4225 0,4214 0,4444 0,4973 0.5071 0.5196 0,5005
3060 0.2713 0.2638 0.2653 0.2633 0.2847 0,2936 0.3023 0.3353 0.3402 0.3836 0,3635 0.3405 0.3487 0,3420 0.3287 0.3504 0.3235 0.3084 0,3303 0.3664
3080 0.8602 0.8440 0.7840 0.6715 0.5946 0,4940 0.4012 0.3540 0.4424 0.4043 0.4031 0.2665 0.4057 0.5243 0.5559 0.5644 0.5752 0,5995 0.6261 0.6545
3081 0.5351 0.5004 0.5001 0 .5000 0.5009 0.5007 0.5033 0.5000 0.5913 0.5779 0.3520 0,2697 0.4491 0.3898 0.3455 0,3000 0.2963 0.2732 0,2616 0.2910
3089 0.3750 0.3666 0.3466 0.3430 0.3250 0.3080 0.2919 0.2788 0.2894 0,2956 0.2392 0,2245 0.2132 0.1868 0.1829 0,1865 0.1929 0.1821 0.1779 0.1745
3100 0.6223 0.5805 0.6517 0.6401 0.6426 0.5032 0,5144 0.5005 0.5047 0.5063 0,5027 0,5125 0.5002 0.5204 0.5004 0.5003 0.5121 0.5499 0,4873 0.4609
3140 0.4820 0.4649 0.4362 0.4267 0.4284 0.4052 0.3909 0.3903 0.3897 0,3893 0.3633 0,3776 0.3865 0,3689 0.3440 0,3165 0.2478 0.2400 0.1990 0.1824
3220 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8700 0,8694 0.8777
3221 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,5285 0.5032 0.4938 0.4922 1.0000
3231 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7142 0.7151 0.7289 0.7473 0.7597 0.7732 0.7748 0.7922
3241 0.3834 0.4175 0.4605 0.4789 0.4133 0,4503 0.4577 0.4871 0.3473 0.3335 0.3259 0.3192 0.3343 0.3473 0.3802 0.4123 0.4274 0.3792 0.3480 0.3767
3250 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.5073 1,0000
3260 1,0000 1,0000 0.6318 0.4450 0.4681
3270 0.5842 0.6240 0.6414 0.6477 0.6304 0.6023 0.5965 0.5828 0.6390 0.6792 0.6665 0.6779 0.6882 0,5627 0.5327 0.4987 0.4938 0,5201 0.5363 0,4529
3272 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
3290 0.4498 0.4371 0.4209 0.4184 0.4013 0.4187 0,4307 0.4533 0.4529 0.4555 0.4465 0.4520 0.4890 0.5171 0.5323 0.5442 0,5749 0,5390 0,5378 0.5335
3310 0.4585 0.4067 0.4143 0.4014 0.3895 0.4093 0.4083 0,4730 0.5198 0.4232 0.4419 0.4454 0.4057 0.4053 0.3360 0.3137 0,3537 0,3205 0.3282 0.2444
3312 0.1977 0.1976 0.1994 0.1958 0.1949 0.1924 0.1917 0 .1590 0.1369 0.1402 0.1321 0.1152 0.1084 0.0964 0,1010 0,1067 0.1061 0.0942 0 .0876 0,0785
3317 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5184 0,4221 0.7006
3320 0.7049 0.7154 0,7394 0.7347 0.6610 0.6703 0.5923 0.5890 0.5873 0.4897 0.5671 0.5820 0.5762 0.6378 0.7040 0.7264 0.7372 0.7724 0.8003 0.5139
3330 0.2629 0.2721 0.2696 0.2656 0.2588 0.2673 0.1971 0.2024 0.1982 0.2057 0,2008 0,2066 0.1799 0,1813 0.1935 0,1840 0,1810 0.1564 0.1638 0.1440
3334 0.3272 0.3323 0.3340 0.3348 0.3370 0.3355 0.3340 0.3372 0.3394 0,3373 0.3431 0.3414 0,3502 0.3356 0.3003 0.2650 0.2618 0.2266 0.2284 0.2293
3341 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
3350 0.4324 0.4306 0 .4278 0.4228 0.4090 0.3939 0.4056 0.4115 0,4265 0,4277 0.4204 0.4098 0.3266 0,3199 0,2510 0.2144 0,2231 0.1991 0,1570 0,2215
3357 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.9820 0.9523 0,7336 0.5037 0.6117 0.6776 0.6394 0,7102 0.6075 0.8098
3360 0.5579 0.5869 0.5962 0.5217 0.5578 0.5485 0.5325 0.5230 0,5038 0.5005 0.5086 0,5165 0.5071 0.5012 0.5334 0,5439 0,5690 0.3936 0.3515 0,3415
3390 0.8423 0.8337 0.7983 0.7400 0.7352 0.6180 0,5706 0.6066 0.6358 0,5647 0.5779 0.5735 0.5712 0.5629 0.5826 0,5996 0.5981 0,5939 0.5763 0.5234


















The Herfindahl Index by Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3420 0.3532 0.3526 0.3395 0.3252 0.3159 0.3236 0.3058 0.2997 0.2885 0.2728 0.2440 0.2409 0.2391 0.2431 0,2640 0.2755 0.2977 0,2899 0.2961 0,3294
3430 1.0000 0,8481 0.8468 0.8442 0.8221 0.8154 0.8314
3440 0.7727 0.7440 0.7762 0.8236 0.7846 0.7806 0.7353 0.7585 0.6936 0.7006 0.6384 0.6007 0.5428 0.5007 0,4809 0.5206 0.6529 0.6076 0.4242 0.4386
3442 0.7371 0.6137 0.5830 0.5587 0.5431 0.5069 0.5002 0.5000 0,5000 0.5063 0,5045 0.5181 0.5625 0.5543 0.5434 0.5675 0.6145 0.6347 0.6168 0.6120
3443 0.6431 0.6425 0.5775 0.6068 0.6318 0.6353 0.6646 0.6216 0.5518 0.6352 0.5608 0.4149 0.4436 0,4354 0.4185 0.4145 0.3348 0,2459 0.2408 0.2508
3444 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 ...
3448 0.5157 0.5006 0.5011 0.5005 0.5003 0.5167 0.5192 0.5184 0.5234 0.5130 0.5055 0,5002 0.5145 0.5240 0,5006 0,5001 0.5147 0.5061 0.5210 0,5731
3452 0,2390 0.2059 0.1940 0.1935 0.2037 0.2231 0.2197 0.2091 0.1976 0,2021 0.2042 0.2141 0.2112 0.2053 0,1855 0.2181 0.2026 0.1924 0.1844 0,1948
3460 0.2013 0.1933 0.1943 0.1993 0,1917 0.2062 0.2134 0.1925 0.1672 0,1617 0,1534 0.1844 0,2224 0.2384 0.2401 0.2390 0.2621 0.3126 0.3049 0.4229
3470 0.5316 0.5316 0.5254 0.5078 0.5136 0.5508 0.5251 0.6236 0.4544 0.5544 0.3896 0.3960 0.4086 0.4133 0.4008 0.3992 0,4126 0,4108 0,4141 0.4191
3480 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0,9825 0.9809 0.9774 0.5275 0.6422 0.7767 0.7668 0.6494 0.5693 0.5297 0.6130
3490 0.2005 0.1945 0.1904 0.1839 0.1859 0.1872 0.1874 0.1891 0.1895 0,1933 0.1844 0,1867 0.1833 0.1831 0.1979 0,1937 0.1947 0.1921 0.1965 0.1961
3510 0.2261 0.2094 0.2130 0.2256 0.2199 0,2299 0.2480 0.2367 0.2199 0,2096 0.2147 0.2034 0.1845 0.1839 0.1833 0.1899 0,1975 0.1632 0.1624 0.2019
3523 0.2195 0,2237 0.2278 0.2322 0.2435 0.2517 0.2720 0.2882 0.3031 0.2973 0,3081 0.3111 0.2907 0,2522 0,2440 0,2330 0.2372 0.2337 0.2032 0.1882
3524 0,6104 0.5311 0.5789 0.8433 0.8766 0.8764 0.8027 0.7456 0,7724 0,6766 0.7446 0,8975 0.9244 0.9020 0.8872 0.9205 0.9378 0,9448 0.9549 0,9676
3530 0.7144 0.7205 0.6857 0.6878 0.6891 0.5400 0,5698 0.9100 0.9096 0.9360 0,9514 0,9602 0.9508 0.9548 0.9520 0.9547 0.9549 0.9467 0.9799 0.9853
3531 0.5959 0.6077 0.6221 0.6338 0.6073 0,6511 0.6765 0.6525 0.6744 0.6518 0.6892 0.6893 0.6881 0,7281 0,7229 0,7255 0.7343 0.7709 0.7746 0.7898
3533 0.8301 0.8509 0,8815 0.8701 0.8603 0,8469 0.8177 0.8967 0.9130 0.9094 0.9227 0.9284 0.9252 0.9010 0.8531 0.8066 0.7597 0.7521 0,7288 0.6805
3537 0.5680 0.5829 0.5109 0.4613 0,4722 0.5232 0,5560 0.6124 0.5911 0.5502 0.5746 0.5598 0.4843 0.4970 0.6407 0.6807 0.6946 0.4358 0,4279 0,6884
3540 0.5849 0.6312 0.6256 0.6161 0.6361 0.6499 0.6763 0.6843 0.7262 0.7308 0.7566 0.7488 0.7507 0,6682 0.7089 0.7770 0.7626 0.6564 0,6823 0,6650
3541 0.4126 0.4223 0.4360 0,4237 0.3900 0.3697 0.3818 0,3806 0.3760 0.3697 0.3729 0.3956 0,3940 0.3873 0,3930 0,3700 0,3624 0.3879 0,4383 0.4320
3550 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.9675 0,9621 0,9709 0.9865 0,9850 0,9858 0,9865 0.9892 0.8560 0.8379 0,8062 0.7679
3555 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.9952 0.9792 1.0000 0.7997 0.7881 0.6632 0.6026 0.5695 0.5688 0.4926 0,4483 0.4359
3559 0.4684 0.4133 0.3863 0.3398 0.3121 0.3073 0.2830 0.2785 0.2595 0.2139 0.1911 0.1932 0.1630 0.1588 0,1640 0.1685 0.1820 0.2062 0.2381 0.3771
3560 0.4958 0.5001 0.5034 0.4801 0.4710 0.4869 0.5087 0,4592 0.4392 0.3941 0,3980 0.3438 0,3056 0,2886 0.2788 0,2798 0,2818 0.2931 0.3325 0.3856
3561 0.1836 0.1888 0.1889 0.1899 0.2035 0.2275 0.2244 0,2068 0.1969 0,2166 0.2290 0.2222 0.2109 0,1523 0.1519 0,1550 0.1598 0.1392 0.1450 0.1400
3562 0.9021 0.9116 0.9035 0.8991 0.8960 0.8841 0.9332 0.9474 0.8413 0.8382 0.8332 0,7923 0,7855 0,8053 0,7725 0,7750 0.7712 0.7506 0.7472 0.7451
3564 0,8427 0.8269 0.8164 0.8253 0,8264 0.8284 0.8178 0.7870 0,7294 0.7364 0.6029 0.5866 0.5624 0.5670 0.4746 0.4267 0,4590 0.4670 0.3896 0.5432
3567 0.6006 0.6451 0.4995 0.5282 0.5122 0.4680 0,4370 0.4089 0.3474 0,3546 0,3459 0.3759 0.3952 0,3912 0.4260 0,4880 0.4542 0,4012 0.5239 0.6827
3569 0.5299 0.4819 0.4798 0.4755 0.4355 0.3868 0,3379 0,2933 0.3074 0.2977 0.2948 0.2998 0.3321 0.3457 0.3392 0.2736 0.4017 0.3855 0.3808 0,3929
3570 0.4410 0.4217 0.3988 0.3920 0,3762 0.3690 0.3651 0,3685 0,3776 0,3728 0.3559 0,3342 0,3182 0.3151 0,3081 0.3158 0.3101 0,3109 0.3083 0,4028


















The Herfindahl Index by Industry for 1975-1994
ocn
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80
3572 0.7935 0.7381 0.7443 0.7853 0,8263 0,8050
3575 0.6823 0,5998 0.5003 0.5029 0,5172 0.5612
3576 0.7599 0,6840 0,6399 0.6348 0,5226 0.4263
3577 0,3560 0,3480 0.4000 0.3952 0.2490 0.2234
3578 0.5140 0.5030 0.5017 0.5008 0.5085 0.5090
3579 0.7474 0.7637 0.7602 0,7459 0.7749 0.7930
3580 0.4595 0.4380 0,4352 0.4379 0.4375 0.4345
3585 0.4873 0.4081 0.4016 0.3106 0.2990 0.3238
3590 0.5840 0.6314 0.6389 0.6345 0.6357 0.6307
3600 0.2802 0.2766 0.2697 0.2614 0.2711 0,2650
3612 0.8587 0.8914 0,9055 0.8994 0.8883 0,8741
3613 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
3620 0.7404 0.7585 0.7282 0.6986 0.7091 0.6173
3621 0,3202 0.3018 0,3014 0.2829 0,2885 0,2693
3630 0.4335 0.4300 0.4360 0,4355 0.4331 0,4356
3634 0.7639 0.7680 0.7677 0.7901 0.8072 0.6898
3640 0.1932 0.1895 0.1872 0.1711 0.1995 0.2283
3651 0.3803 0.3659 0.3837 0.4022 0.4000 0.4475
3652 0.9939 0.9925 0.9932 0.9937 0.9942 0.9890
3661 0.4315 0.4363 0.4155 0.4134 0.3813 0,3821
3663 0.3327 0.3199 0.3403 0.3452 0.3396 0.3277
3669 0.9279 0.9169 0.9101 0.8537 0.8158 0.8089
3670 0.4359 0.5199 0.4875 0.4801 0.4529 0.4099
3672 0.3291 0.3204 0.3003 0.2917 0.2891 0.3050
3674 0.4629 0.4056 0,4000 0.3739 0,3370 0.3313
3677 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
3678 0.5564 0.5481 0.5616 0.5621 0.5248 0.4981
3679 0,3397 0.3266 0,3017 0,3238 0.3353 0.4940
3690 0.4133 0.3958 0,3737 0.3544 0.3644 0,3924
3695 1,0000
3711 0.1565 0.1609 0.1618 0.1710 0.1720 0.1728
3713 1,0000
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0.8183 0.7237 0.5458 0.3232 0,2404 0,1881 0.1799 
0.6961 0.6445 0,4514 0.4339 0.4054 0,4029 0.3695 
0,2355 0.1829 0.1828 0.1489 0,1279 0.1121 0.1296 
0,1976 0.1587 0.1763 0.1620 0,1648 0.1523 0.1183
0.5031 0.4307 0.4141 0.3876 0.3452 0.3375 0.4789 
0.8004 0.7863 0.7983 0.8004 0,7785 0,7546 0.7397 
0,4335 0.4510 0.4350 0.4070 0.3784 0.3503 0,3336 
0,2724 0.2708 0.2572 0.2769 0.2156 0.2062 0.1965
0,6378 0.5573 0,5941 0.5921 0,5357 0.4900 0.4828 
0.2653 0.2685 0.2658 0.2648 0.2526 0,2548 0.2528 
0.8638 0,8326 0.8391 0.8554 0.4782 0.5158 0.6391
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.6144 0.5776 0.6110 0.5796 0.5651 0,5665 0,4960 
0.2676 0.2656 0.2665 0.2624 0,2668 0.2917 0.2766 
0.4316 0.4233 0.4146 0.4201 0.4225 0.3700 0.3659 
0.8069 0.8610 0.8136 0.7891 0.7807 0.6882 0.4783
0.2972 0.2753 0.2268 0.2154 0.2696 0.2759 0.2508 
0,4648 0,4768 0.4529 0.4309 0.4612 0,4298 0.4795 
0.9881 0.9883 0.9808 0.9803 0.9798 0,9765 0,9734 
0.3553 0.3344 0.3173 0.2979 0.3317 0.3390 0.3530
0,3080 0.3139 0.3346 0.3575 0.3495 0,3611 0,3713 
0.8026 0.7549 0.7125 0,6451 0,5335 0.4847 0.4609 
0.4091 0.3759 0.3993 0,3992 0.4357 0,4215 0.4420 
0.2891 0.2674 0.2371 0.2225 0.2105 0.1886 0,1891
0.3457 0.3198 0.2670 0.2533 0,2387 0,2223 0,1988
1.0000 0.5597 0.5290 0,5041 0.5279 0.5674 0.6576 
0.4695 0.4491 0.5080 0.5368 0,5272 0.6084 0.4868 
0.5893 0.5746 0,4938 0.4313 0.4402 0.3248 0.2296
0.3577 0.3247 0.3194 0,3323 0.3322 0,2185 0.1870
1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9838 0.9694 
0.1720 0.1776 0.1702 0.1634 0,1568 0.1531 0.1387
1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.1766 0.1528 0,1589 0,1561 0,1517 0,1460 0.1959 
0.3604 0.3553 0,3360 0,3447 0.3441 0,3851 1.0000 
0.1417 0.1183 0.1020 0.0919 0.1002 0.1125 0.5028 
0.1116 0.1028 0,1009 0.1041 0.0952 0.0966 0.1375
0.4364 0.4228 0.3862 0.4058 0.4224 0.3913 0.5754 
0.5881 0.5807 0.6144 0 .6426 0.6268 0,6569 0.6515 
0,3261 0.2961 0.2859 0.2934 0.2683 0.2529 0,2986 
0,1815 0,1752 0,1886 0.1930 0.1903 0.1902 0.1918
0.4509 0.4076 0,3555 0.3426 0.3536 0.3527 0.3285 
0.2594 0.2612 0.2593 0,2616 0.2662 0.2721 0.3511 
0.7161 0.7331 0.8044 0,8198 0,8229 0.8530 0,6965
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.4857 0.2480 0.2381 0.2313 0.1882 0.1912 0.2558 
0.2405 0.2575 0.2653 0.2857 0.2887 0.2728 0.2674 
0,3698 0,3605 0.3339 0.3254 0.3230 0,3270 0.3261 
0.5205 0.5074 0.5101 0.4286 0.4265 0.4611 0.5444
0.2382 0.2614 0.2889 0.2759 0.2488 0.2394 0.2057 
0.5285 0.5859 0.6464 0.6582 0,6809 0.7036 0.5009 
0.5905 0,6486 0.6593 0.6314 0.6493 0.5167 0.9389 
0,3413 0.3518 0,3605 0.3415 0.3164 0.2948 0.4838
0,4050 0.4218 0.4260 0.4587 0.4763 0.3952 0.4033 
0.4421 0.4337 0,3870 0,3657 0.4700 0.2895 0.2556 
0.4594 0.4052 0.4404 0.3467 0,3116 0.3679 0.4480 
0.1735 0.1371 0.1466 0,1574 0,1800 0,2588 0,3953
0,1920 0,1820 0.1728 0.1670 0.1704 0,1600 0.2604 
0.6863 0,6426 0,4472 0,4734 0.4421 0.4227 0.5154 
0.4802 0.4895 0,5076 0.4859 0,4924 0.4486 0.4914 
0.2002 0.1935 0,1656 0,1647 0.1473 0.1456 0.1558
0.2173 0.1992 0.1935 0.2078 0.2117 0.2109 0.2985 
0.9535 0.9470 0,9275 0.8786 0.8747 0,8530 1,0000 
0.1261 0.1262 0.1244 0,1243 0.1255 0.1252 0.1731






















































0.1412 0.1409 0.1467 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.4233 0.4415 0.4068 
0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
0.2701 0.2795 0.3099 
0.5102 0,5117 0.5675 
0.3801 0,3883 0.3677 
0.8512 0.8067 0.8025
0.3954 0,3796 0,4037
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.4872 0.4685 0.4787
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.3295 0,3268 0.3216 
0.5527 0.4499 0.4249
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.7456 0.7252 0.7147
0.5846 0,5905 0.5768 
0.3887 0.3968 0.3784 
0.3715 0.3728 0.3674
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.2934 0.2692 0.2601 
0.3781 0.3643 0.3670 
0.4273 0.4143 0.3853 
0.6025 0.5953 0.5737
1.0000 1.0000 0,5470 
0.7330 0.7548 0.7384
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.2740 0.2671 0.2710




80 81 82 
0.1587 0.1590 0.1606
1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 
0.4978 0,4634 0.5146 
0.5000 0,5000 0.5000
0.3085 0.3043 0,2879 
0.6197 0.6203 0.6272 
0.3573 0.4039 0,3755 
0.7979 0.7829 0.7987
0,4341 0.4224 0.4129
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.4996 0.5032 0.5400
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.3210 0.3146 0.3126 
0.4125 0.4064 0,3849
1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 
0.6873 0.6953 0,7059
0.5792 0.5645 0.5258 
0.3378 0.3385 0.3076 
0.3627 0.3718 0.5317 
0.7704 0.6809 0.5122
0.2640 0.2829 0.3015 
0.3559 0.3381 0.3270 
0.3770 0.3724 0.3464 
0.5427 0,5164 0.5123
0.5100 0.5192 0.5372 
0.6810 0.5818 0,4202
1.0000 1.0000 0.6698 
0,2668 0.2683 0.2679






1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.4755 0,3918 0.4097 
0,5000 0.5000 0,5000
0.2871 0.2758 0.2747 
0.6408 0.6294 0.6165 
0.3441 0,3301 0.3606 
0,8526 0.8678 0.8886
0.3970 0.3943 0.4017
1.0000 1,0000 0.5009 
0,5045 0.4776 0.5179
1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
0,3007 0.3055 0,2367 
0.3750 0.3637 0.3443
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.7195 0.7218 0.7297
0.5277 0.5055 0.5414 
0.2911 0.2531 0.2285 
0.3414 0,3480 0.3458 
0.4611 0.4264 0.4026
0.2819 0.2755 0.2548 
0,3174 0.3095 0.3385 
0.2724 0.2331 0.2191 
0.5183 0.5225 0.5179
0,4997 0.4816 0,5030 
0.3811 0.3248 0.3004 
0.6160 0.5620 0.5409 
0.2603 0.2578 0.2460
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0,9399 0,7392 0,7402




1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.4160 0.4190 0,4380 
0,5000 0.5000 0,5118
0.2797 0.2722 0.2815 
0.6436 0.6265 0.5687 
0.3623 0.4223 0.4064 
0.9016 0,8268 0,8123
0.4135 0,4027 0,4178 
0.5000 0.5565 0.4831 
0.5263 0.6001 0.5566
1.0000 0.5218 0.5792
0.2331 0.2233 0.2277 
0.3410 0.3440 0.3369
1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 
0.7388 0.7560 0,7332
0,7038 0,5656 0.7196 
0.2350 0.2177 0.2009 
0.3174 0.2955 0.2594 
0.3885 0.3694 0,3918
0.2455 0.2382 0.2353 
0.5059 0.5030 0.4960 
0.1842 0.1493 0.1362 
0.8159 0,5860 0.6226
0.6171 0.6279 0.5777 
0.2078 0,2128 0.2012 
0.5212 0.5105 0.5266 
0.2420 0.2359 0.2455
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.5292 0.4564 0.3498 




1.0000 0.7549 0.4132 
0.4477 0.4613 0.5552 
0,5143 0.5166 0.5198
0.2994 0.3283 0.3317 
0.6092 0.6292 0.6455 
0.4012 0,3843 0.3783 
0,8214 0,8234 0,8054
0.4289 0.4233 0,4232 
0,4225 0,4340 0,4145 
0,6230 0.6350 0,6045 
0.4082 0.4341 0.4499
0.2106 0.2046 0.1988 
0.3372 0.3363 0.3372
1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 
0.7217 0.7162 0.7038
0.4864 0.5168 0.4018 
0,1908 0.1823 0.1748 
0,2280 0,2248 0.2209 
0.4326 0.4216 0.4106
0.2252 0.2166 0.2168 
0.4969 0.4653 0.4215 
0.1261 0.1075 0.1070 
0.7470 0.7499 0,6269
0.4937 0.5448 0.5216 
0.1933 0.1850 0.1847 
0.6728 0.6499 0.6455 
0,2452 0.2378 0.2363
1.0000 1.0000 0.6543 
0.3498 0,3722 0.3877 
0.7461 0.7188 0.6985 
0,7230 0,7512 0.7567
92 93 94
0.1192 0.1103 0.1077 
0.3522 0.3876 0.3613 
0,5114 0,4944 0.3360 
0,5190 0.5166 0.5168
0.3366 0.3122 0.3995 
0.6707 0,6823 0,6960 
0,3682 0,3431 0.3368 
0.6886 0.6917 0.6970
0.4299 0.4321 0.5004 
0.4269 0.4117 0.4203 
0.5793 0.5861 0.6124 
0.4739 0.3404 0.5538
0.1891 0,2023 0.2474 
0,3374 0.3377 0.5013
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.6419 0.6506 0.7445
0.3803 0.4089 0.4799 
0.1720 0.1666 0.1798 
0.2148 0.2201 0.2192 
0.4184 0,4203 0.4719
0.2295 0,2643 0.3118 
0.3639 0.3270 0,3375 
0.1024 0.0952 0.1218 
0,6387 0.6057 0.7523
0,4980 0.3627 0.3668 
0.1933 0,1868 0.1531 
0,5396 0,5328 0,9065 
0,2361 0.2311 0.2344
0,6087 0.5681 0.5583 
0.3678 0,4165 0,7009 



















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3944 0.5541 0.5561 0.5170 0.5355 0.5832 0.3432 0.3385 0.4152 0.4526 0.6942 0.7356 0.6772 0.6408 0.5397 0.4460 0.4462 0.4994 0.5482 0.5875 0,5512
3949 0.6281 0.6551 0.6818 0.8279 0.8492 0.7385 0.5396 0,5309 0.4524 0.4448 0.4305 0.2917 0.2780 0.2863 0.2873 0.2831 0,2385 0,2306 0,2201 0.1660
3950 0.4245 0.4281 0.4122 0.4024 0.4015 0.3927 0.3828 0.3897 0.3783 0.3080 0.3081 0.3054 0.3014 0.2903 0.2896 0.2922 0.3069 0.3162 0.3294 0.3270
3960 0.8073 0.8354 0.7816 0.8448 0.8942 0.9053 0,9643 0.9588 0.9832 0.9844 0.8763 0.8415 0.7537 0.7827 0.7123 0.6285 0.5572 0.6081 0.6896 0,6157
3990 0.5343 0.5286 0.5218 0.5228 0.5363 0.3163 0.3800 0.3516 0.2214 0.2285 0.2315 0,2592 0,2475 0,2536 0.2474 0,2030 0.2053 0.2267 0,1963 0.2544
4011 0.1931 0.1895 0.1903 0.2033 0,2077 0.1981 0.1719 0.1663 0.1638 0.1585 0,1564 0.1502 0,1502 0.1572 0,1330 0.1366 0.1368 0.1318 0.1296 0,1360
4100 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.7983 0.7664 0.6558 0.5539
4210 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9296 1,0000
4213 0.2641 0.2713 0.2712 0.2743 0,2858 0.2822 0.2487 0.2112 0.2070 0.2070 0.2023 0.1985 0.1944 0.1895 0.2324 0.2316 0.2238 0.2137 0.2110 0.2080
4400 0.3383 0.3154 0.2786 0.2349 0,2309 0.2409 0.2370 0,2348 0,2501 0.2372 0.2746 0.2122 0.2299 0.2158 0.2255 0.2416 0.2162 0.1811 0.1752 0.2042
4412 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5406 0.5624 0.6568 0.6584 0.4141 0.3443 0.4878 0,4697 0,5027 0.3956 0.3671 0,3248 0,3245 0.3093 0.3122 0,5516
4512 0.2422 0.2448 0.2396 0.2411 0.2275 0.2319 0,2151 0.1654 0.1711 0.1723 0.1357 0,1390 0.1288 0.1245 0.1233 0.1247 0.1275 0.1302 0.1328 0,1707
4513 1.0000 1.0000 0.5005 0.5125 0.5326 0.5598 0.6170 0,6496 0.6934 0.7169 0,7427 0.7512 0.7591 0.7747 0,7899 0,7690 0.7404 0.7316 0,7196 1.0000
4522 0.6184 0.5268 0.5333 0.5611 0.5480 0.5714 0.5730 0.5244 0.5423 0.6220 0.6432 0.5064 0.6041 0.5898 0.6090 0.6359 0.6215 0.5846 0,5938 0.5725
4581 0.9575 0.9529 0.9439 0.9456 0.9545 0.9579 0.9575 0.9538 0,7231 0.7081 0,8857 0,8335 0,8135 0,4515 0.4626 0,4657 0,4664 0.4803 0,5295 0.5354
4610 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6086 0,6950 0.4846 0.3845 0.4024 0.2355 0.1825 0.1743 0,1871
4700 0.9925 0.9923 0.9933 0.9986 1.0000 0.9950 0.9771 0.9630 0,9425 0.8183 0.7485 0.6282 0,6045 0,8514 0.6026 0.6367 0.6664 0,9162 0,9164 1,0000
4731 0.4730 0.4697 0.4439 0.4299 0.4234 0.4193 0,4166 0.4227 0.3687 0.3476 0.3338 0.3115 0.3025 0.2943 0.2755 0.2730 0.2603 0.2401 0.2471 0,2415
4812 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9987 0.9973 0,9930 0.9833 0.9713 0.9105 0.8750 0.8537 0.8892 0.4252 0.4181 0.4773 0.3949 0,3713 0.2327 0.1996 0.2397
4813 0.5540 0.4153 0.3835 0.3807 0.3892 0.3883 0.4048 0.4049 0,3500 0.1401 0,1322 0.1208 0,1171 0.1060 0.0949 0,0933 0.0935 0.0967 0.0977 0.1382
4822 1,0000 1.0000
4832 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.6189 0.3861 0.4296 1.0000
4833 0.7653 0.7533 0.7361 0.7348 0.7279 0.7211 0.6720 0.6008 0.5838 0.5512 0.4985 0.3468 0.3283 0,3052 0,2929 0,2628 0,2270 0.2045 0,1945 0.2100
4841 0.4411 0.4587 0.4601 0.4496 0.4007 0.3943 0.3759 0.3573 0.3444 0,3468 0.2870 0.2757 0.3709 0.3715 0.4118 0,4239 0.4118 0.3766 0,3153 0.3443
4899 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0,9250 0.8650 0.7625 0.6214 0.4987 0.5093 0.5168 0.5504 0,5997
4911 0.0307 0.0302 0,0297 0.0298 0.0294 0.0311 0.0305 0.0309 0,0309 0.0314 0.0311 0.0312 0.0312 0.0300 0.0303 0.0302 0,0302 0.0295 0.0287 0.0319
4922 0.1356 0.1356 0.1463 0.1423 0,1313 0.1289 0,1287 0.1292 0,1292 0.1277 0.1360 0.1539 0.1758 0.1901 0.1750 0,1983 0.2070 0.1936 0.1777 0.1762
4923 0.1528 0.1491 0.1426 0.1460 0.1416 0.1431 0.1430 0,1493 0.1530 0,1686 0,2079 0.1908 0.1708 0.1546 0.2047 0.2478 0,1368 0,1441 0.1449 0.1565
4924 0.0838 0.0833 0.0819 0,0847 0,0881 0.0938 0.0881 0.0835 0.0818 0,0812 0,0845 0.1708 0.2097 0,1908 0.1859 0,2208 0.2531 0.2163 0,1875 0.1854
4931 0.0526 0.0519 0.0516 0.0470 0,0482 0.0486 0.0497 0.0482 0.0458 0.0469 0.0481 0.0464 0.0448 0.0444 0.0466 0,0479 0.0470 0,0471 0,0452 0.0454
4932 0.5432 0.5503 0.3821 0.3754 0.3882 0.4137 0.4595 0.4188 0.4070 0.3981 0.3783 0,3592 0.3693 0,3725 0.3535 0,3750 0.4233 0.4223 0.4061 0.4006


















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
o
00
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
4950 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
4953 0.5277 0.5235 0.5147 0,5035 0.5041 0.5000 0,5031 0,4927 0.4862 0.3866 0.3863 0.3864 0.3723 0.3687 0.3619 0.3730 0.3433 0.3557 0,3525 0,4222
4955 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,6132 0.4226 0.4516 0.3718 0.3082 0.2028 0.1640 0,1426 0.1375 0,1443 0.1412 0,1281 0.1280 0.1977
4961 1.0000 1.0000
4991 0.7980 0,7681 0.7906 0.8061 0.7529 0.7145 0.7171 0.6563 0.5320 0,4913 0.4943 0.4873 0.4912 0.4032 0.4467 0.2591 0.2467 0.2364 0.1836 0.2625
5000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
5010 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.7034 0.7119 0.7291 0.7005 0.7094 0.6049 0.6308 0.5918 0.5509
5013 0.8789 0.8897 0,8879 0.8865 0.8913 0.9016 0.8956 0.9072 0.8984 0.9009 0,8654 0.8521 0,8655 0,8684 0.8778 0.8845 0.8968 0.8979 0.9034 0.8835
5020 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5030 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5031 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.5683 0.6358 0.6421 0.6232 0.6204 0.6196 0.5897 0.5631 0.5212 0.5008
5040 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 -.- -.- -.- -,- -,- 0.9428 0.9503 0.9735 0.9525 0.9666 0.9995 0,9997 0.8572 0.7730
5045 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9526 0.5115 0.4156 0.3674 0.4077 0,4036 0.2959 0.1630 0.1241 0.1345 0,1436 0.1840 0.2021 0.2039 0.2008 0,2305
5047 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7041 0.7000 0.4235 0.4857 0.4658 0.4524 0.4509 0,4659 0.5406 0,5495 0.5741 0.5201 0.4974 0.4860 0.4816 0.9268
5051 0.2559 0.2545 0.2521 0.2552 0.2736 0.2338 0.2317 0.2344 0.2180 0.2222 0.2099 0.1948 0.2128 0.2222 0,2215 0.2123 0.2147 0.2170 0.2140 0.2225
5063 0,3146 0,3344 0.3951 0,4850 0.2837 0.2757 0,2825 0.3436 0.3559 0,3217 0,3353 0.2499 0,3349 0.3673 0.3968 0.3959 0.4358 0.4540 0.4422 0,3592
5065 0.2734 0.2714 0.2652 0.2561 0.2538 0.2687 0.2675 0.2312 0.1944 0.2161 0.2188 0.1760 0.1608 0,1596 0.1571 0.1450 0.1421 0.1432 0.1639 0.3345
5070 0.7637 0.7824 0.7904 0.8070 0.7897 0.7686 0.7653 0.7383 0.7401 0.7506 0.6719 0.6589 0.6314 0.5844 0.4384 0.4029 0.3696 0.3616 0,3496 0.3635
5072 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.9193 0,5002 0,6102 0.3744 0.3749 0.4779 0,4095 0.4808 0.4799 0.4872 0.4265 0.3734 0,3521
5080 0.2583 0.2547 0.2578 0.2586 0.2713 0,2868 0.2815 0.2911 0.3000 0.2988 0.2935 0.2891 0,2948 0.2943 0,2571 0.2450 0.2527 0,2593 0,2600 0.3915
5082 -.- -.- -.- -,- -.- -.- -,- -.- 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5084 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.6255 0.6926
5090 0.8646 0.8565 0.8605 0.8302 0.8318 0.6284 0.6429 0.5170 0.6786 0.7795 0.5040 0.4697 0.4674 0.4727 0.4526 0.3921 0,3401 0.3385 0.3459 0,4577
5094 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,9521 0.9397 0,7589 0.7791 0.6728 0.6200 0,8307 0.8747 0.8741 1.0000
5099 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,9985 0,7336 1.0000
5110 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0,5000 0.5000 0.4640 0.4617 0.4522 0.4449 0.4400 0.4387 0,4209 0.4030 0.3963 0.3890 0.3828 0.3605 0.3604 0.3533
5122 0.4385 0.4398 0.4443 0.4412 0.4324 0.4197 0.4151 0,3423 0.3246 0.3319 0.3407 0,3008 0.3077 0,2931 0.2919 0,2786 0.2823 0,2593 0.2849 0.3192
5130 -.- -.- -.- -.- 1.0000 1.0000 0.5001 0.5009 0.5207 0.5788 0.5944 0.5997 0.7903 0.8337 0.8398 0.8473 0.8294 0.7956 1.0000 0.9949
5140 0.1993 0.2048 0.2210 0.2269 0.2283 0.2417 0.2445 0.2559 0.2628 0,2880 0.3022 0.3092 0.2892 0.2716 0.2715 0.2614 0,2490 0.2680 0.2992 0,4882
5141 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000
5150 0.5523 0.7279 0.4602 0.4519 0.4445 0.4181 0.4145 0.4378 0,4146 0.4200 0.4027 0,4084 0.5096 0.4603 0.4793 0.4501 0,4183 0.4129 0,4331 0,6394


















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
o
CD
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
4950 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
4953 0 .5277 0.5235 0.5147 0.5035 0.5041 0.5000 0,5031 0,4927 0.4862 0.3866 0.3863 0.3864 0.3723 0,3687 0.3619 0,3730 0.3433 0.3557 0.3525 0.4222
4955 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6132 0.4226 0.4516 0.3718 0.3082 0,2028 0,1640 0,1426 0.1375 0,1443 0.1412 0.1281 0.1280 0.1977
4961 1,0000 1.0000
4991 0.7980 0.7681 0.7906 0.8061 0,7529 0.7145 0,7171 0,6563 0.5320 0.4913 0.4943 0.4873 0,4912 0.4032 0.4467 0,2591 0.2467 0.2364 0.1836 0,2625
5000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5010 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7034 0,7119 0.7291 0.7005 0.7094 0.6049 0,6308 0.5918 0.5509
5013 0.8789 0.8897 0.8879 0.8865 0.8913 0.9016 0,8956 0.9072 0.8984 0.9009 0.8654 0.8521 0,8655 0.8684 0.8778 0.8845 0.8968 0.8979 0.9034 0.8835
5020 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
5030 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
5031 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.5683 0.6358 0,6421 0,6232 0.6204 0.6196 0.5897 0.5631 0.5212 0.5008
5040 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 -•* -•* 0,9428 0.9503 0,9735 0.9525 0,9666 0,9995 0.9997 0.8572 0.7730
5045 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9526 0.5115 0.4156 0.3674 0.4077 0.4036 0.2959 0.1630 0.1241 0.1345 0.1436 0.1840 0.2021 0,2039 0.200B 0.2305
5047 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7041 0.7000 0.4235 0.4857 0.4658 0.4524 0.4509 0.4659 0.5406 0.5495 0.5741 0.5201 0.4974 0.4860 0.4616 0.9268
5051 0.2559 0.2545 0.2521 0,2552 0.2736 0.2338 0.2317 0.2344 0,2180 0.2222 0,2099 0.1948 0.2128 0,2222 0.2215 0,2123 0.2147 0.2170 0.2140 0.2225
5063 0.3146 0.3344 0.3951 0,4850 0.2837 0.2757 0,2825 0.3436 0,3559 0,3217 0,3353 0,2499 0.3349 0.3673 0.3968 0.3959 0.4358 0.4540 0.4422 0.3592
5065 0.2734 0.2714 0.2652 0.2561 0.2538 0,2687 0.2675 0.2312 0.1944 0.2161 0.2188 0.1760 0,1608 0.1596 0.1571 0,1450 0.1421 0,1432 0,1639 0.3345
5070 0.7637 0.7824 0.7904 0.8070 0.7897 0.7686 0.7653 0,7383 0.7401 0,7506 0,6719 0,6589 0,6314 0,5844 0.4384 0.4029 0.3696 0.3616 0.3496 0.3635
5072 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9193 0.5002 0,6102 0.3744 0.3749 0,4779 0.4095 0.4808 0,4799 0.4872 0.4265 0.3734 0.3521
5080 0.2583 0.2547 0.2578 0.2586 0.2713 0.2868 0,2815 0.2911 0.3000 0.2988 0.2935 0.2891 0.2948 0,2943 0.2571 0.2450 0,2527 0.2593 0,2600 0.3915
5082 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000
5084 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6255 0.6926
5090 0.8646 0.8565 0.8605 0.8302 0,8318 0.6284 0.6429 0.5170 0,6786 0,7795 0.5040 0,4697 0,4674 0.4727 0,4526 0.3921 0,3401 0,3385 0.3459 0.4577
5094 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9521 0.9397 0.7589 0.7791 0.6728 0.6200 0.8307 0.8747 0.8741 1,0000
5099 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9985 0.7336 1.0000
5110 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.4640 0.4617 0.4522 0.4449 0,4400 0.4387 0,4209 0.4030 0,3963 0,3890 0.3828 0.3605 0,3604 0.3533
5122 0.4385 0.4398 0.4443 0.4412 0.4324 0.4197 0.4151 0.3423 0,3246 0,3319 0,3407 0.3008 0.3077 0.2931 0,2919 0.2786 0.2823 0,2593 0.2849 0.3192
5130 1,0000 1.0000 0.5001 0.5009 0.5207 0.5788 0.5944 0.5997 0.7903 0,8337 0.8398 0,8473 0.8294 0.7956 1.0000 0.9949
5140 0,1993 0.2048 0.2210 0,2269 0.2283 0.2417 0.2445 0,2559 0.2628 0,2880 0.3022 0,3092 0,2892 0.2716 0,2715 0.2614 0,2490 0,2680 0.2992 0,4882
5141 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000
5150 0.5523 0.7279 0.4602 0.4519 0.4445 0.4181 0.4145 0.4378 0.4146 0.4200 0,4027 0.4084 0.5096 0,4603 0.4793 0,4501 0.4183 0.4129 0.4331 0,6394


















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 66 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
5171 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.8068 0.8005
5172 0,3281 0.3385 0,3488 0.3658 0.2759 0.2793 0.2590 0,2715 0,2900 0.3152 0,3380 0.4394 0.2413 0.1646 0,1594 0.1563 0.1430 0.1339 0.1267 0.1355
5190 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6376 0.6089 0.6063 0.6384 0.5651 0.5470 0.5292 0,4870 0.4604 0,4084 0.3915 0.4028 0.5627
5200 0.7481 0.7161 0.6982 0.6803 0.6855 0.5631 0.5748 0,5630 0.5705 0.5400 0.4282 0.4444 0.3648 0.3654 0.3661 0.3569 0,3762 0,3646 0.3586 0.6048
5211 0.3993 0.4154 0.4204 0.4357 0.4237 0.3979 0.3636 0.3480 0.3358 0,3121 0.3034 0.2280 0,2186 0,2095 0.2149 0.2251 0,2452 0.2496 0.2710 0.2968
5311 0.2851 0.2822 0.2869 0.2443 0.2301 0.2639 0,2645 0.2689 0.2814 0.2796 0.2648 0.2462 0.2660 0.2544 0.2740 0.2667 0.2370 0.2094 0.2005 0,2534
5331 0.5953 0.6024 0.5973 0,5672 0.5419 0.5206 0.4968 0.4539 0.4216 0.4026 0.3729 0,3335 0.3187 0.2409 0.2317 0,2210 0,2336 0.2149 0.2320 0.2513
5399 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8708 0.8509 0.8510 0.8469 0.8557 0.8518 0.8953 0.8805 0.8695 0.8780 0.8826 0,8897 0.8915 0.8878 0.8877 0.9060
5411 0.1855 0.1820 0.1760 0.1685 0.1549 0.1497 0.1506 0.1524 0.1512 0,1466 0.1418 0.1342 0.1237 0.0980 0.0907 0.0884 0.0858 0,0842 0.0824 0.1124
5412 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.5783 0.5386 0,5670 0,4679 0.3832 0.3321 0,3336 0.3262 0.3110 0.3105 0.2859 0.2760 0.6067
5500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0,9130 0.8822 0.8684 0.4293 0.4133 0.3802 0.3766 0.4002 0.2789 0,2843 0,3184 0.3840
5531 0.5036 0.5012 0.5000 0.5001 0.5022 0.5054 0,5119 0,4441 0,4376 0,4348 0.4313 0.4199 0.4261 0,4321 0.4531 0.2833 0.2667 0,2725 0,2758 0.3201
5600 0.4715 0.5219 0.5291 0.5312 0.5452 0.5571 0.5703 0.6007 0.6123 0,6244 0.6768 0.6754 0.6927 0.7153 0.7019 0,7021 0,7166 0.7114 0.7106 0.7321
5621 0.3845 0.3806 0.3564 0.3294 0.3319 0.3372 0.3219 0.2733 0.2673 0.2531 0.2574 0,2658 0.2636 0,2724 0.2556 0.2628 0.2750 0.2594 0,2568 0.3808
5651 0.7593 0.6515 0.5754 0.5513 0.5392 0.5056 0,4909 0,4126 0.4037 0.3705 0.3723 0.3823 0.3740 0.2147 0.2361 0.1919 0.1820 0,1797 0.1770 0.1836
5661 0.6913 0.6858 0.7215 0.7498 0.7773 0.8142 0.8461 0.7967 0.8121 0.8271 0.8480 0.8252 0.8528 0.8482 0.8291 0.8426 0.8344 0,8014 0.7383 0.7664
5700 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6808 0.6934 0.4988 0,4953 0.5681 0.4524 0.4875 0.5105 0.5229 0,5289 0.5174 0.3813 0.3702 0.3520 0,4793
5712 0.6128 0.5264 0.5335 0.5333 0,4253 0.3935 0.3550 0.3414 0.3713 0.3709 0,3447 0.3318 0.3257 0.3196 0.3041 0.2884 0.2788 0,2701 0.2642 0.4592
5731 0.7931 0.7755 0.7792 0.7613 0.7619 0.7613 0,7588 0.7910 0.7130 0,6559 0.5562 0.4139 0.3844 0,3720 0,3715 0,3555 0.3274 0.2979 0,2695 0.3865
5734 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
5735 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
5812 0.2582 0.2611 0.2565 0.2478 0.2395 0.2424 0,2213 0.2188 0.2114 0.1999 0.1960 0.1968 0.2145 0.2000 0.1879 0.1818 0.1803 0.1527 0.1232 0.1794
5900 1.0000 1.0000 0.9126 0.8641 0.6985 0.6821 0.6776 0.6057 0.5856 0.5562
5912 0.2147 0.2085 0.1999 0.1941 0.1907 0.1812 0,1800 0.1805 0.1845 0,1834 0.1806 0.1833 0,1748 0.1756 0.1754 0,1805 0.1809 0,1851 0.1883 0.4204
5940 0.3575 0.3490 0,3467 0.3375 0,3354 0.3338 0.3367 0.2893 0.2799 0,2749 0.2691 0,2112 0.2090 0.1807 0.1710 0.1832 0,2239 0.2018 0.1732 0.2835
5944 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8113 0.8178 0,7960 0.8169 1.0000
5945 1.0000 0.5193 0.5322 0.7284 0,7860 0.8282 0.8956 0,9154 0.9274 0.9316 0.9421 0.9480 0,9519 0,9565 0,9605 0,9633 0.9648 0,9605 0.9532
5960 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000
5961 0.4487 0,4338 0.4321 0.3956 0.4055 0.3903 0.3748 0.3681 0,3647 0.3722 0.2985 0.2330 0.1946 0.1935 0.1552 0.1574 0,1518 0.1420 0,1422 0.1647
5990 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.9282 0.9301 0,9275 0.8425 0.8047 0,5143 0,5683 0,3236 0.2471 0.2532
6021 0.1009 0.0999 0,0991 0.0959 0.0999 0.0998 0,0970 0,0898 0.0843 0.0805 0,0762 0,0705 0.0688 0.0688 0.0680 0.0650 0.0552 0,0566 0.0499 0,0475


















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
6029 1,0000 0.4440 0,4441 0,4375 0.4417 0.3700 0.2054 0,1814 0,1766 0,1691 0,1616 0.1408 0.1216 0.3330
6035 0.4147 0,3884 0.3924 0.3894 0.3056 0,2942 0,2261 0,2247 0,2213 0.1709 0,1375 0.1091 0.0995 0.1021 0.0967 0.1052 0.1043 0.1063 0,0447 0,0432
6036 1.0000 1.0000 0.8450 0,7959 0.5407 0.3119 0.2457 0,2836 0.2512 0.0580 0,0666
6099 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.5010 0.5224 0.5205 0.6101 0.5231 0.8479 0.8439 0.8498 0.8063 0.7533 0.5200 1.0000
6111 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,8222 0.8245 0.8290 0.7992 0,8117 0.6096 0,5613 0.5089 0.4587 0.4624 0.4654 0.4924 0.4940 0.4810
6141 0.5022 0,5007 0,5000 0.5002 0.5033 0.5127 0.7209 0.7361 0.7223 0.7021 0.5168 0.5454 0.5579 0.4991 0.5158 0.5307 0.4779 0.3283 0,3078 0.2939
6153 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6497 0.6176 0.4794 0.4633 0,6892
6159 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6429 0.6285 0.6266
6162 0.8897 0.8544 0.8420 0.7933 0.7545 0.8395 0.8523 0,5594 0.5549 0.7985 0.7562 0.7021 0,6776 0,5659 0.6440 0.2584 0.2168 0.2013 0.2155 0,2189
6163 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5165 0.5521 0.5727 1.0000
6172 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0,9426 0,4509 0.3454 0.3628 0.3499 0.3518 0.9059 0.9228 0.9374
6199 0.6810 0.6529 0,6416 0,6246 0.5692 0.5271 0.4349 0,4240 0.3943 0,3822 0,3805 0.3915 0,4065 0,4035 0.4056 0.3915 0,3970 0.4090 0.3826 0.3781
6200 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7091 0,7211 0.7302
6211 0.6756 0.6729 0.6922 0.6119 0,6927 0,7036 0.6358 0,6092 0.5888 0.5245 0.4343 0.3445 0.3385 0.3879 0.3432 0.3216 0.2864 0.1842 0,1534 0.1611
6282 0.5645 0.4465 0.5315 0.4783 0.4197 0.4305 0.2736 0.2600 0.2712 0.2974 0,1996 0.1949 0.1806 0.2081 0.1713 0.1920 0.1464 0,1463 0.1466 0.1525
6311 0.1825 0.2282 0.2324 0.2424 0.3743 0.3271 0.2935 0.2851 0.1646 0.1559 0.1502 0.1464 0,1341 0.1349 0.1478 0.1701 0.1326 0.1180 0.1226 0,1135
6321 0.5376 0.5389 0,5401 0.5336 0.5477 0.5733 0,5464 0.5236 0.4986 0.4867 0.4253 0,4075 0.3672 0.3629 0,3331 0.3095 0.2852 0,2275 0.1982 0.1962
6324 1.0000 0.8587 0.7042 0,5278 0.4571 0.4160 0.3850 0,4101 0.2654 0.1968 0.1440 0.1131 0.1121
6331 0.1292 0.1285 0.1259 0.1237 0.1155 0,1137 0.1100 0.1516 0.1412 0,1366 0.1182 0.1050 0.0933 0.0853 0,0825 0.0834 0,0819 0,0785 0.0688 0.0785
6351 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8869 0.5114 0.4922 0.4792 0.4627 0.4628 0.4910 0.5220 0.3000 0.2794 0,2561 0.1691 0.1493 0.1274 0.1039 0.1033
6361 0.7438 0.7450 0,7615 0.7416 0.8538 0.7509 0.7662 0.7577 0.3470 0.3498 0.3812 0.3685 0.4055 0,3841 0.3788 0,4068 0,3915 0,3659 0.3384 0.3483
6399 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
6411 0.4412 0.4400 0.4351 0.4210 0.4064 0.4221 0.4279 0,4147 0.3844 0.3780 0.3683 0.3690 0.3698 0.3575 0,3392 0.2594 0.2223 0.2132 0.2149 0.2155
6510 0.5160 0.6597 0.6082 0.5693 0.5096 0.5713 0.5010 0.6656 0.4400 0.3988 0.7343 0.4420 0.5428 0.5192 0.5572 0.4933 0.6163 0.6457 0,6317 0.4058
6512 0.4614 0.5905 0.4436 0,4304 0.4220 0.4344 0.4190 0.4033 0.3979 0.3916 0,3707 0.3647 0,3385 0.2851 0.2705 0,2154 0,2227 0,2825 0,2944 0.2974
6531 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.7599 0,6739 0.6214
6532 0.6729 0.6564 0.5954 0.5440 0.5349 0.5267 0,5302 0.5000 0.5011 0.5158 1.0000 0.6350 0.5307 0.5889 0,5996 0.5183 0.5114 0.6167 0.6290 0.8465
6552 0.9365 0.9080 0.8226 0.8656 0.8402 0.8196 0,4814 0,4253 0.4250 0.3900 0,4006 0,3139 0,3117 0,3077 0.3244 0,3274 0.3145 0.2909 0.2721 0,4257
6726
6792 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6036 0,3141 0,2855 0.2925 0,1632 0,1765 0,1669 0,1689 0.1714 0,1734 0.2246 0,2178 0,1376 0.1243 0.1055
6794 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.9721 0,8559 0,4528 0,4319 0,6927 0,7785 0.7784 0.7680 0,5272 0.4937 0,5185 0,6108 0,6300


















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
6798 0.5772 0.5830 0.5589 0.4153 0.3884 0.3008 0.0729 0.0472 0,0443 0.0440 0.0366 0,0300 0.0557 0.0747 0.0550 0.0430 0,0385 0.0330 0.0185 0,0153
6799 0.5560 0.6054 0.6335 0.6310 0.4448 0.3528 0.3473 0,4739 0.4818 0,4838 0.6163 0.5198 0,5900 0.7007 0.8198 0,6771 0.4084 0.2216 0,2238 0.3233
7011 0.5129 0,4808 0,4576 0.4593 0,4505 0.4295 0,4105 0,3990 0.2980 0,2731 0.2372 0.2593 0.2284 0.2262 0.2260 0.2902 0,2504 0.2774 0.2575 0.2805
7200 0.2465 0.2521 0.2060 0.2092 0.2066 0.2137 0.1871 0.1681 0.1748 0.1789 0.2087 0.2115 0.2153 0.2182 0.2238 0,2280 0.1940 0.1977 0.1771 0,2440
7310 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.6153 0.5018 0.5076 0.4212 0,4060 0.3790 0,3920
7311 0,3493 0.3421 0.3499 0.3522 0.3543 0.3401 0.3309 0.3455 0.2786 0.2613 0,2395 0,2285 0,2459 0.2482 0.2524 0.2442 0.2443 0,2468 0.2431 0.3235
7320 0.5138 0.5319 0.5334 0.5274 0.4928 0.4928 0,4993 0.4808 0,5166 0,5173 0.5368 0,5199 0,4675 0.3990 0,4244 0,4373 0.4387 0.4251 0,4247 0.4420
7331 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0,9725 0,9730 0.9808 0.9774 0,9740 0.9754 0.9750 0.8555 0.8313
7340 0.5251 0.5249 0.5248 0.5283 0.5285 0.5280 0.5312 0.5360 0.5005 0,4952 0.4921 0.4892 0.4877 0.4845 0.4765 0,4700 0.4628 0.4498 0,4082 0.4414
7350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
7359 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8359 0.7828 0.7382 0.3632 0.3436 0.3105 0,2649 0.2537 0.6527 0.6978 0,6297 0.6357 0.5975 0.5589 0.4813 0,4447 0.2432
7361 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
7363 0.2455 0.2534 0.3044 0.3039 0.3062 0,2997 0.2907 0.2776 0.2616 0.2709 0.2696 0,2551 0,2056 0.2613 0,2503 0.2566 0.2433 0.2433 0.2138 0.2407
7370 1.0000 1.0000 0.7153 0.5445 0,4338 0.4857 0.4998 0.4970 0.5460 0.5269 0.7996 0.8974 0.8803 0.8689 0,8861 0.8101 0.8097 0.7905 0.7652 0.8833
7371 0.5098 0.4287 0.3705 0.3491 0.3141 0.2184 0,2051 0.2233 0.2348 0.2348 0.2366 0.2283 0.2248 0.2250 0,2223 0,2146 0,2208 0.2250 0,2056 0.3423
7372 0.3898 0.4022 0,4045 0.4215 0.4792 0.4090 0.3583 0,1763 0.1217 0,1237 0.0988 0.0887 0.1069 0.1050 0,0977 0.0880 0.0886 0.0955 0.1031 0.1567
7373 0.2522 0.2297 0.2181 0.2138 0.2174 0.2124 0.1975 0.2024 0.1951 0.1609 0.1567 0.1561 0.1484 0.1682 0.1555 0.1678 0.1648 0.1786 0.1772 0,1147
7374 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.9237 0.9196 0.9225 0.8847 0.8511 0.7908 0.7519 0.7198 0.6780 0,6563 0,6406 0,3807 0.3709 0.3599 0,3779
7377 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.7810 0.7412 0.6442 0.6287 0.6387 0,6743 0.6979 0,7087 0.8535
7380 1.0000 1.0000 0.5010 0.5010 0,5097 0.5001 0.5551 0,5771 0,4891 0.4868 0.5392 0,5872
7381 0.8893 0.8943 0.8963 0.8985 0.9019 0.8833 0.8697 0.8755 0.8816 0.8757 0.8480 0.8416 0.7974 0.7346 0,5092 0,5130 0.4960 0.4031 0.4052 0.3911
7384 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000
7385 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5409 0.5296 1.0000
7389 0.6124 0.5509 0.4576 0.4493 0.3351 0.3772 0,3482 0.2948 0.2981 0.2712 0.2470 0.2352 0.2054 0.2136 0.2138 0,2187 0,2129 0.2215 0.2199 0,3126
7500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
7510 0.6084 0.6168 0.5564 0.5529 0.5433 0,5288 0.5363 0.5247 0,5611 0,5123 0,5124 0,4985 0,5122 0.5384 0,5158 0.5085 0.5109 0.4983 0.4529 0,7742
7600 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6958 0.6559 0.6768 0.6993 0.5963 0,7122 0,5196 0.5088 0.6341 0.6700 0.6829 0,4243 0.3547 0.2987 0.2557 0.5920
7812 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.9868 0.9721 0.9751 1,0000
7819 ... 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8205 0,8149 0,7448 0,6247 0.6319 0,6815 0.8284 0.8498 0,7900 0,7550 0,7954 0.8882
7822 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,9779 0.8793 0.7553 0,6544 0.5085 0,5137 0.4941 0,6510 0.5270 0,5086 0,5061
7830 -, - 0.9016 0,9317 0.8295 0.3749 0,4017 0.4162 0.4516 0.4399 0.4120 0.3961 0.2770 0.2697 0.3408


















The Herfindahl Index by  Industry for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
7948 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8411 0.8172 0,5317 0.4260 0.3711 0.3615 0.3600 0,3568 0,3491 0,3508 0.3875 0.4130 0.3854
7990 0.4664 0.4959 0.4850 0.4002 0.3711 0.4228 0.3868 0.3572 0.2941 0.2885 0.2620 0.2265 0,2810 0.2032 0.1711 0.1557 0.1289 0.1253 0.1077 0.0986
7997 1.0000 1.0000
8000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.9831 0.9787 0.9696 0.9757
8011 0.5258 0.5659 0.3368 0.6486 0.6388 0.6255 0.6451 0.4350 0.4787 0.4784 0.5013 0.5631
8051 0.5280 0.4438 0.4276 0.4876 0.4945 0.5278 0.4791 0.4780 0.5196 0.5358 0.5536 0.5718 0.5203 0.3324 0.3204 0.2395 0.1979 0.1889 0.1687 0.2104
8060 0.4860 0.4902 0.4603 0.4426 0,4463 0.4356 0.4333 0.4357 0.4358 0,4145 0.4243 0.4498 0.4267 0,4026 0.4429 0.4190 0.3358 0.2981 0.2587 0.2489
8062 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8708 0,8614 0.8377 0,7922 0.7867 0.7837 0.7353 0.5858 0.6030 0.6107 0.5015 0.4683 0.4045 0,5002 0,6372
8071 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5630 0.5620 0.4812 0.3480 0.3512 0.4975 0.5164 0.5056 0.5300 0,5407 0,5446 0.5955
8082 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0,5483 0.6669 0.5209 0.5407 0,4824 0.3951 0.3145 0,2751 0.3172 0.2487 0.2121 0.1673 0.1632 0.1666 0.1730
8090 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8236 0.5346 0.4684 0,3561 0.3487 0.3481 0.3430 0,4367 0.4724 0.5139
8093 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.5227 0.4265 0.3288 0,3364 0,4130 0.4618 0,5145 0,5666 0.5659 0.5624 0.7384
8200 0.3683 0.3677 0.3371 0.3231 0.2952 0.3460 0.2995 0.2308 0.2344 0.2279 0,2178 0.2263 0.3079 0.2559 0,1894 0,1836 0,1914 0.1932 0.1647 0.1569
8300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1,0000 1.0000 0.9209 0.9199
8700 0,9491 0.9486 0.9422 0.9395 0.9515 0,9526 0.9531 0,8837 0.8642 0.8799 0.8385 0.8398 0.8367 0.8489 0.8369 0.8332 0.8082 0.7842 0,7596 0.8105
8711 0.2132 0.2213 0.2384 0.2427 0.2553 0.2512 0.2464 0.2357 0.2600 0.2779 0.2663 0,2326 0.2352 0,2349 0.2358 0.2662 0.2677 0,2334 0.2027 0,1836
8731 0.7630 0.6823 0.5799 0.5403 0.5218 0.5188 0.3553 0,4306 0.3863 0,3774 0.4498 0.4759 0.4771 0.2899 0.2956 0,3088 0,2871 0.3897 0,4586 0.7423
8734 1.0000 0.5027 0,3563 0,3690 0,3639 0,4195 0.5109 0.5380 0.4297 0,7404
8741 0.7052 0.7399 0.7991 0.8742 0.8807 0.8830 0.8918 0.9037 0.9232 0.8953 0.8867 0.8827 0,8903 0.8791 0.8668 0.8492 0.8193 0.7646 0.7425 0.7514
8742 0.5255 0.6199 0.6338 0.5867 0.5539 0.5288 0,5000 0.5304 0,5712 0,6069 0,7649 0,9091 0.7058 0.9723 0.5512 0.5168 0.5008 0.5241 0.5483 0,5371
8744 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0,4893 0,4295 0,3672 0,3403 0.3435 0.2796 0.3071 0.3770 0.4152 0.3649
9995 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.6436 0.6768 0.7020 1.0000
MED 0.5478 0.5381 0.5315 0,5283 0.5222 0.5206 0.5087 0.5040 0.5000 0.4897 0.4612 0.4521 0.4553 0.4359 0,4260 0.4203 0,4084 0.3868 0.3851 0.4257


















Industry Median Values for Tobin’s q for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0100 1.0151 1.2072 0.7913 0.8164 0.7678 0.9078 1.0447 0.8092 1.2436 1.0946 1.3650 1.1403 0.7442 0,9635 1.1919 0.9976 1,0568 0.8689 0,8674 0.9182
0200 0.3691 1.3889 1,3832 0.9483 1,1066 0.9687 0.7343 0.6881 0.7302
0700 2.8933 7.3201 5.0909 4,3395
0800 1.0660 1.4749 1.0314 1.1021 1.0372 0.8863 1.0547 1.2300 1.1694 1.1620
1000 0.6939 0.7327 0.4220 0,6630 0.7338 0.5792 0.5435 0.3669 0,5217 0.5419 0.5163 0.4839 0.5966 0.7814 0.9049 0.4756 0,6778 0.7062 0.6590 0.8071
1040 0.8747 0.7515 0.7538 0.6129 1.1964 1.4339 0.7951 0.7710 1.4883 1.1017 1,3713 1,4353 1.7675 1.1309 1,4184 1.1522 0.9223 0.9657 1.7248 1.3529
1090 1.7777 3.0317 6.5104 3.4179 8,4088 2.4867 1.2743 0.8967 1.0020 1.6010 1.1380 2.0096 1.6582 1.8801 2,0347 0.7774 0.5874 0.7501 0.4403 0.7809
1220 1.0289 1.4077 0.9901 0.5950 0.6193 0.5422 0.5301 0.3158 0.4445 0,3937 0.4691 0,4250 0.5053 0,5081 0.6592 0,6968 0.8192 0 ,5756 0.4300 0.5736
1221 0.4470 1.3205 0.8388 1,0407 0.7968 0,7635 0,9538 0.9452 0.8768
1311 0.8498 1.1042 1.0154 0.9303 1,5093 1.6605 1.1044 0.8226 0.9822 0.8484 0.7499 0.7938 0.8476 0.8810 0.9983 0,9215 0,9456 0.9904 1.1232 1.0983
1381 0.7302 0.7550 0.7366 0.8764 1,0783 1.6388 1.1457 0.6958 0.6984 0.6487 0.4914 0.4509 1.0030 0.7623 1.2868 0.9866 0.7572 0.6730 1.0600 0.8994
1382 0.8349 0.6272 0.6304 0.6213 0,5583 1.0041 1.2747 0.5002 0.8083 0.5505 0.6096 0.3506 0.7016 0,5097 0.8598 0.5943 0.9977 0.9997 1.1899 1.2667
1389 0.7748 0.7265 0.6396 0.7430 0,9504 2.0128 1,5120 0.8209 0.8848 0,7713 0.7387 0.8632 0.8651 0,8581 1.7925 1.6113 1.2037 1.3680 1.4431 1.0877
1400 0.4012 0.4736 0.5827 0.5500 0.5405 0.6560 0.4704 0.4379 0.4259 0.5320 0.5835 0.7674 0,9142 1,0355 1.0203 0.7356 0.7429 0.8663 0.9224 1.0468
1531 0.5468 0.6279 0.6166 0.5667 0.5422 0.6118 0.6934 0.6992 0.9625 0.6891 0.6026 0.7914 0.7579 0.8611 0.7951 0.7324 0.7969 0.6990 0.8441 0.7264
1540 0.1677 0.1192 0.1095 0.0780 0.1441 0.1952 0.2688 0,1969 0.2171 0.2548 0.3267 0,2923 0,2825 0.4577 0,5330 0,2290 0,4005 0.4288 0.6742 0.5853
1600 0.7672 0.5859 0.6647 0.5772 0,6271 1.2549 0.6961 0.5555 0.4927 0,3745 0.3662 0.4110 0.4160 0.6978 0.6069 0.6525 0,8193 0.7103 0.9196 0.8254
1623 0.4526 0.2851 0.5256 0.5004 0.5990 0.6941 0.4709 0,4720 0.3638 0,4222 0.7718 0.7346 1,2704 0,9358 0.9546 0,9623 0.7639 0.3852 0.6106 0.4971
1700 0.3034 0.2130 0.4333 0.5225 0.6276 0,9522 0.9494 0.9275 1.1958 0.8721 1.0890 1,0597 0,7440 0.8124 0.7657 0.9018 1.0136 0,8511 0.7018 0.5241
1731 1.6760 0.3961 0.2278 0.3196 0.2232 0.6332 0.0805 0,0961 0,1193 1.9463 2.6235
2000 0.3190 0.2927 0.3674 0.2791 0.2505 0.2277 0.2353 0.2523 0.2756 0.3070 0,4041 0.6470 0.7574 0,6039 1.0651 0.8759 1.2910 1.3576 1.2342 1.2159
2011 0.2115 0.2714 0.2633 0.2999 0.2865 0.4565 0.4181 0.5075 0,5037 0.4610 0,5784 0.7584 0.7056 0.6695 0.7813 0.9240 0.7520 0,8109 0.8736 0,9894
2013 0.4292 0.4010 0.4029 0.3234 0.3677 0.3472 0.4352 0.4429 0.3688 0.3059 0,7247 0.7021 0,8152 0.8028 0.8496 0,6724 0.8052 0,7599 0.9685 0.7835
2015 0,2368 0,1817 0.2257 0.4360 0.3668 0.3513 0,3346 0.3797 0.4970 0,4251 0.7811 0.8344 0.8489 0,6536 0.7701 0.4573 0.4981 0.6566 0.7375 0.7259
2020 0.1741 0.4706 0.4407 0.4656 0,3383 0.6578 0,5889 0.9621 1.1237 1,2193 1.6866 1.6410 1.2351 1.0225 1.0130 1.2272 0.8605 1.1983 0.9555 0.9241
2024 *,* 4.2096 6,6770 2.5389 2,2346 4.1039 3.6648 2,5783 2,2571 3.0493 1.0355 1.7585 2.1304 1.5981 1,2334
2030 0.3059 0.2905 0.4028 0.4751 0,4191 0.4328 0,4750 0.5282 0,6094 0.7359 0,8838 1.1683 0,9405 0.8450 0.8048 0.8301 0.6378 1.2688 1.5020 1.4136
2033 0.2011 0.1942 0.1444 0.1355 0.0982 0,2071 0.3042 0.6858 0.5151 0.7517 1.1206 1.1054 1,0586 1,0592 1,1699 1,3306 1.5532 1,1735 0,8810 0,2402
2040 1.0068 0.8855 0.9024 0.6845 0.6123 0.5915 0.5330 0.7732 0.8332 1,0841 1.6274 1,4860 1.6877 1,5870 1.6569 1,7604 1,6069 1,3883 1,3919 1.3745
2050 0.5952 0.7007 0.7479 0,6808 0.6122 0.5532 0.5255 0.6878 0.4407 0.6937 0.9439 0.8761 0,9855 1,1508 0.9472 0.6863 0,9549 0.8303 0.8084 0,8689
2052 1.3947 1,2132 1.1830 1.1443 1.2876 1.1152 1.0865 1.6486 1.4971 1.4707 1.1165 1.6891 1,6651 1.7366 1.9890 1.2911 1.5005 1,3524 1.0075 1.0600


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s p fo r  1975-1994
cn
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2070 0.9506 0,9368 0.4121 0.4032 0.6351 0.7816 0.5882 0.4222 0.6958 0.4273 1.8741 0.9919 1.1264 0.9391 0.9220 1,1513 1.1769 1.6198 2.1678 2.3381
2080 0.3838 0.5898 0.6209 0.9718 0.6795 0,8534 0.9225 0.9428 0.6673 0.7345 1.0037 0.9835 0.9110 1.3045 1.4726 1.5078 1.5120 1.2502 1,2715 1.0491
2082 1.4156 0.9483 0.6002 0.5661 0.5260 0.5884 0.5563 0.6824 0.7000 0.6467 0.8628 0.9385 0.9832 0.9112 0.3496 0,8258 0,8145 1.3379 0.8456 0.8723
2086 0.6016 0.4194 0.4545 0.4697 0,3942 0.4098 0.6191 0.8351 0.4735 0.6316 0.6543 0.9007 0,9674 1.0273 1.2919 1,0620 0.9997 0.9410 1.2293 1.1036
2090 0.2719 0.2641 0.5508 0.5383 0.5264 0.4740 0.7754 1.1922 1.2504 0.8496 0.7907 0,9859 0.6590 0.6798 0.9053 0,8204 0.7148 1,2634 0,9270 0.6640
2100 0.5848 0.7211 0.7559 0.6593 0.6182 0.6746 1.3377 0.9445 1.4436 1.2382 1.0776 1.2244 1.3355 1.9508 2.7449 3 ,0990 5.2794 4.9575 4,0324 3.7697
2111 0.5102 0.5142 0.4504 0.4185 0.5086 0.5587 0.5142 0,5865 0.7098 0.7645 0.7524 0.9322 0.7868 0.9465 0,7910 0.6027 0.7904 0.7104 0.6105 0.7676
2200 0.3138 0.3598 0.3007 0.2343 0.2870 0.2847 0.5881 0.3334 0.5495 0.3250 0.4121 0.6433 0.5854 0,6526 0.5786 0,6857 1.0494 0,9366 1,2385 0.7245
2211 0.2359 0.2230 0.2442 0.1232 0.1647 0.2215 0.0845 0.1752 0.2163 0.2637 0,3116 0,4375 0.3759 0,3483 0.3798 0.3092 0,4417 0,7163 0.7365 0.5735
2221 0.6113 0.3157 0.3481 0.7504 0.2696 0.4721 0.7147 0.6741 0.7429 0.5725 0.5698 0.6281 0.7817 0,5597 0,7477 0,4953 0,6967 0.7431 0,8041 0.8449
2250 0.1277 0.0578 0.1765 0.2309 0.0631 0.2225 0,6353 0.2513 0,2827 0.2157 0.2110 0.4977 0.4413 0,2952 0,4697 0.2313 0,8458 0.7352 0.6769 0.6397
2253 0.0440 0.0198 0.1176 0.0733 0.1371 0.1686 0.1775 0.4723 0.4444 0.4382 0.4162 0.9310 0.4157 0,2539 0.4112 0.6265 1.5253 0,5654 0,8519 1.0311
2273 0,3427 0.3491 0.5491 0.4078 0.2788 0.2173 0.2321 0.1322 0,6405 0,3456 0.7720 0.8782 0,7645 0.6898 0.7930 0,4567 0.4570 0,7273 0.9990 0,5844
2300 0.1504 0.3011 0.3262 0.2744 0.0444 0.0873 0,0923 0.1589 0.3931 0.2410 0.3793 0.5226 0.3115 0,4918 0,4828 0,7449 0.4306 0.8697 0.8966 0.4811
2320 0.2286 0.3779 0,3114 0.3502 0.1859 0.3824 0.3493 0.7667 0.3196 0.2818 0.4756 0.4030 0.2485 0.3407 0.4022 0.5813 0.7775 0,5490 0.4667 0.3804
2330 0.3095 0.4516 0.3417 0.5625 0.6086 0,5324 0.2967 0.3065 0.7336 0.6634 0.6268 0.8066 0,7734 0.4483 0.4892 0.4429 0.5173 0.4173 0.4217 0.4584
2340 0.0122 0.0441 0.0449 0.0044 0.3026 0.3365 0.6456 0.3614 0.5065 0,8098 0.5549 0.5199 0.6265 0.5268 0.6844 0.8636 0.6477 0.6303
2390 0.2087 0.3072 0.0473 0.1712 0,1992 0.0691 0.0012 0,3087 0,2288 0,2261 0.2408 0,3805 0.1822 0,3139 0.1100 0.0119 0.5733 0.9831 0.4943
2400 0.7413 0.8820 0.6503 0.5437 0.5097 0,4934 0.4516 0.5176 0.4617 0.4664 0.4738 0.5478 0.4472 0.4080 0.4016 0.4064 0,4314 0.3927 1.0224 0.9454
2421 0.6062 0.6837 0.4962 0.4494 0,4821 0,5896 0.5058 0.7001 0,6818 0,6480 0.6455 1.0307 0.8683 0.5840 0.7731 0,6477 0.8366 1.1222 0.8387 1.0721
2430 0.1930 0.2883 0,6353 0.1037 0.1483 0.7093 0.6561 0.9317 0.8365 0.7287 0.7099 0.8704 0,4520 1.0021 0.4500 0.2305 0.3389 0.4958 0.6541 0.4743
2451 1.1595 0.7366 0.7690 0.2371 0.4393 0.8088 0.5292 1.6420 0.9942 0.5595 0,5750 0.4204 0.4466 0.4658 0.4299 0.4840 0.6877 0.9448 1.1729 1.2219
2452 0.4868 0.5495 0,3312 0,2367 0.2197 0.2720 0.4119 0.7023 0.5463 0.2840 0.3547 0.3087 0.2713 0.4083 0.3966 0.5610 0,6355 0.4361 0,4580 0.1786
2510 0.3093 0.2945 0,2535 0.2667 0.1431 0.1718 0.2212 0.2856 0.7886 0.5444 0.9495 0.9901 0,5798 0.7618 0.6728 0.5935 0.6560 0.7228 1.1572 0.7056
2511 0.2422 0.2235 0.1049 0.1327 0.1041 0,1567 0.1308 0.1216 0.4323 0,5225 0.5759 0.7680 0.4396 0.5810 0.3959 0,2902 0.3268 0,6511 0,9108 0.7474
2520 0.1164 0.3250 0.4803 0,5804 0.4132 0.5273 0.6072 0.6876 0.9350 1.2955 1.4297 1,0922 1.1676 0,8893 0.8624 0.9014 0.8354 0.9890 1.0064 0.6507
2522 0,5418 0.7090 0.7780 0.8819 0,8891 1.1447 0.7523 1.3088 0.9402 0.8445 1,1433 1.2732 1.0960 0.7926 1.4958 1,0461 1.2452 1,3981 1.4336 2,1408
2531 0.0481 0.0348 0.3279 0,3007 0.2897 0.2974 0.2181 0,2365 0.2468 0,3050 0.3768 0.3154 0,1938 0.3380 0.4394 0.3465 0,4355 0,6272 0.5241 0.6822
2540 0.4359 0.4949 0.4619 0.3774 0.1410 0.1423 0.1158 0.0682 0,5439 0,3987 0.5770 1.0783 0,8602 0,5524 0.5210 0,4074 0.4907 0,7318 0.6530 0,7312
2590 0.5548 0.4043 0,3063 0.4922 0,5094 0.4431 0,6056 0,8927 1,0333 1,0406 1,5993 1,5289 1.2952 1.0542 1,1707 0.7517 0.9460 1,2322 1.2817 0,7493
2600 0.4066 0.4998 0.5145 0.5293 0,5292 0.5593 0,5184 0.5288 0,7792 0,6523 0,8173 0,8555 0.8776 0.8758 0.7977 0.6347 0.4349 0,5968 0.7881 0.6334


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q for 1975-1994
O)
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2621 0.5529 0.6055 0.4706 0.5313 0.5300 0,5502 0.4794 0.5730 0.6438 0.5926 0.7031 0,8822 0.8183 0,7457 0.8111 0.6465 0.7453 0.7656 0.8627 0.8326
2631 0.5038 0.6422 0.6012 0.6149 0.6964 0.6319 0.7030 0.6988 0.9146 0.7223 0.8193 0.9549 0.9406 0.8633 0.7380 0,6414 0.7542 0.7705 0.7987 0.9277
2650 0.6794 0.8959 0.8576 1.2849 1.1032 1.2927 0.9960 0.8518 0.9331 0,8454 0.4805 0.8174 0.6992 0.8451 0.7403 0.5989 0.6490 0.7232 0.6718 0.6019
2670 0.3447 0.4170 0.3146 0.2671 0,2888 0.3180 0.3568 0.3543 0.5467 0.4735 0.5064 0.5607 0,6547 0.9039 1.0559 0.7513 0,8469 0.9079 1,1993 1.1705
2673 0.0065 .  . .  - 0.0572 0,3097 0.3756 0.3302 0,2679 0.3225 0.4691 0.8014
2711 0.8131 0.9270 0.9420 1.0368 1.0274 0.9771 0,9692 1,4548 1.4931 1,4746 1.7428 1.6507 1.6340 1.3828 1,4254 1.1027 1,1973 1.3448 1,4456 1.4360
2721 0.2533 0.1168 0.3059 0.6780 0.7155 0.5619 0.6861 0.8815 1.0970 0.8366 1.5333 1.2158 0.9566 0.8644 0.8882 0.7113 0.6597 0.8552 1.0763 0.9466
2731 0.0908 0.1257 0.2683 0.3437 0.2047 0.3747 0.4177 1.0170 0,7215 0,6935 0.7720 1.0944 0.7063 1.2247 1.0587 0,8477 0,9908 1,1039 1.3298 1.2542
2732 _ . 0.0595 0.3468 0.2108 0.2168 0.2206 0.0893 0.2228 0.3350 0.4900 0.4972 0.5097 0,5906 0.4726 0.3749 0.3297 0.2751 0,4070 0.4095
2741 1.1847 0.7506 1.1151 0.9228 1.1897 0.6978 0,7168 0,7422 0.6850 1.3390 1.2398
2750 0.2020 0.1820 0.2711 0.3622 0.3602 0.3898 0.3241 0.6307 0,8290 0.7890 0.9401 0.9900 0,7243 0,7305 0.7434 0.6161 0.8358 0.8858 0,8391 0.7271
2761 0.5983 0.5641 0.3613 0.2939 0.4715 0.4943 0.3880 0.6135 0.9124 0,8388 1.3508 1,0323 0.9772 0.7950 0,9906 0,5649 0,6834 0.8971 0.8310 0.7005
2771 0.3775 0.1240 0.1923 0.2107 0.1447 0.2346 0.3585 0.3025 0,9038 0.9499 0,9346 0.6521 0.4314 0.5902 0.7437 0.6628 0.7264 0.7435 0.9454 0.6272
2780 1.2907 0.7363 0.7753 0.7898 0.9620 1,3474 1.2087 1.5112 1,4653 1.6317 2.0889 2.5189 1.8084 1.8649 1.7068 1,1923 1.7110 1.8757 1.4472 1,6558
2790 0.1320 1,5413 0.7796 0.8907 0,7247 0,4640 0,5490 1.1950 0.9619 -.-
2800 0.3699 0.3913 0.3304 0,3247 0.3439 0.3422 0.3540 0.3526 0,4845 0,4509 0.5880 0.7725 0,7701 0.6883 0.8333 0,6191 0.7645 0,7597 0.7001 0.8098
2810 0.9696 0.8792 0.6989 0.6561 0.7826 1.1801 0.7394 0,6085 0,7037 0.6284 0.5860 0.6991 1.0851 0,8367 1.0770 0.8226 0,8265 1.0932 0.9778 0.9710
2820 0.9265 0.9026 0,7196 0.6250 0.5007 0.5159 0,4374 0.4156 0.5480 0,5042 0.6479 0.5406 1,0789 1.3247 1.2628 0,8216 0.9865 0.9068 0,8837 1.0470
2821 0.2616 0.3354 0.2681 0,3022 0.4065 0.3139 0.4045 0.5090 0.6873 0.6016 0.6270 0,7214 0.8091 0.9324 0.6961 0.6584 0.7849 0.5942 1.0508 1.1241
2833 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -,- -,- -.- -.- -.- -.- 1.5515 2.7024 1,5251 1.6428 0.5615 -.-
2834 1.2914 1.1227 0.9659 1.0613 0.9229 1.1377 1,4091 1.4527 1.4779 1.4679 1.9437 2,2276 1.8955 1,9564 2.3398 1.9526 2,8572 2.2142 2,2609 1.7189
2835 0.7685 0.6202 0.6642 0.5536 0.6423 2,1262 0.9801 2,0992 2,1532 1.4093 2,1530 1.8865 1.3069 1.4750 1,7183 2,0177 2.8342 2,2436 1.7310 2,3716
2836 0.1871 0.6911 0.4520 2,4644 0.9697 1,9168 1.0582 1,2442 1.0532 1.0932 2,1550 1.2565 1.3682 1.6091 2.0812 3.0222 3,1285 2.7161 2.4897 1.8166
2840 0.5068 0.7682 0.6201 0.4758 0.5318 0,5538 0.5488 0,5453 0.7950 0.6954 0,8323 0.9560 0.8325 0.9432 0.9372 0.8841 1,0409 1.2363 1.3106 1.1315
2842 0.9651 0.8920 0.8252 0.7232 0.6657 0.5445 0.5024 0.8717 1.1774 0.8838 1.1130 1.1547 1,2943 0.9406 1.3820 1.3891 1.1213 1.2643 1.7331 1.3751
2844 0.6214 0.5544 0.3369 0.2917 0.2138 0.2242 0.3317 0.3478 0.6030 0.7515 1.0759 1.0430 0.9008 0,9243 0,8642 0.9482 0.9465 1.1032 0.9752 1.6204
2851 0,3276 0.2594 0.3629 0,2995 0.2786 0.3795 0.3763 0.4161 0.6950 0,5661 0.7513 0.9339 0.8050 0,9053 0.8545 0.8012 0.8869 1.0988 1.2707 0.9552
2860 0.5874 0,5639 0.3819 0.3407 0.4143 0,3936 0.4275 0.6868 0.6724 0.5718 0.8436 0.7894 0,6345 0,8613 0.9852 1,0065 1.1805 1.0851 1.1191 1.2122
2870 0.3860 0.3445 0,3803 0.4333 0,3419 0.7016 0.6432 0.3442 0.1504 0.5451 0.3797 0,6022 0,7840 0.9196 0.8043 0,7490 0.7016 0.6836 0.8717 0,8220
2890 1.5212 1.5072 1.0814 1,0701 1.2553 1.5969 1.1696 1.2246 1.3823 1.5721 1.3743 1,3989 0.8517 0.9979 0.9663 1,0157 1.0615 1.0724 1.2981 1,6234
2891 1.2852 1.1576 1.0590 1.1549 0.2954 0.6103 0.8435 0.6097 1.1449 0,4310 0,4872 0.7505 0.6491 1,3713 1.7912 1.0070 0.8258 0,8111 1.0167 0.6013


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s <7 for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2950 0.6263 0.6477 0.3989 0.5590 0.5068 0.5426 0.6376 0.5686 0,8475 0,3575 1.0587 0.8748 0.7535 0,5219 0.5731 0.5163 0.5300 0.5905 1.2044 1.0762
2990 0.1973 0.4250 0.2398 0.4597 0.4099 0.3405 0.5278 0,4740 0,6398 0.5713 0.5663 0.5915 0,5952 0.5020 0.4790 0.5342 0.5641 0.5906 0.3928 0.8085
3011 1.4134 0.3594 0.3855 0.3094 0.1584 0.2091 0.1868 0.5278 0.4142 0,4198 0,4926 0.6569 0.6595 0,9391 1,1180 1.0224 3,0194 3.0265 1.5086 1.1028
3021 1,4462 1.1211 0.9066 0,2898 0.4088 0.4671 0.7336 0.6214 0.9874 1.9847 0.4887 1,8040 1.3474 1.0886 1.0364
3050 0.6541 0.2633 0.3229 0.3315 0.2043 0.3862 0,2053 0.5565 0.6802 0.6417 0.7964 0.6546 0.4104 0.4884 0.5089 0.4719 0.6416 0.6694 0.6660 0.6510
3060 0.1961 0.2600 0.3806 0.3085 0.3607 0.6886 0,9987 1.0274 0.5702 0.5626 0.6600 0.6185 0.4491 0.5863 0.5511 0.4028 0.6742 0.6846 1.0090 0,9375
3080 0.6186 0.6679 0.3620 0.3095 0.4468 0.3511 0.3211 0,3977 0.4744 0.2947 0.4653 0.6612 0.5464 0.6251 0.7283 0.4879 0.5539 0.7049 0.6769 0.6374
3081 0.1540 0.4080 0.3978 0.2456 0.2285 0.3030 0.4911 0.8046 1,1997 1,1955 0,6342 0.9881 0.8599 0.6144 0.7082 0.7141 0.9147 0.7128 0.7942 0.8665
3089 0.7713 0.8234 0.4459 0.4219 0.4424 0.3099 0.2997 0.4715 1.1205 1.0462 1,3065 1.0363 0.9303 0,7562 0,8350 0,7159 1.0192 1.3229 1.3234 1.0845
3100 0.1129 0.1925 0.0251 0.1515 0.3280 0.2924 0.2485 0.3540 0.3360 0.2968 0.1342 0,4356 0.3076 0.6598 0.5736
3140 0.1077 0.1645 0.1308 0.1464 0.1682 0.1926 0.2442 0,4646 0.4241 0.2585 0.3822 0.4389 0.6166 0.4596 0.4131 0.3081 0.2856 0.4828 0,7983 0.5355
3220 0.7561 1.0987 0.6837 0.5974 0.5763 0.6290 0.5244 0,7665 0.8044 0.7774 1,3121 1.0210 0.7715 1.0905 1,2557 1.2259 1.9818 1.6408 1,5460 1.4807
3221 0.5459 0.4630 0.4052 0.3196 0.3240 0,3283 0.3074 0,3158 0.3779 0.4441 0,5995 1,0003 1,1378 0,6257 0.6902 0.4211 0.8203 0.6931 0.6855 0.7134
3231 -  ,  - 0.2666 0.1457 0.0775 0.1356 0,0188 0.4506 0,5450 0.3445 0,3985 0.6911 0.7126 0.5152
3241 0,3718 0.5052 0.5082 0,5594 0.6208 0.6159 0,5491 0.6566 0.6262 0.5534 0.5634 0.5276 0.4853 0.7155 0.6270 0,4959 0,5630 0.6438 0,8627 0.6653
3250 0,2034 0.3324 0.0341 0.0308 0.0494 0.1516 0,0890
3260 0,1257 0.1090 0.5495 2.9710 2.3903
3270 0.3599 0,3777 0.3727 0.3897 0.3794 0.3940 0.4281 0.3506 0,5059 0.4120 0.5762 1.2391 0.8303 0.8552 1.0774 0.6851 0.6451 0.6168 0.6482 0,4449
3272 0.9142 0.5246 0,4425 0.3008 0,2807 0.2823 0,4150 0.4819 0.4807
3290 0.8327 1.0951 0.9187 0,6533 0.6024 0.5892 0,4739 0,7160 0.6468 0.8715 0.9178 1.0257 1.2728 1.0414 0,9454 0.8972 0,8839 0.5768 0.7100 0.6340
3310 0.2246 0.2950 0.1753 0.1789 0,1547 0.4203 0.4006 0,3806 0.4376 0.2440 0.5781 0.5375 0.5089 0.4482 0,5035 0.3432 0,3885 0.2781 0,5310 0.5216
3312 0.3499 0.3874 0.3655 0.2947 0.3130 0.3621 0.2984 0.3709 0.5068 0.4476 0.4681 0.4795 0.4574 0,5358 0.4611 0,4138 0,5131 0.4788 0,5924 0.5728
3317 0.2270 0.1044 0.4348 0.4681 0.4178 0.2866 0.0964 0.2064 0.3724 0.8355
3320 0.2046 0.7262 0.6674 0.6435 0,6910 0.7962 0.7055 0.6945 0.7005 0.5946 0.7296 1.2257 1.2370 0.9316 1.0401 0.8303 0.7247 0.6082 0.8933 0,5212
3330 0.6485 0.7349 0.4523 0.4943 0.6548 0.7202 0,6627 0,6735 0.8003 0.6464 0.6823 0.6114 0.8300 0.7032 0.7502 0,7090 0,8027 0.7293 0.9348 0.9545
3334 0.4640 0,5284 0.4680 0,4060 0.3830 0.4389 0.3726 0.4861 0.5896 0.4705 0.5089 0.4288 0.5435 0.4943 0.5439 0.4435 0,4909 0.4935 0.4996 0,5600
3341 0,5507 0,5985 0.7473 1.5901 1.5459 1,3809 1.2808 2.4353 1,6905 1.7427
3350 0.2417 0.2850 0.2687 0.5527 0.6273 0.9092 0.6238 0.6804 0.6402 0.5149 0.5870 0.3299 0.2788 0.1272 0.3597 0.3467 0.2307 0.2090 0.5546 0.6265
3357 0.4800 0.6366 2.0832 0.4800 1,8461 0.9996 1.0928 0.6516 0.6459 1.0516 0.7705 0.5702 0.9070 0,9851 1,1483 1.4312 0.3939 1,1660 1.8346
3360  0.2834 0.2361 0.2830 0.1929 0.0933 0.2159 0.1127 0.4602 0.4301 0.2040 0.3554 0.3768 0,1138 0,3244 0.5069 0,5534 0.7965 0.7083 0,5584 0.5348
3390  0.5474 0.5650 0,7994 0.5213 0.6232 0.9337 0.7030 0,7945 0,8635 0.5481 0.5014 0.5985 0,5325 0.5626 0.4090 0.4644 0.4234 0.3522 0,4536 0,4441


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q fo r  1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3420 0.2620 0.4014 0.3463 0.3388 0.5197 0.4594 0.4540 0,6801 0,7926 0.6006 0,6698 0.7589 0,6919 0.6153 0.5443 0,5255 0.4797 0,6125 0.7190 0,7429
3430 0.5324 0.2977 0.3908 0.4788 0.5582 0.4080
3440 0.3630 0.4685 0.2910 0.2897 0.2811 0.2904 0,3683 0.3163 0,4625 0.3656 0,5398 0.4002 0,4067 0,3574 0.5402 0.2755 0.4622 0.7503 0.7575 0.8483
3442 0.1191 0.2560 0.3682 0,4681 0.4010 0.3526 0.4597 0.4205 0.9346 0.4371 0.4470 0.4860 0,4658 0.3381 0.4239 0,3122 0.4290 0.3784 0,5832 0.4572
3443 0.0482 0.2580 0.2231 0,3769 0.3292 0,3808 0.1489 0,0709 0.3084 0.7248 0.1762 0.3267 0.3936 0.4628 0.5717 0.6279 0.2947 0.7653 0.9646 0.8408
3444 1.2284 1.6119 0.9645 0.5608
3448 0.0931 0,2293 0,1999 0,2471 0.1356 0,2108 0.2403 0.2173 0,3764 0.3367 0,3114 0.2763 0.2872 0.2504 0.3369 0.2987 0.2919 0.4529 0,5862 0.5890
3452 0.2214 0.2418 0.4519 0,3658 0.4579 0.4385 0.2803 0.1559 0.4392 0.3342 0,4452 0.5450 0,3174 0.5247 0,4204 0.2745 0,3012 0.4340 0.5820 0,3836
3460 0.3499 0.3566 0.4453 0.4940 0.5630 0.8824 0.6150 0.6290 0,8533 0.7028 0.5934 0.4889 0.5604 0,5377 0.4460 0.6231 0.3872 0.4922 0.5954 0.7956
3470 0.4847 0.4124 0.3215 0.2755 0.2238 0.3957 0.6907 0.5336 0.5913 0.8670 0,8478 0.7775 0.5548 0.7454 0.8742 0,9417 1,1895 0.8884 0.8235 0.9828
3480 0.0269 0.2010 0.0731 0.0193 0.5673 0.1110 0.1710 0,1407 0,5006 0,7373 1.1123 0,9167 0.3604 0.6367 0.9917 0.3979 0.3555 0.3877 0.4629 0.9406
3490 0.2614 0,4424 0.3144 0.2553 0.2958 0.4388 0.5105 0.4424 0.5697 0.6134 0,6037 0.6020 0.5722 0.7209 0.7145 0,6246 0.7386 0.6701 0.8667 0.7085
3510 0.4297 0.3670 0.3096 0.1912 0,2245 0.3348 0,2868 0,2530 0.4060 0.3744 0,3425 0.4325 0.4184 0.5245 0,7003 0.6037 0.6782 0.7485 0,8451 0.7936
3523 0.2567 0.2210 0.1962 0.2934 0.3277 0.2563 0,2433 0.3669 0.3240 0.3090 0.2924 0.3499 0.3712 0.5705 0.4336 0.4253 0,3741 0.3746 0.7013 0,7759
3524 0.1144 0.1391 0.1383 0.4119 0.3400 0.2764 0,3478 0,1928 0.5019 0,4126 0,4330 0,6784 0,6964 0,4801 0.3709 0,2738 0,2057 0.2460 0.3018 0.2515
3530 0.5912 0.7818 0.7680 0,6014 0.7449 1.2860 1.1204 0.9688 0.8570 0.7104 0.6219 0.6539 0.8140 0.6560 0.7556 1.4969 1,6126 1.6958 0,9790 0.6952
3531 0.3014 0.4704 0.4049 0.5969 0.4935 0,3764 0.4650 0.3966 0.6304 0.4244 0.5566 0.3559 0.4177 0.4646 0,4975 0.3883 0.3906 0.5901 0.8595 0.8251
3533 1.2266 0.8424 0.5898 0.7271 0.8602 1.2874 0.9194 0.4737 0.6130 0.4957 0.6260 0.6475 1.1048 0.6613 1.2463 1.1788 1,0131 0.7901 0.8375 0.6980
3537 0.4170 0.0936 0.3003 0.2356 0.4083 0.4575 0.3400 0,1852 0.7267 0,5849 0.6867 0.6405 0.4887 0.5376 0.5811 0.6164 0.8496 0.8921 0.9771 0.8104
3540 0.2421 0.3090 0.2845 0.1377 0,2704 0.2035 0,0916 0.1187 0.2716 0.1388 0,2583 0,2704 0.2011 0.1420 0.2233 0.1295 0.4240 0.4416 0.4980 0.2519
3541 0,2127 0.2803 0.3114 0.3665 0.5186 0.5917 0.3921 0.4356 0.6256 0,4686 0.4492 0,5246 0.4529 0.4865 0.4205 0.3032 0.4939 0.6130 0.6348 0,6416
3550 0.0886 0.0869 0,0998 0.0745 0.2202 0,1809 0.0491 0.1102 0.5640 0.6795 0.8500 0.8276 1.1838 0.7111 0.7607 0.4076 0.3719 1.2324 1.0564 1.9034
3555 0.1039 0.1944 0.0790 0.1086 0,3481 5.8566 4.8259 1,9936 0,5578 0.7018 0,8050 0.9854 0.2595 0,3557 0.4037 0.3071 0.5932
3559 0,3676 0.3824 0.3361 0.3383 0,5546 0.8738 0.4266 0,7502 0.8162 0.7808 0.5250 0.4593 0,6046 0.5358 0.3885 0,3102 0.4872 0.6319 1.0521 1.4262
3560 0.1951 0.2479 0,3154 0.3655 0,2494 0.3841 0.2509 0.2571 0.3029 0.2821 0.3541 0.3562 0.4072 0.5366 0.5250 0.3381 0.6287 0.5147 0.6739 0.7597
3561 0.1020 0.3380 0.2816 0.4286 0.3862 0.6176 0.5426 0.3608 0.5769 0.3466 0.5500 0.5642 0.4828 0.7160 0.6017 0,5820 0.9507 1.0602 1.0384 0.9691
3562 0.8559 1.0809 1.2613 1.3178 1.5052 1,5380 0.7908 0.8362 0.5677 0.5778 0.5528 0.8538 0,6108 1,2093 1.1133 0,6024 0.7620 0,6472 1,3255 1,2394
3564 0.2318 0.5523 0.4960 0.6761 0.6553 0.6765 0.8204 1.0126 0.9949 1.0220 0.8499 0.7178 0,8598 0.9198 0,6000 1.4711 1.2893 0.6556 1.0253 0.8586
3567 0.0244 0.1139 0.2679 0.2004 0.2980 0,1264 0.2111 0.0301 0.2371 0.1086 0,0703 0.1113 0.2251 0.2317 0,2905 0.0856 0,2048 0.3500 0,6047 0.2421
3569 0.3610 0.5255 0.5538 0,1669 0.3947 0,5770 0.5717 0.5808 0.7123 0.6736 0.5874 0.6504 0.5169 0.8361 0.9331 1,2179 1.1192 0,9252 0.9003 0.9694
3570 1.7758 2.1007 1.2771 1.0253 0,9584 0.7630 0.6636 0.4514 0.8320 0.6410 0,4959 0.8246 0,7965 0.7128 0,5723 0.3794 0.4629 0.3317 0,4346 0.5519


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q  for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79
3572 0.5792 0.3414 0.7273 0.7170 1.6743
3575 0.6409 0.3738
3576 1.2061 2.1981 1.2270 1.5403 2.4283
3577 0.2919 0.3338 0.3031 1.6389 1.4418
3578 0.0201 0.0240 0.0158 0.2161 0,2698
3579 0.9396 0.7250 0.5101 0.5534 0.5473
3580 0.1152 0.2190 0.2704 0.3618 0.4007
3585 0.1181 0.2644 0.4288 0.3208 0.2795
3590 0.1564 0.0955 0.2158 0.3484 0.3354
3600 0.3113 0.1648 0.1748 0.6092 0.5989
3612 0.0500 0.1629 0.2043 0,1992 0.1447
3613 0.7720 0.6035 1.0230
3620 0.0082 0.0379 0,1460 0,3943 0.3663
3621 0.4048 0.5403 0.6164 0.6347 0.9434
3630 1.8671 1,8671 1.2155 0.8164 0.7286
3634 0.3167 0.2416 0,3906 0.4059 0.2791
3640 0.5067 0.5584 0.4881 0.5189 0.5282
3651 0.6200 0,8095 0.3484 0,3679 0.1957
3652 0.7157 0,6987 0.3658 0.6522 0,6181
3661 0.2426 0.1438 0.5057 0.6362 0.8537
3663 0.4273 0.4384 0.5595 0.4936 0.7459
3669 1,3192 0.6593 0.4322 0.4406 0.6387
3670 0.1829 0.3107 0.2148 0.5203 0.3783
3672 0.1631 0.1820 0.0746 0.2414 0.3365
3674 0.4951 0.6862 0.5755 0.7205 0.9233
3677 1.1626 0.8595 1.0035 0.8714
3678 1.1651 0.7458 0.5907 0.7305 1.0761
3679 0.1992 0.2612 1.1017 0,9587 0,5694
3690 0.0834 0.0868 0.2175 0.2699 0.2195
3695
H-* 3711 0.1561 0.2081 0.1738 0.1698 0.16931—' 
CO
3713
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
1.1156 0.6855 1.7155 1.5254 1.1251 1.1070 1.3237 0.7579 
0.6908 1.2050 0,8758 0.9493 1.2182 0,7088 0.3073 0,3461 
1,2483 1.3941 1.5354 1.8726 1.5851 0.9381 0.9180 0.6600 
1.8777 1.1425 1,3574 2.2388 1.2235 1.2942 1.3975 0,9124
0.4667 1.2172 1.9440 1.2792 1.5377 1.4551 1.0596 0.7236 
0.6339 0,3731 0,5629 0.5883 0.5933 0.7737 0.9565 0,8318 
0.9479 0,4592 0,7632 0,9409 0,5849 0.5625 0.6598 1.0047 
0.4345 0.3290 0.4464 0.5962 0.4257 0.5304 0.5373 0.4774
0.4417 0.2817 0.2750 0.6263 0.4787 0.4066 0.5150 0.5569 
0.6839 0.5004 0.7363 0,4918 0.3333 0.2613 0.3772 0.1433 
0,0848 0.1346 0,1952 0.3402 0.4486 0.3402 0.6094 0.3616 
1.8098 0,6733 0.4985 0.5128 0.3546 0.2383 0.2120 0.1571
0.1916 0.4083 0.4113 0.7288 0.5353 0.5159 0.4777 0.4140 
1.1796 1.1695 1.0027 0.8700 0.5173 0,5577 0.5424 0,5592 
0.6367 0.7522 1.2220 1.3717 1,1568 1.6617 1.4569 1.2369 
0,6461 0.3679 0,5873 0.7062 0.3992 0.3322 0.5137 0.4715
0,7254 0,5159 0.5880 0,8384 0,6792 0,8023 1.1399 0,9667 
0.6119 0.6674 0.4760 0,7651 0.5395 0,4818 0.6690 0.5418 
0.7157 0.8661 0,8400 1.2873 0.9212 1.0114 1,3067 1.3269 
1.2363 1,2047 1,5953 1.2200 0,8299 0,7500 0.5808 0,4303
0,8382 0.9859 0.7668 1.1522 0,5767 0.4943 0.5151 0.6329 
0.8095 0,5315 0.6651 0,8444 0,7667 1,1412 1.0496 0,7029 
0.4373 0.5362 0.4849 0,8230 0.5661 0.6110 0.7494 0.4270 
0.5990 0.6007 0.5827 1.2967 0.9660 0.8935 0,7916 0.7575
1.0277 0.9718 1.0752 1,5334 0.9453 1.0745 0,8214 0,7830 
1.0687 0.7694 1.1212 1.2645 1.3024 1.0042 1.1209 0,7205 
0,9510 1.4368 1.0227 2.8445 2.1539 1.7223 1.5914 1.2562 
0.8643 0.7913 1,1378 1,2155 0,8398 0.8450 0.6290 0.4729
0.3641 0.5648 0.9392 1.1626 0.8254 0.9006 0.7824 0.6266 
1,5611 1.1047 1.7746 1.3608 1.1752 0.9890 1,0116 1,0414 
0.2397 0.2964 0.5209 0,5214 0.4623 0.4191 0,4998 0.4036 
0.3892 0.8757 0.2284 0.4183 0.4086 0,8422 0,6232 0,4647
88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.6059 0.4756 0,6751 0.9188 0.5095 0.4938 0.3865 
0,2452 0,2267 0.4540 0.8581 0.9310 0.5589 0.1968 
0.5333 0.6307 0.6512 0,8577 1.2611 1.1986 1.0450 
0.9942 0.6765 0,7583 1,1297 0.7377 0.8683 0.9239
0.6333 0.4190 0.5953 0,8188 1.1356 1,7089 0.6528 
0,9987 0,9462 0.6514 1.0702 1.0949 0.8212 0.9236 
0.9096 0,8323 0.6368 0,6294 0,7705 0.8930 0.7963 
0.4980 0,5059 0.2894 0.4230 0.5246 0,6902 0.6914
0.6298 0.7114 0.5260 0.6175 0.7421 0.7207 0.6992 
0.3979 0.3704 0.2132 0.3044 0.2836 0.3581 0.3368 
0.3748 0.6069 0.3794 0,6340 0.5986 0,5974 0.6649 
0,4835 0.9139 0.8707 0.7039 0.5398 0.2775
0.7104 0.5925 0.3833 0.5354 0.6759 0.7330 0.8871 
0,6934 0,8027 0.5444 0,8156 1.2030 1,2481 1.4050 
0.8914 0.4921 0.2367 0,7635 0,7685 0,9100 0.6699 
0.8028 0.3429 0.0299 0.1359 0.5084 0,2798 0.3500
0.7774 0.9681 0.7702 0,6561 0.7555 0.9224 0.8661 
0,7648 0.5257 0,4161 0.4089 0.5496 0,6844 0.8438 
1.0497 0.9190 0.8639 0.9145 1.0740 1.3472 1.4574 
0.4644 0.7968 0.6432 0.9045 0.9283 1.2696 1.3141
0,4284 0.4537 0.4163 0.4734 0.7018 0.9510 1.0029 
1.1978 1.4024 0.6370 0.8347 0.9955 1.0162 1.2986 
0,4620 0.3169 0.3363 0.3214 0.2914 0.4940 0.4518 
0,6064 0.3908 0,4767 0.7485 0.7103 1.1564 1.3615
0,6929 0.6014 0.5652 0.8104 0.8521 1.3627 1.6090 
0.4148 0,3688 0.2017 0.5839 0,3580 0.1654 0.2126 
0.6507 0.5566 0.5954 0.8845 1.2481 1.5399 1.7943 
0.5160 0.4025 0.3324 0.4133 0.6346 0.7383 0,8757
0,5662 0.4814 0.4442 0.5250 0.3760 0,6593 0.5451 
0,8549 0.9045 0,8735 0.7075 0.7174 0,7933 1.1703 
0,3969 0.3701 0.3336 0,3985 0.3763 0,4512 0.4006 


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q for 1975-1994
to
o
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80
3714 0.3241 0.3370 0.3221 0.3185 0.2678 0.3148
3715 0.0226 0.0173
3716 0.8398 0.6518 0.5061 0.2005 0.0758 0.4035
3720 0.3359 0,4121 0.3236 0.4008 0.3658 0.3403
3721 0,0671 0.2256 0.2301 0.3422 0.3750 0,5659
3724 0.2691 0.3261 0.2568 0.3840 0.4265 0.4209
3728 0.1565 0.2804 0.3759 0.4730 0.7830 1.0661
3730 0.3148 0.3664 0.2780 0.4109 0.4768 0.5922
3743 0.4896 0.5205 0.3717 0.4556 0.6186 0.8683
3751 0.0567 0,1009 0.2104 0.3372 0.3351
3760 0.3005 0.3238 0.2627 0.2670 0.2443 0.3330
3790 0.3427 0.2810 0.3103 0.1237 0.0478 0.0837
3812 0.1936 0,2352 0,2276 0.3433 0.4817 0.8734
3821 0.6697 0.9605 1.0746 1.0916 0.8968 0.8477
3822 0.2529 0.3400 0.2533 0.4229 0.4384 0.5160
3823 0.3874 0.3608 0.5085 0.5670 0.5685 1.0150
3824 0.1221 0.1232 0.1965 0.1588 0.2531 0.1755
3825 0.5552 0.7528 0.8748 0,9459 1.0449 1.1616
3826 0.8365 0.8214 0.6716 0.8095 0.8983 1.1795
3827 0.3415 0.3315 0.3462 0.1577 0.1430 0,2551
3829 0.3907 0.2382 0.2243 0.5159 0.7184 0.4554
3841 1,7301 1.2665 1.1772 1.0850 1.1026 1.1663
3842 0.2286 0.1919 0.3611 0.4371 0.5692 0.7221
3843 0.6969 0.5062 0.3675 0.3718 0.3449 0.4535
3844 1.3150 1.2348 0.8828 0,6808 0.8044 1.5537
3845 1.5462 0.8773 0.5421 0.9144 1.1703 1.5395
3851 0.4899 0.3868 0.5982 0.4014 0.9245 1,4000
3861 0.8363 0.8865 0.6723 0.7820 0.4054 0.6022
3910 0.1766 0.1548 0.1426 0.1945 0.4899
3911 0.5189 0.3345 0.7787 0.4108 0.6376 0.6137
3931
3942 0.3250 0.3801 0.2617 0.2637 0,3096
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0.4259 0.4846 0,6878 0,5538 0.7399 0.7103 0.6582 
0,0855 0.6813 0.2481
0.6025 1.5110 1.4066 0.6974 0,7924 0.8221 0.8338 
0.2443 0.1745 0.2875 0.2680 0.3433 0.4502 0,3076
0.5550 0.6858 0.9380 0.5072 0.7004 0,4855 0,4015 
0.3809 0.3778 0.4912 0,4040 0,5239 0,4906 0,3516 
0.6223 0.7053 0.7690 0,6475 0.8436 0.6590 0.6299 
0.3096 0.4569 0,6332 0.3302 0.3093 0.4014 0.8799
0.3989 0.5893 0.7304 0.4274 0.3543 0.6423 0.5605 
0.4108 0.3225 0.4174 0.2156 0.2742 0.4203 0.3732 
0.3080 0.2580 0.5447 0.4999 0.6594 0,7518 0.9610 
0.2331 0.2515 0.3564 0.3218 0.2934 0.2447 0.5526
0.7976 1.0717 1.0147 0,7708 0.9057 0.8127 0.6394 
1.9114 0.5895 1,1815 0.6878 0,7710 0.8220 0.7120 
0,2854 0.3267 0,5492 0.5165 0.5809 0,6846 0.4652 
0.7360 0.6103 0.7234 0,5140 0.5251 0,6638 0.6862
0.1055 0.1787 0.2665 0,6109 0.7655 0,4967 0.3882 
0.9727 1.4292 1.8501 0,9689 0,8437 0,7437 0,7315 
0.7673 0.5997 1.0777 1,2068 1,1846 1.1710 1.4832 
2.1241 0.6359 1.2399 1.2290 1.2206 1.6348 1.2405
0,3207 0.3725 0,7436 0.6029 0.8371 0.6549 0.5794 
1.4889 1.6219 1.7621 0.9118 1.0321 1.3556 1.3985 
0.5131 2.7119 1.6570 0.5839 1.4022 1.2285 1,1202 
0.6430 0.6133 0.6020 0.4412 0,5165 0.6994 1,7603
1.0101 1.4756 0.9709 0.4564 1.2563 0.9441 0,3958 
1,9953 1.9847 1.3858 0.5804 0.8304 0.9759 1.2370 
1,1182 0.4745 1.2283 1,0775 1,1102 1.0613 0,6642 
0.4700 0.6726 0.7054 0,5832 0.6109 0,7117 0.5019
0.3138 0.3316 0.6688 0.4739 0.4049 0,3979 0.3516 
0.8576 0.7130 1.1871 0.8228 0,3296 0.5042 0.5122 
0.5379 0.4426 0.5313 0.5248 0.2441 
0.2943 0.2442 0,5924 1.4479 1.4148 1,4540 0.6703
88 89 90  91 92 93 94
0.6157 0,6548 0.4973 0.5622 0,8171 1.0812 0.8484 
0.1983 0.2652 0.1166 0,5367 0.5620 1.6460 1.4208 
0.6549 0.4750 0,1764 0,4849 0.8741 0.9288 0.9863 
0.4601 0.4477 0.4523 0.4445 0.4550 0.4454 0.3898
0,5260 0.4005 0.3312 0.3922 0.6123 0.5606 0.6642 
0.4024 0.4913 0.4000 0,3351 0.3855 0.5145 0.3723 
0.8414 0.9079 0,7973 0,9360 0.8744 0.8508 0.8206 
0.7832 0.5629 0,2379 0,5557 0.3636 0,8224 0.6265
0,6422 0.5650 0.4465 0.5253 0.6970 0.8229 0.8282 
0.5857 0.5980 0.4285 0.8482 0.5608 0.6923 0.5328 
0.7359 0.6171 0.5447 0.5585 0,5766 0,7414 0,6507 
0.4912 1.0447 0.8296 1,4365 2.0785 1.4935 0.2926
0.5821 0.3720 0.3565 0.3739 0.3772 0.2830 0.4810 
0.5415 0,4553 0,2244 0.2839 0,3298 0.3711 0.8461 
0.5911 0.7184 0.7077 0.9536 0.8867 0.9386 0.8049 
0,7038 0.8003 0.4192 0.5469 0.4774 0.7243 0,5562
0.5737 0,3053 0.1979 0.3464 0.3908 0.5882 0.8080 
0,5011 0.4314 0.2791 0.4334 0.3356 0,5713 0.5181 
1.0954 1.1215 1.0565 1.1307 1,1495 1,1594 1.2986 
0.5588 0,7678 0.4764 0.7131 0.5473 0.7021 0.5335
0,6036 0.5232 0.5058 0.8288 0.8581 0.7450 0,5636 
1,4702 1.7432 1.9628 2.4799 2.1245 1.4126 1.1905 
1,0066 0.8504 0.8246 1.1974 1,3074 1.2687 1.4549 
0,8255 0.5331 0.5455 0,5108 0,8328 1.0838 1,6858
0.7210 1.5327 0.1876 1.0095 1.6484 1.3002 0.7060 
1,0300 1.0408 1.3500 1,6571 1,7017 1.3150 0.8560 
0.6903 0.7397 1.1630 1.8588 1,6025 0.7787 1.1132 
0.6872 0.6929 0.4256 0.5017 0.5793 0.5634 0.5068
0.5652 0,4093 0,2582 0.3953 0.7045 0.6131 0.4869 
0,4641 0.3049 0.3521 0.8250 0.4088 0.3718 0.3258 
0.2877 0.3699 0,0884 0.1073 0.1835 0.2187 0.0359 


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
3944 0.0926 0.1040 0.1874 0.0727 0.0873 0.1617 0.1323 0.3406 0,3517
3949 0.1755 0.0863 0.1699 0.3227 0.3611 0,2237 0.2994 0.3276 0.4464
3950 0.5069 0.5451 0,5288 0.5001 0.5845 0,9541 0.8857 0.9001 0.7866
3960 0.3262 0.2577 0.8294 0.3464 0.3720 0,2973 1.4161 3.6946 4,8044
3990 0.4065 0.4119 0.3661 0.5516 0.5866 0.6699 1.0505 0,7435 0.8359
4011 0.4427 0.4985 0.5126 0.4536 0.4558 0,5960 0.5407 0.5603 0.6425
4100
4210
4213 0.7444 0.6732 0.5320 0.4812 0.4896 0.4728 0.5426 0.5833 1.1311
4400 0.5592 0.6180 0.6596 0.4459 0.7046 0,8264 0.7265 0.5587 0.7754
4412 0.6385 0,8694 0.7933 0.7439 0.6877 0.8868 0.6860 0.6458 0.7264
4512 0.7513 0.6638 0.6298 0.5826 0.4946 0.5024 0.6531 0.7654 0.8049
4513 0.9421 1.2689 1.4793 1.2175 1.5198 1.8962 1.0349 1.3437 1.2780
4522 0.4587 0.4754 0.7487 0.6792 0.6852 0.7992 0.7842 0.7816 0.8617
4581 0.6264 0.6461 0.5585 0.5036 0.4687 0.4530 0.5518 0.4694 0.5663
4610 0.9382 0.9597 0.8951 0.9234 0.9700 0.8742 0.8230 1.0233 1.0291
4700 0.5055 0,5840 0.5724 0.6244 0.6800 1.7861 0.7634 0.6701 0.8619
4731 0.6357 0.6974 0.4340 0.5030 0.7231 0.6174 0.6739 0.4117 0.4819
4812 0.6946 0.8545 0.8805 1.0199 1.2594 2,0698 1.8827 5.3611 2.3239
4813 0.7999 0.7924 0.7978 0.7701 0.7243 0.7105 0.7135 0.7598 0,7549
4822
4832 1,0301
4833 0.6341 0.6450 0.6020 0.5313 0.6404 0.9856 0.8322 0,7940 1.3081
4841 0.9007 0.9406 1.1603 1.0992 1.9358 2.7486 1.5900 1.8891 1.5798
4899 0.5135 0.4935 0.3718 0.4928 0.4622 0.5429 0.8167 0.8124 0,6818
4911 0.8405 0.8596 0.8170 0.7856 0.7444 0.7106 0.7249 0.7668 0.7522
4922 0.6701 0,6611 0.6169 0.5503 0.6370 0,7240 0.5914 0.4607 0.5320
4923 0.7426 0.7915 0.7562 0.6641 0.7053 0,7861 0.7496 0.6246 0.7100
4924 0.7308 0.7594 0.7005 0.6589 0.6360 0.6259 0.5877 0.5636 0.6100
4931 0.8215 0.8492 0.8151 0,7589 0.7291 0.6924 0.6991 0,7532 0,7246
4932 0,6728 0.7168 0.6965 0.6852 0.6916 0.7189 0.5770 0.5871 0,5709
4941 0.6713 0.6880 0.6769 0.6500 0,6678 0,6576 0.6751 0.6893 0.7213
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0,4486 0,8709 0.7145 0.2918 0.3983 0.5763 0.3429 0.7646 0.6675 0.4723 0.5507
0.4033 0.4830 0.6205 0.3883 0.6285 0.5999 0.1794 0,4568 0.4645 0.5975 0.6566
0.9656 1.5179 1.6130 1.3582 1.5812 1.7377 0.8053 1.1334 1.2151 1,1281 0,8827
3.2346 0.8943 0.6036 0.4712 0,5345 0.6024 0,7430 0.4776 0.7358 1,0738 1,4208
0.7922 0,5196 0.6689 0.8320 1.2754 1.1783 0.8707 1.2185 1,1091 1,2628 1,2008 
0.5558 0.6458 0.6579 0.5908 0.7492 0.6900 0.6626 0.8441 0.9241 1,0342 0.8855 
0.7653 0,7233 0,6610 0.1335 0.8076 1.8743 1.4820 1.2704 
0.0624 0,2073 0.2113 0.1610 0.0806 0.7760 1.3204 1.6146 0.8234 2,3609
0.8309 0.8540 0.9105 0,8474 0.7533 0,7068 0.6024 0,6311 0,7084 0,8933 0.6760
0.7078 0.6291 0.5271 0,7301 0.8003 0.9442 0.7650 0.7732 0,7823 0.9389 0.9589
0.6109 0,6180 0.5904 0.5481 0.6932 0,8887 0,6533 0.6598 0.6284 0.7334 0.6710
0.6852 0.6141 0,7745 0.6774 0.7168 0,7269 0,7047 0.7672 0.7824 0.7802 0.6555
1.0405 1,1333 1.2795 0 .7760 0,7743 0,8228 0,7441 0,8476 0.7971 0.9961 0.7103
0.8853 0.9846 1.2788 1.0685 0.9979 1.4943 1.4636 1.3513 1.4293 1.7136 1.7808
0,5143 0.7655 0.7779 0.8271 0.9385 1.0138 0.8825 0.8884 0.8310 0.7043 0,6406 
1.1030 1,2428 0.9155 0.9223 0.7253 0.8467 0.7680 0.8306 0.9169 1.0004 0.9889
0,5193 0,6110 0,5541 0,4534 0,6964 0.5199 0,5230 0.4598 0.9034 0.7927 0.7814 
0.5557 0.6486 0,8689 0,4562 0,7058 0.6384 0,4732 0.6906 0.9076 0,7666 0,8232 
1,7756 2,1752 1.3408 1.3329 4.9275 5.5317 2.0935 1.9656 1,7668 1,7002 1.7228 
0,7172 0.7918 0,8402 0.8384 0.8829 1.2050 1.0715 1.1060 1.1467 1.2851 1.0936
1.8275 0.9730
1.8786 2.0718 1.3567 1.3576 1.3773 1.2999 1.2860 1.3061 1.1933 3,0782 2.6388 
1.3389 1.0010 1.1081 1.2398 1.2013 1,5592 1.2547 1,5757 1.7261 1.5659 1.3518 
1,4945 1,5943 1.4889 1.7112 1,3522 1.5181 1.3331 1.6107 1.5366 2.0384 2.1902
0.5583 0.7433 0,4466 0.3912 0.6777 0.8092 0.8160 1.2119 0.9249 1.0278 0.7117 
0,7531 0,8003 0.8709 0,7868 0.7961 0.8386 0.8076 0.9002 0,9077 0.8523 0,7713 
0.4564 0.5580 0.6486 0.6254 0.6621 0,8387 0.7169 0,7115 0,7016 0.8436 0.8784 
0,7356 0.7878 0.8183 0 .8118 0.7829 0.8582 0.8434 0.8416 0.8876 0,9000 0.8336
0.6314 0.7026 0,8085 0.7694 0,7662 0.8079 0.7853 0.8274 0.8750 0,9403 0.8450 
0.7264 0.7867 0.8560 0.7862 0.7999 0.8414 0.8129 0.8857 0,8754 0,8604 0.7708 
0.6123 0.6630 0.7485 0.7555 0.8166 0.7957 0.7436 0,6994 0.7981 0.7838 0.7341 


















Industry Median Values for Tobin’s q for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
4950 0.6491 5.8670 2.7620 2,7729 2.2078 1.4844 1.2218 0.9769 1.0606
4953 0.5776 0.7505 0.7559 0.9860 1.1514 1,6641 1.3960 1,7808 1,8365 0.9677 1.5942 2.2254 2,1091 1.8877 0,9783 1.6865 1.3187 1.1450 1.0453 1,1036
4955 0.0995 0,0924 0.4156 1.3612 2.1569 1,1792 2.2256 1.7732 1,1998 1,1409 0.9566 1 ,02910 ,9126  0,8564 0,6988 0,8036
4961 0.6033 1.0230
4991 0,4102 0.3422 0.3795 0,3236 0,1455 0,2901 0,5116 0,9012 1,1950
5000 1.4824 1.5298 1,3382 1.1225 1.1115 0,8927 0.8579 1,2409 1.1821
5010 0,2640
5013 0.9702 0.9046 0,7001 0.6110 0,8364 0,8236 0.4998 0,7628 0,7716
5020 0.0252 0.0837 0.0799 0.0994 0.0638 0.1 138 0,0269 0.7269
5030 0.6950 0.5654 0,2531 0,1486 0,1088 0.0916 0,0485 0,4881 0.2792
5031 0,0292 0,0278 0,1450 0,0549 0.1926 0,2220 0,2653 0,2920
5040 0.0971 0,1256 0,0568 0,1906 0.5858
5045 0.1630 0,3203 0.4391 0.5872 2,0609 1,1953 1.0619 0,8164 0,9220
5047 0.0606 0,0189 0,0121 0.8404 1,0967 0.3953 1.2442 0,5560
5051 0,1042 0.1405 0,1020 0.1552 0.1918 0,1142 0,3199 0,2222 0,2963
5063 0.4745 0.6317 0.7216 0.3195 0.3855 0,6275 0.5782 0.9462 0,3523
5065 0.2203 0.2095 0,1975 0,1272 0.2856 0,4139 0.3915 0,5150 0.5700
5070 0,6254 0,3208 0.1911 0.2185 0.2426 0.2528 0,2918 0,1050 0,4823
5072 0.1504 0.1626 0.2385 0,2150 0,3230 0.3992 0.5083 0.6414 0.8782
5080 0,3377 0,3333 0,0998 0.1515 0.2539 0,2097 0.1345 0,1688 0,3631
5082
5084 0,3635 0,3131 0,3073 0.1724
5090 0.1417 0,1140 0,0914 0.0790 0,0304 0.0660 0.7687
5094 0,2837 0.2038 0,6687 0,3411
5099 0.1738 0,1875 _ 0,2232 0,1211 0,6620 0,8895
5110 0,1912 0,2432 0.2527 0,3118 0.2805 0,2608 0,2510 0,5689 1,0381
5122 0,3566 0.3686 0,3176 0.2709 0.2259 0,3173 0.2954 0,4051 0.4491
5130 0,1695 0,1829 0.1648 0,0287 0,2891
5140 0,2134 0,1968 0.1894 0,2500 0,2173 0,2167 0.2594 0,3262 0,4111
5141 0.2525 0,3383 0.3108 0,3441 0,3409 0,4554 0,4505 0,6497 0,7263
5150 0,0948 0.2331 0.2060 0,3122 0.2594 0,2246 0,2219 0,1957 0.2849
5160 0.6697 0.7334 0,7556 0.6271 0,6260 0,7411 1.3758 1,8234 1,1061
0.8197 0.8127 0.6316 0.5679 1,1639 1.2494 0,9552 1.3987 1.1615 1,2776 0.9389 
0,9106 1,1348 1,0676 1,5164 1,1725 1,1891 1,0754 1,8970 2,0379 1,8001 1,5815 
0,2676 0.2303 1,2219 0.6329 0,5681 0,6436 0,4343 0.8428 0,9435 1,5356 0.8948 
0.3288 0.6711 0.3800 0.2028 0.3282 0,2820 0,8372 0.1979 0.3135 0.3187 0.3389
0,7836 0.5271 0.5948 0,3033 0,1972 0,0782 0,1264 0,2637 0,1389 0.0701 0,1156 
0.2189 0,3591 0,3551 0.2555 0.4794 0,4025 0,5172 0,5723 0,4268 0,5268 0,6873 
0,1923 0.7712 0,6048 0.5780 0,4508 0,2965 0,1595 0,2093 0.3000 0,6314 0.2820 
0.5541 0.4341 0 ,3 1 1 10 ,0233  0,4598 3,8297 1,1382 0.7223
0,6273 0.6475 0.5654 0.5722 0.4742 0,3929 0,2654 0,3543 0.2329 0.3692 0,3293
0,4032 0,4970 0,4912 0,3865 0.4373 0.3525 0.4199 1,5077 0.8681 1,1313 0.5987
0,2851 0,3162 0,4540 0.3964 0,3824 0,3326 0.2707 0.3018 0,3189 0,5189 0,4609 
0,2764 0,7302 0,6415 0,4487 0,5128 0.5770 0,3458 0.6280 0.5757 0.5061 0,8507
0,4236 0,4550 0,4817 0.3840 0,3141 0,2505 0,3339 0.4098 0,4349 0,5994 0,2990 
0,3441 0,3128 0.2833 0.3431 0,3396 0.2761 0.2778 0,3207 0,2622 0,1897 0.2907 
0,4655 0.1451 0.4278 0,4474 0,3744 0,3934 0,5428 0,6923 0,9397 0,8729 0.5185 
0,3177 0,7122 0.6657 0.7978 0,8543 0,4870 0.2743 0,1960 0,2458 0,3145 0,6392
0,4357 0,4826 0.7546 0.8655 0,3817 0,2574 0,5722 0.831 1 0.0876 1,2629 1,1035 
0.7252 0,7670 0.5251 0,5632 0,4588 0,4989 0,5137 1,0365 1,6622 1,6852 0,8904 
1.9580 0.9846 0.6601 0,8938 0,5689 0,9258 0,7298 0,7146 0.9345 0,7146 0,7819 
0,3581 0,5540 2,0112 1,5244 1,0211 0,5881 0,3373 2,5127 2.2010 2,4689 3,7340
1,3937 1.9936 1,0994 1,0354 1.6794 0,8551 0,7956 0.5419 0,5704 0,8612 0,5367 
1.1924 0,8624 0,6939 0,7810 0.7035 1,3939 0,8428 1,2816 1,2721 0,7859 1,5330 
0,4391 0,5872 0,4762 0,3512 0,3173 0.5584 0.3976 0,3445 0.3664 0,3255 0,6072 
0,4196 0.4703 0,3314 0.4704 0,3252 0.4739 0,2963 2.7666 3,7697 2,7103 1.2487
0,5061 0,6015 0,6865 0,6671 0.6487 0,7040 0,6276 0.7318 0,6180 0,4662 0,8575 
0.7017 0,7071 0,5740 0,4741 0.6507 0.5896 0,6254 0.5893 0,5343 0,4757 0,5142 
0,0762 0,2620 0,3553 0,4571 0.3705 0.4634 0,3066 0,4369 0,6147 0,5497 0.4429 


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q f o r  1975-1994
to
CO
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
5171 0.5810 0.7387 0,7269 0.7254 0.6909 0.8176 0.6580 0.6236 1.2413 2.2522 1.5202 1.1259 0.7484 0.8405 1.0199 0.8167 0.9191 0.7703 0.9917 0.5245
5172 0.3783 0.5272 0.6506 0.5716 0,8388 0.7887 0.7478 0.5562 0.6245 0.6940 0.7051 0.7900 0.7987 0.7196 0.9489 0.7095 0.6340 0,5976 0.6208 0.7416
5190 0.0826 0,2385 0.0620 0.1006 0.0649 0.2374 0.1603 0.2903 0.4963 0.4157 0,5626 0.7361 1.0102 0.7160 0.4437 0,8790 0.8752 0.8782 0.8696 0.8105
5200 1.5368 1.3905 1.0292 0.9314 0.5313 0.6580 0.5409 0.6534 0.8194 0,6719 0.7733 0.8169 0.6472 0,6929 0.7741 0.6502 0.7639 0,6829 0.8468 0,5772
5211 0.5320 1.0281 0.6860 0.6065 0.6384 0,6040 0.8701 1.9355 1.3953 1.3139 1.0728 0.9617 0.6024 0.7596 0,7128 0.4886 0.6718 0,6078 0.7364 0.5194
5311 0.6013 0.4884 0.3689 0.4195 0.3374 0.3022 0.3584 0.4938 0.4507 0.5137 0,5898 0.7007 0.6955 0.5806 0,5293 0.4459 0,4795 0.5952 0.4448 0.4441
5331 0.5891 0.5888 0.4836 0.7752 0.6481 0.4740 0,5113 0,8649 1.0364 1,1531 1.3434 0.7974 0.5967 0.5700 0.6460 0.4158 0.9181 0.7921 0.6258 0.5513
5399 0.5080 0.8586 0.7905 0.8241 0.5237 0.3597 0.5322 0,6174 0,7401 0,5222 0.3899 0.2663 0.1645 0,2605 0,3563 0.5405 0.7615 0.5465 0.4141 0.4150
5411 0.2665 0.3281 0.2791 0.4339 0,4272 0,4337 0.4413 0.5626 0.6609 0.6235 0.6647 0.7398 0.8017 0.8501 0,8367 0.8021 0.8557 0.8511 0.8371 0.7496
5412 0.3408 0.4799 0.4209 0.6101 0.8910 0.8467 1,0082 0.5123 1.2352 1.1290 1,1725 1,0006 1.0173 1,0552 0.9040 0.7844 0.7201 0.6119 0.7148 0.6146
5500 0.4642 0.3292 0.2415 0.1823 0.4100 0,3236 0.3347 0.3678 0.3879 0.8739 0.7877 0.8458 0.6326 0.7811 0,6280 0,5320 0.5009 0.4248 0.6454 0.4932
5531 0.2382 0.2046 0.0991 0.2367 0,3402 0.1796 0.6056 0.6483 0.5482 0,5289 0.3783 0.5008 0.9212 0,2068 0,1422 0.1402 0.6999 1.4906 1.0910 0.4074
5600 0.5034 0.6383 0.7111 0.6127 0.5753 0.5449 0.5581 0.7170 0,8489 0.7397 0.7272 0.6659 0,6589 0,6096 1.2670 1.1375 1.0620 1.1596 0.7742 0.3930
5621 1.1615 1,4057 1.9231 1.7700 0.8794 0,8922 1,4039 1.5901 2,2261 1.7401 2,0483 2.8158 1.0084 1.2711 0.7494 0.6366 1.5129 1.1681 1.0269 0.7691
5651 0.3330 1.0363 0.7084 0.4428 0.2786 0.3851 0.3342 0.6910 1.6698 0.8696 1.4397 1,1495 0.9341 0.9603 1.0548 0,6476 1.3160 1.5414 1,1191 0.6629
5661 0.1846 0.1691 0.2766 0.3618 0.3631 0,3726 0,3797 0.2823 0.4479 0.3985 0.5017 0.8301 0.5249 0.6816 0.6656 0.4461 0.3548 0.5199 0.5802 0.2773
5700 _ t _ 0.3929 0,1917 0.3155 1.1438 0.7937 1.3553 1.6599 1.1150 1.1293 0.8786 0.3957 0.8136 0,7898 2,3733 1,5913
5712 0.5035 0,3327 0.2407 0,0578 0,1087 0.1688 0.1077 0.4530 0.4042 0,4475 0.6219 0.7381 0.3526 0,3801 0,3905 0,4371 0.7890 1.0088 1,3396 0.7968
5731 0.1229 0,6555 0.0484 0.0953 0.3041 0.4187 0.2068 0,5434 0.6066 1,2770 1,3972 0,7737 0.2594 0.5227 0.6987 0.5005 0.3956 0,4006 0.8355 0.6064
5734 0.3053 1.7651 0.9979 0.2438
5735 0.6227 0.9004 0,5568 0,5481 0,4876 0.7159 0,8818 0.4130
5812 0.7212 1.0344 1.0885 1.0649 0.9819 1.0892 0.8740 1.2068 1,3544 1,3497 1.3118 1.2742 1.2023 1,2283 1.4730 1,1463 1,3276 1,3835 1.4197 1.2839
5900 1.0078 0,6833 1,1407 0,9826 1,0460 0.9387 0.7957 0.6036
5912 0.9585 0.5782 0.7476 0.6586 0.6341 0,8689 0.7861 1.0519 1.2947 1,1608 1,1371 0.9549 0.6740 0.9028 0.6114 0.5925 0,6260 0.6191 0.7517 0.6354
5940  0.7079 0.2880 0.2177 0.1283 0.2889 0.1307 0.2326 0.8253 0.5910 0.4838 0,3325 0.3382 0.2162 0,3273 0.2475 0.5466 0.8274 0.2976 0,4146 0,7596
5944 1.0774 2,0290 2.2724 1.5960 1.8052 1.0227 0.6033 0.5879
5945  0.6020 0.2656 0.5925 0,8128 0.4607 0.7744 2.3278 1.1868 1.0974 1.1694 1,5761 1.1788 1,1364 1,3131 1,3612 1.1907 1,2448 1.7567 1.1015
5960  0.5240 1,7952 1,8353 2.1017
5961 0.5873 0.5967 0.6507 0.5477 0.4947 0.8374 0,7499 1.0825 1.3049 0.8063 0,5901 1.7002 0.9845 1.2608 0.9946 0,9092 1.1514 0,9392 1.3817 0,7145
5990  0,2261 0.3433 0.5191 0.5484 0.5108 0.5423 0.5157 0.7382 0.6922 0,2996 0.4943 0.6218 0.5992 0.7231 1.2090 2.8736 0.3556 1.0521 0.6927
6021 0.0592 0.0726 0.0677 0.0637 0.0599 0.0581 0.0596 0.0604 0.0775 0,0832 0.1010 0,1033 0.0948 0,0980 0.0994 0,0760 0.1004 0.1302 0.1405 0.1371


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
6029 0.0154 0.0176 0.0249 0.0397 0.0452 0.0787 0.0736 0.0983 0,1309 0,0996 0.1073 0,0964 0,1687 0.1478
6035 0.1359 0.1289 0.1408 0.1885 0.1327 0,1335 0,1368 0,1815 0.1687 0.1214 0.1844 0,1663 0,1643 0.1438 0,1367 0.1025 0.1011 0.1215 0,1659 0.1963
6036 0.1216 0.1620 0.2037 0.2022 0.1568 0.1763 0.1517 0,1360 0.1259 0.1479 0.1697
6099 0.3298 0.0803 0.2876 0.6546 0.0772 0.3566 0,3170 0.6757 0.3213 0.4611 0.8601 1.5604 1.3714 1.0068 5,9074 2.8604 2,0066 0.8694
6111 0.9845 0,9922 0.9856 0.9867 0.9861 0.9818 0,9834 0.8957 1,0094 0.9106 0.9205 0.8440 0.6741 0.6490 0.6641 0.7005 0.6308 0.5803 0,7037 0.6504
6141 0.5427 0.9760 0.9140 0,7891 0.7958 0.7740 0.5837 0,6559 0.6759 0.5829 0.5477 0.5225 0,4558 0,3715 0.4962 0.4649 0,3626 0.5968 0,5527 0.5993
6153 0.4559 0.4118 0,4682 0.4121 0,4561 0.5325 1.0907 1.0707 1.0669 1.0607 1.0328 1.0187 0.9935 1.0070 1.0005 0.3806 0.6693 0.7557 0.9579 0.8602
6159 0.4292 0.4914 0.1239 0.1491 0.1618 0.2868 0.4037 0.3868 0,3562 0.3296 0.2835 0.2656 0.3017 0.2974 0.6243 0.6276 0.7051 0,8874 0.7105
6162 0.9468 0.9357 0.9563 0.9606 1.0474 0.7390 0.7093 0,5672 1.1843 0.8019 0,7505 0.9075 0.6442 0,3975 0.4595 0.2362 0.3951 0.7988 0.4624 0.6897
6163 0.6762 1.8327 1.8744 1.4401 0.8835 0,9647 0.9475 0.6573 1.5007 1.7268 0.9390
6172 0.9017 1.1287 0,9509 1,1407 1.0174 0.9639 1.0048 1.0588 0.7943 0.7732 0.7359 0.7102 0.7102
6199 0.4513 0.6274 0.5820 0.6656 0.4279 0.5164 0,5599 0.5080 0,6190 0.6538 0,6177 0,7363 0.3819 0,3802 0,4830 0.4316 0.3885 0,3855 0.3688 0.3837
6200 0.9639 5.9433 4.3010 3.6879 3.4706 1.9515 1.3353 0.8060 0,7640 0.3963 1.1512 0.7201
6211 0.3445 0.3807 0.4102 0.2601 0,3157 0.3950 0,3781 0.5253 0.4843 0.3565 0,3795 0.3686 0.3763 0,3484 0.2657 0.2787 0.2789 0.2697 0.2453 0.1528
6282 0.3981 0.6118 1.0877 0.5492 0,5555 0.7409 0,8060 0.8767 2.5157 2,0728 2,1296 1.8299 1.0051 1.1908 1,1812 1.0868 1.6309 2,4992 2.1629 1.4483
6311 0.1287 0.1759 0.1924 0.2024 0.2219 0.1827 0.1997 0.2033 0.2087 0.2623 0.2789 0.2444 0.1956 0.1804 0,1974 0.1218 0,1383 0.1458 0,1600 0.1501
6321 0.1800 0.2247 0.2383 0.2311 0.2095 0.1823 0.1933 0,2250 0.2790 0.3033 0,3418 0.3008 0.2161 0.2009 0.2471 0.2048 0.1990 0.2919 0,3077 0.3240
6324 0.0816 1.4914 2.6270 2,9134 0.8594 0.5382 0.6125 1,1604 1.6998 1.4071 2.2227 1.8702 1.7517
6331 0.3045 0.3199 0.2971 0.2980 0.3507 0.3318 0.3442 0.3711 0.2753 0.2587 0.3550 0.4733 0.2987 0.2741 0.3298 0.2956 0.3401 0.3346 0,3766 0.3308
6351 0.5957 0.3935 0.6042 0.3669 0,3229 0.2143 0,2297 0.2845 0.3753 0.2797 0.3121 0.4348 0.3414 0.4301 0.4322 0.3386 0.3780 0.6020 0.4155 0.3607
6361 0.4017 0.5291 0.5427 0.6208 0.6223 0,5906 0.5510 0.5951 0.8058 0,6135 0.6186 0,4135 0,4613 0.4240 0.4214 0,2918 0.2765 0.4349 0.4976 0.3515
6399 0,1592 0.0217 2.1617 2,6167 1.6138 0.4303 0.4622 0.3513 0.2984 0.4588 0.4993 1.8196 1.3634
6411 0.6846 1.8626 1.7972 1.6569 1.9517 1,3035 1.3075 1.4122 0.7912 1.2301 1.4782 1,2555 0.8140 1.0080 1.1661 0.8809 1.1322 1.3244 1.1611 1.1542
6510 0.7678 0.8068 0.8173 0.7685 0.8737 0.6707 0.7903 0.7570 0.7359 0.7520 0.8365 0.8495 0.9334 0.9351 0,8446 0,8385 0,9018 0,9311 0.9580 0.9021
6512 0.3895 0.3561 0.3601 0.3419 0,4086 0.3992 0.7002 0.4716 0.6081 1.1333 0.9093 1.0625 0.9322 1.0151 0.9535 0.7888 0.7938 0.8508 0.9149 0.9639
6531 1.2043 1.0199 1.2095 0.7912 0.9513 0.5323 0.4880 0.5286 0,5560 0.3821 0,7369 1,2000 1,1836 1,0893
6532 2.0994 3.2698 3.5626 3,4816 5.3752 7.8705 4,4801 2,7730 4.2400 3.5150 3.2606 2,8851 3.0108 3.6053 3.9246 2,8704 2,5394 2,4654 2.6276 2.2570
6552 0.7902 0.8664 0.9091 0,8062 1.2649 1.5634 0.6267 0,7601 0.6700 0.6268 0.9161 0.9341 0,7554 0,7788 0.7008 0.4952 0.6505 0.8580 0.9210 1,0557
6726 .  . „ . . . _ . . _ . . _ _
6792 3 1.239CB9.940136,293663.317428.980318.800715,090917,0646 4.4556 3.8886 5.0744 3.6631 4.1445 3.6002 3,6607 3,1914 5.1904 3.1981 3,7625
6794 0.2552 2.4719 3.1371 2.8031 3.6874 3.022110.6975 7,7237 2,5432 4.7431 3,2306 3,2266 2,1875 2.8825 1.8796 1.4776 1.6386 1.4871 1.4279


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q fo r  1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
6798 0.7252 0.6939 0.7071 0.7310 0.8457 1.0013 1.0123 1.0878 1.1530 1.1138 1.1519 1.0704 0.9370 0.9351 0,8336 0.6782 0,7836 0.8658 0.9811 1.0268
6799 1.5213 1.2903 1.0895 0.5647 0.5672 0.6100 0.6211 0.6007 0.6670 0.5763 0.8855 0.5721 0.8437 0,8285 0.7987 0.8341 0,8657 0.9150 1.0009 0.9413
7011 0.7914 0.8869 0.8867 1.0887 1.0745 1.4794 1.2534 1.3574 0.9439 1.0756 1.2352 1.0604 0,8939 0.9841 1,0350 0.8782 0,9156 1.0357 1.0010 1.0589
7200 0.3349 0.4072 0.6343 0.5142 0.3984 0.4565 0.7446 1.0949 0.9793 0.9759 1,2711 1.4608 1.1704 0,8748 0,9496 1.3779 0,9566 1.1483 1.3591 0.9853
7310 -t- ... 0.7315 0.7642 0.7724 0.8318 0.8634 0.9351 0.9686 0.9629 1,2932 1.3058 1.1634 1.2208 3.1860 2.7690 1.8118
7311 0.0611 0.2012 0.2176 0,2119 0.2430 0.2231 0.2154 0.3517 0.3368 0.3878 0,4238 0,5146 0,3893 0.4183 0.5615 0.4613 0.6011 0,7344 0.8779 0.7620
7320 0.5551 0.6874 0.5043 0.3737 0.1855 0.1199 0,2228 0.2870 1.0671 1.0454 1.8122 1.6432 0.9726 0.9254 1.0020 1.5557 1.1628 1.2600 0.8934 1.0499
7331 0.2964 0.1012 0.3260 0.6205 1.8869 2.8766 3,0111 5.4781 2,1345 2.2569 1.2938 2,4378 2,6425 2,2765 2.3542 1.2915 1.5503
7340 1.0696 0.9576 0.8298 0.6353 0.6171 0.7546 0.8197 0.7521 1.2511 3.7809 2,1217 1.9084 0.8172 1.0053 1.9395 1.5451 1.3085 0.7311 0.5491 0.8044
7350 -, - 0.6959 0.7901 1.8306 1,0197 1.0463 0.5041 0.7322 0.5004 0.4828 0.4792 0,5867 0.7791 0.8536 0.9058
7359 0.5670 0.5990 0.7271 0.7446 0.8440 1.0026 0.9426 1.2714 0.9986 1.1828 1.2925 0.7801 0.8869 0.6859 0.8819 0.8649 0.9092 0.9179 1.2082 1.0312
7361 0.3871 1.0421 0.9901 0,9803 0.7078 1,3024 0.8538 0,9966 1,4574 0.5575 0.6490 0.3840 0,6283 0,3171 0.6480 0.3389 0,8916 0.5639 1.2241 1.8631
7363 0.2019 0.4208 0.7565 0.5507 0.6810 0.6841 0.8709 0.6257 0.5612 0.5822 1.2792 1.4760 1.1908 1.3289 1.0883 0.7179 0.7908 0.9144 1.1566 1.3485
7370 0.3958 0.4345 0.8786 0.8793 0.3218 0,4686 0.5568 0.4766 0.6046 0.4106 0,8143 0.3695 0.4149 0.2378 0.6490 1.6201 1.3073 1.2104
7371 0.3569 0.3600 0.4709 0.2684 0.8036 0.5839 0.7319 0.9786 1.0532 1.0541 0.7445 0,5561 0,6833 1.1212 0.2907 1.2144 1.5456 1.8688 1,7083
7372 0.7759 1.0809 0.7018 0.9796 0.7433 0.5410 0.6910 2,3814 2,2280 1.2006 1.1706 2.6642 2,2833 1.7206 1.5262 1.9557 2.0325 1.9755 1.8682 1.7023
7373 0.5121 0.5750 0,4356 0.4935 0,2772 0.6063 0.8287 0.7217 0,9220 0,9016 1.0375 0.8695 0.7763 0.5914 0,6138 0.5278 0.8059 0.7530 1.0895 1.5495
7374 3.5399 3.3453 2.3428 2.0463 1,7345 1,1008 1.3976 1.4483 1.6178 1.5733 1.2899 1.8417 1.5936 1.1413 1.0520 0.8787 0.8284 1.0554 1.2087 1.2025
7377 0.6745 0.6973 0.1991 0.5933 1.0997 0,8849 1.0309 1.1035 1.7425 1.0088 1,0360 0.6645 1.1612 0,8497 0.7782 0.5569 0.5897 0.5304 0.6122 0,6017
7380 ••• 0.0359 4.1242 2.1137 4.5787 1.8778 1.9102 2.6279 2.0539 1.0017 1.1457 0.7729 0.8135
7381 0.2511 0.2600 0,2605 0.1949 0.2666 0.4030 0.4403 0,8191 0,7825 0.6510 0.8081 0.8605 0,5970 0,4628 0.4282 0.5621 0.6249 0.5694 0.4990 0.4286
7384 0.2328 0.5720 1,4209 0.8425 0.8393 0.8239 1,6707 1,2226 1,9432 3.9009
7385 0.9038 1,2607 1.2934 1.0232 1.8313 0,6679 1,4140 0.5034 0.3570 0.4101 0,4685 0,3937 0.4687 0.6240 0.3673 0.4494 0.5047 1,0903 1.4935
7389 0.2324 0.5267 1.0881 0.9799 1.3520 1.5541 2.0167 1.4591 1.5888 1.2420 1,5251 1.5067 1.5400 0.9875 0.9366 0.5661 0.7257 1.1808 1.2264 1.0373
7500 0.5219 0.4717 0.5734 0.4158 0,1104 0.6081 0.7981 2,3266 1,2934 1,2253 2.0278 2.1278 1,4652 1.9610 1,4438 1.3916 1,3099 0,7503 0.4722 . _
7510 0.7417 0.7570 0.7848 0.9580 0.8152 0.9010 0.7132 0.8221 0.9513 0.8755 0.8751 0.9280 0.8258 0.8791 0.7541 0,5433 0,8091 0.7685 0.9151 0.7701
7600 0.2065 0.0248 0.0178 0.1898 0.1440 1.1760 0,3999 0.5172 0.5380 0.3871 0.8987 0.6328 0.7148 0,5900 0.9206 0.5713 0.9432 0.5225 0,6732 0.7242
7812 1.6122 1.5528 1,0875 1.0098 0.7846 0.8667 0.8417 1,0360 1.0041 1.0395 1.2204 1.8295 2,9894 1,9534 2,5129 1.6547 1.2746 1,5050 1.4793 1.7477
7819 0.1084 1.1705 1,1076 1.1217 0.5701 0.9354 1.2205 3.4340 2.4246 2.6051 1.9441 1.9957 1.6165 1.3162 1.2615
7822 0.4850 0.4736 0.3654 0.3596 0.5984 0.4494 0.3077 0,3851 0,3392 0.0609 1.1824 0.7709 3.8336 2,6390 1.6756 1.0320 1,5322 0.9347 1.4640 1.5090
7830 0.2886 0.8489 1.2051 0.6392 0.9356 0,9451 0.9085 0.8166 0.8122 1,0180 0.9327 0.9372 0.9349


















Industry M edian Values for Tobin’s q fo r  1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
7948 0.7981 0.9176 0.8143 0.9210 1.0995 1.9566 1.5679 1.6254 2.2339 1.7057 1.5957 1,8667 1.9803 2.3051 1,9832 1.4516 1.3540 1.3483 1.0580 1,2158
7990 0.6986 1.0044 1.1196 1.7116 1.4134 1.0292 0.9409 0.7867 1.0289 0.8296 0.9288 1.0430 1.1061 0.9793 1,0207 0.9284 0,9591 1.0789 1.1925 1.3077
7997 0.8435 0.7654
8000 10.1276 4.0404 4.5415 2.3439 1.3557 0.8891
8011 1.1867 1,5684 0,7662 0.6776 1.0250 0.8238 1.1432 2.5970 1.4731 0.8705 1.2668 2,3425
8051 0.6622 0.7470 0.7390 0.7571 0.8334 0.9253 0,8195 1.0954 0.9335 1.0191 1.1461 1.0192 0.8029 0.7688 0.8151 0.7581 0.8686 0.8993 0.9772 1.0378
8060 0.6132 0 .7110 0.8333 1.1789 2.0469 2.2800 1.1137 3.0326 1.4554 1,6245 1.2769 1.1542 1,4178 0.9096 1.3190 1.3963 1,3123 0.9328 0.7857 0.7301
8062 0.6243 0.6408 0.7821 0.7528 0.9939 1.0994 1.0535 1.4207 0.9689 0.9601 0.9135 0.8458 0.8371 0.8470 0,8753 0.6590 0.8721 0.8382 0.9709 1.2406
8071 3.277816.5407 2.6406 5.4683 2.6180 1.5866 1.4048 1.2803 1.6938 2.2273 1.5483 2.1765 1,7602 2,3556 1.7888
8082 0.4334 0.2536 2.6772 1,2654 1.8693 1.6676 1.1782 0,7119 0,8339 0,9376 0.6212 0.7060 0.8157 1.0412 1.4085 0.8072 0.7987 0.6985
8090 0.4388 0.1053 4.6768 2.5057 0.5998 0.7760 1,1115 0.9539 1.5719 1.6953 1.7457 0,7772 1.0861 1.3123
8093 4.4351 2,9064 2.3521 0.7705 0.6955 1.4439 0.9489 1,1526 1.0876 0.9462 0,9163 1,3861 1.1476 1.2175
8200 2.0487 1.4060 1.8014 2.0123 1.8594 1.8673 1.3575 1.9216 1.8914 1,1392 1.1233 1,1631 1.0103 0.8114 0.9797 0.9500 1.4066 1.4759 0,9004 0.7864
8300 0.5480 0.4316 0.4802 0,4962 0,6029 0.6123 0.3604 0.8039 0.7657
8700 0,9410 0.8245 0.7775 0.7324 1.5612 1.2488 1.7988 1.4980 3.4380 2.3573 3.0700 2,3968 1.2474 1.5476 1.5866 1.1658 2.0975 2.0361 2,0144 0.8094
8711 0.4916 0.3684 0.4593 0.2464 0.2315 0,5150 0.3859 0.3591 0.4423 0.4220 0.5114 0.4256 0,7472 0,6469 0.7137 0,5327 0.8648 0,5589 0.6281 0,6409
8731 0.0407 0.0799 0.1668 1.0175 0.7774 1.2161 0.5957 0.6516 1.0042 0.4829 0.5168 0.4547 0.4981 0.4015 0,4944 0,8713 0.5937 0.7009 0,6452 0.4246
8734 0.4857 0.4872 1.6035 2.9713 1.8209 2.1180 1.3447 0.8793 2,3978
8741 1.3265 1.3565 3.5293 4.1048 4.2586 2.5064 2,5458 0.1801 1.6702 1.8592 0.8809 0.8453 0.7642 0,3780 0,5059 0,7405 1.2658 0.6112 1.3953 0.3871
8742 0.0865 0.1961 0.1294 0.2576 0.7125 1,4381 1,6306 0.3650 0.3841 0.3146 0.3026 0.8390 0,4007 0.7160 0.2938 1.3276 0,5349 0.4124 0.4648 0.5852
8744 0.0369 1,5029 4,5282 3.0370 0.7611 2.6765 1.7481 0.4484 1.1474 1,5291 0.5785 1,6440 0.6990 1.5849 1.4032 1.3779 1.6203
9995 0.2432 0.2579 0.1023 0.0746 0.0908 0.0598 0,3594 0.6659 0.7120 0.4575 0.5704 0.5919 0,5070 0.6569 0,6692 0.3035 0,4883 0.6676 3.9329 1.5695
MEDN0.4587 0.4745 0.4459 0.4758 0.5068 0,5888 0.5620 0.6299 0.7336 0.6484 0.7345 0.7707 0.7315 0.7120 0.7437 0.6423 0.7702 0.7705 0.8810 0.8076




















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to  M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
to
's i
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0100 0.6020 0.4828 0.6963 0.7168 0.8268 0,7156 0.8480 0.8662 0,5057 0,4884 0.4193 0.4701 0.6425 0.4855 0.4728 0,5280 0,4847 0.5244 0.5278 0.6368
0200 0.3830 0.4872 0.6228 0.4413 0.6090 0.8950 1.0031 0.8711
0700 0.0800 0 .1 2 9 5 - ,-
0800 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -,- 0.7830 0.6015 0,8757 0.7868 0.7957 0.8811 0.7542 0.6961 0.6443 0.6199
1000 0.9688 0.7621 1.1357 0.8729 0.7687 0.8344 0.9792 1,1286 1.0030 0.6196 0.9783 1.2185 0.9252 0.5458 0.4321 0.9023 0.6754 0.6196 0.6225 0.6956
1040 0.7838 0.8816 0.9307 0.8834 0.4977 0.4168 0.7898 0.8581 0.5278 0.5931 0.5363 0.3865 0.3485 0.4429 0.4157 0.5542 0.6233 0.7032 0.3466 0,4257
1090 0.3177 0.3749 0.0782 0.1245 0,1141 0.1878 0.4483 0,7526 0.7499 0.3076 0,4732 0.2474 0.4486 0.4397 0.3913 0,8820 1,1845 1.0020 1.0982 0.9474
1220 0.5595 0.4966 0.6705 1.0352 0.9488 1,1366 1.0312 1.7572 1.1327 1,1703 1.0589 1.1130 0,9188 0,9759 0.7480 0.7715 0,6780 0.8907 0,5260 0.4691
1221 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.3930 0.5167 0,4748 0,8078 0.9708 0.5984 0.4195 0.7778
1311 0.8020 0.5513 0.5673 0.6828 0.3511 0.2588 0.4219 0.6245 0.5830 0.7115 0.8101 0.7073 0.7156 0.7065 0,5360 0.7091 0,7400 0.6524 0,5573 0.5800
1381 1.0985 1.2495 1.0018 0.6367 0.4339 0,2976 0.5598 1.1044 0.9592 1,2244 1,4206 1.2293 0.8917 1.0575 0.4794 0,6528 1.0341 0,8117 0.6086 0.7492
1382 0.5766 1.2143 1.3297 1.1908 1.0744 0.3636 0.4198 1.0939 0.8167 0,6754 0.7767 1.0964 0.8919 1.0066 0,7550 0,5916 0.5994 0.5808 0,5051 0.5578
1389 0.4549 0.6099 0,7253 0,8046 0.5332 0.2534 0,3458 0.6748 0.5109 0,7521 0.7913 0,5415 0.4876 0.3556 0.2875 0,3090 0.4578 0.4675 0,4288 0.5345
1400 1.1857 0.9286 0.9490 0.9262 0.9679 0,8265 1.1618 1.2368 1.1322 1.0896 0.8114 0,7003 0.5313 0.5327 0.5787 0.8755 0.7505 0.6752 0.6251 0.5096
1531 2.3235 1.3754 1.1519 1.3129 1.0943 0.8802 1.1353 0.7612 0.7087 0.7234 0.6025 0.6110 0.9374 0.8632 0.9939 1.4330 0.8619 1.0991 0.7738 1.1924
1540 1.9549 1,9632 1.3301 1.6999 1.0490 0,7489 0.9049 1.1198 0.7129 1.0402 0.7237 0.9037 0.9877 0.6643 0.7783 0,6593 1.4586 1.2407 1.0967 1.5494
1600 0.6471 0.6319 0,6152 0.6936 0.4757 0.2995 0.6084 0.8336 0.7078 1.0019 0.9448 0,8916 0.6532 0.5540 0.4593 0.4335 0,4958 0,4261 0.4743 0.4712
1623 1.1936 1.2208 1,2326 1.0818 0.8353 0.5697 1.0389 0.8810 0.9843 0.8177 0.8412 0,6458 0.4779 0.5806 0.5339 0,5614 0,6591 1.0976 0.7379 0.8089
1700 0.8318 1.0220 0.8731 0.7869 0,5300 0.4031 0.5545 0.5628 0.4257 0.8617 0.8002 0.4863 0.9258 0,5550 0.6108 0.5714 0.7717 0.8748 0.6814 0,5414
1731 -.- -,- -,- -,- 0.2318 0.5771 0,7782 0,7283 0,8461 0,5284 1.1770 1,5330 1.0918 3.6389 2,8036 1.9123 0.2600 0.1304 -.-
2000 0.9332 0.9301 0,8327 0.9450 1.0765 1.1099 1.0891 0.9296 0,7666 0.6752 0,5468 0.3962 0,3602 0,4477 0.2814 0.3026 0.2516 0.2865 0,2383 0,2387
2011 1.5280 1.4075 1.3141 1.1273 1.1993 0,9338 1,4652 1.0706 0.9722 0,9710 0.7543 0,5897 0.6147 0,5933 0.5527 0.4084 0.5522 0.4772 0.4217 0.4479
2013 0.9605 1.4725 1.0995 1.5560 1.0217 1.2657 1,2035 1,0829 1.4420 1.3220 0.6192 0.5172 0.4787 0,3887 0.5983 0.7384 0.6093 0,6596 0.4729 0.5229
2015 1.5094 1.8939 1.6576 0.9775 1.2956 1.6298 1,5424 0.8759 0.6979 0.8653 0,4110 0.3682 0.4999 0.6116 0,5453 0,9979 1.0726 0.8070 0,6697 0.6089
2020 1.5494 0.7237 0.8350 0.7977 1.0767 0,5986 0,6880 0.4207 0.3629 0.3481 0,2653 0.2932 0.3807 0,4472 0.3855 0.5778 1.2270 0,3984 0.5196 0.6396
2024 *,* 0,1127 0.0832 0.1584 0,2909 0.1720 0.2195 0,2389 0.2256 0,1990 0.3541 0.2252 0.3015 0.2929 0.3905
2030 1.0667 0.9907 0.8774 0.7707 0.8945 0.9178 0,9038 0,8404 0.6666 0,6816 0.5531 0.4511 0,4657 0.5852 0.6351 0.6177 0.6307 0.4320 0.3120 0,3326
2033 1.5468 1.7504 1.6898 1,5549 1.9357 1.9663 1.7257 1.0549 1.3843 1.0147 0.8594 0.7157 0.7114 0.7794 0.7343 0.6099 0.7393 0.9397 1.0362 1.4332
2040 0.4741 0.5560 0.5506 0.6978 0,8367 0.9025 0,9419 0,7476 0.5411 0,3838 0,2555 0.2080 0.1874 0,1966 0.1983 0,2077 0,1529 0.1993 0,1447 0.2191
2050 1.0723 0.9377 0,8557 1.1995 1.1768 1.1316 1.2189 0.6896 1.0957 0.7630 0.5321 0.3899 0,2817 0.3606 0.4082 0,5217 0,5394 0,5617 0.4429 0.4092
2052 0.5094 0.5547 0.5329 0.5390 0.5153 0.5678 0.5647 0.3945 0.4226 0,4217 0.3349 0.3854 0.2874 0.3225 0.3530 0.6765 0.4708 0.6442 0.4389 0.4262


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
2070 0.3782 0.4346 0.7913 0.8621 0,6625 0.5895 0.8496 1.2265 0.6919
2080 0.8463 0.6616 0.6959 0.4926 0,6152 0.5745 0.5286 0,4958 0.6678
2082 0.4288 0.6454 0.9754 1.0339 1.1617 1.0596 1.3598 1.1783 0,9153
2086 1.4676 1.4950 1.3773 1.3576 1.5024 1,3906 1.2145 1.1180 1.3210
2090 0.9916 0.9104 0.7979 0.7824 0.7213 0.8155 0.6285 0.4279 0.4593
2100 1.4234 0.9340 0.9589 1.4173 1,5747 1.3419 1.2686 0.9589 0.7582
2111 0.8559 0.7960 0.9370 0.9660 0.8566 0.7893 0,8642 0.8110 0.7107
2200 1,3482 1.2882 1.5188 1.6847 1.5009 1.6644 1.4165 1.4361 0.8122
2211 1.7520 1.4734 1.9753 2.2567 2,4763 2,0253 2,4045 1.9040 1,2333
2221 2.8871 2.4836 2.7408 1.3569 1.0260 0.8511 1.0559 1.1121 1.0489
2250 2.2550 2.4298 2.1709 1.6373 1.4126 1.5235 1.5538 1.4050 0.8943
2253 2.6577 2.6047 1.5371 1.8085 1.9681 1.3428 1.3172 1.0651 0.8489
2273 1.6332 1.5691 0.7855 1.0387 1.4710 1.6961 1.6349 2.1693 0.5383
2300 2.1339 1.6532 1.7907 1.8773 2.0435 1.7185 1,2413 1,0921 0,7452
2320 1.6866 1.4038 1.9297 1.9058 2,1620 1.3295 1.1377 1.0300 0.7848
2330 1.2308 1.4930 1.3092 0.9760 1,4686 0.9930 0.8353 0.6681 0.4988
2340 2.8846 2.4911 2.1515 1.7572 1.8498 1,8352 0.8085 0,8057 0.5491
2390 1,4907 1.1229 1.6022 1.2715 1.2192 1.7042 2.4106 1.8355 0.8714
2400 0.4047 0.3571 0.5909 0.7126 0.6998 0,7787 0.9494 0.7550 0.8065
2421 1.0816 0.8435 1.1567 1,1679 1.1085 0,9378 1.2711 0.9747 0.9179
2430 1.9004 1.5015 1.5303 0.9603 1.0248 1,7462 1.4853 0.6801 0.5396
2451 0.4716 0.6493 0.6091 1.0161 0,8498 0.5961 0.7343 0.3619 0.4530
2452 1.1435 0.9572 1.2888 1.3811 2,0395 1.1994 1.8648 1.2705 0.9096
2510 1.1251 1.0026 1.0220 1.0830 1.3355 1.2345 1.2383 0,8604 0.5587
2511 1.7136 1.3765 1.7716 1.4687 1.6185 1.6580 1.9411 1.4337 0,8599
2520 1.5478 0.9429 0.7726 0.7155 0.9595 0.8361 0.7096 0.7304 0.5050
2522 1.1532 0.7535 0.7507 0.6147 0,6241 0,4267 0.6867 0,3812 0.5234
2531 2,7570 1.7269 2.1072 1.6815 2.6052 2,7134 2.4457 1.1429 1.0145
2540 0.9999 0.9248 0.9536 1.0007 1.3714 1.2971 1.3652 1.4503 0.8217
2590 0,7633 0.8714 0.9740 0.7703 0.7520 0,8188 0.7099 0,5124 0.4593
2600 1.6809 1.1566 1.1914 1.1341 1,1988 1,2493 1.4617 1.5061 0.7386
2611 . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . .
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
1.0204 0.4895 0.5853 0.5190 0.6601 0.6063 0.5264 0,4907 0,4454 0,4214 0.4175 
0,6238 0.4734 0.4869 0,4409 0,3045 0.3333 0.3196 0.3084 0.3665 0,3673 0.4187 
1.0904 0.8116 0.7487 0.9833 0.8978 1.4557 0.9111 0.8309 0.4948 0.8329 0.7903 
0.6278 0.5683 0.5590 0.6062 0.6569 0.4526 0,3634 0.3232 0.3232 0,2979 0.3637
0.5553 0,5700 0.4786 0,6415 0.5093 0.5369 0.6226 0.8247 0.5780 0.5754 0,8333 
0.8526 0.5934 0.5033 0.6015 0,5134 0.4692 1.2091 0.7965 0.8950 0.8034 0.9703 
0.6212 0,6758 0.5023 0.5494 0.2965 0.3510 1.4184 0,5705 0.6746 0.8355 0,9135 
0.9776 0,9066 0.9590 0,6479 0,5160 0.4964 0,5287 0.2790 0.4970 0.4582 0.6483
1.5432 1.2347 1.0521 0,9961 1.0270 1.0376 1,1980 1,0282 0.6634 0,5902 0.8835 
1.2741 1,0965 0.5747 0.6016 0,8273 0.7614 1,1269 0.6814 0.6648 0,5302 0.5333 
1.1649 0.8720 0.7919 0,8052 0.9075 0,7299 1,0934 0,7581 0.5998 0.6477 0.7540 
1.0707 0,8857 0.5584 0.9470 1.1200 0.8116 0.6674 0.3502 0.7070 0.6608 0,5202
0.9825 0.5149 0.4258 0,6788 0.5252 0,5152 1,1809 1,3384 0.6326 0.4891 0,7969 
0.9324 0.7600 0.6699 0.8509 0.6876 0.6880 0.9358 0.7192 0.5154 0,4899 0.7069 
0.8536 0,6822 0.7137 0.9986 0.8056 0.8511 1.1488 0,5173 0.6358 0.5145 1.0227 
0,8401 0.5934 0.4529 0,5660 1.0230 0.7498 1,2921 0,7264 0.7557 0.7051 1.0573
0.7839 0.6405 0.3535 0.7325 0.3576 0,3689 0,4869 0.3666 0.4439 0,4820 0,5604 
0.9123 1.0852 1.0464 0.7465 1.2219 1.1967 2.0592 2.3191 0.8603 0.4307 0.7387 
0.8001 0,7904 0.6257 0.7417 0,7535 0,6905 0,8997 0,6055 0.4702 0.3870 0.5367 
0.9678 0.9883 0,8066 0,7811 1.0798 0.7835 1.0299 0.7426 0.5719 0.4702 0.6060
0.5122 0.5345 0.5370 0,7566 0,5933 0.9119 1,0929 0.8479 0.8316 0.5565 0.7636 
0.6372 0.6700 0.8058 0.8159 0.7966 0,9793 0.8428 0,8670 0.4688 0.3971 0,5114 
1.5192 1,0283 1.0173 1.0336 0.9673 1.2702 1.4516 1.3014 0.9251 0.8524 1.2398 
0.6829 0.4848 0.4602 0.6724 0.5703 0.6192 0.7383 0.6808 0.6189 0.4228 0.6597
0,8263 0.7690 0,6128 0.8538 0,8078 0,8826 1,4869 0.9115 0,7198 0.5269 0.6802 
0.4534 0.3965 0.4990 0.4652 0.5759 0.6142 0.5928 0.6169 0.5400 0.5150 0,7133 
0.5769 0.4382 0.4084 0.4666 0,5930 0.4036 0.5517 0.5387 0,4604 0.5118 0.2372 
0.8264 0,9138 0.8000 1,6429 1.0348 1.5435 2.1051 1.2858 0,7873 1,0353 0,5495
0.9485 0,7842 0.5400 0,6009 0.7989 0.8338 0.9665 0,8543 0,6892 0.7620 0.6615 
0.5062 0,4031 0,3092 0.3660 0.4732 0.4360 0.6711 0.5735 0.3720 0,3057 0,4865 
0.9179 0,7496 0.6192 0,5859 0.6141 0.7225 1,0205 0,7346 1,0592 0.7020 0.8134


















industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2621 1.1143 0.9772 1.0357 1.0033 1.0871 1.0575 1.1332 1.0650 0.7517 0.9377 0.7654 0.6492 0.6373 0.7246 0.7366 0,9810 0,7786 0.7373 0.5757 0.6118
2631 1.2481 1.0652 1.2949 1.0800 0.8339 0.8850 0.9406 0.7260 0.5456 0.7155 0.6808 0.5506 0.5392 0.6157 0.6906 0.9762 0.7083 0.6580 0.5851 0.5029
2650 0.9665 0.7316 0.7590 0.5471 0.5990 0.4871 0,6027 0.8102 0.7052 0.8043 0.7775 0.5961 0.7987 0.4377 0.5380 0.7493 0.5305 0.4286 0.4330 0.4656
2670 1.3357 0.9869 1.1132 1,2534 1.2063 1.0183 1.0817 1,1222 0,7040 0,9078 0.8078 0.5929 0,7134 0.5919 0.5531 0,6351 0,6847 0.6544 0.5143 0.6023
2673 _ . 3.8013 3.2829 3.0382 4,8035 3,7936 3.1153 3.8844 2.5970 2.1597 3.2827 2,5662 2.2558 3.0044 1,9336 0.9401 0,5198
2711 0.7762 0,6092 0.5869 0.5284 0.5706 0.5868 0.5859 0.4606 0.4030 0.4190 0.2624 0.2461 0,3153 0.3656 0,3175 0.4498 0,4036 0.3970 0,3793 0.4368
2721 1.6940 1.1272 0.8815 0.4531 0.4804 0,5501 0.5283 0.5134 0,3541 0,4644 0.2968 0.2971 0.2889 0,2964 0.3039 0,3285 0.3657 0.3587 0,3951 0.3437
2731 1.2732 1.1700 0,9636 0.9960 1.1340 0.8777 0.8261 0,4389 0.6464 0.5456 0,4344 0.3387 0.5896 0,3801 0.4971 0.4821 0.4054 0.3404 0.2736 0.3241
2732 3.7019 3.3831 2.1161 1.1196 1.5362 1,7377 2.2521 2.8290 1.4248 1.0419 0.7834 0,8120 0.7089 0,8591 0,8508 1.2074 1.4339 1.8239 1.0314 0,9489
2741 0.3363 0.5080 0.3321 0.4975 0.3466 0.6425 2.2254 2.7079 2.9482 1,5800 2.1981
2750 1.1238 1.2904 1.2678 1.0530 1,1810 1.0486 1.1244 0.6936 0.5647 0.6115 0,4318 0.4400 0.5929 0.5549 0.6581 0.8220 0.6217 0.5734 0,5616 0.6469
2761 0.8154 0.9475 1.1094 1.0243 0.8193 0.8518 0.9883 0.6824 0,5330 0.5478 0,3843 0,4784 0.4553 0,5501 0,5289 0,7645 0,7630 0.6520 0,6068 0,6539
2771 0.8818 1.0494 2.2735 2.6534 1.2127 1,2662 0.9166 0.8574 0.4865 0.4078 0,4083 0.5630 0,7955 0.5005 0.5207 0.6066 0.5972 0.6042 0.5284 0,7539
2780 0.8947 0.6573 0.9187 0.7538 0.7369 0.5635 0,5872 0.4986 0,4063 0.3988 0.4071 0,3329 0.3480 0.3353 0,2692 0.4323 0.3400 0,2743 0,3697 0.3341
2790 7.2663 0.3611 0.5732 0.5622 0.5971 1.0576 0.8025 0,3951 0,4897 . . .
2800 1.1351 1.0770 1.1837 1,3540 1.3108 1.1921 1.2017 1.1828 0.8510 0.9661 0.7197 0.6386 0.6343 0.6534 0.5363 0.7227 0.5711 0.4882 0.5123 0.4132
2810 0.6133 0.6259 0,6448 0.6747 0.6522 0.4227 0.6478 1.0829 0.8015 1.0905 0.9360 0.8355 0.3745 0.5719 0.4080 0.5637 0.5004 0.4142 0.4995 0.5762
2820 0.6048 0.5971 0.7187 0.7564 0.8736 0.8901 1.1659 1.2439 0.9063 1.0111 0,7640 0.6557 0.5126 0.5056 0.4207 0.6691 0.5641 0.5311 0,5826 0.4720
2821 1.9902 1.5343 1,5914 1.3669 1,2429 1.2971 0.9722 0.8027 0.5769 0.6100 0.6128 0.6796 0,6502 0.5277 0.6062 1.0194 0,8071 0.4668 0,3533 0.3334
2833 0.2071 0,2253 0.4441 0.4784 0.9487
2834 0.3579 0.4301 0.4719 0.4412 0.4831 0.4002 0.4198 0.3056 0.3448 0.3658 0.2709 0,2505 0.2799 0.2917 0.2430 0.2367 0.1958 0.2421 0,2325 0.2957
2835 0.6315 0.8501 0.8357 1.0567 0.9006 0.5692 0.5032 0.3030 0,3099 0.4157 0.2736 0.3349 0,4963 0.3284 0.3730 0.2444 0,2375 0.2899 0.4026 0.3182
2836 0.1070 0.3094 0.3774 0.3729 0.4785 0.4097 0.2759 0,3217 0.3420 0.3722 0,3007 0.2226 0.2184 0.2563 0.2690 0.2775
2840 1.0776 0.7586 0.7711 1,1215 1.1117 0.9914 0.8251 0.8600 0.6387 0.6994 0.6520 0.5140 0.5784 0.5459 0.5230 0.7221 0.4129 0,2848 0.2811 0.3269
2842 0.2927 0.5510 0.5201 0.6460 0.5868 0.6881 0.9383 0.7247 0,5958 0.6608 0.4882 0.2761 0.3790 0.5021 0.3206 0.3760 0.4507 0.4418 0,3172 0.2994
2844 1.1446 0.9758 1.0970 1.0428 1.2443 1.0522 1.0044 0.8244 0.6993 0,6438 0.4675 0,3614 0.4814 0.4966 0.5849 0.5409 0.4390 0.4357 0,3758 0.2747
2851 1.2600 1.0181 1.0689 1.2035 1.2420 0.9895 0.9014 0.9303 0.6193 0.6409 0.5183 0.4546 0.5064 0.4856 0,4484 0.5214 0.5195 0.3822 0,3397 0.4339
2860 0.7330 0.7991 1.0935 1.1653 0.9600 1.1032 1.2307 0.8741 0.7450 0.7312 0.5840 0.4994 0.5902 0.4923 0.4678 0.4129 0.3976 0.4136 0.3746 0,3762
2870 0.5202 1.0674 0.9492 0.7153 0.7680 0,3771 0,3521 0.8721 0.6453 0.7043 0,7331 0.3179 0.4775 0.5516 0,5479 0,8041 0,5594 0,5225 0.4292 0.5116
2890 0.4324 0.4161 0.5201 0.5187 0.4263 0.3335 0,4541 0.4585 0,3871 0.3606 0.4206 0.3852 0,5047 0.4745 0.4349 0.4578 0.3847 0.4045 0,3593 0.2886
2891 0.7704 0.7261 0.6792 0.7261 0,7683 0.6281 0.6824 0.7747 0,5171 0.8423 0.7621 0.5301 0,6028 0,3442 0.3604 0.5580 0.4791 0.4789 0.5393 0,6158


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2950 0.6495 0.7042 1.1543 1.0012 1.1037 1.0214 0.6909 0.9913 0.4884 0.9265 0.4786 0,5045 0.7646 0.8747 0.9257 1.1095 1.1264 1,0034 0.7028 0.7256
2990 2.7377 1.7823 1.1829 0.8051 0.8998 1.0716 1.5712 1.0109 0.8404 0.8109 0.6525 0.6146 0.6624 0.7875 0.8806 1,5468 1.2829 1.3540 1.6052 0.5665
3011 1.1654 1.0922 1.6011 1,8276 1.9473 1.1509 1.3219 0.6631 0.8804 0.9231 0.8999 0.7329 0,5365 0,5250 0.4657 0.5223 0,2078 0.2109 0.3044 0,4428
3021 -•* 96,8533 0,2088 2.2773 0.3662 0.7747 1.1347 0.4796 0.4887 0.5752 0.4478 0.3284 0.8353 0.5287 0.3960 0,4032 0.5291
3050 1.3746 1.1252 1,0286 1.0555 1,0408 1.3116 0.9900 0.7005 0.5937 0.6457 0.5827 0,7364 0.8139 0.9228 0.9667 1.2005 0.6115 0.5715 0.5593 0,6206
3060 2.2655 1.4691 1.4079 1.5068 1.2382 1.0175 0.8141 0.9508 0,8354 0.9306 0.6973 0.6983 0.6794 0.7020 0.6738 0.9234 0,6116 0.5743 0.4933 0.4736
3080 1.0013 0.9043 1.1071 1,3383 1.1210 1.4148 1.4089 1.3351 1.3882 1.1690 0.8398 0.6956 1.0311 0,9110 0.7232 1.1076 0.8332 0.6875 0.7371 0.7176
3081 1.5024 0.9727 1.0308 1.3923 1,5822 1.5686 1,4620 0.7427 0.5599 0.6453 0,3688 0.5937 0.5063 0.7156 0.6019 0.7519 0.5145 0.6569 0.5331 0.5940
3089 0.7178 0.6911 1.1977 1.0990 1.0510 1.3637 1,1055 0.9822 0.4588 0.5660 0.4574 0.3762 0.5451 0.4513 0.5343 0,6872 0,4693 0,3882 0,3233 0.3535
3100 2.4757 1.9110 1.7106 1.5520 1.5940 1.7861 1.8498 1.6974 1.1663 1.1577 1.1657 1.1382 1.1944 1.0315 0.7354 0.9293 1.1580 0.8969 0,6343 0.5507
3140 1.9153 1.6733 1.5266 1.3579 1.0507 1.0730 1.1027 0.8109 0.9480 1.0277 0.9377 0.6620 0.5960 0.7747 0.8307 1.1428 1.0576 0.7734 0.4714 0,6380
3220 0.7068 0.4775 0.7222 0.7850 0.8366 0.8359 1.0182 0.7279 0.7027 0.7302 0.4476 0.5540 0,7293 0,5063 0.4269 0.4530 0,2745 0.2508 0.3033 0.3344
3221 1.0574 1.1521 1.4106 1.9070 1,8564 1.6506 1.5606 1.7513 1.2508 1,1816 0.9767 0.5255 0.0570 0.5370 0.6948 0.6461 0.2805
3231 21.9524 0.8526 1.1952 1,7846 1.243124.0395 0.8244 0.6391 0,8936 0.8070 0.5930 0.5776 0.6964
3241 1.8146 1.2424 1.2809 1.1658 1.0706 1.9696 2.7885 2.5688 1.1344 1.2095 1.1795 1.2709 1.1992 0.8228 0.8891 1.2313 1.2114 0.7992 0.5400 0.6952
3250 1.5063 1.1623 2.4640 2,9005 2,2861 1.4177 1.4368
3260 0.9909 0.9946 1,7004 1.9030 0.4675
3270 1.6485 2.0301 1.9215 1.1827 1.1766 1,2263 1,3490 1.5970 0.7436 0.8686 0.7632 0,3672 0.6458 0.8759 0.6143 0.8951 1.1143 1.1299 0.8116 0.9757
3272 0.6997 1.5474 1.9403 1.5171 2,2906 2.7500 1.7988 1.4710 1.2900
3290 0.6177 0.4551 0.5553 0.8251 0.8510 0.9273 1.1216 0.6313 0.7147 0,6536 0.6176 0,4677 1.3353 0.6936 0.7605 0.7035 0.6220 0.8347 0.7252 0,7891
3310 1.4152 1,2389 1,3013 1.2758 1.1905 0.7867 1.0663 0,8882 0.8553 0,9119 0,7498 0.7476 0,6951 0.8078 0.7211 1.1873 0.9361 1.1374 0,7426 0.9878
3312 1.4852 1.3882 1,6823 1.6241 1,4957 1,4914 2.1055 1.8024 1,1970 1.3628 1.3062 1.5553 0.8710 0.7802 0.8726 1,1644 1,0413 0.8431 0,5627 0.5354
3317 1.7633 2.3201 0.8677 0.8444 0.7977 1.4606 1.2948 1.0915 0,6756 0.5315
3320 1.2864 0.7383 0.7297 0.5884 0.6031 0.5257 0.6633 0.6136 0.6153 0.6071 0.5483 0.3765 0,3921 0.3866 0.5347 0.6880 0.6676 0.5459 0.4242 1.0588
3330 0.7884 0.6884 1.1743 1.2567 0.7569 0.7552 0.7826 0.7694 0.7034 0.8931 0.8303 0,7885 0.7890 0,9031 0.7009 0,8536 0.6973 0.6743 0.5911 0.5416
3334 1.7252 1.0469 1.2207 1.2096 1.1687 1.1115 1.4865 1.1481 0.8626 1,0778 1.1028 1.2140 0.8724 0.7700 0.8189 1.0880 0.9137 1.1089 0,5913 0.6397
3341 0.3193 0.1934 0,3786 0.4516 0,5136 0.2902 0,4214 0.3922
3350 2.7472 1.7723 1.9923 0.7318 0.4235 0.2978 0,5186 0,5230 0.4141 0.5887 0.5013 0.7925 0.9044 0.7389 0.7381 1,5953 1.8584 1.5794 0.6049 0.4987
3357 . . 0.7085 0.2847 0.4690 0.3677 0,4199 0.1914 0.4269 0.6736 0.6614 0,2963 0.3569 0.3884 0.4827 0,4031 0.3259
3360 1.3475 0.9223 0,8608 1.3917 1.4981 1.1393 1.0622 0.6693 0.7156 1.0390 0.8391 0,8295 1.1687 1.1731 0.9121 0,8269 0,6862 0,6610 0.6666 0.7978
3390 1.6361 1.1944 1.0589 1.2871 0.9960 0,6893 0.7519 0,8103 0.7348 0.9526 0,9002 0.7418 0.8081 0.7717 0.9488 1.0042 1.0843 1.2108 0.8956 0.8496


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3420 1.0294 0.9801 0.9602 0.9404 0.5688 0.6797 0.6863 0.5268 0.5593 
3430
3440 1.0575 0,9076 1.4826 1.3663 1.3070 1.2785 1.0858 1.3382 0.8164
3442 2.5457 1.2831 0.7914 0.6148 0.7526 0.7465 0.7125 0.6756 0,4695
3443 1.4389 1.0631 1.1291 0.9788 0.9443 0.8180 1,2039 1.5108 0.9995
3444
3448 1.3611 1.0823 1.0679 1.1396 1.2828 1.1396 1.0347 1.1097 0,8756
3452 1.7452 1.1788 0.8625 0.9301 0.8209 0,8198 1.4875 1.4681 0.8838
3460 1.1787 1.0045 0.8278 0.7337 0.6635 0.5293 0.6967 0,7148 0.5553
3470 1.6248 1.8618 1.6584 1.4023 1.2638 1.1645 0.9813 0.6528 0.8671
3480 1.4153 1.0956 1.2793 1.3284 0.7064 1.1210 1.0270 1.0263 0.6929
3490 1.2594 0.9441 1.1473 1.2775 1.1002 0.8968 0.9056 1.0513 0.7749
3510 1.0237 0.8673 1.2065 1.2538 1.0885 1.1530 1.2670 1.4296 0.8570
3523 1.6013 1.3910 1.5723 1.5017 1.1933 1.4824 1.3438 1.2712 1.2235
3524 1.7687 1.4284 2.0219 0.8705 0.8246 1.0049 1.4551 1.1625 0,7631
3530 2.0622 1.3568 1.0791 1.2919 0.9648 0.6993 1,2925 0.7935 0,7364
3531 1.4685 0.7870 0,9619 0,8349 0.8590 0.8489 0,7350 1.1268 0.7313
3533 0.4257 0.5663 0.5321 0.6265 0.6245 0,5193 0.5968 1.3910 0.9847
3537 1.7368 1.2444 0.9344 0.9844 0.7802 0,8150 0.9621 1.3833 0.6768
3540 1.0345 0.8258 0.8797 1.1676 0,8518 1.0012 1.4708 1.4958 1.1078
3541 1.6494 1.1506 1.1078 0.9439 0.7502 0,6602 0,7913 0.8824 0.7090
3550 1.1661 1,1751 1.2563 1.3862 0.9766 1.2387 1.7678 1.6843 1.3005
3555 3.7863 2.7773 1.8109 1.0675 1.6906 1.4049 0,1076 0.1087
3559 1.7556 1.0868 1.0694 0.7587 0.5856 0.4925 0.6653 0.4835 0.4797
3560 1.4342 1.2406 1.0628 0.9432 1.0381 0.9964 1.1023 0.9830 0.9478
3561 1.4543 0.8097 0.8808 0.8253 0.8388 0.7235 0.7430 0,9723 0,6987
3562 0.8455 0.6664 0.6829 0.7343 0.7516 0.7036 0.8712 0.9693 0.7658
3564 1.7823 1.1041 0.8015 0.6977 0.6658 0,7110 0.5825 0.5391 0.5535
3567 1.8877 1,6527 0.8493 1.5364 0.9777 1,2658 0.9872 1.5835 0.9032
3569 1.2890 0.9703 1.2923 1.6103 0,9264 0.6866 0.9842 0.7131 0.5692
3570 0.3386 0.2946 0.4051 0.4673 0.4465 0,4848 0.6411 0.6989 0.5304
3571 1.4623 0.4268 0.4956 0.2265 0.4312 0,3005 0.2580 0.3712 0,2860
0.5867 0.5693 0.5281 0.5687 0,5804 0.7366 0,8642 0.7353 0.7692 0.4963 0.5029
0.6029 1.4833 0.7644 0.6527 0.3607 0.6856
1.0334 0.7262 0.9186 0.8892 0.6413 0.5902 0.8524 0.8089 0.5339 0.5157 0.6071
0.7273 0.8674 0,8927 0.8875 1.0050 0.7619 1.0113 0,7252 0.9754 0.7533 0.8173
1.3493 1.1198 1.2564 0.9220 0.7938 0.6944 0,6685 0.6920 0.5251 0.4982 0.5334
0.5721 0.4066 0.6448 0.9409
0.8882 0.8880 1.0493 0.9458 1.0945 0.8329 1.5421 0.8193 0,6815 0.4818 0.4885
0.9743 0.8467 0,7446 1.0230 0.7956 0.8881 1,2042 1.1139 1,0811 0.7871 0.9166
0,6592 0.7278 0,7280 0.7655 0.7239 0.9639 1.3469 0.8014 0.5952 0.7368 0.4620
0.8463 0.4382 0.4745 0,8907 0.6647 0.4503 0.5316 0,4703 0.5390 0.5884 0.6048
0.8614 0.6170 0.7263 1.1624 0,8521 0.5089 0.5092 0.4235 0.3410 0,3904 0.8407
0.6549 0.6428 0.6964 0.7941 0.5443 0.6386 0.8014 0.6535 0.7128 0.5530 0.4667
0,8847 1.0566 0.9329 0.9029 0.8064 0.6251 0,7278 0.6334 0.3673 0,3764 0.4593
1.1296 1.0784 0.8325 0.9317 0.5978 0,6733 0,9880 0.9532 0.7941 0,3954 0.5397
0,8957 0,9922 0.4128 0.5086 0,5650 0,5974 0.8967 0,9063 0.8139 0.7040 0.7915
0.7966 0.9071 0.9049 0.8549 0,9953 0.8177 2.5687 2.8792 1.5666 0.9865 1,0712
0.9557 0,7752 1.0331 0,7658 0.6374 0,7622 0.8771 0.8521 0.5445 0,4065 0.4571
1.0026 0.8193 1,0259 0.7047 0.7883 0.3544 0.3928 0,4848 0,6644 0.5818 0.6514
0.8360 0.7225 0.7085 0.8774 0.7535 0.6618 1.3140 0.8302 0.6022 0,5641 0.6452
1.2787 1,0224 1,1001 1.1491 1.0656 1.2231 1,7000 1,3263 0,7936 0,5808 0.9941
0.9652 0,9238 0.7862 0.7798 0,6973 0.8797 1.0713 1.0511 0.6035 0.5717 0.5258
0,6325 1,0856 0.7502 0.3899 0,4495 0.4913 0.8283 0.6988 0.7433 0.4900 0,3384
0,0653 0.3429 0.3726 0.4194 0.4281 0.3153 0,9085 0.8873 1.0304 0.7719 0,5538
0,4993 0.6288 0.6891 0.6270 0.6282 0,7321 1.0695 0,8974 0.7022 0.6021 0.4625
0.9087 0.9060 0,9311 0.9501 0.7840 0.7743 1,2246 1.0684 0,9411 0.6757 0.5091
0.9884 0.6821 0.7174 0.6751 0.5182 0.6502 0.7230 0.4782 0.3784 0,3827 0.4124
0.9368 1,0438 0.7545 0,8775 0,5293 0.5213 0,8000 0.7024 0.7174 0.4153 0.4634
0.5020 0.5127 0,5544 0,4804 0,4766 0.5987 0.3810 0,4282 0.5027 0.5080 0.5840
0,9844 1.1490 1.7895 1.1603 0.9392 0.7971 1.1772 1.1252 0.9324 0.8894 1,0575
0,6096 0.6711 0.5631 0.6967 0,5153 0.4527 0,3937 0.4209 0.5255 0.4725 0.5075
0.5946 0.7352 0.6333 0.5206 0.5337 0.7163 0.8940 0.8280 1,0070 0,7854 0.8465


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
CO
tsD
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86  87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3572 1.6952 1.0365 0,5659 0.3051 0.3032 0.3864 0.5637 0.4278 0.4258 0.4338 0.4301 0.3597 0.5263 0.6572 0.6355 0.6642 0.5141 0.6244 0.5631 0.6755
3575 6.0596 3.8508 1.9921 1.5406 0.7654 0.4634 0.3606 0.4459 0.6151 0.5541 0.6009 0,8247 1,1826 0.9139 0,9956 0.8588 0,6888 0,4695 0.7230 0.9748
3576 0.1745 0.2867 0.3811 0.4352 0.0936 0.4073 0.4369 0.2514 0,2882 0,3628 0,5488 0.5045 0.6676 0.7474 0.7113 0.8088 0.4748 0.4336 0.4115 0.4958
3577 1.2044 1.3821 1.2300 0.2862 0,3463 0.2532 0.4433 0.3457 0,2884 0.3726 0.4527 0.4176 0.5509 0.4713 0.6109 0.6563 0.5277 0.7038 0.5588 0,4383
3578 1.9312 2.0529 1.7628 1,0916 1.1197 1.0700 0.3937 0.2560 0.3490 0.3344 0.4249 0.5057 0.7197 0.6621 0,8238 1.1764 0.6181 0.6686 0.3513 0.6305
3579 0.5327 0.6396 0.7374 0.7340 0.6861 0.6761 0.9730 0.5985 0,6544 0.6441 0.5728 0.3763 0,4965 0.3792 0.3831 0.4775 0.4015 0.3912 0.4944 0.4594
3580 1.2670 0.9243 0.8344 0.7620 0,7031 0.4528 0.6866 0.5996 0,4923 0.6683 0.5613 0.5344 0.5152 0.5428 0,4549 0.7301 0,5418 0.4202 0.3745 0.3107
3585 2.0294 1.2614 1.0991 1,1022 0.8404 0,9399 1.0991 0.9308 0.6959 0.9512 0,7960 0.7858 0,7839 0.7761 0,7637 1.0552 0.8139 0.7964 0.6092 0,5689
3590 1.6879 1.5751 1.4031 1.0629 1.0226 1.0887 0.9663 1,0943 0.8006 0.9018 1.0743 1.0161 0.8002 0.8554 0.8442 1.1242 1.2791 1.1615 1.0080 0.8743
3600 0.7834 1.0576 1.3972 0.8170 0.8827 0.7629 0.6973 0.5477 0.7066 0,8805 1.0583 1.1115 1.3020 0.8939 0,8412 1,1354 1.1634 1.2777 0.8991 0.7376
3612 1,4435 1.3565 1.4600 1.2449 1.4469 1.5054 1.2759 1,1565 0.9297 0.7483 0,9115 0.7135 1.2043 1.0976 0.6183 0.8063 0,5756 0.6907 0.5116 0.6531
3613 0.5543 0.6094 0.4050 0.2271 0.5194 0,6491 0.7537 0,9574 1.0091 1.1860 1,4384 2,0963 0,5149 0,3628 0.3750 0.5171 0.6130 0.8929
3620 2.6832 1.9192 1.4691 1.2475 1.6616 1.1697 0.8139 0.8395 0.6789 0.7321 0.7326 0.7537 0.7298 0.5895 0.6893 0.7840 0.7643 0.5171 0.4303 0.4132
3621 1.4133 0.8981 0.5965 0.6175 0.4463 0.3742 0.3960 0.4269 0.4514 0.6391 0.6990 0.7470 0.7235 0,5744 0.4340 0,7781 0,5249 0,3338 0.3057 0.3078
3630 0.3650 0.3751 0.5230 0.6835 0.7427 0.8006 0.6995 0 .4646 0.4319 0.5105 0.4546 0.4070 0.5076 0.5541 0.5383 0.8878 0.4623 0.3287 0.3223 0,4594
3634 1.2956 1.0608 1.3499 1.3498 0.8864 0.6715 0.8806 0,7393 0.6990 0,8641 0.8182 0.6335 0,7423 0.4984 0.9158 2.6958 1.8572 0.6962 0.8489 1.0373
3640 0.8111 0.7435 0.8128 0.8406 0.8008 0.6822 0.8140 0.7653 0.5481 0.5988 0.5907 0.5392 0.4604 0,5333 0.5027 0.5868 0.7049 0.5660 0.5056 0.5025
3651 0.5989 0.5166 0 .9846 0.7469 0.7743 0.5812 0.4578 0.7153 0.4813 0.6085 0.6978 0.5919 0,4904 0,4793 0.5447 0.6572 0.8533 0.8505 0.5470 0.4273
3652 1.1740 1.2499 1.3125 1.7890 2.4967 0.6813 0,4781 0.5004 0.3252 0.4671 0,4687 0.3044 0.3019 0.3910 0,5401 0.5801 0,5918 0.4078 0.1466 0.0853
3661 0.9158 1.4367 0.6673 0.6204 0.5391 0.3839 0.4244 0,3290 0.4006 0.5797 0.5342 0.7174 0.8101 0.7139 0.5466 0.6250 0.5614 0.4737 0.3529 0.3392
3663 0.8580 0.7124 0.7827 0.7144 0.6302 0.5082 0,4481 0,5365 0,4037 0.6872 0.7135 0.7060 0.7110 0.8095 0.7988 1,0159 0.8479 0.6266 0.5182 0.3979
3669 0.5001 0.5680 0.7748 0.7902 0.5216 0.4770 0,6896 0.6386 0,5845 0.6708 0,5776 0.5498 0,6072 0,5092 0.4638 0.6173 0.5394 0.5703 0.4619 0.4551
3670 1.5028 0.9433 1.0666 0.6921 0.7859 0.7136 0.7616 0.7960 0.4806 0.6486 0.5912 0.4876 0.8587 0,9481 0.9937 1.3358 1,1830 0.9232 0.5955 0,7376
3672 1.4324 1.3250 1.3155 0.9799 0.6620 0.6321 0.5602 0.6090 0.3166 0,4803 0.5930 0,7264 0.6594 0.6821 0.9885 0,8571 0,5124 0,5932 0.3899 0.4536
3674 1.0247 0.8992 0.7234 0.6154 0.4688 0.4469 0.4955 0.3964 0.2628 0,4267 0.4564 0.5601 0,5451 0,6406 0,7431 0.7769 0.6085 0.4573 0,3704 0.3807
3677 0.3476 0.4145 0.3217 0.3449 0.4133 0,4948 0.3158 0,4573 0.3944 0.4342 0,2922 0.4943 0.7739 0.9054 1,5528 0,5960 0.8701 1.2160 1,2676
3678 0.9671 0.9489 0.7411 0.6684 0.4515 0,4979 0.3613 0.4412 0.2141 0.2779 0.2721 0.4051 0,3153 0,7028 0.7490 0.6636 0,6648 0.4602 0.3472 0.3648
3679 1.2402 1.1501 0.9181 0.5197 0.6687 0.4873 0.6090 0.4507 0.3547 0.5468 0,6311 0,6416 0.7056 0,7786 0,8960 1.1546 0.9865 0,9023 0.7273 0.5935
3690 1.3898 1.4371 1.2277 1.0376 0.9892 0.7543 0.5908 0.4580 0.3613 0.5121 0,4878 0,5194 0.6819 0.6664 0.7329 0.8340 0.6730 0,8721 0.5920 0.7576
3695 0.2993 0,4110 0.2914 0.3651 0.4160 0.4997 0.5073 0.4760 0.5507 0,5443 0.5839 0,7165 0.7283 0.6618 0.5536
3711 1.9123 1.8484 2.0891 1.9236 2.3180 1.3062 1.0364 0,7761 0.7564 0.8484 0,7926 0.6564 0.8753 0.9381 0,9715 1.6010 1,2471 0.7402 0.5351 0.6808


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
COco
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3714 1.2614 0.9958 1.0807 1.2130 1.2649 1.1460 1.1483 0.8595 0.6121 0.7282 0.6281 0.5679 0.6735 0.6417 0,6584 0.9294 0.7429 0.4574 0.3649 0.4643
3715 1.6538 1.8808 1.5476 1.7471 2.2346 3.5520 5.3709 2,9705 0.5640 0.6755 0.5482 0.6918 0.4833 1.2529 0.3828 0.2250 0.2219 0.2088
3716 0.4800 0.5704 0,8376 1.0836 1.7144 0.9210 0,7563 0.3931 0.3512 0.5381 0,5276 0.5552 0.5897 0,6706 0.7085 1,1656 0.7886 0.5578 0.5158 0.4868
3720 2.3382 2.4870 2.7554 1.4262 1.7204 2.2430 3.3100 4.4815 4.3892 5.8569 9.956515.327731.928638.258016.762552,991364.135650.529778.890188.5272
3721 1.5358 1.0832 1.0273 0,9694 0.7307 0.5586 0.6487 0.4325 0.4397 0.5855 0.4797 0.6086 0.9690 1.0116 1.0172 1.1512 0.9354 0.6425 0.7197 0.6146
3724 1.3063 0.9320 1.0436 1.0035 0,9379 0.9176 1.0496 1.1191 0.7766 0.7343 0,7020 0.6775 1.0493 0.9817 0.8033 1.1212 1.1667 1.2364 0.8967 1.0612
3728 1.8687 0,8983 0.8230 0.6943 0.5007 0.3937 0.6091 0,7156 0.5948 0.6746 0.5378 0.6050 0.5211 0.5036 0.4739 0.5974 0,4517 0.3643 0.4268 0.7071
3730 0.9550 0.8611 0.9722 0.6806 0.6999 0.5707 0.9115 0.7808 0.6603 0.9307 1.0863 0.8718 0.7833 0.7045 0.6722 0,8245 0,8789 0.8138 0.6896 0.6641
3743 0.7562 0.6945 0.9134 0.7709 0.5543 0,4131 0.8621 0.6356 0.5589 0.7998 0.7485 0.5689 0.5992 0,5146 0.7316 0.9686 0,7614 0.4965 0.4346 0.5031
3751 2.4475 1.5167 1.2752 0.9562 0.8259 0.9143 0.7459 0.9306 0.7222 1.0745 1,0524 0.7635 0.7363 0,5552 0.4864 0.6510 0,4349 0.2548 0.1938 0.5770
3760 1.2945 1.0332 1.0225 1.0626 1.1860 1.1063 1.0444 1.0110 0.7129 0.7127 0.6204 0.5679 0.4813 0.6345 0.6801 0.9504 0.6630 0.6318 0.4292 0.4841
3790 1.6200 1.3634 1.0784 1.5447 1.9512 1.8088 1.0865 1.1025 0,8524 0.9158 0.9037 0.9742 0,9028 0.9251 0.9866 0.6542 0.4517 0.2942 0.4346 0.8667
3812 1.4445 1.3378 1.2751 1.0685 0.7208 0.4294 0.5157 0.3311 0.3675 0.5655 0,4617 0.4397 0.5863 0.5974 0.8448 1,2115 0,9848 0.9155 0.8906 0.6643
3821 1.1226 1.1431 1.1045 0.3953 0.4313 0.4190 0.4566 0.7437 0.4254 0.7119 0.5766 0.5202 0.5747 0.7070 0.7802 0.9939 1.1233 1,2503 1.1289 0.5931
3822 1.4912 1.1036 1.2750 0.9308 0.8875 0.7520 1.2956 1.1046 0.7595 0,8058 0.7565 0.8232 0.9800 0.6719 0.5528 0.5387 0.4070 0.3940 0,3935 0.4627
3823 1.0852 1.0315 0.7162 0.6403 0.6008 0.3851 0.5672 0.6441 0.5766 0.7638 0.6746 0.4930 0.5927 0,4089 0.5182 0.8735 0.8071 0.7563 0.6655 0,5604
3824 2.1705 1.5319 1,3961 1.4029 1,2879 1.5658 2.1639 1.8337 1.4057 0.9125 0.7710 0.6813 0.7984 0.5557 0.8547 1.1942 0,9879 0,6267 0.5506 0,5369
3825 1.0830 0.5916 0,5569 0.4200 0.4334 0.4167 0.4447 0.3261 0.2955 0.4807 0.5551 0.6671 0.5722 0.7430 0.8926 1.1724 0,8649 0.9302 0.7563 0.6923
3826 0.4643 0.4897 0.5672 0.4648 0,3230 0.3421 0,5622 0.6503 0.3738 0.4053 0.4509 0.4104 0.3985 0.4308 0.5161 0.4322 0.4239 0.4594 0.4141 0.4355
3827 1.3724 1.3244 0.9484 1.6560 1.2390 1.1170 0,5876 0.4236 0.4293 0.4213 0.4828 0.3730 0.5022 0.9499 0.6910 1.1199 0,7099 0.6572 0.7505 0.9183
3829 2,1974 1,3409 0.8769 0.6934 0.5401 0.6657 0.9071 0.7137 0.5323 0.6711 0.5229 0.4919 0,5237 0,5144 0,6013 0,7230 0,7733 0.5960 0.6224 0.6606
3841 0.2961 0.3313 0.4099 0.4480 0,4447 0.3453 0.3306 0.3110 0,2469 0.5010 0.4440 0.3701 0.3224 0,3512 0.2769 0.2709 0,2049 0,2503 0,2912 0,3261
3842 1.2721 1.4036 0.9103 0.7759 0.6281 0.5790 0.7241 0,3007 0.3531 0.7431 0,5589 0.3594 0.4684 0.4743 0.4982 0.4271 0.3186 0.3275 0.3937 0.4387
3843 0.5818 0.6982 0.8667 0.8380 0.9866 0.7586 0.6714 0,6872 0,5212 0.9180 0,6362 1.0530 0.4189 0.6669 0.8335 0.8274 0.9162 0.6051 0.5087 0.2209
3844 0.3179 0.3981 0.4359 0.5396 0.5033 0.3121 0.5769 0.3634 0.4497 0,5948 0.3645 0.3977 0.7105 0,5014 0.3164 0,9600 0.4271 0,2931 0,3428 0.5556
3845 0.3523 0.3274 0.3919 0.4664 0.3778 0.2763 0.2585 0.2651 0,2527 0,5622 0.4777 0,3465 0,3816 0.3802 0.3280 0.3127 0.2957 0.3000 0.3901 0.5329
3851 0.6621 0.7742 0.5908 0.7542 0,4574 0.3352 0,3805 0,4589 0.4095 0,4386 0.3945 0.4076 0.8386 0,5022 0.4868 0.3929 0,2375 0.2772 0,1537 0.4576
3861 0.4711 0.3810 0.6552 0.5711 0.6940 0.5354 0.5858 0.5298 0.6840 0.8199 0,6887 0,5579 0,7161 0.5478 0.6717 0.7931 0.6825 0.5268 0,4566 0.5535
3910 2.2724 1.3992 1.4163 0.9896 0.8396 0,5497 0,7618 0.7945 0,5812 0.7828 0.8839 0.8322 0.6761 0.5278 0.7235 1.1138 0.7332 0.5505 0,5822 0.6756
3911 1.2347 0.7974 0.9812 0.9538 1.1963 1.4302 1,5452 1,7646 1.5648 1.3183 0.6934 0.5698 0.4167 0.6520 0,7922 0,8372 0.6114 0,7439 0.8474 0,8169
3931 2.6192 1.6654 1,3476 1.3611 1.4716 1.7024 1,4244 1.3133 0,7012 0,7607 0.5303 0.5960 0.8316 0.8300 0.8464 1.2945 1,1704 0.9736 1.1207 1.2430


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3944 2.6016 1.4606 1.5719 1.4492 1.9757 1.6748 1.4307 0.9813 0.9856 0.7632 0.4967 0.5107 0.8604 0.7856 0,6783 1.1223 0,7115 0.6875 0.9423 0.6442
3949 2.4367 1,4515 1,8842 1,7439 1,1294 1.3022 1.6679 1.3649 0.6604 0.8226 0.7638 0.5432 0.8865 0.6978 0.6121 1,2097 0.8451 0.8026 0.5220 0.5225
3950 0.9066 0.8460 0,8625 0.8842 0.8563 0,5922 0.8058 0.8272 0.8026 0.5751 0,3562 0.3566 0.3640 0,3780 0.3575 0.6419 0.4898 0.4699 0.4929 0,5314
3960 2.2176 1,7486 1.2341 0.9247 1,1422 0.9596 1.6303 1.7640 1.4195 1.6726 0.7465 0.5578 0.8732 0.9484 0.8519 0.5685 0.2861 0.2441 0.1826
3990 3.3891 2.6781 2.6058 1.2968 1.1677 1.0860 0.6293 0.7186 0.6652 0.5909 0,9240 0.5537 0.4095 0.3474 0.3576 0.4868 0.4260 0,5050 0,4035 0.4072
4011 2.2713 1.8094 1.9343 1.6186 1.4496 1.0659 1.0673 1.0812 1.0227 1.1883 0.9306 0.9509 0.9542 0.8646 0.7610 0,9064 0.5370 0.4507 0.3729 0.5117
4100 1.0611 0.7264 0.5648 0,4561 0.2953 0.6046 0.7697
4210 *•" -•* 0.6260 0.2831 0.2283 0.2100 0.2045
4213 1.0605 0.8656 1.1749 1.3628 1,3051 1.0481 0.9560 0.7395 0.4829 0.6201 0.5658 0.4997 0.6602 0.7175 0.5773 1.0373 0.7948 0.6311 0,5417 0.6919
4400 1.3522 0.9375 0.9167 1,1873 1,0250 1.0111 0.8542 1.0846 0.7737 0.8316 1.2792 1.3049 1.1349 0.8107 0.5370 0.8931 0.8452 0,7906 0.5937 0,6056
4412 1.5534 0.8452 0.9770 1.2492 1.5653 0,8039 1,3718 2.0898 1.6150 2,1634 1.3101 1.3995 1.4332 0,9411 0.9230 1,2456 1.0687 1.3118 0.9946 0.9283
4512 0.8422 0.9750 1.2694 1.2880 1.6121 1.2635 1.2536 0.6908 0.5505 0.6967 0.6574 0,6467 0,7873 0,8328 0.7842 0.7953 0.5882 0.3427 0.3660 0.5648
4513 0.4459 0.3291 0.3480 0.4128 0.3670 0.3287 0.6589 0.4706 0,4375 0,5556 0,5347 0.4232 0.9129 0.7273 0.6364 0.8091 0.6848 0.7211 0.4741 0.9023
4522 1.8728 1.6201 1.7951 1,5510 1.7753 1.3736 1.2586 0.9729 1.4884 0,6884 0,3953 0.1072 0.4148 0,5790 0.3788 0.2985 0.5825 0.7167 0.5279 0.5903
4581 1.2705 0.9917 0.9693 1,1289 1.1506 1.5233 1.2121 1,5036 0.9510 0,9248 0.6949 0.6269 0.6196 0,6447 0.3555 0.5257 0.5520 0.7152 0.8313 0.9994
4610 0.6232 0.5480 0.5827 0.5426 0.5061 0.6216 0.7202 0.4806 0.5910 0.5453 0.4821 0.7839 0.7958 0.8033 0.7868 1.0260 0.9705 0.8449 0.7162 0.7291
4700 1.2287 1,0016 1.2076 1.3742 1.1369 0.6416 0.9554 1.1045 0.4474 0,8966 0.7485 0,6642 0.6506 0,5316 0.8731 1.5152 0.8406 0.6813 0.5453 0.6322
4731 0.4364 0.4611 0.5853 0.3974 0.4646 0.3240 0.3247 0.5949 0.4207 0.3628 0.2866 0.3106 0.7368 0,5291 0.5397 0,6629 0.3982 0.4614 0,4064 0.4420
4812 1.2491 0.8307 0.7176 0.5804 0.5079 0,3811 0,3867 0.2079 0.2420 0.2932 0,2544 0.2615 0.1645 0.1163 0.0902 0.1650 0.2052 0.1520 0,3305 0.3448
4813 1.2006 1.1084 1.0275 1.0026 1.0353 1.0738 1.0522 0.9131 0.8339 0.9042 0.7146 0.6415 0.6843 0.5814 0.3915 0.4476 0.4597 0.4327 0.3183 0.4219
4822 0,9525 0,0895
4832 0.1631 0,1889 0.2934 0,3297 0.2938 0.0424 0.0446 0.2394 0.1608 0.2295 0.1493
4833 0.7569 0.6875 0.5692 0.5770 0.6026 0.5694 0.7174 0.5203 0.4204 0,3521 0.3047 0.3097 0.3623 0.4509 0.4374 0.6020 0.2045 0,2015 0.2750 0.3265
4841 1.2213 0.9630 0.5712 0.4766 0.2352 0,2045 0.3800 0.3116 0.3595 0,3238 0.2394 0.3202 0.2539 0.2753 0.3229 0.4529 0.2070 0.1693 0,1968 0,2401
4899 1.4434 1.2830 1.4919 1.1851 1,2931 1.0794 0.8607 0.7661 0.9619 1.2800 0,8341 1.0052 1.1166 0.7930 0.4895 0.7310 0,5695 0.4975 0,5677 0.6763
4911 1.0900 0.9791 1.0108 1.1253 1.2290 1.2679 1.2285 1.0542 1.0893 1,0218 0.8895 0.7653 0.8927 0.8515 0.7622 0.8290 0.7014 0.6692 0.6680 0.8416
4922 1.6396 1.0597 1.2536 1,2773 0.8085 0,6226 0.8781 1.3041 0.9977 1.0472 0,9970 0.8802 1.0792 0.8704 0,5426 0.6637 0.7760 0.7320 0,5844 0,6433
4923 0.9430 0.8341 0.8475 1.0122 0.8909 0.7073 0.8422 1.0134 0.8437 0,8120 0.7338 0.7155 0.7391 0.7258 0.6125 0.6658 0.6829 0,6104 0.5707 0.7184
4924 1.2194 1.0822 1.0801 1.2053 1.1626 1.2354 1,2706 1.1905 1.1152 0.9380 0.8339 0.6815 0.7513 0.7769 0,6912 0.7258 0.6714 0,6231 0.5485 0,6795
4931 1.0820 0.9788 1.0031 1.1213 1,2031 1.2863 1.2206 1.0437 1.0336 0,9963 0.8708 0,7270 0.8328 0,8155 0,7308 0.7905 0.7016 0.6802 0,6720 0,8277
4932 1.4009 1.1472 1.0825 1.3764 1.0529 0.9538 1.1600 1.2882 1.3156 1,0816 0,9319 0.8030 0.8372 0.7858 0.6808 0.7486 0.6474 0.6190 0.5524 0.7166


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to  M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
4950 0.1120 0.2418 0.1636 0,2248 0,3699 0.4416 0.5873 0.4880
4953 1.3064 0.9429 0.7637 0.5929 0.5594 0,3774 0,4128 0.2803 0.3453 0,5382 0.3416 0.2642 0,2339 0.3103 0.3153 0.2475 0.3763 0.3909 0.5012 0.4855
4955 1.3074 1.8455 0.7130 0.4370 0,3226 0.4696 0.2496 0.2108 0.4174 0,3311 0.4485 0,3814 0,4782 0.5019 0.6517 0.5862
4961 0.4900
4991 0.7976 0.9380 0.8750 0.9323 1.1142 0.8705 0.6687 0,4083 0.4091 0.6033 0.4075 1.0515 0.5992 0.1714 0.2877 0.3204 0.3574 0,3460 0.3798 0,4854
5000 0.4003 0.3844 0.4255 0.4785 0.4851 0.5982 0.6359 0,4881 0.4649 0.5604 0,4670 0.4631 0.3570 0.4341 0.4163 0.4541 0.2997 0.2963 0.3232 0.3524
5010 0.6245 0,6978 0.7185 0.4434 0.5535 0,6103 0.7339 1.4002 1,8906 0.6594 0.3469 0.5451
5013 0.7561 0.6228 0.6816 0.7906 0,9439 1.0369 0,7544 0.7547 0.5114 0.7301 0.3595 0.7531 1,1083 0.8701 0.9796 1,8842 1,0087 1,0845 0.8940 0,8995
5020 3.1366 1.5680 1.6305 2.4297 2.5645 2.9587 1.9084 2.9286 0.3413 0.3839 0,5626 0,5648 0.8658 1.1514 1,6827 1.1874 0,8399 1,1552 1.3414 1.2163
5030 0.6797 0.7988 1.1477 1.3702 1,5440 1.6324 1.9771 0.7979 1.2058 1.0288 0.9501 0.9580 1.3366 0,8174 0,9438 0.8700 0.8662 1.0759 0.7819 0.7249
5031 2.1556 3.3220 2.6478 1,9539 1.1961 0,9213 1.3327 0.6174 0.8081 0.8736 0.9213 1.4084 2.1380 1,8671 1.1353 0.6593 1.0250
5040 1.6370 1.2675 1.1732 1.5351 1.0770 0.6193 0.5949 0.8590 0.9467 1.2371 0.7370 0.2146 0.3169 0.5293
5045 2.5884 1.2663 0.9755 0.7781 0.2143 0.4178 0.4812 0.7958 0.5876 0.7151 0.6370 0,6328 0.6679 0.5997 0.6664 1,3924 0.7765 1.0915 0.5640 0,6642
5047 1.1991 1.3127 1.2951 1.6701 1.1146 0.9332 0,8105 0,3445 0,7335 0,8570 0.6085 0,6284 0.9191 0.8815 0.8574 0.7950 0.3880 0.4174 0.4499 1.0296
5051 1.9895 1.6879 1.6631 1.7485 1,5458 1.3697 1.2490 1.3955 0.9688 0.9938 0.7895 0.7665 0.8868 0.7455 0.8290 1,0215 0.8459 0.8560 0.6786 0,8273
5063 1.5492 1.3461 1.1488 1.0011 1.0749 1.2660 1,5366 1.0339 0.8104 0,8692 0.7226 0,7524 0.6838 0.8015 0.7194 1.2510 1.1600 0.7697 0,6544 0.5338
5065 1.5827 1.4074 1.4083 1.1464 0,8630 0.6555 0,6921 0,5249 0.3741 0.6898 0.5902 0.6577 0.7468 0,7801 0.8801 0.9163 0.8146 0.6861 0,5356 0.7687
5070 1.2065 0.9419 1.1288 1.0186 1.4335 2.2947 1.7880 1.7707 0.5057 0.5825 0.6857 0.6753 0.8543 0.9756 0,7493 0.6464 1.0385 0.7780 0.7996 1.1206
5072 6.9808 2.7285 1.9100 2.5953 2,4417 1.9229 1,5818 0.6928 0.4776 0,7682 1,0727 0,7542 1,0899 0.8590 0.8830 0.8789 0.7869 0.4769 0.5307 0,5857
5080 1.3572 1.2866 1.3120 1.2068 1.0630 1.0272 1.1577 0.8415 0,6922 0.7721 0,4865 0.5607 0,6896 0.6135 0.6826 0,8565 0.9048 0.9552 0.8431 0.5143
co
o i
5082 0.6098 0.8111 0.5375 0.4852 1,0665 2,5215 0,4019 1,9731 0.4848 0.3721
5084 7.7838 6.9607 5,9603 1,3564 1,2428 1.9715 1.7437 2.1166 1.7845 1,7245 0,8640 0.5291 0.5241 0,5431
5090 2.4336 2.5318 2,5327 2.7996 4.1325 2.6954 2.6318 1.6375 0,7595 0,3984 0.5337 1,0107 1,1032 1.1822 0.4998 0.8739 0,9790 0.8182 0.7443 0.8181
5094 2.0285 1.5351 1,1862 1.2508 1.1587 0.6249 0,7737 0.2057 0,5510 0.5426 0.2704 0.2209 0,2989 0.4994 0.4418 1.0779 0.5262 0.5099 0.4129 0.1326
5099 1.4113 1.5951 0.8696 0.8580 1.4349 0.8536 1.0577 0.5224 0.4126 0.2806 0.2300 0.3893 0.3984 0,2874 0,4805 0.5248 0,5807 0,6103 0.5142 0,4589
5110 2.4983 2.9657 4.2159 5.1252 7.1415 5.8621 4.1924 0.7945 0,5140 0.6882 0,6465 0.5535 0.4891 0.5153 0.4997 0,8896 0.8427 0.7247 0.7079 0.8872
5122 1.0809 1.1455 1.1502 0.9895 0.9231 0.9497 0.8986 0.8681 0.5319 0.6231 0.4106 0.5545 0.6943 0.7169 0,7359 0.6482 0.5455 0,5440 0.6553 0,5811
5130 1.4556 1.7484 1.9225 2.2743 1.4440 1.6103 1.4834 1.1072 1.0712 1.4441 1.0091 1.9758 1.2598 0.4052 0.0598 0.1355
5140 1.0843 1.0327 1.1387 1.0994 1.2009 1.0396 1.2648 0.8438 0,7764 0,7214 0.5514 0,4801 0,5657 0.5637 0.4991 0,6330 0.5544 0.6025 0.5297 0.4428
5141 0.8408 0.7790 0.8365 0.9565 0.9672 0,7433 0.8033 0,5754 0.5102 0.5193 0.5289 0.6161 0.7186 0,6226 0,7742 0,7228 0.7856 0.9173 1.1598 1.2377
5150 1.5365 1.0748 1.2324 1,4272 1.5867 2.0191 1.5283 0.9953 0.6938 1,1250 0,7881 0.7342 0,6405 0,8777 0.6362 0,8293 0.5489 0.3514 0.4763 0.5649


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
CO
O)
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80
5171 2.0294 1.1328 1.2107 1.2134 0.8182 0.6139
5172 1.9350 1,8373 1.5994 1.2237 0,8023 0.7387
5190 1.8425 1.2111 1.6239 1.2952 1,3114 0.9654
5200 1.9526 1.3028 1.5893 1.4034 1.0865 1,1108
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0,7053 0,8354 0.4091 0.2004 0,1871 0,3244 0.5344
0.7615 1.4480 1.0276 1.1067 1.1825 1.2371 0,9451
1.1421 0.8892 1.2252 1.4463 0.8012 0.7482 0.4451
1,2418 0.8097 0.7236 0.7862 0.6356 0.6587 0.6297
88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.5249 0.4863 0.5387 0.4394 0.6173 0.4356 0.6408 
0.9111 0,7069 0.7482 0.9613 0.7037 0.6489 0.6627 
0.4324 0.9895 1,3399 0.5274 0.5542 0.4366 0.4715 
0.6461 0.4223 1,1135 0.5872 0.5415 0,6046 0.6846
5211 0.7985 0.6776 0.6249 0.6416 0.6088 0.6534 0.4989 0,2659 0,3236 0.3394 0.3855 0.4182 0.6048 0,6117 0.7663 0,8596 0,6255 0.5512 0.5011 0.8279
5311 0.8001 0.8887 1.1200 1.1426 1.3741 1.5988 1.3743 0.8762 0.8584 0,7405 0.5649 0.4824 0.5819 0.5762 0.6887 0.9271 0.5367 0.5416 0.6533 0.8229
5331 0.7573 0.7869 0.7559 0.6434 0.8323 0.8385 0.8598 0.4478 0,3494 0,3933 0,2836 0.4915 0,6300 0.5147 0.6214 0.6245 0.4579 0.4796 0.5763 0.8465
5399 0.5514 0.4170 0.4397 0.3924 0.5889 0.8788 0.7087 0.5351 0.4831 0,6967 0.8503 1,0770 1.9667 0,9817 1.5497 1,2515 1.1244 0.7854 0.7031 1.4576
5411 1.3068 1.3018 1.3552 1,2563 1.4724 1.3696 1.2656 0.7558 0.6480 0,7121 0.6458 0,5232 0.5450 0,4895 0.4219 0,5125 0,5313 0.5553 0.6009 0,7267
5412 1.7546 1.0104 1.0624 0.7075 0.5466 0.5937 0.4805 0.4311 0.4151 0.3700 0.4074 0.3468 0.4922 0,5376 0.6599 0,8976 0.9680 1,0924 0.7744 1.0207
5500 0.9529 1.1071 1.3262 1.5028 0.9962 1.2319 1,2473 1.2600 0.7248 0,5700 0.4759 0,5111 0.9417 0.9552 1.2434 2.5774 2.9248 1.6327 1.1384 0,9139
5531 1.3154 1.9432 1.8297 1.9074 1,8662 1.4617 1.4217 0,9426 0.6064 0,5917 0,6435 0.6586 1.1499 1.0284 1.0507 1.3696 0,5167 0.3663 0.5187 0.6888
5600
5700 2.3141 2.0187 1.4872 1.6880 1.6351 1.0719 1.1949 1.0785 0,4069 0.6479 0,3428 0.2100 0.3843 0.3612 0.5139 0.9398 0.4819 0.5147 0,4152 0.6055
5712 1.2543 1.7333 1.4748 1.3321 1.9929 1.2884 1.5249 0.7440 0.6283 0,5970 0.7386 0.5779 0.7066 1.0103 0.7368 0,6669 0.4748 0.5973 0,2947 0,4276
5731 1.2904 1.4617 1.3541 1.2137 0.7849 0.6760 1,4404 0.5203 0,8724 0,3429 0.3356 0.5975 0,8520 0,6908 0,6556 0.6560 0,5031 0.7170 0.4576 0.6034
5734 0.4194 0.1972 0.2983 0.8916
5735 0,5386 0.3191 7.0940 7.0721 7.0530 0.6454 0.4542 1.1040
5812 0.5811 0.5512 0.4985 0.5703 0.6270 0.5892 0.6468 0.4573 0.3631 0,4035 0.3473 0.3498 0,4681 0,4540 0.3808 0.5736 0.4024 0,3659 0.3686 0.4926
5900 0.5479 0.8926 0.4591 0.5016 0.4378 0,5020 0.6261 0,6502
5912 0.4438 0.6315 0.6191 0.6833 0,6808 0.5623 0.6447 0.4481 0.3680 0.3890 0.4389 0.4692 0 .4405 0.4321 0.5446 0.5676 0 ,5096 0.6053 0,5431 0.4848
5940 0.5241 0.8980 1.0312 1.3502 1.7973 1.3822 1.0127 0.4213 0.6388 0.6793 0.8004 0.8288 0.9972 0.7475 0.8462 0.5531 0.4817 0,9634 0.7241 0.5651
5944 0.3524 0.2409 0.2141 0,2920 0.2867 0,4354 0.6021 0.4847
5945 0,5625 4,2902 0.6487 1,1937 0,8470 0.7013 0.7478 0.5071 0,7263 0.7142 0,5885 0.6683 0.6577 0.6458 0.5519 0.7225 0.6056 0,3159 0.4719
5960 0.4088 0,4143 0,3213
5961 0.7522 0.8294 0,5960 0.6652 0.7029 0,4150 0,5638 0,5021 0.3983 0,6535 0.7063 0,2743 0,4096 0,3481 0.3994 0,4802 0.3455 0,4925 0,3309 0,5392
5990 1.5094 1.0572 0.8283 0.8007 0.8764 0.7703 0.7232 0.4584 0.4616 0,5094 0.6062 0.6063 0.6181 0.5654 0,3431 0.6218 0,4001 0.5316
6021 1.6277 1.2633 1.3769 1.3609 1,4367 1.4224 1,3611 1.3109 1,0392 0,9759 0.7700 0,7618 0.9187 0.8659 0.8259 1,1291 0.8353 0.6635 0.7154 0.7423


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
CO
V)
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
6029 182.356B03.795335.250D07.2592 1,0385 0,7480 0,6808 0.7369 0,9012 0,8797 0.8535 0,5429 0.6369
6035 2.0642 1,3586 1.4613 1,6056 1.2933 1,3026 1,8258 0,8731 0.9702 1.0952 0,9172 0,9553 1,7154 1.7779 1.4960 1,9738 1,3820 1,1929 1,0957 1.0979
6036 0.8290 0,8526 0.9138 1.1652 1.0225 1,5978 2.6460 1.2539 1.0326 1,1304 1.1062
6099 1.5105 0 .8747 1.5965 1.8450 1.0764 0.6855 1,4641 1,0102 0.7472 0.6862 0.9154 0,7412 0.6483 0,4560 0.4589 0.5394 0,7090 0.4141 0.2852 0.4829
6111 1.1982 1.1598 1.4643 1.4948 1,5860 2.0761 2.4745 0.7505 0.6179 0.8115 0,5459 0.5300 0,7542 0,5661 0.3696 0.4643 0.2945 0.2895 0.4131 0,5409
6141 1.2555 1.0264 1.3048 1.3673 1,3210 1.5328 1.5208 1.1447 0.9428 0.9929 0.7652 0.5444 0.9110 0.7914 0.6704 0,8296 0.6948 0,5644 0.4236 0.4489
6153 0.8185 0,6674 0.5853 0.7228 0.6620 0.5415 0.6015 0.6240 0.5361 0.5494 0.6240 0.7789 1.0485 0,9159 0,9885 2.1768 1.3398 0.9635 0.5474 0.8765
6159 2.8957 3,5871 4.5839 1.4585 1.6645 1.9054 1.1009 1.4537 2.2671 1.9712 2,4899 2,6031 2.8442 2.5597 2.8638 1.4396 0.8246 0.5112 0.8199
6162 1.3059 1.6121 1.1878 1.1543 0.6428 0.5970 0.7314 0.4707 0.4040 0.4813 0.4603 0.3944 0.6833 0,9603 0.9278 0.7111 0,8030 0.4684 0.6252 0.8306
6163 0.5542 0 .3 1 6 10 .3237  0,3730 0.5941 0,3822 0.2032 0.2134 0,2818 0.2367 0.6418
6172 0.4929 0.9376 0.5202 1,0983 0.8071 0.9700 0 .9 2 1 1 1 .4 6 0 9  1,8384 1.6012 1.0080 1.1049
6199 1.7549 1.1219 1.0691 1.1769 1.0219 0.9876 0.9518 1,0808 0.8916 0.8696 0.8929 0.8752 1.0371 1.0275 0.9500 1.1305 1.0517 0.7419 0.7409 0.6819
6200 0.0772 0.1349 0,1614 0.1595 0.3010 0.4164 0.8333 0,9605 0,8997 0.3161 0.8187
6211 1.1463 1.1402 1,2343 1.1689 1,1744 0.7104 0.8343 0,6120 0.5202 0.6569 0,6685 0,5972 0,8210 1.0130 0,9795 1.0459 0.7176 0.7286 0.7797 0.9473
6282 2.0471 2 ,2118 2.4627 2.7255 2,4806 1.2062 0.5271 0.4614 0.2673 0.3444 0,2263 0,3090 0,5542 0,4938 0.4168 0,5980 0.3545 0.2912 0.3232 0.4216
6311 1.5622 1.1702 1.1737 1.2042 1,1596 1.3506 1.3239 1.3002 1.1481 0.9618 0.8453 0.9097 1.0644 1.0821 0.9010 1.1927 1.1040 0.8617 0,8380 0.7931
6321 1.0256 0.8615 0.9496 1.1331 1.0585 1,1822 1.1287 1.2056 1.0069 0.7578 0.7861 0.8786 1.2864 1.2073 0.7743 1.2008 1.2128 0,6889 0.9391 0.8835
6324 1.3487 0.2170 0.1880 0.1312 0,4262 0.7164 0.5276 0.2513 0.1845 0,1951 0.1968 0.2797 0.2915
6331 0,8711 0.7726 0,9743 1.1008 0,9822 1.1305 1.0665 1.0050 0.8821 0.8226 0,6374 0.6462 0.9238 0.9316 0.7817 0.9409 0.8232 0,7068 0,7928 0,7832
6351 0.6720 1.2389 0.8005 1.0358 1.0993 1.3246 1.2024 1.1152 0,8089 1,0792 0.7393 0,6120 0,9382 0.7607 0,6536 0.9160 0,7106 0.6734 0,8478 0,8698
6361 3.2325 1.5968 1.4749 1.2188 1.2986 1,4801 1.5588 1.0234 0.7875 1.1015 1.0423 1.1550 1.1974 1.1885 1,1136 1,6407 1.1484 0,8222 0,8376 1.2295
6399 4.3115 2.0054 0.1880 0.1184 0.2192 1 ,10011,2761 3,3765 4.8450 1 .94011 .6184  0.2329 0,4515
6411 0.4331 0.2329 0.2352 0.2644 0.2538 0.2862 0.3908 0.3591 0,2547 0.2056 0,1728 0,2268 0.3797 0.3835 0.3032 0.2984 0,2901 0,2297 0.2970 0,2740
6510 9.0366 3.7150 2.6723 1.6959 0,9345 1.6191 1.2552 1,5726 1.2388 1.1578 1.1634 1.3346 0.8954 1,3185 1.7052 1,5516 1,5940 3.1070 1.7779 1,4679
6512 1.7780 1.1327 1,2468 1,1215 0.7249 0.8137 0,7294 0,7873 0.4596 0.3972 0,2493 0.3702 0.9783 0.7189 0.6955 1,1650 1.3476 1.5236 0.8578 0.8540
6531 8.0948 0.3982 0.5142 0.4270 0 .57510 .5424  1.0430 1.3403 1.2930 1.1522 2.6818 0.2572 0,4208 0.4582 0.4289
6532 1.6599 0.1464 0.8741 0.6361 1.3023 0,8830 1.3141 0.6780 0.4303 0,3422 0.2543 0,3019 0.3516 0.3624 0.3558 0.4626 0.4735 0.5189 0.6366 0,6242
6552 0.9649 0,8290 0.6024 0,6991 0,4965 0,4948 0.9151 0.9970 0.8850 0.7768 0.6201 0.6801 0.7913 0.8619 0.8405 1.7284 1.4529 0.7270 0.8325 0,9081
6726
6792 0,0214 0.0145 0,0104 0.0065 0,2897 0.1473 0.1544 0,1400 0.2244 0.2571 0.1971 0.2714 0,2413 0.2803 0.2606 0.1602 0.2061 0.3026 0.2601
6794 3,1342 1.6885 0,2557 0.1749 0,1987 0.1565 0.2027 0.0764 0.1284 0.1259 0.0948 0.2114 0.2291 0.2816 0.2322 0,7849 0.3168 0,3903 0.4235 0,4566


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to  M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
6798 2.0974 1.4873 1.3106 1.3017 1.0164 0.8607 0.8054 0.7877 0.6746
6799 0,6338 0.7438 2.2497 2.0640 1.4671 0.9512 1.2130 0.9739 0.9317
7011 0.9374 0.8289 0.7532 0.5371 0.4625 0.4119 0.5258 0.4762 0.4273
7200 0.7393 0.7544 0.6655 0.9072 1.0640 0.8843 0.6266 0.4212 0.4832
7310 0.2575 1.0000 1.0000 0.3238
7311 1.2777 0.7548 0.6969 0.7266 0.6826 0.7434 0.7869 0.5548 0,5392
7320 0,9895 0.8907 1.2036 1.4079 1.6817 1.3870 1.1644 0.6158 0,3588
7331 0.8388 0,9673 0,7733 0.6282 0.3083 0.2360
7340 0.7687 0.9580 0.8287 0.8905 0.9533 0,8364 0.8178 0.6947 0.5357
7350 0.7083 0.5463 0.2086
7359 2.3611 1.5659 1.0266 0.8197 0.9545 0,7781 0.4940 0,2267 0,4370
7361 0.7399 0.3777 0.3464 0.2832 0.4189 0.3117 0.4300 0.4513 0,3090
7363 2.5076 0.9424 0.8056 0.8102 0.7457 0.5805 0.6946 0.8780 0,6092
7370 0.6377 0.5784 0.5202 0.8159 1.1273 0.8564 0.8812
7371 1.5702 0.5270 0.6648 0.6265 0.8391 0.4429 0.6413 0.6052 0.4850
7372 0.6522 0.4726 1.0460 0.6798 1.2179 0.8807 0.5419 0.1966 0,2680
7373 0.7355 0.6641 1.0002 0.7025 0.9130 0.6114 0.5557 0.5122 0.3816
7374 0.1983 0.2078 0.2919 0.3198 0.3618 0.4806 0,3307 0.4371 0.3954
7377 1.1189 0.8969 0.8047 0.2699 0.4101 0.4944 0.4371 0.3684 0.1796
7380 •••
7381 1.2416 1.1352 1.2317 1.3970 1.2262 0.9776 0.8879 0.5852 0.5607
7384
7385 0.4394 0.3167 0.2454 0.4453 0,3156 0.6524 0.3712 0.9885
7389 0,9350 0.7937 0.4792 0.5047 0,4046 0,2595 0.2360 0.2344 0,2397
7500 0,9623 1.0536 0.9664 1.1606 2.3771 0.9325 0.7593 0.3024 0.5453
7510 1.1490 0.8910 0.7981 0.5895 0.7139 0.5848 0,8282 0.5185 0.4864
7600 2.9057 2.0977 1.7017 0.9657 1.0581 0.4325 1.1643 1.1922 1.1225
7812 0.4712 0.4706 0.6158 0.6266 0.7393 0.7031 0.7697 0.6750 0.6546
7819 0,5776 0.6603 0.6437
7822 1.2774 1.5081 1.5439 1.5467 0.7844 1.2620 2.2498 1,8317 1,9097
7830 -, - 0.7076
7900 0.9532 0.9528 1.0194 0.8810 0.8668 1.1418 0.9314 1,0890 0,6530
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.6841 0.6835 0.7531 1.0236 1,0117 1,1763 1.5531 1.2899 1.1628 0.7949 0.8162
1,1100 1.0791 1,1262 1.0385 1.1125 1.1187 1.2018 0.9418 0 .9425 0.9795 1.0181
0.5337 0,4708 0.5256 0.7893 0.6807 0.7508 0.9968 0,7296 0.5701 0.7360 0.3448
0.4994 0,4373 0.3850 0.4109 0.5446 0.5214 0.3835 0,4157 0.4701 0.3971 0,4972
1.0000 0.1978 0.6601 0.4328 0.2123 0.3182 0.1771 0.1896
0.4734 0.5421 0.4731 0.5358 0.6563 0.4896 0.5735 0,5690 0.4919 0.2622 0.2978
0,3552 0,2617 0.2695 0,5230 0,4948 0.4391 0,3250 0,3598 0.4662 0.4120 0.5161
0.2343 0.1476 0.3852 0.2737 0.4994 0.3079 0.3489 0.3058 0.2778 0.2593 0.1526
0.1625 0.2262 0.3135 0,5114 0,5657 0.3338 0.4271 0.4175 0.6453 0,5953 0.5799
0.3253 0.3142 0,7305 0,6733 0,9267 0.7682 1.6475 1.1288 0.7230 0,5324 0,4894
0.4992 0.4936 0.8386 0.7508 0.7562 0.5677 0.7452 0.6823 0.6174 0,5561 0.5713
0.5870 0.5268 0.7195 0.4354 0.7119 0,4542 0.6644 0,2484 0,1978 0.1307 0.1317
0,5061 0,2795 0.2951 0,3160 0.2880 0,3583 0,7645 0,6444 0.5773 0,4039 0.3482
0.7262 0.7179 0,7232 0.5347 0.5769 0.7160 0.6234 0.4043 0.2885 0.3556 0.2743
0,4604 0.4270 0.5745 0.6933 0.6243 1.0136 0.8709 0.5681 0.4763 0.4464 0.3502
0.4005 0.4082 0.2153 0,2527 0,3400 0.3387 0.2726 0.2680 0.2654 0.2614 0.2693
0.3654 0,3476 0,4328 0.5032 0.6987 0.5850 0.7026 0,4380 0.5506 0.3317 0.3272
0,3804 0.2905 0.3051 0.3436 0,4860 0.4152 0.4146 0.4596 0,3281 0,3193 0.2891
0.6088 0.5370 0.5410 0.3346 0,5154 0.4800 1.0853 0.8418 0,9586 0,9770 0.7669
0.1272 0.1194 2.0312 2.3615 0.2626 0.2351 0.2329 0.3969 0.2661 0.4933 0.7978
0.6602 0.5646 0.4551 0.3874 0,4653 2.8086 0.3791 0.4127 0,5502 0,4720 0,5563
0.7756 0.3120 0.2296 0.3273 0.4024 0.2807 0,3735 0.2779 0.1450
1.1926 1.0817 0.7838 0,9335 0.8568 0.5330 0.9567 0,7437 0.7282 0.5633 0,3665
0.3666 0,2383 0,3174 0.3463 0.4099 0.5016 0,6915 0.5357 0.3737 0.3245 0.3422
0.5362 0.3602 0,3384 0.4708 0.3887 0.4636 0.4697 0.5272 0.8094 1,1051 _ „
0.5566 0,5277 0.4665 0,6147 0.6521 0.7272 1.0302 0.6358 0.6677 0.5071 0,6516
0.8980 0.4784 0,6145 0.6042 0.6575 0,6237 0.8687 0,7250 0.6563 0.9940 0.8636
0.5819 0,4368 0.2748 0.1808 0.2730 0.1861 0.2921 0.2608 0.1932 0.3249 0.2712
0.7925 0.8315 0,2904 0.1361 0,2160 0,2387 0.2961 0.3869 0.3283 0.3291 0,3407
0.1984 0,2464 0.5301 1.0003 0.6776 0,7409 0.3878 0.6046 0,4618 0,4448
0.4485 0,5469 0,5394 0.6644 0,6897 0,6971 1.0773 0.6922 0,9125 0.6603 0.6742


















Industry M edian Values for Book Equity to M arket Equity Ratio for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
7948 0.3414 0.0725 0.3371 0.4182 0.3495 0.1221 0.2440 0.3545 0.2097 0.2247 0.3493 0,2954 0.2663 0.2708 0.3524 0.4764 0,5029 0.4630 0.3901 0,4401
7990 0.8669 0.6536 0.5578 0.3389 0.4095 0.5318 0.7174 0.7106 0.5425 0.7040 0.5712 0.5025 0.3759 0,5145 0.3226 0.4827 0.4930 0,3176 0.3674 0.5526
7997 . . . 0,1370 0,0046
8000 0.0429 0,1108 0.1344 0,2983 0.2899 0.3967
8011 1.2433 0.4454 0.8695 0.6174 0.3973 0.3818 0.2489 0.3132 0.3620 0.5494 0,3322 0.2513
8051 1.6797 0.9882 0.9121 0.8700 0.4899 0.3929 0.5398 0.4164 0,4484 0,4092 0.3278 0,3228 0.4897 0,8779 0.7951 0.6384 0,6136 0,5478 0,4475 0.4694
8060 1.4695 1.0422 0.7613 0,5144 0.3176 0.2354 0.3293 0.2397 0,2436 0.2534 0,3243 0,3455 0,3181 0.6005 0,3498 0.3449 0.4703 0.4419 0.7205 0.7045
8062 1.5975 1.3034 0.6924 0.8372 0.5022 1,1835 0.5372 0.3597 0,5811 0,6241 0.6709 1.0240 0.7460 1,0963 0,8254 0.8828 0.6025 0,5414 0,3761 0.3933
8071 0.2283 0.0555 0.2465 0.0721 0.2801 0,3416 0.3774 0.2370 0.3614 0,2558 0.3439 0.1991 0.2673 0.1537 0.2721
8082 0.1094 0.2717 0.2696 0.2782 0.4695 0.4111 0,4676 0,4800 0.5947 0,5595 0.4496 0.4414 0.3802 0.4552 0.5553 0.6296
8090 0.5586 0,8493 0.0672 0.1223 0.4150 0.4848 0.4967 0.5483 0.4274 0.5028 0.3940 0,5963 0,4308 0.4046
8093 0.1715 0.2301 0.3022 0,5656 0.7180 0.3523 0.4964 0.3555 0.3711 0.5917 0.5327 0.3816 0.6911 0,4973
8200 0.4809 0.4791 0.3848 0.4829 0,3211 0.2405 0,3888 0.3137 0.2778 0.4064 0,3054 0.3264 0.4163 0.3811 0.5470 0,7611 0.4599 0.4190 0.5994 0.5154
8300 3.885213.2434 5.4979 1.0305 0.8232
8700 0.5993 0.7212 0.6111 0.6119 0.2746 0.2834 0.2470 0,3507 0,1660 0.2164 0.1856 0.1933 0.3523 0,3492 0.2565 0.3536 0,2106 0,2417 0.2337 0.6181
8711 1.0450 0.8915 0.8565 0.9645 1.0115 0.5908 0.7732 0.7835 0.6924 0.9032 0.6900 0,6782 0.5139 0.6477 0.5861 0.6280 0.5304 0.6965 0.6427 0.5720
8731 2.0134 1.8641 2.0514 1.0067 1.4137 0.8766 1.1167 0.7237 0.4305 0,7650 0.6202 0.6109 0,6950 0.5378 0.3123 0.5869 0.8939 0.6878 0.8077 1,2569
8734 0.5737 0.7808 0,3679 0.1511 0.2509 0.2496 0.3716 0,4333 0,3035
8741 1.1017 1.1552 1,2210 1.5248 1.0755 0.7956 0.7729 0.5669 0.3800 0.3353 0.5160 0.6244 0,7802 0.7809 0.5420 0.5470 0.2991 0.3794 0.3548 0.8455
8742 1.6197 1.5158 1.0359 1.0071 0.8882 1.2554 1.1694 1,6315 0.8480 0,9959 0,9468 0.7166 0.7597 0.6118 0.5457 0.7266 0.8552 1.1546 0.8958 0.9012
8744 0.1939 0.0808 0.2202 0.6574 0.2515 0.2406 5.8299 0.7504 0.5152 0.4215 0.3711 0,3392 0.3956 0.3949 0.3911 0.2830
9995 1.3584 1.3367 1.8977 2.0218 2,1820 2.6077 2.5756 1.0290 0.8264 0.8238 0,6633 0.5845 0.8542 1.0509 0.8471 1.8157 2.6654 1.2512 0.4680 1.2696
MEDN1.2416 1.0181 1.0308 1,0035 0.9672 0.8515 0.8677 0.7854 0.6388 0.6898 0.6202 0.5812 0,6594 0,6360 0.6181 0.7905 0.6497 0.5984 0,5197 0.5656




















Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0100 0.4082 0.4030 0.4197 0,3880 0.3661 0.3637 0.3287 0.3285 0.3143 0.3050 0,3123 0.2681 0.3580 0.2448 0.2162 0.3272 0.3434 0.4186 0,4292 0.3432
0200 0.8290 0 .1490 0.1177 0.4304 0,6844 0,5029 0,5278 0,4949 0.4590
0700 6.6429 1.5518 0.3538 0.2120
0800 0.0388 0.0721 0,1150 0.1559 0.1999 0.2443 0.2738 0.3278 0.4557
1000 0.0641 0.0934 0.0702 0.2404 0.3434 0.2875 0.3317 0.4364 0.3791 0.4457 0.3584 0.3988 0.3427 0.3430 0.4253 0,4244 0.5013 0,5275 0.3969 0.4110
1040 0.1512 0.1567 0.1394 0.1505 0,1823 0.1525 0.2382 0.2282 0,1718 0.2294 0.2980 0.2617 0.3055 0.2802 0.3175 0,2779 0.3065 0.3223 0.2507 0.3486
1090 0.3972 0.4810 0.4535 0.4205 0,3865 0,4541 0.4878 0.4459 0.5851 0.6104 0.6265 0.4855 0.4626 0.4072 0.2884 0,2536 0,2974 0.2625 0.1504 0,2268
1220 0.1128 0.2442 0.3581 0.3291 0.3584 0,2429 0.2170 0,2548 0,2936 0.2618 0.1821 0,2183 0.1975 0.3265 0,3235 0.4260 0,6745 0.4878
1221 0.7394 0,5271 0.7475 0,5784 0.5498 0.5691 0.5305 0.5640 0,3043
1311 0.4149 0.4068 0.4075 0.4607 0.4255 0.4207 0.4937 0.5694 0.5207 0.4659 0.4697 0.5256 0.5410 0.6383 0.4752 0.4125 0,4334 0,4376 0.4738 0.5104
1381 0.4919 0.4692 0.4755 0.5477 0,5994 0.4062 0.4302 0.5255 0,4093 0.5484 0.7164 0.4575 0.8387 0,4431 0,3768 0,3987 0.3875 0,8991 0.2708 0.3160
1382 0.7387 0.7335 0.6924 0.7051 0.7016 0.4325 0.3094 0.3487 0.4044 0.4145 0.4311 0,8056 1.5044 0.8605 1.5926 0.5676 0,3287 0,3091 0.2960 0.3195
1389 0.4243 0.3823 0,3613 0.3339 0,4039 0.2760 0.3465 0.2790 0,4401 0.3982 0.4603 0.5223 0.3614 0.3789 0,5259 0.1822 0,1741 0.1344 0.1301 0.1842
1400 0.3405 0.3025 0.2486 2.4892 0.4441 0.2635 0.2497 0,2801 0.2014 0.2078 0.1849 0.1696 0.2491 0.2615 0,3192 0.3661 0,3654 0.3256 0.3065 0.2416
1531 0,6254 0.6302 0.5686 0.5958 0.5779 0.5380 0.4925 0.5100 0.4431 0.4786 0.5633 0.5496 0.5863 0,6426 0.7008 0.7341 0.7150 0.6897 0.6028 0.6289
1540 0.3612 0.3167 0.2732 0.2054 0.2331 0,1448 0.2640 0,3122 0,2877 0,2933 0.2879 0,4524 0.5783 0.5937 0.5565 0.6647 0,6233 0.5375 0.5436 0.5148
1600 0.2793 0.1959 0.2275 0.2135 0.2693 0.2487 0.2454 0.3128 0.2433 0.2682 0,3261 0,3252 0.3675 0.2751 0.2539 0,2308 0.3408 0.4484 0.3148 0,2005
1623 0.2646 0.3429 0.4351 0.4740 0.3575 0.3518 0.3344 0.3997 0.3354 0.4431 0.4588 0.3765 0.3233 0.3921 0.3198 0.3743 0,3703 0.3275 0.4498 0.4439
1700 0.4685 0.3692 0.3869 0.4174 0.4079 0.4721 0.2995 0.2519 0.2789 0.2854 0.4436 0,2867 0,3298 0,4559 0.5057 0.3895 1.1894 0.7378 0.4888 0,7347
1731 0,6164 0.4585 0,5237 0,5227 0.4602 0.5466 0.4671 0.4608 0.4315 0,5170 0.3853 0,3450 0,2036 0.2442 0.5490
2000 0.3450 0.3388 0,3141 0.3832 0,3895 0.3971 0,3954 0.3686 0,3372 0.3631 0,5392 0.5573 0.4588 0.7300 0.7489 0.6934 0.7584 0.7215 0.7978 1.1122
2011 0.3764 0.2905 0.3435 0.3416 0.2969 0.3433 0.3558 0.3708 0.3613 0.3373 0.3167 0.2977 0,4590 0.4569 0.4707 0.5814 0.4474 0.4112 0,4542 0,2046
2013 0.4618 0.4631 0.4680 0.4262 0.3918 0.3193 0.7065 0.6999 1.0219 0.9200 0.6576 0.6327 0.6165 0,6134 0.8143 0.4758 0.8211 0.9159 0.4183 0.9670
2015 0.4787 0.4679 0.5172 0.5377 0.5561 0.5903 0,4999 0.4976 0.5099 0.4889 0.5518 0.4897 0.4803 0.4252 0.5241 0.4992 0.5060 0.4966 0.4343 0.4254
2020 0.3292 0.3344 0.2674 0.3574 0.3225 0.3871 0.3245 0.2778 0.2742 0,2549 0.2516 0.1992 0,1774 0.7915 0.9640 1,1989 0,9691 0.8478 0.9306 1.0000
2024 0.3204 0.2539 0.2352 0.8796 0.2611 0.1835 0.2932 0.4986 0.5147 0,5278 0.4377 0,3013 0.2601 0.2680 0.4455
2030 0.4185 0.3685 0.3777 0.4260 0.4537 0.4040 0.3986 0.3944 0.3639 0,3660 0.3012 0,3814 0,4276 0.4691 0,4993 0,5173 0.4672 0.4500 0,3900 0.3703
2033 0.4459 0.4398 0.3812 0.3487 0.4024 0.3884 0.3609 0.3553 0.3994 0,3420 0.3447 0.3299 0.3057 0,3003 0,2755 0,2549 0.2784 0.5133 0.3606 0.4106
2040 0.3245 0.2951 0.2925 0.2818 0.3507 0.2784 0.2761 0.2634 0.2504 0,3538 0.4463 0.5474 0,5902 0.5414 0.5679 0,5867 0.5345 0.6065 0,5389 0,6235
2050 0.4013 0.4872 0.5103 0.5030 0.6604 0.4616 0,4625 0.4382 0,3895 0,3476 0.3587 0,3627 0.5384 0,5397 0,5700 2.1666 0.6757 0.6606 0.6268 0.4395
2052 0,0030 0.0024 0.0018 0.0070 0.0061 0.0191 0.0167 0.0142 0,0116 0.0108 0,3511 0.4152 0.7272 0.7070 0.1924 0.1751 0.0471 0.0612 0,6660 1.9168


















Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80
2070 0.2729 0.1439 0.2076 0.1859 0.3240 0.2298
2080 0.3071 0.2848 0.2514 0.3115 0.3114 0,3050
2082 0.3656 0.3552 0.3316 0.3616 0.3580 0,4337
2086 0.2247 0.2199 0.2159 0.2744 0.2632 0.2651
2090 0.3022 0,3510 0.4407 0.2394 0.2305 0.1962
2100 0.5101 0.4533 0.4440 0.5159 0.5464 0.4985
2111 0.4125 0.4313 0.4332 0.3733 0.3745 0.3499
2200 0.3779 0.3720 0.3587 0.3725 0,4608 0.4142
2211 0.3147 0.3038 0.3067 0.3139 0,3199 0.2854
2221 0.6852 0.7813 0.7337 0.6469 0.7761 0,8294
2250 0.2976 0,2708 0.2993 0.2511 0.2426 0.2028
2253 0.3326 0.3264 0.3187 0.3490 0.3026 0.3227
2273 0.3561 0.3802 0.3823 0.4444 0,4504 0.4238
2300 0.3151 0.3479 0.3379 0.3368 0.3011 0.2823
2320 0.3120 0.3710 0.3888 0.4134 0.4315 0.4322
2330 1.4591 0.5701 0.4237 0.4948 0.6829 0.5820
2340 0,3124 0.4869 0,3962 0.4227 0.4130 0.3340
2390 0.3600 0.2996 0.0689 0.0109 0.3856
2400 0.4115 0.3609 0.3547 0.3615 0.3560 0,3696
2421 0.4611 0.4611 0.3918 0.3429 0.2843 0.3047
2430 0.4324 0.4351 0.4363 0,4124 0.4680 0.4036
2451 0.1916 0.2514 0.2244 0.2165 0.2078 0,1461
2452 0.4899 0.7750 0.6301 0.5239 0,4266 0.3838
2510 0.2739 0.2714 0.2591 0.2841 0,3217 0,3050
2511 0.2720 0.2429 0.2057 0.1784 0.1544 0.1513
2520 0.2005 0.3390 0.3531 0.2865 0.2748 0.2561
2522 0.3937 0.3697 0.3813 0.3525 0.3307 0,3026
2531 0.3256 0.3280 0.3057 0.4218 0.4206 0.3369
2540 0.1582 0.0929 0.1141
2590 - 1 - - ,  - 0.4279 0.3140 0.3293
2600 0.3753 0.3537 0.4075 0.3883 0.3546 0.3697
2611 •  f *
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0.3394 0.3345 0.3049 0.2279 0,1711 0.1276 0.1326 
0.3055 0.2961 0.3688 0.3874 0.4137 0.4589 0.5094 
0,4260 0.3655 0.3320 0.2835 0,2728 0,3248 0,3389 
0.2904 0.3293 0.3381 0.4453 0.7364 1.2239 1.2345
0,1643 0.1347 0,0956 0,2930 0.3150 0.2957 0,4522 
0.2104 0.2988 0,2832 0.3287 0.2844 0.3740 0.3380 
0.3403 0.3159 0.3024 0.3448 0.5831 0.7450 0.5584 
0.3705 0.3631 0 .3190 0,3126 0.3047 0.3911 0.4926
0.3000 0.3417 0.3381 0.4587 0.5969 0,6259 0,5636 
0.4691 0.5104 0.4945 0.6884 0,5459 0.5419 0,4103 
0.1962 0.2364 0.1113 0.1114 0.1449 1.5851 1,4363 
0.3064 0.3113 0.3032 0.3221 0,2186 0,1592 0.2828
0,3959 0.3974 0.3233 0.3645 0.3016 0,4751 0,4292 
0.2841 0.2669 0.2363 0.2277 0.2192 0.1713 0.1608 
0.4235 0.3676 0.2833 0.4206 0.3002 0.4172 0.5217 
0,4181 0.3770 0.3469 0,3609 0,4825 0,4169 0.3426
0.3758 0.2196 0,1855 0.2979 0.2868 1.3092 0.8216 
0.5714 0.3389 0.2580 0,3991 0,5832 0.4917 0.5048 
0,3888 0.3823 0,3537 0,3462 0.3167 0.3379 0.3343 
0.3179 0.3659 0.3359 0,3457 0.3442 0,4609 0,2941
0,3276 0.3652 0.4585 0.4668 0.5169 0.4051 0.4105 
0,1136 0,2474 0.0572 0.0746 0,1785 0.3015 0.3719 
0.4402 0.3426 0.2953 0.2700 0.2146 0,1861 0,1627 
0.2829 0.3706 0.2473 0.2470 0.2407 0.3045 0.3412
0.1499 0.1364 0.1993 0.3466 0.3482 0.4587 0.4052 
0.2463 0.2310 0.2003 0.1777 0.1696 0.1541 0,1833 
0.2849 0.2531 0.2087 0.1548 0,1468 0.1260 0.1380 
0.2901 0,2956 0.3561 0,3723 0.4141 0,3867 0,4203
0.2026
0.2782 0.2339 0.2117 0.2653 0.2389 0,3549 0.3263 
0.4578 0.5389 0.4184 0.3645 0.3396 0.4773 0.4284
88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.1412 0.1418 0.1894 0.2232 0.2427 0.2516 0.3506 
0,544842.5801 0.5813 6.8546 0.6175 0,6527 0.6596 
0.1857 0.4114 0.3132 0.2970 0.3258 0,3381 0.3229 
1.0771 0.8565 1.3473 1.5073 2,3189 0.6939 0.9952
0.4340 0.4544 0,4531 0,4518 0.5842 0.3444 0.7161 
0.3522 0.3376 0.3294 0.2933 0,6640 0.3807 0.3940 
0.6808 3.9793 1.785315.7724 8.048827,9525 6.3651 
0.4821 0.4781 0.5011 0,6738 0.5359 0.4806 0.5011
0,4819 0,5159 0,5468 0.6659 0.5428 0.5570 0.6168 
0,3641 0.4009 0.5287 0.6011 0.6395 1,0480 1.2617 
0.7675 0.5963 0.4899 0.4020 0,3213 0,3493 0.3586 
0.2944 0.3644 0,3619 0.4337 0.4899 0.4425 0.5948
0,6393 0.6375 0,6486 0.7140 0.6351 0.6417 0.6510 
0.2135 0.2172 0.2046 0.3093 0.3694 0.2213 0,2336 
0.5183 0.5714 7.2689 0.3601 0.3125 0,3598 0.4478 
0.3032 0.3866 0,3918 0,3418 0,5440 0,3722 0.4451
0.9039 0.8959 0.9062 0.8175 0.7252 0.7050 0.6842 
0,5245 0.2484 0.2279 0.2283 0.4172 0,3197 0.8769 
0,4241 0,3942 0.5141 0.5318 0,5617 0,5027 0.5099 
0.2726 0.3684 0.4191 0,4572 0,4484 0.5722 0,5138
0.3896 0.5241 0.5162 0.4795 0.4627 0,3917 0.3116 
0.4033 0.4868 0.4326 0,3628 0.3699 0.2641 0.2095 
0.1329 0.1089 0.1730 0,1461 0.1181 0.1073 0.0980 
0.3778 0.6107 0,3677 0.3305 0.3349 0,3236 0,4160
0.3982 0,4006 0,5038 0,5197 0.4984 0.3003 0.3264 
0,2024 0.1643 0,1193 0.0976 0.0778 0,1063 0,0102 
0,1173 0,1296 0,1293 0.2804 0.2958 0,3338 0,2386 
0,4672 1,0454 1,0924 1.0166 1.2802 0.8717 0,9594
0.2407 0.3361 0,1842 0,1482 0.0881 0.1679 0.4543 
0,3103 0.2885 0.2742 0,3108 0.2985 0.2615 0.2911 
0.4234 0.4298 0,5150 0,4724 0.3489 0.3400 0.2647 


















Industry A verage Values for Leverage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
2621 0.3762 0.3651 0,3552 0.3277 0.2935 0.3258 0.3320 0.3356 0.3408
2631 0.3573 0.3870 0.3920 0.3793 0.3620 0.3522 0,4088 0.4189 0.3607
2650 0.1331 0.0961 0.0730 0.0088 0,0276 0.1797 0.4314 0.4567 0.4769
2670 0.5484 0.5253 0.5274 0.4969 0.4422 0.3752 0.4688 0.4596 0.3941
2673 0.2297 0.2115 0.1849 0.2683 0.1684 0.2675 0.2505 0.2355 0,2239
2711 0.2442 0.1753 0.1499 0.2180 0.2346 0.2958 0.3045 0.3185 0.2726
2721 0.3252 0.2496 0.2190 0.1414 0.1398 0.1689 0.1396 0.0692 0,0976
2731 0.1612 0.1998 0.1964 0.1759 0.2906 0.2421 0.1710 0.2103 0.1744
2732 0.1885 0.1653 0.2344 0.3136 0.3445 0.3857 0.4208 0.4121 0,3813
2741 0.4506
2750 0.3685 0.3859 0.4247 0.3409 0.2960 0.3520 0.3616 0.4010 0.4199
2761 0.2276 0.2162 0.2231 0.1872 0.1920 0,1905 0.1833 0.2177 0.1666
2771 0.4214 0.4616 0.3785 0.3872 0.9603 0.5075 0.5554 0.4701 0.2931
2780 0.2983 0.2948 0.2737 0.2983 0,2836 0.2737 0.2662 0.2053 0.2808
2790
2800 0.3639 0.3275 0.3604 0.3524 0.4302 0.3845 0.3665 0.3561 0,3243
2810 0.4277 0.4754 0.4699 0.5312 0.4267 0,3868 0.4892 0.5141 0.5263
2820 0.2744 0.2788 0,2634 0.2233 0.2020 0.2087 0,4018 0.3632 0.3087
2821 0.4468 0.4335 0.4105 0.3928 0.3808 0.3683 0.3919 0.3380 0.3385
2833 -•*
2834 0.2643 0.2575 0.2275 0.2764 0.2969 0.3001 0.2594 0,2550 0,2591
2835 0.4070 0,4034 0.4041 0.3597 0.5711 0.2442 0.1775 0.2015 0.1559
2836 0.7995 1.8599 1.2974 0.4537 0,5998 1,0958 0.6716 0,2639 0.2921
2840 0.3286 0.3211 0.3279 0.3468 0.4623 0.3502 0.3211 0.3046 0.2575
2842 0.3097 0.2985 0.2206 0.3139 0.2850 0.3405 0.4081 0.6339 0.7729
2844 0.1870 0.1938 0.2137 0.2262 0.2281 0,2333 0.2578 0.3323 0.2566
2851 0.3007 0.2726 0.3275 0.3481 0.3944 0,3473 0.3280 0.3108 0.2700
2860 0.2879 0.2786 0,2926 0,3189 0.3226 0.2747 0.2684 0.2765 0.2718
2870 0.5857 0.6182 0.6789 0.5997 0.4682 0.5184 0,4953 0,5605 0,5338
2890 0.1846 0.1504 0.1439 0.1361 0.1641 0.1402 0.1527 0.1824 0,1669
2891 0.3733 0.2790 0.2544 0.2201 0.3001 0.3094 0.2625 0.3121 0.2967
2911 0.3417 0.3676 0,3778 0.3757 0.3453 0.3256 0.3544 0.3605 0.3642
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.3212 0.3193 0.3488 0.3193 0.3431 0.3217 0.3763 0.4109 0.4132 0,4394 0.4391
0.3401 0.3796 0.3783 0,3775 0.3924 0.4716 0.4849 0.5214 0,5267 0.5852 0,6134
0.4885 0.5553 0.3604 0.4191 0.5145 0.5695 0,5941 0.5964 0.5780 0.5257 0.5261
0.3331 0.3636 0.4895 0,4104 1.2096 2.2996 1.7018 1.4247 1.4420 1.8821 1.1858
0.1720 0.2161 0.2183 0.5194 0.5673 0,4805 0.4877 0.4305 0.4514 0,3997
0.3953 0.5528 1.0901 1.1567 0.6799 0.7030 0.7417 0.6647 0,6482 0.5555 0.5429
0.0847 0.0838 0.1290 0.2143 0.2655 0.2251 3,5642 1,2265 2,6547 0.9072 1.2024
0.2351 0,2368 0,2318 0,1943 0.1466 0.2616 0.3500 0.3409 0.4367 0.5188 0.4689
0,3006 0.3023 0.3170 0.4473 0,4703 0.3852 0,4490 0,4908 0.5337 0.3936 0,2070
0.4123 1.3393 1.2931 0.5203 0,3764 1.9408 2,0870 0.6048 2.1307 2.8671 1.3266
0.4348 0.4454 0.4794 0.8952 0.8888 0.8527 0.5930 0.4429 0.3544 0.3889 0.4546
0.1487 0.1633 0,1982 0.2048 0.1722 0.1805 0,1849 0,1487 0.1324 0.1820 0.1791
0.9445 0,2647 0.3482 0.7000 0,3658 0.4324 0.2781 0.2832 0.1477 0.2169 0,2587
0.2647 0.2225 0.2271 0,3193 0.3318 0.3539 0.3286 0,3679 0.2114 0.3028 0.3990
0,4224 0,0749 0.2123 0.2162 0.5277 0,5735 0.4785 0.2826 0.1838
0.3917 0.3697 0.5018 0.5072 0.5346 0.4794 0,4781 0.4875 0.4977 0.4982 0,5026
0.5480 0,5470 0.5251 0.4204 0.4238 0.5450 0.8703 0.7912 0.7324 0.6083 0.5240
0.2523 0.2409 0,5099 0.2819 0.2433 0.4638 0,4349 0.3748 0.4474 0,4208 0,3430
0.3761 0.4353 0.3795 0.3536 0.3643 0.4816 0,5608 0.4934 0.4672 0.4807 0,3857
0.2998 0.6229 0.5978 0.6847 0,0809 0.0032
0,2449 0.2188 0.2405 0.6908 0.3321 0.4023 0.9124 0.4103 0.3924 0.5413 0.5378
0.3041 0.2239 0.2315 0.3471 0.2533 0,3862 0,2605 0,2901 0,2031 0.2266 0.3522
0.3560 0,2469 0.1888 0.1589 0.3471 0.2090 0.2178 0.4375 0.2372 0.2691 0.2476
0.2860 0.3191 0,4182 0.5551 0.5518 0,5509 0,4905 0,3833 0,3843 0.5475 0,5831
0.5373 0.4589 0,2860 0.1864 0.4522 0.4065 0.3028 0,7825 0.3748 0.3622 0,4933
0.2849 0.2965 0.3116 0.4255 0.4480 0.4745 0,4725 0,5821 0.5036 0.5223 0.7142
0,3255 0.3083 0,3362 0.3473 0,3414 0,4023 0.3934 0.3908 0.3460 0.3254 0.2825
0.2705 0.2783 0,3958 0,3367 0.3166 0.3165 0.4581 0,3814 0,4091 0,4802 0.3988
0.4476 0,5687 0.5687 0,5126 0,4562 0,4902 0.5303 0.6116 0.5589 0.5874 0.5319
0,1854 0.2032 0.2429 0.2031 0.2149 0.3566 0.2607 0,2563 0,2558 0.2283 0,2642
0.3015 0.2779 0.1523 0,2250 0,3043 0,2802 0.2599 0.1532 0.1686 0.2476 0.3244


















Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
co
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
2950 0.3773 0,3822 0.2970 0.4197 0.4158 0.5236 0.5467 0.6343 0,6078 0.5700 0.5291 0.4767 0,3839 0,3907 0.4771 0.4847 0.5355 0.4556 0,4671 0.5870
2990 0.5825 0.2724 0.2499 0.2359 0.2318 0.2809 0.2502 0,4235 0.4198 0.4582 0.4202 0.4219 0,4049 0,4130 0.4791 0.5223 0.4647 0.5132 0.2149 0.1993
3011 0.2855 0.2841 0.2955 0.2998 0.3452 0.3130 0.2645 0.2148 0,1665 0.1601 0.1796 0.2836 0.3859 0.3509 0.3017 0.3276 0.2166 0.2865 0.1790 0.2002
3021 0.4610 0.4899 0.4683 0.4750 0.5438 0.2433 0.2470 0.1952 0.2479 0.3517 0.2199 0,1481 0,2127 0,3232 0.1817 0.2642 0.1828 0.2774 0.3684 0.2602
3050 0.5113 0.4935 0.4514 0.4671 0.3539 0.3922 0.3457 0,3914 0.2781 0.3084 0.5334 0.5491 0.6804 0.6365 0.6785 0,5942 0.5532 0.4944 0.4665 0.2109
3060 0.3703 0.2983 0.2879 0.2438 0.2557 0.2588 0.2067 0.1874 0.2062 0.2275 0,2468 0.2951 0,3372 0.4739 0.4283 0.6396 0.8528 0.6874 0.3926 0,3221
3080 0.0947 0.0731 0.0964 0.4396 0.4168 0,3145 0.3204 0.3469 0.5073 0.2758 0.3284 0.4636 0,6927 0.5142 0.5056 0.5761 0.7476 0,6585 0.6536 0,4436
3081 0.1462 0.1334 0.4499 0.3526 0.4145 0.4689 0.3512 0.2370 0,3429 0.2837 0.4792 0.7139 0.6603 0.5960 0.6696 0.6520 0.5363 0,5339 0.5407 0.5192
3089 0.2578 0.2328 0.2632 0.2352 0.2301 0.2186 0.2325 0.2488 0,2709 0.3469 0.3132 0.4530 0.4594 0.5216 0.5313 0.6100 0.6125 0.3826 0,4473 0.3450
3100 0.3622 0.3282 0.2900 0.3107 0.2011 0.1330 0.1135 0,1225 0.0808 0.0560 0,0398 0.0877 0.1131 0.0793 0.0721 0.0686 0.1441 0.1418 0,2052 0.3627
3140 0.2299 0.2533 0,2829 0.2532 0.3221 0.2979 0.2752 0.3493 0.2745 0,3335 0.2676 0,3351 0,2387 0.2812 0,3122 0,2855 0.2941 0.2919 0,2287 0.2040
3220 0.2828 0.2481 0,2142 0.2044 0.1979 0.1804 0.2060 0,2748 0.2533 0.2421 0.2355 0.2074 0.2226 0.2490 0.2762 0.2826 0,2982 0,6817 0,8555 1,3096
3221 0.4167 0.3755 0.3692 0,3941 0.4098 0.3759 0.3200 0.3222 0,3099 0,3297 0,3290 0,3051 1,3307 1.4026 1,5234 1.0201 0.9372 0.7456 0,7702 1,3340
3231 0.2173 0.1978 0.5432 0.5536 0,5244 0.4020 0.3883 0,4488 0.4181 0,3639 0.2662 0.3308 0.3940
3241 0.5121 0.5194 0.5225 0.5168 0.4708 0,4362 0.4001 0,3957 0.4304 0.4243 0.3805 0.3469 0.3353 0.5254 0.5018 0.3600 0.3769 0,3427 0.3308 0.4346
3250 0.1187 0,1093 0.1060 0.1616 0.1784 0.1158 0.3027 0.2577
3260 1,0000 2,4639 1.0359
3270 0.3247 0,3472 0.3396 0.2948 0.3041 0.2654 0.2546 0,3193 0.3074 0.3267 0,2792 0.3631 0.3335 0,8939 0,9505 0,8874 0.9808 1.1303 0,8770 0,6975
3272 0.5422 0,4104 0.4006 0.4345 0,2287 0.2565 0.2060 0.1870 0.1723
3290 0.2893 0.2466 0.2113 0.2374 0.2540 0,2403 0.2549 0,1840 0.1344 0.1586 0.1651 0.5771 0.6423 0.6848 0.5976 0.5723 0.282231.5945 4,5812 0,8450
3310 0.1724 0,1731 0,2478 0.2620 0.2984 0,2669 0,2104 0,2554 0.2035 0.3516 0,2126 0.2554 0,2905 0,2622 0,3055 0.3227 0.2595 0.3293 0.8083 0.8651
3312 0.3356 0.3660 0.3669 0.3466 0.3439 0.3175 0.3192 0.4051 0.4089 0.4343 0.4466 0.4641 0.4411 0,3406 0.3480 0.4340 0.4539 0,5339 0.5564 3.2624
3317 0.0635 0.0096 0,0427 0.3576 0.8490 0.9265 0,8285 0.4672 0.5345 0.5113 0.3332
3320 0.4536 0.4118 0.3940 0.4386 0,4756 0.4641 0.4969 0.4787 0.4325 0.5374 0.4423 0.4593 0.4023 0.4948 0.3549 0.3371 0,3209 0.3740 0.4233 0.6824
3330 0.3260 0.3322 0.3384 0.3029 0.3388 0,3117 0.3471 0.4354 0.3702 0,3575 0,3648 0.3518 0.2734 0.3298 0.3437 0.3064 0.2809 0,2942 0,2699 0.2688
3334 0.5305 0.5257 0.5315 0.4851 0,3962 0.4166 0.4859 0.4879 0,4944 0.4926 0.5193 0.4922 0,4949 0,4860 0,4293 0,4944 0.4764 0,4990 0,6548 0.6254
3341 0.9911 1.4715 1,0310 0.9614 0,4403 0.3481 0.2978 0.2337 0.1966 0.1730
3350 0.3245 0.3800 0.4576 0.4077 0.5070 0,4173 0,4171 0,4789 0.6236 0.7322 0,8197 0.6753 0.5559 0.5445 0.4978 0.4253 0.4508 0.4719 0.5547 0.4379
3357 0,1944 1.0000 0.1787 0.2592 0.7178 1.4069 0.7739 0.6157 0,7017 0.7301 0.8095 0.9688 0.7873 0.9059 0,6441 0.6844 0,5346 0,2649
3360 0.3869 0.3526 0.2767 0.2926 0.2772 0.2449 0.2357 0,2105 0,1397 0,1346 0,1336 0,1192 0.1043 0,3932 0.3765 0,2917 0.2592 0,3713 0,2470 0,3425
3390 0.1083 0,0930 0.1242 0.2414 0.2486 0.2006 0.2370 0.2426 0,2777 0.3019 0.2760 0.2922 0.2956 0.2239 0.1990 0.2010 0,2211 0.2010 0.1827 0,2560


















Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
H-• 
&
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3420 0.4257 0.4364 0,4013 0.3874 0.3796 0,3495 0.3511 0.3184 0.2518 0,4105 0.4864 0.4852 0.5013 0.5101 0.4844 0.4907 0.4432 0,5101 0.5013 0.5412
3430 0.0886 0,6338 0.6005 0.7635 1.0672 1.1226 1.1894
3440 0.2821 0.3116 0,2870 0.2754 0.3111 0.3424 0.3418 0.3436 0.2921 0.3129 0.3900 0.2845 0.4508 0.4607 0.4705 0.5431 0,5223 0,4207 0.3408 0.6771
3442 0,4919 0.4881 0.5689 0.5015 0.4486 0.4432 0.4324 0.5225 0.2673 0.3158 0.2847 0.4127 0,2566 0 ,2480 0.4877 0.3920 0.3397 0.0987 0.0874 0.0769
3443 0.1596 0.1558 0.1268 0.1065 0.1024 0.1209 0.1075 0.1188 0.1040 0,1051 0.1378 0.3807 0.3082 0.2724 0.2791 0.2389 0,3244 0.2752 0,2757 0.2645
3444 0.4555 0.1947 0.3048 0,5011 0.6374
3448 0.2016 0.2118 0,1943 0.3075 0.3256 0.2806 0.2514 0.2016 0.1996 0.2839 0.3411 0,4028 0.3729 0.3553 0.6106 0.5407 0,7370 1.2220 0.9912 2.9494
3452 0.3447 0.3040 0.3631 0.3677 0.3680 0.4256 0.3878 0,3659 0.3290 0,3107 0.2769 0.3093 0.5248 0.4689 0.4384 0.5281 0.5418 0.5371 0.4957 0.5665
3460 0.2816 0.2300 0.2749 0.2854 0.3022 0.2925 0.2832 0.2040 0.2429 0,2741 0,2882 0.1959 0.4322 0.3696 0.3791 0.6378 0,3540 0.3959 0.6222 0.6111
3470 0.3457 0.3243 0.4271 0,3476 0.3983 0.3901 0.4123 0.2751 0.3667 0,4858 0,6068 0.5608 0.5591 0.5273 0.5546 0.5817 0.4243 0.3281 0.2377 0.1321
3480 0.0429 0.2187 0.6392 0.9280 0.7214 0.4886 0.4160 0.4862 0,6301
3490 0.3412 0.3651 0.3247 0.3151 0.3583 0,3126 0.2752 0,5444 0,3240 0.2889 0.3910 0.4144 0.4047 0.4843 0.5106 0.5001 0,6022 0,5639 0,7324 0,4591
3510 0.3612 0.3336 0,3617 0.3558 0.3494 0.3526 0,2769 0.2953 0.2843 0,2648 0,2794 0.4182 0.3468 0,3860 0.3991 0.3833 0.3397 0.4129 0.3912 0.3125
3523 0.4539 0.4497 0.4454 0.4467 0.4389 0.4922 0.4763 0.4874 0.4930 0.5000 0.5302 0.5132 0,5516 0.5247 0.5591 0.6256 0.6415 0.6108 0.5663 0.5237
3524 0.5072 0.4200 0.4072 0.3948 0.3002 0.3023 0.2599 0,2969 0.2471 0.4099 0,4599 0.5440 0.4907 0,5308 0.5601 0.4720 0.4872 0,5489 0.5448 0.5340
3530 0.4811 0.4107 0.3466 0.3241 0.4582 0.4495 0,4648 0.4439 0.3775 0.4483 0.3504 0,4650 0,4635 0.5173 0.5033 0.4442 0.3022 0.3766 0.3879 0.4130
3531 0.2884 0.3184 0.3044 0.3700 0.3503 0.3601 0,3560 0.4248 0.4530 0.4267 0,4309 0,4363 0,4518 0,4537 0.4840 0.5321 0.5650 0,5122 0.3453 0.3723
3533 0.3232 0.3710 0.4181 0.3821 0.3007 0.4576 0,4022 0.4427 0.3911 0.3811 0.4157 0.4263 0.3832 0.3480 0.3519 0.3560 0.2818 0,3397 0,4081 0.4198
3537 0.5190 0.5146 0.5049 0.5076 0.4544 0.4568 0.4606 0,4769 0.4504 0.4256 0.4012 0.3754 0.3645 0,4125 0.6133 0,6160 0.6131 0.6456 0.4076 0.4370
3540 0.3584 0.2825 0.2539 0.2314 0.2204 0.2803 0.2050 0.2450 0.2401 0.3196 0.2267 0,3120 0.3375 0,2609 0,3488 0.4786 0.4817 0.5577 0.5210 0.4817
3541 0.2900 0.2235 0.1989 0.1879 0,1617 0.1826 0.1812 0.2083 0.2761 0,2892 0,3212 0,3509 0.3467 0.3819 0,3379 0.2814 0.2817 0.2864 0.3461 0.2860
3550 0.3724 0.4139 0.4753 0.4996 0.5797 0.5494 0,3891 0.5250 1.5698 0.5756 0.7848 0,7779 0.7225 0.5353 0.4882 0.4804 0,5839 0.6568 0,8059 0.4045
3555 0.3573 0.3072 0.3758 0.2986 0.4119 0.5205 0.9541 0,086510.5994 0.4642 0.7918 0.6555 0.5911 0,5265 0,5188 0.6626 0,7327 0.4259 0.4417
3559 0.3943 0.3721 0.3378 0.2764 0.3255 0.2562 0.3067 0.3217 0.3371 0.3246 0.2796 0.3348 0.3204 0,3282 0.3524 0.3154 0.3077 0.3002 0.3293 0.2596
3560 0.3686 0.3077 0.3260 0.3691 0,3959 0,4206 0.4124 0,3213 0.2476 0.2986 0.3292 0.2855 0.3141 0.3766 0,3757 0.3191 0.3219 0,3696 0,3999 0,4312
3561 0,2337 0.2122 0.1963 0.1843 0.2631 0,2602 0.2988 0,3577 0.3520 0.3072 0.3095 0.2954 0,5053 0,5699 0.5138 0,4285 0.3004 0.4073 0,3031 0.4851
3562 0.0490 0.0629 0.0581 0.0621 0.0610 0.0568 0.0517 0.0452 0.6412 0.6173 0,5515 0,5161 0.3558 0.2278 0,1804 0.2036 0.2285 0,1880 0,1954 0,1712
3564 0.2660 0.3355 0.2792 0.2338 0.2393 0.2318 0,2160 0.1966 0.1806 0,2923 0.2273 0.3279 0,2507 0.2453 0.3702 0.1819 0.1414 0.2892 0,1910 0,2183
3567 0.2157 0.2827 0.2341 0.2417 0.2674 0.3014 0,3810 0.2001 0.2570 0.3188 0.3396 0.5066 0,5869 0,5377 0,3448 0.5442 0.3221 0,3731 1.7967 0,2901
3569 0.2975 0.2235 0,2007 0,2545 0.2490 0.2571 0,2879 0.2620 0.2215 0.1920 0,2666 0,2739 0.2800 0,2904 0.5120 0,5850 0.6550 0,6097 0,5583 0,5632
3570 0.2139 0.1924 0.2129 0.2210 0.2313 0.2629 0.2349 0.2112 0.1865 0.2005 0.2299 0.2411 0,2125 0,2431 0.3074 0.3109 0.3475 0,3539 0,3843 0,3776


















Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
Ul
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80
3572 0.4550 0.4040 0.2352 0.3566 0.4595 0.4214
3575 0.4373 0.5045 0.3305 0.5754 0.4345 0.3746
3576 0.6173 0.4329 0.3863 0,2848 0.5415 0,3417
3577 0,775212.1237 0.6519 0.3992 0.2590 0.3085
3578 0.1531 0.1432 0.1302 0.1161 0.1161 0.0911
3579 0.3180 0.2889 0.3659 0.3618 0.2520 0.2353
3580 0.2662 0.2102 0,2805 0.3138 0.4509 0.1938
3585 0.4548 0.4520 0.4299 0.4430 0.4577 0.4939
3590 0.3092 0.3174 0.3148 0.3075 0.3026 0.2646
3600 0.3906 0.3330 0.2535 0.2861 0.2945 0.2901
3612 0.1913 0,1594 0.1652 0.1657 0.2214 0.2074
3613 0.2429 0.3524 0.3394 0.3436
3620 0.2432 0.2048 0.1703 0,2432 0.2028 0,1746
3621 0.2801 0.2357 0.2251 0,2136 0,2660 0,2653
3630 0.2565 0.1819 0.1623 0.1485 0.0972 0.0782
3634 0.3750 0.4308 0,4298 0.3994 0.4039 0.4351
3640 0.2317 0.2116 0.1979 0.1673 0.1969 0.1886
3651 0.3838 0.3569 0.3723 0.3721 0.4143 0.3655
3652 0.2456 0.1604 0.4486 0.3481 0.4209 0.4188
3661 0.4361 0.3987 0.3985 0.3073 0.3186 0.2674
3663 0.2670 0.2686 0.2383 0.2426 0.2723 0.2612
3669 0.3181 0.2807 0.2923 0.2400 0.3168 0.3271
3670 0.5800 0.5448 0.4376 0,4120 0,2473 0.2248
3672 0.3823 0.3835 0.4963 0.5666 0.4956 0.4739
3674 0.3204 0.2727 0.2553 0.2553 0.2775 0.3176
3677 0.3892 0.4154 0.4802 0.5817 0.5915 0.3269
3678 0.2559 0.2515 0.2825 0.2711 0.2290 0.2408
3679 0.3210 0.3140 0.3108 0.2718 0.2819 0,2657
3690 0.3681 0.3091 0,3298 0.2930 0,3445 0.2888
3695 0.1197
3711 0.3078 0.2668 0.2545 0.2334 0.2438 0.3416
3713 - ,  - 0.7604
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0.2941 0,1585 0.1989 0.3736 0.3330 1.4864 0.2890 
0.2641 0.4328 0.0891 0.0705 0,1192 0.1704 0.2297 
0,2095 0.2891 0,1105 0,1257 0.1221 0.1958 0.2298 
0,6982 0.3852 0.6246 0.4892 0.5740 0.4318 2.7173
0.1153 0,1240 0.2738 0.1993 0.1637 0.2287 0.2717 
0,2847 0.3414 0.1750 0.3281 0.4640 0.3552 0,3055 
0.2167 0.1770 0.2113 0.1463 0.3233 0.3919 0.4428 
0.5410 0,5171 0.6876 0.6077 0,4594 0.4307 0,4048
0.2430 0.2774 0.2676 0.2769 0.3442 0.5146 1.1650 
0.2257 0.2089 0.1952 0.2017 0.2051 0.2873 0.3322 
0.2254 0.1541 0.2132 0.2518 0.4818 0.4785 0.5175 
0,2994 0.2713 0,0352 0,2543 0.4342 0.4703 0.3876
0,2215 0.2048 0,1620 0,1465 0,1543 0.2047 0.1700 
0.2304 0.3550 0,3567 0.3906 0.3899 0.4728 0.4126 
0.0714 0,0770 0.0692 0.0626 0.0629 0.1274 0.2570 
0.5177 0,5253 0,2157 0,3526 0.4056 0.4597 0.6112
0.1609 0,2228 0.1955 0,2282 0.2114 0.2544 0.2528 
0.3514 0.3892 0.3564 0.4605 0.3794 0.4612 0.4742 
0.4779 0,4398 0.3732 0.2571 0,3271 0.6351 0.6749 
0.3270 0.3046 0.2901 0.3010 0.3391 0.3246 0.2532
0.1919 0,1728 0.1452 0.1767 0.1729 0.1877 0.1795 
0.1491 0.1792 0,1452 0,1848 0.2921 0.2633 0.2923 
0.2327 0,2332 0,2847 0,3398 0,2237 0.2426 0,3150 
0.5404 0.5029 0.3938 0.3730 0.2822 0.4151 0.4023
0.3372 0,3853 0.2675 0,2603 0.3288 0.3411 0.3253 
0.4042 0.2962 0.5365 0.3039 0.3783 0.4617 0.3356 
0,2242 0.2301 0.2586 0.3718 0.2892 0.1650 0.2887 
0,2578 0.2869 0.3072 0.2691 0.2835 0.2930 0.2927
0.2627 0.2737 0.1691 0,1870 0.2133 0.4068 0.4099 
0.1004 0.1175 0.1246 0.1030 0.1123 0,2984 0,2353 
0.3512 0.4175 0.3763 0,3042 0.3261 0.2844 0.2841 
0,3626 0,3372 0,3265 0.7438 0.2516 0.9740 0,8564
88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0,3214 0.3054 0.2446 0.2666 0.3470 0,4024 0.3176 
0,1998 0.1458 0.1994 0,1156 0.1226 0.1930 0,1566 
0.2049 0.1780 0.1656 0.2015 0.2235 0.2421 0.1028 
0,3941 0.3230 0.2673 0,2097 0.1818 0.2523 0.2609
0.2748 0.2076 0,3067 0.1986 0.4390 0,3012 0.3188 
0.4125 0,4401 0.4281 0.4184 0.3922 0.7041 0.4261 
0.4882 0.5627 0.4730 0.4329 0.4222 0.6297 0,5385 
0.5466 0.7029 0.7513 0.7352 0.6869 0,7294 0.4637
1.1952 1.1594 0.6593 1.1080 1.1825 1.2579 1.0833 
0.4461 0,4351 0,5495 0,5570 0.5474 0.5094 0.4869 
0,4959 0.3901 0,3109 0.3212 0.3033 0.5741 0.5789 
0.2713 0,4176 0.3432 0.2808 0,2645 0,2141 0.1536
0.1560 0.2599 0,2494 0.3212 0.3333 0.3619 0,3926 
0.4501 0,4931 0.4550 0,3303 0,4274 0,3699 0.3900 
0.4213 0,5766 0.6204 0.5323 0.5977 0.5792 0.5595 
0,2526 0.2667 0.3872 0.4205 0.2471 0.2518 0,2290
0.2943 0.3242 0.3214 0,3400 0,3780 0,3908 0.3622 
0.3818 0,4116 0.4314 0.4906 0.5718 0.3734 0,3074 
0.4382 0.5079 0,6440 0,6126 1,9038 1.1376 0,7493 
0.2685 0.2550 0,2782 0.2834 0,3072 0.3112 0,2184
0,1993 0.2472 0.4007 0,2712 0,5735 0,5773 0.3236 
0.3123 0,2853 0.4009 0,3850 0.3348 0.4268 0,3304 
0.3190 0.3867 0.3255 0.4469 0.4666 0.5300 0.3668 
0.5078 0.4257 0.4453 0.4849 0,5190 0.3589 0.3516
0.2710 0.2834 0,2951 0,2886 0,2291 0.2220 0.1977 
0.3427 0.3429 0.3547 0.1683 0.1026 0.1989 0.0212 
0,1341 0.4089 0.3998 0.2900 0.4892 0.4713 0.4143 
0.3592 0.3605 0.4203 0,3584 0.2679 0.2619 0.2864
0.6243 0.5277 0.4542 0.3879 0.3821 0,3590 0.3413 
0,2902 0,2993 0.2434 0,1845 0,1705 0,1701 0.0817 
0.3959 0.4027 0.4377 0.4585 0.5518 0.6192 0.4178 


















Industry A verage Values for Leverage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3714 0,2896 0.2791 0.2755 0.3025 0.3011 0.3521 0.3442 0.3109 0.3205 0.2780 0.3348 0.4149 0.4013 0,4293 0.5027 0.4953 0.6709 0.4687 0.5278 0.4570
3715 0.3965 0.4333 0.3927 0.4456 0.4758 0,5667 0.5806 0.6704 0.4519 0.0023 0.3778 0.6203 0.6658 0.6194 0.7731 0.5964 0.4790 0.8452 0.7707 0.7142
3716 0.1129 0.1377 0.1692 0.2697 0.2199 0.2174 0.3516 0.1497 0.2424 0.0884 0.1582 0.1399 0.1785 0.1984 0.3287 0,2261 0,2738 0.2529 0.1499 0.1020
3720 0.3086 0.2447 0.2701 0.2491 0.2544 0.2603 0.2397 0.1933 0.1741 0.1746 0.5139 0.6709 0,4872 0.6704 0.6690 0.6592 0.6227 0.7514 0.7128 0.6819
3721 0.4127 0.3208 0.2597 0.2070 0.2514 0.2656 0.2795 0,2185 0.1266 0.1299 0.1851 0.3275 0.3503 0.3648 0.4567 0.4289 0.3703 0.4078 0.4319 0.6383
3724 0.3854 0.3301 0.2791 0.3307 0.3734 0.3771 0.3525 0.3525 0.3121 0,4294 0.4209 0.4262 0.4008 0.3910 0.3986 0.4380 0.4389 0,5004 0,5144 0.5308
3728 0.5563 0.5570 0.5568 0.3939 0.3762 0.3882 0.4328 0.5077 0.6469 0.9342 2.0477 4.2241 0.5782 0.6287 0,6669 0.6859 0.5635 0.5704 0.5241 0.6109
3730 0.5778 0.4928 0.4694 0.4346 0.2273 0.3417 0.2045 0.1626 0,1611 0,1033 0,2885 0.3248 0,2021 0,2859 0.2969 0.3402 0,4053 0.3257 0.3197 0.4366
3743 0.4084 0.3885 0.4096 0.3725 0,4163 0.3782 0,3971 0.3323 0.4007 0.4410 0.4492 0.5542 0.5002 0.5685 0.4954 0.4821 0,5422 0.4866 0,5393 0.7212
3751 0.4979 0.3568 0.3483 0.3939 0,8454 0.3610 0.3885 0.4331 0.3308 0.3020 0.5823 0.7929 0.7207 0.6728 0.6212 0.5952 0.5641 0,4899 0.4442 0.4256
3760 0,4293 0.4021 0.3830 0,3485 0,3536 0.2979 0,2877 0.2066 0.2483 0.2821 0,3512 0,2817 0.5942 0.5862 0.5906 0,5052 0,4367 0.4362 0.4577 0.6085
3790 0.5441 0.3920 0.2638 0.1811 0.2344 0.1042 0.0816 0.0397 0,0367 0,1058 0.0230 0,0825 0,1653 0.0403 0,0256 0.0139 0.3637 0.7374
3812 0.2760 0.2469 0.2887 0.2962 0,2788 0.2840 0.2526 0.2351 0,2265 0,2332 0.2939 0.3990 0.4013 0.4635 0.4401 0.4595 0,4482 0.4054 0.4000 0,3064
3821 0,2885 0.2913 0.5267 0.1915 0.2011 0.2847 0,3142 0.4506 0.3650 0.2053 0.3470 0.4350 0.3968 0,3999 0,4197 0,3066 0,3189 0.4415 0.3953 0.4119
3822 0.4239 0.2457 0.2395 0.2492 0.2572 0.2472 0.2690 0.2841 0.2788 0.2578 0,2564 0.3933 0.3843 0,3918 0.3041 0.2994 0.3039 0.2812 0,2807 0.3173
3823 0.4189 0.3322 0.3629 0,3340 0.3390 0.2951 0,2145 0.2380 0.1800 0,2321 0.2705 0.2649 0.2756 0.2563 0.2367 0,3066 0.3146 0.3742 0,3773 0.4134
3824 0.3755 0.3739 0.3963 0.3697 0.2116 0.3138 0.3840 0.3296 0,3125 0,3820 0.2340 0.5217 0,5549 0,5090 0.4912 0,4700 0.3318 0.4514 0.6489 1.1806
3825 0.3365 0.2944 0.2637 0.3044 0.2966 0.3066 0.3085 0.2743 0,1725 0.2157 0,2145 0.2192 0.2526 0.2757 0.3679 0.2765 0.2304 0.3358 0.6526 0.3244
3826 0.2609 0.2276 0.2780 0.3141 0.3215 0.3584 0,3583 0,3514 0.3459 0.3487 0,3323 0,2510 0,2234 0,2131 0,2017 0.2661 0,2198 0.2052 0.2299 0.2493
3827 0.3923 0.3394 0.3489 0,3566 0.3366 0.5551 0.3145 0.4754 0.0703 0.0663 0.0942 0.0530 0.0926 0.3778 0.1857 0.1643 0.1877 0,1704 0.2084 0.1968
3829 0.4741 0.4116 0.3797 0.4327 0.3681 0.3169 0,3314 0,4094 0.3505 0.3588 1.6334 0.2966 0.3205 0,3352 0,4347 0.3512 0,3198 0,4091 0.4179 0.5702
3841 0.3115 0.3607 0.4168 0,3634 0.3522 0,3480 0.3274 0.3655 0.3212 0.3455 0.4257 0.3330 0.3001 0,2763 0.2595 0.3729 0,4802 0.4235 0.4431 0.5181
3842 0.2874 0.3084 0.2586 0.3030 0.2499 0.1893 0.2598 0.1661 0.2335 0.2468 0,2560 0.2766 0.2855 0,3382 0,5375 0,5701 0.4957 0.6693 0.3326 0.6575
3843 0.4456 0,4256 0.4887 0.5768 0,5509 0.4868 0,2565 0,6265 0.6903 0.7188 0.7428 1.1716 0.9721 0.8339 0,7510 0.7056 0,6052 0,5534 0.5019 0.5068
3844 0.5509 0.1998 0.2457 0.2463 0,3529 0.3266 0.2869 0.4083 0.4639 0.2479 0,1095 0,0973 0,1436 0.1211 0.1224
3845 0.4181 0.5290 0.3829 0.3843 0.4536 0.2956 0.3608 0.3020 0.3241 0.4366 0.3982 0.3546 0,2788 0.3605 0.3473 0.2946 0.2221 0.1650 0,1660 0.1787
3851 0.4014 0.3528 0.3121 0.2984 0.2295 0.2592 0.2356 0.5611 0.3002 0.3912 0.4936 0.6913 0.7857 0.7581 0,4367 0,4160 0,3641 0.5771 0,8654 0.7662























Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
4s»
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
3944 0.5435 0.3738 0.4429 0.4889 0,4338 0.5214 0,4938 0.4489 0.3662 0.4184 0.4054 0,3356 0.4981 0.4314 0.6155 0.5909 0.4408 0.3194 0.3425 0.3868
3949 0.4434 0,4186 0.4723 0.4332 0.4247 0.4968 0.5086 0.4885 0.4566 0,4263 0.4141 0.4650 0.4360 0.4247 0.4655 0,5737 0,7130 2.2503 0,6793 0,4687
3950 0.2272 0.3093 0.3374 0.3176 0.3297 0.3036 0.3385 0.2878 0.2784 0.2658 0.3076 0,2346 0.2272 0.2858 0,2905 0.5262 0.4857 0.2998 0.2902 0.3663
3960 0.6311 0.7774 0.7541 0.9363 0.6886 0.7720 1.5392 0.6607 4.109510.7490 1.1011 1.1952 1.2483 0.9425 0.9424 1.3416 0.8744 1.3552 1.1772 3.2176
3990 0.2658 0.2711 0.2205 0.1954 0,2156 0.3880 0,2395 0.2545 0.2903 0.2814 0.3335 0.3398 0.4247 0.3717 0.3956 0,3595 0.3451 0.2857 0.3433 0.2296
4011 0.3923 0.3817 0.3839 0.3858 0.3787 0.3717 0.3757 0,3709 0.3236 0,3022 0.3721 0,4129 0.3644 0.4794 0.5963 0,5633 0,5942 0.5640 0.5503 0.4675
4100 0.8795 0.9290 0.9239 0,6909 0.6010 0.3489 0.6200
4210 0,3891 0.4626 0.5126 0.2793 0.1287 0.2275 0.3410 0,3905 0.4615 0,5313
4213 0.4124 0.4149 0,3204 0,2958 0.3225 0.2876 0,2626 0.3832 0.2279 0.2965 0.3357 0.3711 0.3664 0.5418 0.5134 0,5273 0.5417 0.5365 0,4397 0.4897
4400 0.4900 0.4240 0.3569 0,3381 0.3471 0.3848 0.3979 0,4222 0,3857 0,4087 0.3518 0.4027 0,3376 0.5037 0.4725 0,4451 0.4094 0.5188 0.4770 0,5090
4412 0.6034 0.5319 0.4873 0.5630 0,6452 0.6693 0.6304 0.6515 0.5721 0.5792 0.5188 0,5387 0,5199 0.5887 0.5341 0.4968 0,5210 0.4887 0.5045 0.5174
4512 0.6665 0.5960 0.5496 0.5248 0,5406 0.5693 0,5014 0.5354 0,5243 0.5201 0,5453 0.5578 0.5543 0.5828 0.6278 0.6071 0.6832 0,7447 0.9317 3.3563
4513 0.4240 0.3430 0.4463 0.3437 0.3883 0.3928 0,2582 0.3600 0.3887 0.4669 0.4690 0.6440 0,5764 0,4717 0,5550 0.5955 0.5367 0.5073
4522 0,3771 0,4106 0,4315 0.7190 0.7343 0.7339 0.7591 0.8144 0.8467 0.7704 0.8463 1.0595 3.4076 1.8604 1.0172 0.9995 1.2653 1.8522 1.9932 1.7291
4581 0.7399 0.7712 0.7004 0.6165 0.5553 0.5808 0.6051 0,5214 0,6053 0.5728 0.5209 0,4218 0.5593 0.7694 0.8556 0.8492 0,5511 0.5390 0.7666 0.6994
4610 0.6904 0.7227 0.7045 0.6743 0.6385 0.6135 0.5773 0.5321 0,4020 0.4302 0.4292 0,5565 0,5388 0.5892 0.7242 0,7190 0.7748 0,7401 0.7453 0.7181
4700 0.6405 0.6627 0.7283 0.3198 0.3747 0.5199 0.7140 0.7657 0.8863 0,7807 0.8156 0.8352 0.7814 0.6221 0.6698 0,7422 0.6780 0.9155 0.8907 0.7968
4731 0.4943 0.5663 0.3896 0,2995 0.2348 0.1762 0.2066 0.4634 0.3345 0,2704 0.3641 0.2765 0,3711 0.4154 0.4075 0,3361 0.3757 0.3631 0.3401 0.3373
4812 1.8340 1.5878 1.0981 0.8495 0.5560 0.3783 0,2198 0.3688 0.5054 1,0112 0.7523 0.4450 0.6626 0.5609 0.6913 2.0352 2.2673 2.2092 1.4096 1.2847
4813 0.6488 0,6594 0.6303 0.6077 0.6150 0.5891 0.5877 0,5630 0.5301 0,4923 0.5072 0.5051 0.4988 0,4774 0.5098 0,5317 0.5411 0,5956 0.4699 0,5343
4822 . . .  1,2359 1,3761
4832 2,2022 0.7817 0.7007 0.7862 0.7440 0,7497 1.8904 1.8185 2.2333 1,1522 0.6703 1,4652
4833 0.5857 0.6130 0.6644 0.6440 0.6353 0.5325 0.6168 0.7352 0.8643 0,7041 0.8513 1.0664 2,9551 1.0637 0,7428 1.4968 1.7581 0.6364 0.4959 0.5785
4841 0.7262 0.8165 0.7832 0.7339 0.6374 0.4173 0.4752 0.5427 0.5442 0,6414 1.3721 1.0984 1.4116 1.6985 2.0135 1,8075 2,2647 2.2175 1.6231 2.1596
4899 0,0026 0.0576 0.0503 0.0056 0.0137 0.0131 0.0122 0.1401 0.2972 0,3278 0.4119 0.2363 0,3505 0.3887 0.3383 0.4685 0.5593 0,3825 0.4852 0.5281
4911 0.5620 0,5424 0.5382 0.5306 0.5313 0.5369 0,5380 0,5113 0,4992 0.5001 0.5044 0,5016 0.5041 0.5181 0,5168 0.5356 0.5490 0.5383 0,5402 0,5458
4922 0.5884 0.5583 0.5785 0.5390 0.5493 0.5019 0.5451 0.5410 0.4929 0.4904 0.5680 0.5589 0.4964 0.5584 0.5267 0.5845 0.5944 0,5708 0.5480 0.5853
4923 0,5013 0.4759 0.4577 0.4512 0.4452 0.4311 0.4269 0.4316 0.4001 0,3956 0.4337 0.4700 0.4602 0.5078 0.5131 0,5013 0.5240 0.5363 0.5060 0.4845
4924 0.5709 0.5484 0.5458 0.5309 0.5372 0.5264 0.5282 0,5333 0.5151 0.4842 0.5054 0.4923 0.4924 0,4934 0,5106 0.5218 0.5286 0,5287 0,5262 0,5280
4931 0.5458 0.5278 0.5157 0.5054 0.5130 0.5104 0.5049 0.4964 0.4821 0,4733 0.4830 0.4869 0.4970 0.5043 0.5034 0,5128 0.5120 0.5244 0.5190 0.5165
4932 0,5221 0.5133 0.5338 0.4986 0.5189 0.5135 0.5075 0.4868 0.4753 0.4516 0.4710 0.4734 0.4538 0.4556 0.4919 0.6696 0.6259 0,5832 0,5692 0.5684


















Industry A verage Values for L everage for 1975-1994
00
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
4941 0.6196 0.6045 0.5907 0.5897 0,5912 0.5716 0.5833 0.5853 0.5771 0.5644 0.5603 0.5424 0.5415 0,5617 0.5851 0.6006 0.5882 0.5674 0.5461 0.5438
4950 0.9311 0.1623 0.2035 0.4867 0.4709 0.6082 0.6525 0.7203 0.7794
4953 0.5530 0.5116 0.4426 0.3974 0.3966 0.3534 0.3049 0.4178 0.2489 0.5091 0.4480 0.4443 0.4656 0.4616 0.5679 0,4824 0.5828 0.5389 0.6060 0.5494
4955 0.1431 0.4393 0.0771 0.0852 0.2586 0,3389 0.1145 0.3789 0.2323 0,2811 0.2012 0.3573 0.3039 0.4466 0.4243 0.3911 0.3944 0.3333 0.3142 0.4194
4961 _ „ . _ _ _ _ _ . . .. . . t. ___ ___ 0.8466 0.7142
4991 0.2825 0.1736 0.2068 0.2983 0.3924 0.2476 0.4014 0.3889 0.3513 0.3892 0.5572 0.6679 0.3921 0,4606 0.4276 0.6821 0,5946 0.5022 0.4527 0.5917
5000 0.0396 0.0312 0 .0248 0.0268 0.0935 0.0966 0.0930 0.0665 0.1323 0.0684 0,0751 0.0691 0,0685 0,0480 0.0387 0.0442 0,0359 0.0388 0.0707 0,0392
5010 -•* 0.1626 0.0064 0.1159 0.1239 0.3438 0.4550 0.3489 0.3820 0.3915 0.2282 0.4173 0,3655 0.3985
5013 0.2026 0.2101 0.2108 0.2168 0,1858 0,1542 0,1732 0.1369 0,1215 0.2473 0,5082 0.3918 0.3681 0,3512 0,3590 0,3472 0,3370 0.3040 0,2984 0,3310
5020 0.4482 0,2699 0.5160 0.5652 0.5932 0.5739 0.5655 0.4549 0.5691 0.5152 0.4756 0.4483 0.6232 0.5757 0.6122 0.6665 0.4925 0.4894 0.6037 0,4526
5030 0.0177 0.0147 0.0122 0,0101 0.1103 0.1953 0.3447 0,4244 0.3670 0.5029 0.3968 0.4835 0.4675 0.3957 0.0305 0,0790 0,1602 0.3125 0.5343 0.4477
5031 0,5590 0,5486 0.5131 0.4511 0.4271 0.6109 0.6013 0.5764 0.1484 0.2332 0,5656 0,5089 0.4286 0.4351 0.4379 0.4475 0,4364 0.4451 0.3454 0.3646
5040 0.2969 0.2964 0.3690 0.3948 0.3602 0.2787 0.3910 0.4183 0.3470 0.5327 0.5960 0.2615 0.5355 0.5212 0.8141
5045 0.5354 0,4714 0.5185 0.4484 0.4423 0.2290 0.1946 0.3021 0.3241 0,4262 0,3569 0.4027 0.3804 0.3185 0.4062 0.3499 0,3501 0.4765 0.3948 0,4704
5047 0.4329 0.5341 0.5121 0.4826 0,3554 0.2939 0,3131 0,2442 0.2492 0.3250 0.5558 0.6629 0.4901 0.5016 0,4865 0.5127 0.2877 0.1952 0.2508 0,6606
5051 0.2989 0.3574 0,3746 0.3765 0.3424 0.3073 0,3281 0.3088 0.3033 0.3156 0.3213 0.4745 0,2480 0,2686 0.3000 0.3548 0.3779 0.4274 0.2991 0.2674
5063 0.6085 0.5939 0.6173 0.5839 0.7001 0.6752 0.6187 0.5050 0.5727 0.6003 0,5353 0.6809 0,6177 0.6042 0.7041 0.9693 0,5708 0,6239 0.6716 0.5044
5065 0.3740 0.3565 0,3945 0,4139 0.4165 0,4446 0.4482 0,4624 0.4404 0.3133 0,3953 0.4050 0.4087 0.4212 0.4200 0.4193 0.5021 0.4840 0.4478 0,5156
5070 0.2596 0.2666 0,3641 0,4182 0.4877 0.4309 0.4661 0.4366 0.4221 0,4046 0.4831 0.5199 0.5714 0.6178 0.7644 0.8102 0,7909 0.7276 0.6234 0.7841
5072 0.7512 0.7649 0.7676 0.7826 0.6267 0.3911 0.2200 0.5894 0,3727 0.3423 0.4859 0.4560 0.5849 0.6740 0.5307 0.4151 0.4896 0.4931 0.4155 0.5701
5080 0.3740 0.4064 0.3818 0.4126 0.4533 0.4680 0.4041 0.4188 0.3588 0.3287 0.2461 0.2720 0.3032 0.3130 0,4628 0.3919 0.4060 0.4545 0,5149 0.4768
5082 0.5807 0.1357 0.7650 0.5799 0,5676 0,5796 0.7771 1.2380 0,5268 0,4614 0.1487 0.7903
5084 0.0696 0.0534 0.0377 0.0277 0.0187 0.3611 0.2232 0.1928 0.1872 0.1646 0.1166 0,0985 0.0928 0.0661 0.0195 0.0120 0,7584 0.5125
5090 0.4003 0.4749 0.4012 0.4291 0.3738 0.3027 0.2986 0,2106 0,2134 0.3488 1,1331 0,4241 0.5175 0.4740 1.1955 0.9386 0.7431 0.3844 0.6468 0,3632
5094 0.1428 0,1805 . . . . 0.2319 0.5896 0.6344 0.8229 0.6230 0.6497 0.9562 0,6519 0,9427 0.6879 0.6952 0.4681 0.4238 0.5173 0.4739 0.4393
5099 0.0916 0.0486 0.0214 0.1264 0.0339 0.0214 0.0409 0.0338 0.0653 0.0792 0,0596 0.0836 0.0665 0,0539 0.0668 0.1447 0.3423 0,2997 0.5531 1.6041
5110 0,2773 0.2810 0,2931 0,3665 0.3752 0.3198 0,4030 0,2964 0.3363 0.3344 0.3731 0.4201 0.2678 0.2355 0.3032 0.4424 0.4119 0.5209 0,5667 0.4824
5122 0.7271 0.4474 0.4729 0.5262 0.5105 0,4489 0.4679 0.3882 0.2174 0.1818 0.4086 0,5070 0.5139 0.6092 0,4879 0.5812 0.5341 0,4737 0.4772 0.3786
5130 0.5727 0.5189 0.3757 0.4441 0.4666 0.4837 0.3881 0.4410 0.3760 0.3936 0.4666 0.5350 0.5792 0.8071 0.8284 0.7922
5140 0.4015 0.4326 0.4932 0.5445 0.5582 0.5942 0.4346 0.4238 0.4239 0,3713 0.4002 0.3581 0,4238 0,4600 0.5422 0,3925 0.4090 0.4448 0.4605 0.4120
5141 0.3211 0.2496 0.2226 0.4383 0.4100 0.3948 0.3688 0.3889 0.3835 0.4152 0,3873 0,4087 0.3547 0.8153 0,7912 0.7402 0,6591 0.6462 0.6469 0,9590


















Industry A verage Values for Leverage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
5160 0.2063 0.2525 0.2608 0,3224 0.2696 0.2618 0,2661 0.4154 0.3007 0.3207 0.4029 0,4219 0.4245 0.4764 0,4356 0.4556 0,4283 0.4284 0.4602 0.2699
5171 0.5638 0.5460 0.5048 0.5400 0.4456 0.3715 0.3553 0.4410 0.4097 0.4422 0.6594 0.6242 0.5473 0.4692 0.4531 0.5481 0.6251 0.5621 0.2839 0,3447
5172 0.4803 0.4822 0,4975 0,5843 0.4513 0.4558 0,4833 0.7461 0.6875 0,6669 0.6136 0.6249 0.4718 0.4990 0.4520 0.6165 0.4637 0.4676 0.4055 0.4014
5190 0.0226 -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.0824 0.1015 0,3287 0.3034 0,2777 0.2483 0,3299 0.1653 0.1763 0.1706 0,2806 0.2300 0,2623 0.2813 0.5324
5200 0.3554 0.3751 0.3912 0,3961 0.2903 0.4184 0,3979 0.3133 0.3651 0.2839 0,2953 0.3862 0.4228 0.5332 0.4878 0.8953 0.4163 0.7177 0.6954 0.4748
5211 0.3246 0.2158 0.2731 0,3393 0.3382 0.3144 0.3249 0.2200 0.2153 0.4251 0.4252 0.4301 0.3607 0.5789 0.5704 0.6096 0.4153 0.6440 0.5781 0,5216
5311 0.3688 0.3612 0.3755 0,4472 0.4551 0.4501 0.5065 0.5077 0.4608 0.4740 0.4942 0.4308 0.4285 0.5606 0,5173 0.5279 0.6970 0.5398 0.4795 0.4891
5331 0.2170 0.1764 0.2399 0.3071 0.2719 0.3097 0.3270 0.3109 0.3251 0.3621 0,3608 0.4784 0.4856 0.4272 0.4136 0.4458 0.4409 0.4588 0.4428 0.4316
5399 0.4088 0.1455 0.2729 0.5566 0.4335 0.4979 0.4132 0,3092 0.2229 0.2310 0.3547 0.4069 0.3747 0.3323 0,5432 0.5050 0.4600 0.4065 0.3784 0.3346
5411 0.2828 0.2738 0.3333 0.4723 0.4846 0,4618 0.4496 0,4300 0.3942 0.3802 0,4064 0.4854 0.5166 0.6553 0.6705 0.5980 0.6418 0.6388 0.6394 0.6095
5412 0.4819 0.2838 0.2424 0.2649 0.7342 0.6849 0.5433 0.7121 0.5264 0.6029 0.5372 0.7629 0,6182 0,6636 0.7153 0.6824 0,6726 0.6756 0,6587 0.6642
5500 -,- -.- 0.0361 0.0417 0.0344 0.0307 0.0264 0,0673 0.4427 0.3674 0.5023 0.4355 0.3180 0.5300 0.5977 0,7228 0,6136 0.6406 0.5043 0.3961
5531 0.2307 0.2038 0.1869 0.1534 0,1609 0.1775 0.1654 0.2022 0,2100 0,1899 0.2725 0.2616 0.2994 0.3298 0,4165 0.5095 0.3705 0.2947 0.2889 0.2791
5600 0.3348 0.3890 0.4180 0.4806 0.4456 0.4529 0.4886 0.3855 0.1953 0.2321 0.2601 0.2301 0.2550 0.2217 0.2160 0,2746 0.2334 0.2266 0.1976 0.2058
5621 0.3030 0.1899 0.2922 0.3488 0.3566 0.3602 0.2047 0.2402 0,1478 0,2417 0,2420 0.2180 0.2726 0.3067 0,6704 0.3435 0.4722 0.4609 0.2629 0.3054
5651 0.4190 0.3606 0.3336 0.3851 0.4482 0.4103 0.4414 0.2372 0.2032 0.2341 0.2220 0,2855 0.1904 0.2402 0.3034 0.3182 0.2554 0.1474 0.1270 0.2041
5661 0.6964 0.6489 0.5454 0.5619 0.5125 0.5072 0.5183 0.5053 0.4803 0.4187 0,4177 0.3192 0.3225 0.2932 0,2819 0.2894 0.2782 0.4158 0.3724 0.4041
5700 0.2656 0.7948 0.3997 0,3695 0.2047 0.2495 0.3093 0.4560 0.4855 0.4292 0.2621 0.2840 0.2402 0.2940 0,2184 0.2620
5712 0.3643 0.3071 0.3554 0.4506 0.5044 0.4685 0.5031 0.4504 0.4280 0.5317 0,5939 0.6778 0.7560 0.8520 0,8354 0.7938 0.8027 1.1822 0.8520 0.5635
5731 0.6122 0.4755 0.5279 0,5331 0.5015 0.4955 0.4613 0.2873 0.3935 0.3526 0,2639 0.2273 0.3100 0,3043 0.2438 0,3262 0.2942 0.2838 0.3889 0,2629
5734 0 ,7 9 8 1 0 .0 5 5 9  0.4317 0.5262
5735 3,5038 0.9663 4,4750 4.3446 1.4632 0,6479 0,5283
5812 0.3932 0.3340 0.5557 0.4571 0,5047 0,4795 0.4654 0.4352 0.3880 0.4141 0.4395 0.4628 0.4089 0,5199 0.5377 0.5020 0.7724 0.5162 0,5645 0.7288
5900 0.4116 0,5946 0.7322 0,6413 0.7028 0.6264 0.7440 0.7498 0,7583 0.6625
5912 0.2424 0.2192 0,2191 0.2383 0,2600 0.2604 0.2173 0,2193 0.1955 0.2832 0,3361 0.5831 0.7182 0.4857 0,5028 0.4751 0.4668 0.4387 0,4941 0,3018
5940 0.1647 0.1514 0.2843 0.2413 0.2599 0.2804 0.2365 0,2752 0,1218 0.1351 0.2412 0.1803 0.2612 0.1678 0.1697 0,1872 0.2429 0.2903 0,3147 0.2875
5944 0,7940 -.- 0,0694 0 .2 0 1 10 .1876  0.2146 0.2480 0.4689 0.4298
5945 -.- 0.2852 0.4175 0.3759 0.2626 0.2151 0.2985 0,1143 0.1066 0.1574 0.1090 0.0858 0.1415 0.2233 0.2134 0.2110 0.1884 0.1740 0,1620 0.3718
5960 -.- -.- -,- -.- -.- -,- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.8642 0,0547 0,0804 0.2869
5961 0.5528 0.4257 0.6002 0.5984 0.6315 0.5859 0.5971 0.5631 0.4155 0,8102 0,5156 0.3382 0.5496 0.5226 0.4870 0,4875 2.5056 0.6262 0.3078 0,2885
5990 0.3780 0.3256 0.4204 0,4039 0.3630 0.6859 0,6094 0.4592 0.3911 -.- 1.0732 0.7354 1.5448 0.9545 1.0058 0.2829 0.2960 0,2970 0,3503 0.5496


















Industry A verage Values for Leverage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
6022 0.5140 0.5336 0.5771 0.6268 0.6272 0.6421 0.6243 0.5498 0.5147 0.5251 0.5304 0.5155 0.4817 0.5070 0.5009 0.4868 0.4907 0.4900 0.3984 0.4246
6029 0.2810 0.4024 0.3291 0.4092 0.3840 0,6479 0.6917 0.6764 0.6859 0.6836 0.6709 0.7337 0.7636 0.7456
6035 0.6430 0.6051 0.6657 0,7060 0.6909 0.6949 0,7639 0.8638 0.8553 0,8783 0.8514 0,8053 0.8401 0.8684 0.8195 0.8041 0.7399 0.6341 0.4957 0.5521
6036 1.0220 0.9526 0.6323 0.4983 0,6248 0.6615 0.6699 0.5745 0,5196 0,4619 0,4480
6099 0.0976 0.3839 0.3075 0,2845 0,2369 0.1326 0.0478 0.0402 0,3035 0.1325 0.2904 0.2793 0.1934 0.2041 0.1178 0.0442 0.0131 1,0992 0.7452 0.3259
6111 0.9721 0.9689 0.9645 0.9678 0.9699 0.9743 0.9830 0.9845 0.9634 0.9674 0.9689 0,9627 0.9646 0,9649 0.9589 0.9591 0.9640 0,9493 0.9513 0.9589
6141 0.7025 0.7018 0.7241 0.7403 0,7943 0.7785 0.8191 0.8108 0,8012 0.8331 0.7681 0.8054 0.8370 0.8701 0.8546 0.8620 0.9201 0.8508 0,8167 0.8200
6153 0.8653 0.8968 0.7958 0.8312 0.7884 0.7744 0.7571 0.7694 0,8518 0.8687 0,8942 0.8877 0.8772 0.8620 0,8514 0.8166 0.8265 0.7979 0.7888 0,8039
6159 0.9270 0.9254 0.9257 0.8573 0,8674 0.8434 0,8513 0.8286 0.8056 0,7925 0,7823 0.7593 0,7612 0,7430 0.7075 0.6882 0.6876 0.6788 0.6149
6162 0.910G 0.9150 0.8936 0.8876 0.8834 0.8623 0.8250 0.8202 0,6772 0.7062 0.6738 0.6922 0,6239 0.8141 0,8141 0,6417 0.9328 0,6874 0.7794 0.6866
6163 0.3481 0,1003 0.1434 0.2252 0.4064 0.5751 0.7849 0.5660 0.3987 0.4229 0,2954
6172 0.9547 0.7906 0.7416 0,7390 0,4172 0,5324 0,6887 0.6674 0.6341 0.5860 0.6115 0.6291 0.6624
6199 0.5353 0.5172 0.5249 0.5577 0.5402 0.4949 0.5499 0.4950 0.4234 0,4281 0.3699 0.3029 0.3466 0.3769 0.4500 0.4390 0.4179 0.4629 0.3438 0.3226
6200 0.2806 0,2423 0.2385 0.3562 0.2551 0,3428 0,3846 0.3099 0.4773 0.3801 0,4224
6211 0,6474 0.7258 0.7326 0.7548 0,7477 0.6978 0.6710 0.6553 0.5841 0.6190 0.5967 0.5992 0.6233 0,6550 0.6567 0.6212 0.5992 0.5803 0,5813 0.6735
6282 24.1300 0.7715 0,4351 1.3383 0.5558 0,3669 0.2265 0,2671 0,2655 2,7167 3,9616 0.844199,398012.855213,8721 1,0236 1.4116 0,6645 0,8467
6311 0.2234 0.2161 0.2119 0.1958 0.2860 0,2690 0.3185 0.3373 0.3289 0.3183 0,3106 0,3324 0.3672 0.3805 0.3955 0.4519 0.4579 0,4169 0.3671 0.4398
6321 0.3319 0.3274 0.3742 0,1402 0.2355 0.2150 0.2658 0,1942 0,2082 0.2141 0.2150 0.2360 0.2671 0.3631 0.2946 0.3067 0,3151 0.2967 0.2470 0.3256
6324 0.3497 0.3067 0.0725 0.5029 0.5309 0.7472 0,4346 0.4674 0,1060 0.3582 0.2792 0.2049
6331 0.3020 0.2725 0.2691 0.2924 0.2979 0.3544 0.2991 0.2809 0,2865 0.3102 0,3571 0.2983 0.2552 0.2808 0,2775 0.3150 0,3445 0.3321 0,2754 0.3026
6351 0.5410 0.4318 0,3892 0.3404 0.3161 0,3289 0.2323 0.2616 0.1965 0.4254 0.3473 0,3104 0.3376 0,3718 0.3694 0,3854 0.2767 0,2514 0.2054 0.2397
6361 0.3468 0.3522 0.1630 0.1729 0.2773 0.3172 0,3507 0.2616 0.2063 0.1541 0.1903 0,2871 0.3164 0,3222 0.3273 0.3597 0.3747 0.2582 0.2445 0.3179
6399 0.2263 0.1949 0,1428 0.5160 0.4935 0.4282 0.3467 0.3502 0.3183 0.2672 0.1895 0,4628 . . .
6411 0.2613 0.1317 0.1583 0.2920 0,3126 0.3322 0,3107 0,3895 0.5506 1.0142 0.5476 0.4601 0.5337 0.4314 0.3444 0.4210 0,5240 0.7743 0,5408 0,4200
6510 0.7641 0.7604 0.7520 0.6119 0.6406 0.4195 0.3737 0.3073 0,4483 0.4281 0.3839 0,4343 0.6099 0.6579 0.7786 0.7904 0.8111 0.8181 0.7977 0.6407
6512 0.7112 0.7000 0.6829 0.6918 0,7155 0,7047 0,7038 0.7061 0.6811 0.8264 0,7113 0,5993 0.5022 0.5482 0,5702 0.5830 0,6305 0,7458 0.6761 0.7690
6531 0.1354 0.5592 0.5527 0.2829 0.3202 0.4176 0,7874 0,7271 0,7465 0.7120 1,1495 2.1418 0,3403 0,574418,8931
6532 0.7535 0.7312 0.6782 0.6292 0.6506 0.5560 0.5097 0.5453 0.4513 0,5617 0.5954 0.3377 0,2180 0.1070 0.0644
6552 0.5581 0.5669 0,5683 0.5015 0.4048 0,3599 0.3815 0.4123 0.2727 0.4211 0,5484 0.4456 0.4719 0.5648 0.4761 0.5169 0,5920 0.5640 0,4483 0.4623
6726 . . . -, - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6792 . . . - 0,2379 0.0623 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


















Industry A verage Values for Leverage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
6795 0.0546 0 ,1430 0.1687 0.1880 0.2571 0.3029 0.2998 0,2938 0.2161
6798 0.6495 0.6411 0.6046 0.5871 0.5668 0.5322 0.4819 0.4968 0.4895
6799 0.6016 0.4768 0.4585 0,2997 0.3800 0.3338 0.4264 0,4519 0.4111
7011 0,6537 0,5943 0.6056 0,5753 0.5815 0.5329 0.5108 0,5016 0.5269
7200 0.3906 0.3852 0.3535 0.3762 0,3994 0.3542 0.2914 0.2818 0.2944
7310 1.0415 1.2767 1.1886 1,5503
7311 0.1250 0.1230 0.1306 0.0813 0,2060 0.1870 0,1453 0,1653 0,1772
7320 0.3109 0.2401 0.2496 0.3571 0.5505 0.3826 0.3970 0.3770 0.2753
7331
7340 0.2840 0.2171 0.2167 0.1904 0.2171 0.1533 0.1145 0.1439 0.0530
7350 0.7620 0,6751 0.6217
7359 0.7028 0.6656 0.6437 0.6779 0.6658 0.6698 0,5516 0.4235 0.4272
7361 _ „ 0.0932
7363 0.5006 0.4441 0.2706 0.2301 0,1844 0.3299 0,3630 0.3944 0.5087
7370 0.0505 0.0369 0.3619 0,3664 0,4251 0.3653 0,4048 0,4053 0.3242
7371 0.1708 0.2788 0.2545 0,2354 0.3126 0.3554 0,1544 0.1257 0.0826
7372 0.7707 0.6291 0.5444 0.3928 0.2685 0,3094 0.2324 0.1107 0.0830
7373 0.4204 0.3717 0.2655 0.2849 0.3156 0.2990 0.2907 0.2504 0,2060
7374 0.0821 0.0502 0.1010 0.1204 0.1652 0.3452 0.1609 0,1421 0.0558
7377 0.6783 0.6940 0.7558 0.7582 0.7588 0.7712 0.8279 0,7912 0.7677
7380 _ . __ .  . 0.3272
7381 0.3866 0.3123 0.3341 0.3182 0,3159 0,3075 0,2876 0,3101 0,2877
7384
7385 0.4055 0.3203 0.5551 0.6352 0.3313 0.1071 0.1356 0.0636 0.0298
7389 0.0088 0.0027 0.0077 0.1656 0.1921 0.1610 0.2342 0.2048 0.1641
7500 0,0043 0.0129 0.0828 0.0778 0.0802 0.0744 0.0573 0,0454 0,0362
7510 0.7835 0.7322 0,7954 0.7885 0.7876 0,7325 0.7020 0.6752 0.6703
7600 0.6516 0.6014 0.5552 0.6566 0.5962 0.5431 0.6787 0.6740 0.6094
7812 _ . .  _ .  _ .  . 0.0898 0.2032 0.2053
7819 0.3039 0,0453 0.2776 0.1899
7822 0.6622 0.6291 0.6636 0.6272 0.4770 0.4797 0.4084 0.4140 0.5065
7830 0.6901 0.4689
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
0.3556 0.2842 0.2131 0.1428 0.1540 0.1654 0.1821 0,2286 0.2313 0.1494 0.1076
0.4474 0.4237 0.4313 0.4287 0.4797 0.4776 0,4862 0.5066 0,5309 0.5716 0.4816
0.4493 0.4159 0.6064 0.4882 0,4343 0.7894 0.9964 0.8508 0.8307 0.4541 0.2440
0.4988 0,5785 0.5399 0,5849 0.6304 0.5727 0.6227 0.6619 0,6773 0.7494 0.7281
0.3007 0.3471 0.3470 0.4734 0.3896 0.3631 0.4114 0.5565 0,4214 0.4184 0,3786
1.5377 0.9431 1.7667 3,2960 2,4598 3.7860 5,2950 7.3965 5,5044 4.6485 9.8622
0.2856 0.4535 0.3837 0.3570 0.7895 0.5116 0,7728 0.6286 0.8351 0.8429 0,4148
0.3720 0.3788 0.5507 0.3857 0.4643 0.4855 0.3465 0,3484 0,4358 0.8540 1.6563
0.0874 0,0368 2.2828 0.9980
0.5748 0.8208 1.2425 0,1632 0,2771 0,3354 0.3225 0,1892 0.1975 0.9131 0.2722
0,8135 0.8729 0.7588 0.9139 0,9922 1,0153 1.0083 0.9690 0.9087 0.9707 0.9905
0.4817 0,4974 0.5644 0,5063 0.4764 0.4943 0.5164 0.4467 0.4939 0.5040 0.4537
0,0743 0.0658 0.0678 0.0197 .t. .t. _ . _  „ _ _
0.4715 0,4438 0.3904 0.8318 0.7900 0,9173 0.9076 1.0925 1,3584 0.7347 0.3240
0.3962 0.3116 0,2283 0.2351 0.3012 0.3321 0,5085 0,5040 0,3690 0,3615 0,3094
0,1394 0,1779 0.1464 0.1346 0.2158 0.1275 0,0568 0.1967 0,1642 0.1576 0.1408
0.1747 0,2099 0.1909 0,1707 0,2041 0.1689 0,1503 0,1665 0.1051 0,1301 0.1911
0,2334 0.2972 0.1823 0,2628 0.5153 0.4020 0.4445 0,5289 0.4334 0.3934 0.3255
0.2065 0,2312 0.2042 0.2152 0.2794 0.2645 0.3065 0.4360 0.2974 0.2569 0.2310
0.7811 0,6917 0,7882 0.7527 0.7696 0,8230 0.8406 0.8382 0.8160 0.8166 0.7850
0.0467 0.5026 0.4102 0.5128 0.4860 0.4438 0.3498 0,4842 0.4820 1.2246 1.8823
0,2775 0.2973 0.3041 1.6582 1.0001 1,2399 1.0203 0,8303 0.6651 1.2372 1.0618
0.6318 0.4119 0,2851 0.8037 0.5418 0,0873 ...
0.0250 0,4192 0.2765 0.0241 0.6125 0.5936 0.5497 0.5653 0.2512 0.5494 0.4233
0.1534 0,3223 0.2348 0,2263 0.2708 0,9309 0.7806 0.7294 0.5531 0.3225 0.2441
0.0274 ...
0,6989 0.7050 0,7160 0,7062 0,7121 0.7038 0,6812 0.6625 0.6553 0.6204 0.4690
0.4968 0.5607 0.5890 0,4721 0.4871 0,4313 0.4533 0.7142 0,4070 0.7429 0.6600
0.4348 0,4170 0,2832 0.2405 0,1625 0.2432 0.3352 0.6542 0.6571 0,5076 0.3611
0,5159 0,7208 0,4831 0,3800 0.5898 0,8932 1,2334 0,3243 0.4854 0,4922 0,4554
0.4554 0.1026 0.5087 0.3867 0,6045 0,3169 0.3044 0.6153 0.6177 0,3802 0.6609


















Industry A verage Values for Leverage for 1975-1994
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
7900 0.3309 0.2662 0.3477 0.3358 0.4220 0.3572 0.2864 0,2344 0,1885 0,1331 0,0554 0.0419 0.0269 0.0193 0.0134 0.0091 0,0018
7948 0.9534 0.9895 0.8527 0.7270 0.7181 0.7283 0.6052 0.4212 0.5384 0.4188 0.4015 0,3508 0.3996 0.3761 0.2003 0.3545 0,3588 0.2893 0.2592 0.3127
7990 0.4983 0.4443 0.4338 0.3986 0.4654 0.4299 0,5307 0.5844 0.6199 0.6826 0.6841 0.8792 0.7385 0.7833 0.7908 0.7919 0.7202 0.7124 0.7130 0.6317
7997 0.7647 0.9928
8000 0.4936 0.3541 0.4439 0.2005 0.2641 0.5994 2.2238
8011 0.5662 0,4398 0,4173 0,6186 0.5078 0.4969 0,5153 0,5589 0,5002 0.5000 0.4710 0,7085
8051 0.6716 0.6918 0.7227 0.7538 0.7443 0.7313 0.7368 0.7727 0,6495 0.6461 0,6211 0,5908 0.7136 0,6400 0.7184 0.7479 0.6399 0.5888 0.5857 0.5756
8060 0.5301 0.5434 0.4878 0.5345 0.5060 0.4781 0,4242 0.3721 0,3228 0,3813 0.3791 0.4517 0.5694 0,8093 0.6662 0.8126 0.7043 0.4386 0.4393 0.4409
8062 0.6917 0.6896 0.6431 0.5611 0.5718 0.6297 0.5118 0.4874 0.7356 0.7268 0.7048 0.7946 0.9384 1.0998 1.2805 0,7800 0,6076 0.5400 0,5506 0,5173
8071 0.0181 0 .0 1 3 6 - .-  0.9417 0.7170 0.6212 0.5745 0.5652 0.4227 0.5593 0.5742 0.6969 0.6695 1.3849 1.0295
8082 -.- -.- 0.7581 0.6212 0.6047 0,5312 0.3065 0,6480 0.2727 0,4527 0,4148 0,3724 0.4543 0.4721 0.4402 0,4801 0.3380 0.3475 0,6198 0.4439
8090 -.- -.- -.- -.- -,- -.- 0.6569 0.6400 0.3937 0.4813 0.2171 0.1803 0.2246 0.1978 0.1662 0.1264 0.1778 0.2208
8093 -.- -.- -.- -,- -,- -.- 0,0832 0.1529 0.0110 0.3845 0.2269 0.2982 0.3057 0,3507 0,4343 0.3025 0.3121 0,3462 0,3652 0.4936
8200 0,1873 0.1572 0.2167 0,2267 0.4363 0.5859 0,3715 0.2706 0,1926 0.2864 0.2856 0,4266 0,4571 0.4702 0.5862 1.2383 2.1047 0,3725 0.3391 1.8959
8300 -.- -.- -.- -,- -.- -,- -,- -,- -.- -.- -.- 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,0000 0.5481 0,6756 0.6617 0.7846 0.3148
8700 0,2496 0.2043 0.0841 0,1193 0.1733 0.5725 0.2957 0.2112 0.1316 0.1165 0.1543 0.1095 0,1764 0,1867 0.2371 0.3062 0.2224 0.1409 0,5080 0.4494
8711 0.4248 0 .1976 0.2385 0.2473 0.2777 0.2167 0.2329 0.2276 0,2250 0,2491 0,2815 0.3582 0.4900 0,3766 0,4862 0.3329 0,2628 0,3208 0.3280 0,6643
8731 0.2106 0.3796 0.2426 0.4169 0.4391 0.3806 0.5933 0.5646 0.6927 0.3516 0.2553 0,2635 0,2049 0,1920 0.4421 0.4020 0.5354 0.9079 0.6746 0.7544
8734 -.- -.- -.- -.- -,- -.- -.- -.- -.- 2.0959 0.0676 0.0723 0.2194 0.2928 0.2326 0.2390 0.2880 0.4208
8741 0.1885 0.2905 0.2006 0.2021 0.2217 0.2180 0.1768 0,3343 0.1119 0.1313 0.1989 1.5722 1.4594 0,8152 0.7989 0,3720 3.3616 1.2930 1.1056 5,3324
8742 0,4126 0.3722 0.3788 0,3306 0,3797 0,2232 0,1534 0,3045 0.3531 0.4302 0.6288 0.6245 0,8118 0,7774 0,5606 0,2633 0,2575 0.1516 0,1947 0.1495
8744 -.- -.- -.- 0.8039 0.6020 0.6324 0.1174 0.0803 0,0730 0.9640 0,5009 0.5692 0.7442 0.6808 0.5862 1,0002 0.7723 0.8923 0,6544 1.1450
9995 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.3586 0.5387 0.5973 0.5098 0.6108 0.6297 0,5996 0,6202 0,7025 0.3066 0.5810 0.3340 0.4625 0.0507
MEDN0.3696 0.3545 0.3609 0.3566 0.3582 0.3452 0,3372 0,3431 0.3220 0,3460 0,3721 0,4170 0.4104 0,4382 0,4716 0.4705 0.4581 0.4627 0.4617 0,4494
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Investors’ Pricing of Exchange Rate Risk in 
U.S. Firms that File for Bankruptcy
I. Introduction
There are two diametrically opposed philosophies regarding corporate finan­
cial distress. The first, which I refer to as the armchair philosophy of corpo­
rate bankruptcy, minimizes any influence of exogenous econom ic factors 
and m aintains the fundamental reasons for bu sin ess failures he within the 
firm itself.1 The second philosophy, w hich is more pragmatic, considers the 
condition o f the overall economy to be the primary force behind corporate 
distress and b u sin ess failures?
Focusing first on the armchair philosophy, the following verse exem­
plifies its outlook:
One ship drives east and another drives west 
With the selfsame w inds that blow.
'Tis the set of the sa ils  
And not the gales 
W hich tells u s the way to go?
While there is  som e validity in this philosophy with respect to corporations,
1 Altman (1983), et al.
2Platt and Platt (1994).
W i l c o x .
155
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
it is not necessarily  applicable to all, and perhaps not even m ost, o f the  
firms that file for bankruptcy. U nquestion ing fealty to this philosophy as  
the principal explanation for a firm’s  failure is analogous to suggesting that  
it is an individual’s fault if they develop cancer. Obviously an  individual’s  
actions, either through ignorance or conscious choice — using tobacco 
products, for example — may be responsib le for som e forms of cancer, bu t  
it is illogical to suggest the citizens o f Chernobyl were responsible for the  
num erous ca ses  of cancer that developed following the release of radiation  
from the nearby nuclear power p lan t in  April 1986. Similarly, corporations 
m ay — through ignorance, calculated risk, or perhaps deliberate design —  
expose them selves to financial d istress and, at the extreme, bankruptcy. 
But this perspective does not presen t the com plete picture — it ignores any  
possible influence of exogenous factors.
In essen ce , this concept —  th at responsibility for bankruptcy lies 
primarily w ithin  the firm — su ggests each  firm is an island unto itse lf  
isolated to a  large degree from other firm s w ithin the industry and to a  
lesser degree from the economic environm ent. Thus, when a firm experi­
ences financial distress and su ccu m b s to bankruptcy, the bankruptcy is  
primarily attributable to the firm’s  financial decisions/actions with perhaps 
a limited role played by the storm s of econom ic instability engulfing it.
If the armchair philosophy were valid for industry on a wholesale  
basis we sh ou ld  expect to find certain supporting evidence. Specifically, the  
inference o f th is philosophy is th a t although econom ic conditions change
156
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from year-to-year, since the econom y plays a  lesser role th an  managerial 
actions in  a  firm’s financial stability, or instability as the case m ay be, there 
should not be a  significant difference from year-to-year in  the num ber of 
b u sin ess failures? 5 Given the focus o f this research, we m u st recognize 
the distinction between the more com m on busin ess term ination and the 
less com m on business failure. W hereas b u sin ess formations generally are 
considered a  primary factor in determ ining the number and distribution of 
b u sin ess terminations, this relationship does not necessarily hold for 
b u sin ess failures. For amplification, Table I presents the total num ber of 
b u sin ess formations, terminations, and failures for the years 1990 -  1994.
Table I 
Business Formations, Terminations, an d  Failures 
1990- 1994
Category 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Business Formations 769,000 726,000 737,000 780,000 807,000
Business Terminations 844,000 821,000 819,000 801,000 803,000
Business Failures 60,747 88,140 97,069 86,133 71,520
Sources: The State o f Small Businesses: A  Report fo r  the President, 1994, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1995; B usiness Failure 
Record, 1994, The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Wilton, Connecticut, 
1995.
4Altman (1983), on page 99 states: . . economic conditions, exogenous to the
individual firm, may [emphasis added] contribute to its eventual failure. It should be made 
clear, however, that in almost all cases the fundamental business failure problems lie 
within the firm itself."
5Although Altman’s pejorative use of the word failure  may be common to describe the 
large number of new business formations that survive less than five years. The Dun & 
Bradstreet Corporation employs more precise terminology. Dun & Bradstreet classifies 
most of the business closings as simply “business discontinuances” or terminations. They 
define a “business failure" as consisting of businesses involved in court proceedings or 
voluntary actions that involve losses to creditors.
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Given the generally consistent patterns for b u sin ess formations and  
term inations, if  the economy an d /or  other exogenous variables do not play  
a major role in  corporate distress — from a rudim entary perspective — we 
should expect a  distribution that is approximately uniform over time with  
respect to the number of firms filing for bankruptcy. Although the absence  
of a  uniform  distribution does not implicate the econom y as the guilty party 
causing b u sin ess failures, a  significant variation in  the distribution  
substantially  eliminates random  possibility as a probable explanation for 
the failures. In eliminating the random possibility explanation, we have a 
rebuttal for Altman’s argum ent that the cause for fundamental b u sin ess  
failure problem s lie within the firm itself.
From a  more m eticulous perspective, if th e  armchair philosophy is to 
prevail, there should be supporting empirical evidence. The empirical evi­
dence w e should  expect would be that there is  little to no contagion effect 
m anifest in  a corporate bankruptcy announcem ent. That is, a  bankruptcy  
announcem ent is firm-specific and does not convey industry-wide negative 
information; the bankruptcy of one firm does not resu lt in significantly 
negative abnorm al returns for the other firms w ithin the industry. To the  
contrary, instead of the contagion effect we sh ou ld  consistently find evi­
dence o f  the competitive effect — a positive benefit to other firms within an  
industry w hen a competitor files for bankruptcy. In other words, the bank­
ruptcy of one or more firms m eans there are fewer competitors to satisfy the  
existing level of demand, consequently the rem aining firms should experi­
ence positive abnormal stock price reactions.
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Unfortunately, we do n ot find data that unam biguously  support the  
armchair philosophy. For a  casu a l review of recent experience, Figure 1 is  
a bar chart showing the num ber of business failures, on a monthly basis, 
for the 1 1-year period of 1984 through 1994. The chart conveys the im pres­
sion of a  large variation in the num ber of firms th at file for bankruptcy on  
a year-to-year basis. Using a  general linear m odel to exam ine the data, w e  
find the differences among the years in the average m onthly number o f  
business failures are significant at the .01 level. This cursory review of the  
data dispels the notion of a  uniform distribution o f firms filing for bank­
ruptcy on  an annual basis and strongly hints there m ay be factors other 
than the firm s’ decisions contributing to their bankruptcy. That is, external 
factors, su ch  as economic conditions asserted in the pragmatic philosophy, 
may be playing a larger role in  corporate financial d istress than the arm ­
chair philosophy recognizes.
From the empirical perspective, evidence supporting this isolationist 
perspective of the armchair philosophy is limited to findings of the compet­
itive effect obtained by Lang and Stulz (1992) and Akhigbe and Madura 
(1995). They found the competitive effect phenom enon w as associated only  
with the bankruptcy announcem ents of relatively large firms in  concentrat­
ed industries. The data su ggest these competitive effects are restricted to 
oligopolistic industries because a subsequent stu d y  by Kim and Papaian- 
aou (1994) that included sm aller firms obtained contradictory results; they  
did not substantiate the competitive effects found by Lang and Stulz or 
Akhigbe and Madura.
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Figure 1. Business Features for the years 1964-1994. Chart created from  data provided by The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Wilton, 





While there is limited empirical evidence of the competitive effect that 
supports the isolationist philosophy, there is other research that under­
m ines its primary tenets. Specifically, there are the results of B em anke’s
(1983) stu dy  finding contagion effects in  the banking industry, and the 
evidence of contagion effects in  industrial firms documented by Lang and 
Stulz (1992), Kim and Papaianaou (1994), and Akhigbe and Madura (1995).
Accordingly, the evidence implies that: 1) firms within an industry, 
from the investors’ perspective, are not entirely autonom ous and isolated  
from one another — there m ay be influences that are pervasive and indus­
try-wide rather than sim ply firm-specific, and 2) economic conditions may 
contribute more to a firm’s financial instability than the armchair theory 
concedes. Thus, the pragmatic philosophy that credits the economy as the 
primary force behind corporate distress em erges as the dom inant theory.
Given the role the economy appears to play in corporate financial 
distress, we should question w hy the research has focused more on firms’ 
internal financial data vice the broader m acroeconom ic factors. Perhaps the 
complexities of the economic issu es facing industrial firms is one of the 
reasons there has been limited research into this facet of corporate finance.
Considering the intricacy of the issu e, the first task is to identify the 
econom ic factor(s) that m ay play a role in corporate bankruptcy. Bartov and 
Bodnar (1994) postulate that the exchange rate is one of the m ost impor­
tant prices in the economy? Obviously, for firms engaged in international
Martov and Bodnar, 1994, p. 1758.
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trade, the exchange rate is of vital importance, b u t is the exchange rate 
relevant to dom estic firms? That is, we m ust question its relevance to 
domestic firm s particularly in  light of the corporate bankruptcy issu e.
For clarification, w e can classify firms into several categories to 
indicate their potential for exposure to foreign exchange m ovem ents. At one 
extreme is a  m ultinational firm — the Coca-Cola Company, for exam ple — 
with operations in foreign countries and deriving a portion of its revenue 
(typically 10%, or more Rivera (1991)) from these operations. Other firms 
with obvious foreign exchange exposure would be  importers/exporters; an  
importer of European w ines and liquors, for example. Another group of 
firms with presum able exposure to foreign exchange movements is m anu­
facturers for whom: 1) the raw m aterials/supplies are purchased directly 
from foreign sources, 2) up-line vendors procure their m aterials from 
foreign sources, or 3) the quoted price for the m aterials are denom inated in  
a foreign currency. The final category is the purely domestic firms — no 
foreign operations nor su p p lies/raw  materials denominated in a  foreign 
currency.
Exam ining the relationship between exchange rates and corporate 
bankruptcy is  important b ecause we traditionally consider these as two 
disparate topics. A common view is bankruptcy is primarily associated with 
domestic firms, because dom estic firms do not have the benefit of the pre­
sumed stability offered by the broader geographical markets of international 
trade. Although the lack o f international markets contributes to dom estic
162
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firm s’ financial instability, a s  a  counterbalance they ostensibly avoid expo­
sure to exchange rate risk. Arguably, to take the analysis one step  further, 
exchange rates should b e  o f limited concern to dom estic firms. Therefore, 
if econom ic conditions p lay a  role in corporate bankruptcy, and the 
exchange rate is one of th e  m ost important prices in the economy, how do 
w e bridge the chasm  isolating corporate bankruptcy from exchange rates?
Adler and Dum as (1984) provide the insight into this area that we 
desire. They argue that m o st firms, evenly purely domestic ones, are 
exposed to exchange rate risk. Other researchers supporting this position  
include: Levich and Wihlborg (1980),7 Jorion (1990, 1991), and Bodnar and  
Gentry (1993). Furthermore, Hodder (1982) developed a theoretical, m ath­
em atical m odel to m easure exposure to exchange rate m ovem ents. His 
resu lts suggest . purely dom estic firms (no foreign assets or liabilities) 
w ill typically be exposed” to exchange rate movements?
According to this rationale, a firm need not be a m ultinational or 
involved in the im port/export busin ess to be exposed to exchange rate risk. 
A Colorado ski resort, a  purely domestic firm, could experience reduced  
revenue during periods o f a  strong dollar because U.S. sk iers find it 
relatively inexpensive to take their skiing vacations in Europe. Conversely, 
European skiers may decide to forgo a U.S. sk i vacation as too expensive  
b ecau se  of the strong dollar. This line of reasoning suggests the exchange
7Levich and Wihlborg (1980), pp. 31-32.
8Hodder (1992), p. 375.
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rate m ay be an  important econom ic issu e  for domestic firms —  particularly 
those experiencing financial distress.
It is this thought process that renders the hypothesis related to the 
exchange rate and corporate bankruptcy we will be testing. We examine 
whether the exchange rate is one of the m ost important prices in the 
econom y particularly for th a t segm ent of firms on the brink of financial 
distress. Specifically, we investigate whether investors place a  value on 
perceived foreign exchange risk for firms on the road to bankruptcy.
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II. Background
This section of the paper presents a review of the salient literature in  two 
specific areas. The first area is  the research that advances the theory that 
the econom y is a major influence on b u sin ess cycles /b u siness failures and  
lays the foundation for the selection of a  m acroeconomic variable as a proxy 
for the b u sin ess cycle that we u se  in our em pirical model. The second area  
discu sses the relevance of exchange rates and their influence vis a  vis the  
stock returns of firms on  the brink of financial distress.
a. The Influence of the Econom y on B usiness C ycles/B usiness Failures
Virtually all countries experience recurrent fluctuations in business activity 
that persist for periods of several quarters to several years. Given the w ide­
spread actuality of these fluctuations, occasionally referred to as the  
b u sin ess cycle phenomena? it is not surprising there is interest in the  
relationship between the econom y and b u sin ess  cycles/business failures.
Before delving into a review of th e  influence of the economy on  
b u sin ess cycles /bu siness failures, we first should have a common under­
standing of the term “b u sin ess cycles.” The definition of a busin ess cycle as 
used  by the National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER), the nonprofit
9Prescott (1986), p. 10.
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membership corporation responsible for dating b u sin ess cycles, is attrib­
uted to Wesley Clair M itchell circa 1927. According to the NBER:
B usiness cycles are a type of fluctuation found in  the aggregate 
economic activity of nations that organize their work m a in ly  in  
b u sin ess enterprises: a  cycle consists of expansions occurring 
at about the sam e tim e in  m any economic activities, followed 
by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals 
which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; the  
sequence of changes is  recurrent but not periodic; in duration  
bu sin ess cycles vary from more than one year to ten  or twelve 
years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of sim ilar 
character w ith am plitudes approximating their ow n .10
Given that a recession  is further defined as a “peak-to-trough” m ove­
m ent in economic activity, the NBER reports the United States has exper­
ienced 30  recessions since the middle of the nineteenth century, w ith nine 
of these recessions occurring sin ce the end of World War II. Appendix A 
presents the NBER B usiness-C ycle Chronology for the United States.
Although we can  clearly identify the peaks and troughs of the b u si­
n ess cycle ex post, it  is m uch  more difficult to a ssess  the current state of 
the economy. Notw ithstanding the difficulties, there are several m acroeco­
nom ic variables frequently u sed  to gauge the condition of the econom y. For 
example, the Federal Reserve looks at, among other factors, real gross 
dom estic product (GDP) growth, consum er prices, M2 growth, and the job­
less rate11 to gauge the state of the economy and then  u ses m onetary  
policy to either stim ulate or stifle the economy’s growth. Other com m only  
used variables are d iscu ssed  by Hardouvelis (1988), who, after exam ining
10Wynne and Blake (1993), p. 3.
llWessel (1995), p. A2.
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the exchange rate and interest rate responses to news-related 15 m acroeco­
nom ic variables,12 concludes that stock m arkets respond not only to m one­
tary new s, b u t also to news about the trade deficit, dom estic inflation, and 
variables that reflect the state of the b u sin ess cycle.
Given the frequency with which recession s occur coupled w ith  the  
significance of b u sin ess failures, one would expect to find an abundance of 
research exam ining the relationship betw een b u sin ess  cycles and b u sin ess  
failures, b u t that is not the case. Surprisingly, an  examination o f the 
Am erican Econom ic Association’s Journal o f  Economic Literature and  the  
Index o f  Economic Articles in Journals a n d  Collective Volumes for the years 
1 9 6 9 -1 9 9 6  produced only two articles related to the specific venue o f  b u si­
n e ss  cycles and b u sin ess failures: W illiam son (1987) and Platt and Platt 
(1994).
The focus of Williamson’s research w as to construct an equilibrium  
m odel o f real b u sin ess cycles with financial interm ediation as an essen tia l 
factor playing a role in  the business cycle. A lthough he concluded h is m odel 
m im ics com m ovem ents in business failures, real output, and m oney am ong  
other factors, h is exposition w as essentially a  m athem atical treatise spot­
lighting the im portance of financial interm ediation rather than investigating  
m acroeconom ic variables linked to b u sin ess failures.
12Four monetary series (Ml, bank reserves. Fed discount rate, and surcharge rates), 
two inflation series (consumer and producer price indices), the trade deficit, and eight 
other macroeconomic variables (unemployment rate, industrial production index, personal 
income, orders of durable goods, the index of leading indicators, retail sales, consumer 
credit, and housing starts).
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Platt and Platt, studying b u sin ess failures on a state-by-state basis, 
found significant differences in  the cau ses of bu sin ess failure across the 48  
states. Segregating the sta tes into four subgroups — northern industrial­
ized sta tes, farm states, rural/o il producing states, and less  industrialized 
states —  they found w ithin each subgroup com m on factors were significant 
determ inants of corporate failure rates. The factors were: econom ic condi­
tions, b u sin ess  costs, and, to a  lesser degree, new b u sin ess formations. 
They concluded the overall condition of the economy is the predominate 
force driving corporate d istress and the aggregate business failure rate.
S in ce  economic conditions play a  major role in corporate financial 
distress, for th is research we desire a macroeconom ic variable that: 1) may 
be used  as a  proxy for the b u sin ess cycle, 2) the data are reported on a 
m onthly basis,13 and 3) is not correlated w ith the exchange rate move­
m ents. From Hardouvelis’ (1988) research we find that neither interest 
rates nor major foreign currencies respond to changes in  the Industrial 
Production index. Additionally, the m onthly data for this index is available 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED® (Federal Reserve Eco­
nomic Data) database.14 Accordingly, we u se  the Industrial Production 
Index as the proxy for th e  state of the U.S. business cycle. Figure 2 is a
13We require monthly data because the data for business failures and exchange rate 
movements are reported on a monthly basis. The requirement for monthly data ruled out 
the possibility of using the Gross Domestic Product as a variable in our model.
l4The internet address for FRED® is: www.stls.frb.org\fred. To judge whether the 
Industrial Production Index is a good proxy for the business cycle, we compare it with the 
U.S. Real Gross Domestic Product (1992 dollars) for the period Q1 1967 -  Q4 1996. The 
coefficient of correlation for the two variables was 0.99359.
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F igure  2. Industrial Product ion Index. Graph generated from data  downloaded from St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, FRED.
graph of the Industrial Production index created from data downloaded 
from FRED?
Using Platt and Platt's (1994) resu lts that established the importance 
o f the econom y relative to business failures and having selected a macro- 
economic variable to u se  as a proxy for the overall economy, w e now  focus 
our attention to the relationship betw een exchange rates and the stock  
returns of firm s that file for bankruptcy.
b. The R elevance o f Exchange R ates to the Stock Returns o f Firm s that 
file for Bankruptcy
Why, to question  Bartov and Bodnar’s  suggestion, is the exchange rate one 
of the m ost im portant prices in the economy? From a simplistic perspective, 
widely fluctuating exchange rates affect not only profits and losses from 
changes in  foreign currency values bu t also the ability to sell abroad, to 
m eet import competition, and compete with substitute goods/services avail­
able in foreign countries. Therefore, the exchange rate, as Adler and Dumas
(1984) and Jorion (1991) assert, can  potentially affect all firm s — even 
purely dom estic firms — that m u st compete against not only im ports but 
also alternatives to domestic products/services available in  foreign 
countries.
The key phrase of the explanation above is “widely fluctuating  
exchange rates.” Fluctuating exchange rates were not a problem in  the U.S. 
prior to 1973 b ecau se  the dollar, as were the major foreign currencies, was
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tied to the gold standard. Before World War I, the U .S. dollar was convert­
ible into gold a t a  rate of $ 2 0 .6 7  per ounce of gold, b u t during the w ar and  
the early 1920s currencies were allowed to fluctuate. Although there were 
attem pts to return to the gold standard following th e  war, m ost trading  
nations abandoned the gold standard in  1931 following the collapse o f the  
A ustrian banking system. The U.S. returned to a modified gold standard in  
1934 with the dollar devalued to $35  per ounce of gold. This rate held until 
1971 w hen  the dollar cam e under intense pressure because of a record- 
high deficit in  the balance of paym ents, causing th e  U.S. to su sp en d  
purchases and sales of gold by the U.S. Treasury.
By the end of 1971 m ost of the major trading currencies had appre­
ciated relative to the dollar —  in effect a  devaluation o f the dollar — w hich  
led to a  formal devaluation o f the dollar to $38 per ou n ce of gold in D ecem ­
ber 1971 by the U.S. Continuing deficits in the U.S. balance of paym ents 
further w eakened the dollar and it w as devalued a  second  time to $ 4 2 .2 2  
per ounce in  February 1973. Since it w as apparent a fixed-rate system  w as 
no longer practical, m ost currencies were allowed to float to levels deter­
m ined by m arket forces. A lthough gold w as not officially demonetized as a  
reserve a sse t and floating exchange rates were not formally sanctioned until 
1976, the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates in 1973 created  
an  environm ent that allows the wide fluctuations in  the exchange rates 
w hich su sta in s Bartov and Bodnar’s contention the exchange rate is  now  
one of the m ost important prices in the economy.
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It is  therefore not surprising that since March 1973 exchange rates 
have becom e more volatile and less predictable than under the system  of 
fixed exchange rates. Figure 3, on the following page, graphically show s 
how the exchange value of the dollar has fluctuated during the years of 
1967 through 1994 when compared with a weighted average of the curren­
cies of ten  foreign industrial countries.15
Given the potential significance of exchange rate movements vis-a-vis 
stock returns, we would expect to find an abundance o f literature d iscu ss­
ing these m ovem ents and their affect upon: 1) the stock  market in general, 
and 2) financially distressed firms in particular. To th e  contrary, as prev­
iously noted, there has been scant attention given to the role economic 
factors in  general, and exchange rates in specific, m ay be playing in stock  
price performance.
The majority of the research associated with changes in the exchange 
rate has b een  related to the exposure of multinational corporations an d /or  
the effectiveness of their hedging strategies. In those instances where it is 
inferred th a t the exchange rate m ay affect domestic firm s, the discussion  
usually is presented in oblique term s that do not m ake it sufficiently 
obvious th a t multinational corporations are not the only ones affected. For 
example, “The declining dollar forces som e foreign com panies exporting 
goods to the U.S. to raise prices in order to get enough o f the now-cheaper
15 The ten foreign currencies are Belgium, Canada. France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
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Figure 3. Weighted Average Exchange Value o f the Dollar in % (percent).
dollars to cover their cost and profit requirements at hom e.”16 W hereas the  
more expensive imports should have a  positive effect for dom estic firms as 
well as m ultinational corporations, the cited article focused exclusively  
upon the m ultinational firms and did not address potential problems con­
fronting dom estic firms.
Although there has been som e empirical research into the relation­
ship between exchange rate m ovem ents and security returns, it is circum ­
scribed in  volum e and diversity. The recent research into this relationship  
by Jorion (1991), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), Bartov and Bodnar (1994), 
and Dumas and Solnik (1995) are representative of the literature.
Jorion, u sin g  the arbitrage pricing theory introduced by Ross (1976), 
tested w hether investors im pute a premium for exchange rate risk in  the  
U.S. stock m arket. Testing this hypothesized relationship with a two-factor 
model and a  six-factor model, Jorion w as unable to find evidence of a 
correlation betw een expected returns and exchange rate risk. Accordingly, 
he concluded U.S. investors do not appear to price foreign exchange risk.
Bodnar and Gentry, u sin g  the ten-year period of January 1979  
through Decem ber 1988 (September 1983 -  December 1988 for Japan), 
created industry portfolio returns for Canada, Japan, and the United States  
to examine industry-level exchange rate exposure. They found evidence of 
significant exposure for som e industries in each of the countries, bu t the
l6“How Dollar’s Plunge Aids Some Companies, Does Little for Others," The Wall Street 
Journal, October 22, 1990, pp. A1 and A4.
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sam e industries were not priced in every country. Furthermore, although 
exchange rate changes help to explain industry-specific returns in  all three 
countries, they also found that many individual industries do not have 
significant exchange rate exposure. They conclude the exchange rate is 
important for explaining industry returns a t the economy-wide level.
Bartov and  Bodnar looked at a sam ple of U.S. firms from 1978 to 
1989 that consistently  had large foreign currency adjustm ents. They found 
that contem poraneous changes in the dollar were of lim ited value in 
explaining abnorm al stock  returns, but there w as a significantly negative 
relationship betw een the lagged change in the dollar and abnorm al stock 
returns. They reason  that the inability to find a significant relationship for 
contem poraneous exchange rate changes m ay be due to including: firms in 
the sam ple with limited linkages to international conditions, or firms with 
exposure of opposite signs. In essence, failure to appropriately filter and 
properly classify the firms m ayb e responsible for these inconclusive results 
related to contem poraneous exchange rate changes. Of particular interest 
is Bartov and Bodnar’s  interpretation of their results that investors do not 
u se  all available information, specifically p a st changes in the exchange rate 
and the past relation between exchange rate changes and firm performance, 
to predict changes in firm value. Moreover, they find significant evidence 
that analyst do n ot fully u se  the information in past changes in  the dollar 
w hen estim ating a  firm’s earnings.
Dum as and Solnik, broadening the horizon of the investigation into 
the pricing of exchange rate risk, examine four countries — Germany, the
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United Kingdom, Japan , and the United States — usin g  a conditional, 
intertemporal APM (asset pricing model). Their selection  of a  conditional 
model is based upon the argum ent that ignoring conditioning information 
that is available to th e  investor — su ch  as interest rates and equity prices 
— introduces defects into the model; moreover, for logical consistency, a 
conditional construct requires the intertemporal specification. They 
conclude foreign exchange risks premia are a significant component of 
securities rates of returns in the international financial market. For 
comparison purposes, in addition to the conditional, intertemporal model, 
Dum as and Solnik te s t  the unconditional versions of international APM and 
classic APM; they are unable to reject the hypothesis that exchange rate 
risk is not priced in  the international APM, which, they say, is consistent 
with the inconclusive resu lts of earlier tests of unconditional APM.
In summary, the results of this research have been mixed with 
respect to the sensitivity of equity returns to exchange rate changes. A 
couple of explanations are; 1) as Bartov and Bodnar suggest, we have not 
properly classified and filtered the sam ple, or instead of contemporaneous 
changes a lagged approach is more appropriate; or, 2) as D um as and Solnik 
argue, researchers have been using unconditional m odels instead of condi­
tional models. W hereas Dum as and Solnik obtained significant results 
using the conditional, intertemporal model, their argum ent for using the 
conditional model disregards Bartov and Bodnar’s findings that investors 
and analysts do not u se  all available information. Consequently, while
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recognizing a  conditional m odel may be of value for exam ining the influence 
of exchange rate changes in  the international environm ent, there are weak­
nesses, acknowledged by D um as and Solnik, inherent in  their formulation 
that renders its applicability to be of questionable value for the research at 
hand.
The results of th is extant research notw ithstanding, the question  
remains: are domestic firms exposed to exchange rate risk? This research 
investigates this question by focusing on firms that file for bankruptcy. The 
logic for th is choice is that limiting the sam ple to firms announcing their 
bankruptcy results in a concentration of dom estic firms b ecause bank­
ruptcy is m ore commonly associated with dom estic firms than multination­
als. Furthermore, it is likely that financially weakened firms — that is, 
firms that subsequently file for bankruptcy — m ay be more susceptible to 
economic shocks than their stronger competitors. It follows that, if there is 
a group of dom estic firms more sensitive to exchange rate movements, we 
theorize it would be the financially infirm.
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III. Data
The sample included in  th is study is lim ited to firms making bankruptcy  
announcem ents during the years 1975 through 1994. The initial sam ple of 
announcing firms w as obtained from th e  1995 COMPUSTAT® II Industrial 
Annual Research File17 and the Wall S tree t Journal Index. This produced  
the preliminary sam ple o f 241 firms for which we had a verified an n oun ce­
m ent date. Validating th is list of firms u sin g  the CRSP® Tapes to ensure  
sufficient return data were available reduced the sample to 2 3 2  firms in 
119 different industries according to their 4-digit SIC code. We did not 
attempt to balance the num ber of firm s am ong the respective industry  
classifications because this research is not focused on the relative sensitiv­
ity of specific industries to changes in the foreign exchange rate, b u t only 
the sensitivity of the firms that are characterized by the category o f “finan­
cially weakened’.’ This listing of 232 firm s that constitute the sam ple is 
provided in Appendix B.
The data used  to com pute the relative change in the exchange rate 
of the U.S. dollar were obtained from the “Weighted Average Exchange  
Value of the Dollar" com piled by the Board of Governors of th e  Federal
l7Acode of “02” in Footnote Slot No. 35 indicates bankruptcy as the reason a firm was 
deleted from the file.
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Reserve System . This Federal Reserve index, w here March 1973 = 100, is 
a weighted average of the U.S. dollar against currencies of ten  foreign 
industrial countries (Belgium franc, British pound, Canadian dollar, Dutch  
guilder, French franc, German mark, Italian lira, Japanese yen, Sw iss 
franc, and Sw edish  krona). The weights are based  on the 1972-1976  
average world trade o f each country compared to the total of all ten  
countries.
The data u sed  to com pute the relative changes in the Industrial 
Production Index were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ 
economic database. Although the data set for the Industrial Production 
Index begins w ith  January 1946, we deleted the data prior to January  
1967. We deleted the data from the earlier years for two reasons: 1) to 
m aintain consistency w ith the data for the weighted average exchange value 
of the dollar, and  2 ) the earlier years were not relevant for our sam ple of 
financially w eak firms that span the period of 1975 -  1994.
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IV. M odel a n d  V a ria b le  Definitions
As d iscu ssed  in the literature review, current research presents various 
m odels for analyzing investors’ pricing of exchange rate m ovem ents and 
argum ents supporting their use. D um as and Solnik (1995) assert that 
disregarding conditioning information available to the investors results in 
a defective model; their premise dictates the use  of a conditional model 
which also requires an intertemporal model. Their argument for u se  of this 
construct ignores the findings of Bartov and Bodnar (1994) w ho conclude 
that neither investors nor analysts use  all freely available information. 
Additionally, Bartov and Bodnar, as a result of their results suggest, a 
lagged relationship between changes in  the foreign exchange rate and 
changes in  firm performance is more relevant than a contem poraneous one. 
Consequently, in light of the results of Bartov and Bodnar, we consider an 
unconditional model with a lagged specification better su ited  for the 
research at hand.
Starting with the basic model used  by Bartov and Bodnar, we 
augm ent it with variables to capture any abnormal returns related to the 
b u sin ess cycle and investors’ stock buying/selling to realize g a in s /lo sses  
for tax advantage purposes during the period surrounding th e  calendar 
year end. The formulation of this augm ented model is:
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TARl t  = p 0 + P,AFXmx. mx+1 + P2AIPmx-mx+l +  P3DEClt  + p 4JANtT + etT (1) 
where:
TARlt = Total Abnormal Return for firm i during tim e period T  com­
puted using equation (2 ) (period T is  a calendar month);
AFXmx_mx+l = the relative change in  the weighted average exchange value 
index from m onth m* to m,,, {AFXmx_mx+i = [(FXm̂ f FX mx)/FXmJ  
Note: neither m* nor mx+i are necessarily included in  period T); 
AIPm^m^i = the relative change in  the industrial production index from 
m onth m^to ^  {AIPmx_mx+l = [[IPmx+rIPmx)/IPmx] again, neither 
n r nor mx+1 are necessarily  included in period T};
JANlt _ dum m y variables to capture abnormal returns associated  with
DEClt
the m onths of January and December (JANtT = 1 if tim e period 
T is January, 0  otherwise, and DECLT = 1 if time period T is 
December, 0 otherwise);
P0, . . .,P4 = intercept and slope coefficients estim ated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS); 
eLT = the error term for firm i during time period T.
TARlt = n  (I + A R td)td.=da
-  1 for [[da,  dz] e  T) (2)
' 10 0,, 
where:
AR Ld = the abnormal return for firm i on day d  com puted using  
equation (3).
AR-td = &id ~ &id (3)
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where:
Rid = the realized rate of return for security i, or firm i, on  event day 
d (data obtained from CRSP);
Rtd = the estim ated rate of return for security i on  event day d 
computed u sing  equation (4).
Rld = &l + PiRm.d (4)
where:
R^d = the m arket rate of return for the CRSP equally w eighted index 
on event day <±,
a 0 Pf = the intercept and slope coefficients, respectively, computed 
using the m arket model given in  equation (5).
Rid = oq + i - 1 , 2  N.  (5)
where:
Bid = the error term  for security i on event day d  (the OLS residual). 
The coefficients of interest for th is research are P j, P 2. P 3. and P 4 from 
equation (1). If the relationship between changes in the exchange rate and 
a stock’s  returns is as w e hypothesize, p , should be negative. That is, a 
strengthen of the dollar should resu lt in decreased returns for domestic 
firms. (Obviously, a strong dollar w ould be more beneficial, corresponding 
to a  positive relationship, for firms that rely more heavily upon  imported 
goods rather than exports, while a  strong dollar would have a m ore adverse 
im pact upon firms dependent upon exporting products. N onetheless, given
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the focus of this research is primarily domestic firms [that is, firms making 
bankruptcy announcem ents], these firms collectively should  have a lower 
degree of im port/export influence with respect to their factors of produc­
tion. Accordingly, we anticipate the negative relationship between the 
exchange rate and th e  stocks’ returns.) Conversely, if there is a  relationship 
between the econom y (for which the industrial production index is the 
proxy) and our stock s’ returns, p2 should be positive — as the economy 
improves, relative to the previous month, there should be a positive change 
in the stocks’ returns.
Similar to (3 lt we expect a negative coefficient for (33. That is, if there 
is selling of the stock  in December for tax purposes, w h en  the variable is 
coded as “1” we would expect the selling action to exert a downward 
pressure on the stock  price producing a negative return. A corresponding 
argument holds for (34, but in this instance we would expect a positive 
coefficient. Here, buying the stock in January, when the variable is as “1,” 
should apply an upward pressure on the price of the stock yielding a 
positive return.
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V. E m pirical Results
Using the methodology defined by equation (2) to com pute a  series of 49 
monthly abnormal returns — the announcem ent m onth and the preceding 
48 months — for each of the 232  firms, produced a sam ple of 9,314 obser­
vations!8 Using these abnorm al returns in equation (1), we tested for a 
significance in the changes of the foreign exchange rate and industrial 
production index, and the presence of December and January effects.
Consistent with the results of earlier research that used uncon­
ditional models to test the data, we did not find any evidence, for either the 
full 49-month period or any one-year subperiods, of the stock market 
returns exhibiting sensitivity to changes in the foreign exchange rate. These 
results were comparable throughout the analyses that included numerous 
combinations of contem poraneous and lagged changes for the foreign 
exchange rates and industrial production indexes. This lack of significant 
results, to undermine the suggestion of Bartov and Bodnar for using a lag 
operator, was persistent for lagged changes as well as contemporaneous 
changes in the exchange rate.
18For some of the firms, there were insufficient data to compute the abnormal returns 
for all 49 months. Consequently, the resulting sample is less than the possible maximum 
of 11,368 observations (i.e., 232 x 49 = 11,368).
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Although w e frequently obtained significant coefficients for the  
industrial production index, the results were erratic — b oth  positive and  
negative coefficients — and they varied to the extent it w as n ot possible to 
identify w hether a contem poraneous or lagged change in th e  Index was a  
more consistently relevant variable. We obtained similarly erratic results for 
the December effect variable, but they were not consisten tly  significant. 
Finally, we did not find any indication o f a  January effect for this sample.
These erratic resu lts bolster Bartov and Bodnar’s argum ent for c lass­
ifying and filtering the sam ple. In filtering the sample we sh ou ld  note one 
of the primary characteristics of exchange rates since March 1973, specifi­
cally their tendency toward volatility. This volatility su ggests sim ply using  
a lag operator m ay be insufficient to detect the relationship betw een stock  
returns and exchange rate movements. The implication related to using a  
lag is the m arket has a delayed reaction to changes in  the exchange rate. 
This delayed effect m ay be troublesome during periods of vacillatory move­
ments in the exchange rates — changing from an appreciation to a depre­
ciation of the dollar, or vice versa — particularly if the m arket returns are 
a factor of a  com bination of the contemporaneous change a n d /o r  two or 
more lags of the exchange rate. That is —  regardless of the tim e chosen — 
during periods of vacillation in exchange rates, before the m arket is able to 
digest and react to one specific change, the exchange rates reverse in the 
following month(s). This reversal may offset, or even outweigh, the previous 
m onths’ change. Thus, if the exchange rates are vacillating w ith no clear
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trend, we should  not be surprised if there are no consistent reactions from 
the stock  m arket related to changes in  the exchange rate.
As a  consequence of this volatility an d /or  want of a  clear pattern, it 
is only w h en  there is a  deviation from a vacillatory m ovem ents that we 
might expect to observe a significant reaction in the stock m arket arising 
from changes in the foreign exchange rate. Therefore, previous research’s 
combining periods of vacillation in the exchange rate with the periods of 
more pronounced trends, and not refining their sam ples to segregate the 
data corresponding to the respective patterns, may have contributed to the 
failure to identify significant relationships between stock m arket returns 
and the foreign exchange rates. Accordingly, we consider it essential to 
refine the sam ple to purge the periods o f vacillatory m ovem ents that only 
serve to obscure any relationships that m ay hold for the firm s’ abnormal 
returns and the exchange rate.
To isolate periods of vacillation from definitive trends in  the foreign 
exchange rates, we created a subset of the data. The qualification criterion 
for inclusion in this subset, we refer to as Condition I,19 is the m athem at­
ical sign, either positive or negative, o f the change of the exchange rate for 
the current m onth (m = T) and the two immediately preceding m onths (m-1 
and m-2) m u st be the same. This refined sample, 3 ,586  observations,
19The Boolean algebraic expression for this condition is:
[AFXm < 0 and AFXm.t < 0 and AFX^^ < 0) 
or
[AFXm > 0 and AFXm.I > 0 and AFXm.2 > 0).
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included only those data that represented a three-m onth trend of either 
appreciating or depreciating exchange rates.
Again, using various com binations of contem poraneous and lagged 
changes in the foreign exchange rate and industrial production indexes to 
examine this data produced improved, but inconsisten t results. For the  
overall period of 49 m onths we found the relationship between exchange 
rates and the abnormal returns w as not significant (the lowest significant 
level was .19). Furthermore, w hen we examined the one-year subperiods 
within this 49 m onth span of time, the results were erratic. That is, we 
obtained a similar relationship for years two and four (m onths 13-24 and  
37-48 , respectively) before the bankruptcy announcem ent (lowest signifi­
cant levels were .17 and .20, respectively), but not years one and three 
(months 1-12 and 25 -3 6 , respectively). Interestingly, th is refinement of the  
sam ple attenuated som e, but not all, of the erratic resu lts for the industrial 
production index. There were no improvements for either the December or 
January effect variables.
These results suggest a  sim ple three-month period m ay not be suffi­
cient to describe a trend in the m ovem ent of exchange rates for the purpose 
of eliciting a reaction from the stock  market. There are a  couple of m ethods 
for ensuring a trend has more definition. One obvious method is to 
lengthen the period of time the trend m u st persist to qualify for inclusion  
in the sample. The second m ethod is to require the overall magnitude of the  
change during the trend to meet, or exceed, a specified threshold.
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Exam ining the former m ethod, we extended the length of the period 
for defining the trend to four m onths. Although there w as a substantial 
reduction in the sam ple size, down to 2 ,255  observations from 3,586, there 
were no discernible changes in the results (the coefficient for AFX w as  
significant at the . 18 level). Another increase in the length o f the period to 
qualify for a trend from four to five m onths resulted in a further reduction  
in the sample size, 1,873 observations, bu t this time the reduced sam ple  
w as accom panied by a  deterioration in the results (the coefficient for AFX 
w as significant at the .44 level). It is possible the retrogression in the  
results may solely  be attributable to the smaller sam ple size; a  factor w e  
could not rem edy given our original sam ple. Mindful of this possible limit­
ation, we cautiously  conclude that lengthening the period to qualify for a  
trend beyond three m onths does n ot appreciably improve the results.
Moving to the second method to ensure a given su b set of data m eets 
the definition for a trend, we added the following criterion for the data to 
qualify for the sam ple: the exchange rates had to change by more than five 
percent over the three month period preceding the m onth in  question?0 We 
refer to this criterion a Condition II. Satisfying this condition eliminates any  
periods of m inu scu le  changes in the exchange rate. That is, applying this 
criterion sharpens the focus to those periods where any changes in the
20The qualifying condition is: 
when AFXn < 0,
(1 + AFX^Kl + AFX^Kl + A F ^ J  < .95.
or, when AFXn > 0,
(1 + AFXm.,Hl + AEX^aKl + AFXm.J > 1.05.
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exchange rate are more definitive, and perhaps the changes are sufficient 
to induce a reaction from the stock  market.
Applying Conditions I and II to the sam ple resu lted  in improved 
results for the changes in the foreign exchange rate and industrial produc­
tion index, b u t no improvement for either December or January. The best 
results for the industrial production index were obtained u sing  a  lag of two 
months relative to the market returns. Although we consisten tly  obtained 
significant resu lts for the foreign exchange rate, they were unpredictable. 
That is, occasionally  the best m odel for the data w as a contemporaneous 
change in the foreign exchange rate, b u t more frequently the b est model 
used a lag of either one, two, or three months.
Given th e  overall results o f a  significant relationship betw een the 
changes in th e  foreign exchange rate and the m arket returns, but the 
unpredictability associated with the choice of a particular lag suggests we 
need to com bine the individual influences attributable to the one, two, and 
three m onth lags. We accomplish th is by calculating the average change in 
the foreign exchange over the three m onth period.
Modifying the original model, equation (1), by: 1) dropping the vari­
ables for D ecem ber and January, 2) u sing  a two m onth lag for the change 
in the industrial production index, and 3) using the average value of one, 
two, and three m onths lags for changes in the foreign index rendered the 
model given below  page (where m  = T):
TARlt = (3 o + P lAFX((m.I + m_2 + m-31/31 +  P 2 ^ ^ m - 2  +  S CT
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This m odel generated the results presented in Table II. As shown in 
the table, the changes in  the foreign exchange rate were significant for the 
full sam ple of 49  m onths as well as the third and fourth years preceding 
the bankruptcy announcem ent. Although changes in  the industrial produc­
tion index were not significant for the full sample, they were for the two 
subperiods of the third and fourth years preceding the announcement. 
Interestingly, neither variable was significant in the first and second years 
immediately preceding the announcement. This pattern suggests that as 
the potential for bankruptcy becomes more certain, the significance of that 
event dom inates the other factors in the economy, particularly with respect 
to changes in the foreign exchange rate and industrial production index.
Table II 
Results for the  Full Sam ple 
a n d  Four, One-Year Subperiods 
(Sam ple Filtered with Conditions I a n d  II)
Sample
+ m_2 +
Period Months Size Estimate Prob>|T! Estimate Prob>|Tl Adi. RJ
Full S am p le •00’ -  -48- 2484 -10.661012 0 .0015 0 .0 6 7 8 8 3 0 .9936 0.0032
Ist y ear before 
an n o u n cem en t
•QV- -12- 563 -4.831555 0.2243 -8 .497777 0 .4328 -0 .0001
2nd y ea r before 
an n o u n cem en t
•13 ' - -24 ' 664 -6.859194 0 .1773 -4 .591616 0 .7592 -0.0001
3rd year before 
an n o u n cem en t
•25' -  -36’ 645 -23.816557 0 .0242 4 4 .3 8 2 5 6 6 0 .0864 0.0088
4th y ea r before 
an n o u n cem en t
•37‘ -  -48- 575 -12.556356 0 .0592 2 2 .8 9 0 1 5 7 0 .0896 0.0080
Subdividing the sam ple into periods of less than  12 m onths did not 
generate any results that were significant at traditionally acceptable levels. 
We attribute this lack of significance for the shorter periods to smaller
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sample sizes th at ranged from 39  observations for one m onth to 2 7 4  for a 
six  month period.
While th ese  results are fax from conclusive, they present a  different 
perspective on  the relationship betw een stock market returns and changes 
in the foreign exchange rate. Perhaps the m ost striking feature of these 
results is the significance of the foreign exchange rate in the third and 
fourth years preceding the bankruptcy announcem ent and the absence of 
significance in  the first and second years. These resu lts do not necessarily  
invalidate the thesis of this research, to wit: investors place a value on 
perceived foreign exchange risk for firms on the road to bankruptcy. To the 
contrary, the resu lts allow for two possible interpretations.
One interpretation, consistent with our thesis, is the seriousness of 
the financial problem s of a firm are evident as m uch as four years before 
the eventual bankruptcy announcem ent, and investors — recognizing these  
problems and anticipating the firm’s alternatives — m ay im pute a value 
appropriating the beneficial or detrimental influences of the foreign 
exchange rate. It is not until it is obvious that filing for bankruptcy will be 
the only avenue for the firm does the influence of the foreign exchange rate 
cease to be a factor in  the market returns. In brief, prior to the point where 
investors consider bankruptcy as “fait accomplis’,’ the foreign exchange rate 
and the overall econom y may be factors in determ ining stock returns; 
subsequent to that point they are not.
A second interpretation, w hich runs counter to our supposition, is 
that all firms, not ju s t  the financially infirm, are subject to the influences
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of the foreign exchange market. Although these results do not conclusively- 
established th is  relationship, it is a  prospect if we consider it unlikely that 
investors perceive the critical nature of a  firm’s financial problems four 
years in advance of the bankruptcy announcem ent.
While th ese  results simply m ay be an anomaly peculiar to this partic­
ular data set, it also is possible this pattern may be a  h in t o f a broader 
implication. The implication, as touched upon in the preceding discussion  
of the alternate explanation for the results, is all firms — except those for 
which bankruptcy is a  foregone conclusion — are sensitive to a definitive 
trend of changes in  the exchange rate as well as changes in  the overall 
economy (for w hich  the industrial production index w as the proxy). For the 
bankruptcy-bound, the potential for bankruptcy overshadow s other influ­
encing factors specifically the foreign exchange rate and the overall 
economy.
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VI. S u m m ary  a n d  C o n c lu s io n s
The focus of this research was to exam ine whether investors place a value 
on perceived foreign exchange risk for firms on the road to bankruptcy; 
earlier research h a s not produced definitive results. Som e explanations for 
this lack of con sisten t results include: 1) the failure to properly classify 
a n d /o r  filter the sam ple, and 2) the empirical m odels should u se  lagged 
instead of contem poraneous changes in the foreign exchange rate.
Using a sam ple of 232 firms that filed for bankruptcy, we examine 
the relationship betw een their abnormal stock returns and changes in the 
foreign exchange rate and economy. S ince the gross domestic product, a 
reflection of the overall economy, is available only a quarterly basis and not 
m onthly as are th e  abnorm al returns and foreign exchange rate, we use the 
industrial production index as its proxy. The analysis spans a 49 month 
period — the bankruptcy announcem ent m onth and the 48 months immed­
iately preceding the announcement.
Consistent w ith the earlier research that employed an unconditional 
m odel, as did th is research, we did not find any evidence of a significant 
relationship betw een the firms’ abnormal returns and changes in the 
foreign exchange rate. This absence o f significant findings was constant for 
the overall sam ple of 49  m onths as well as various subperiods.
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Following through with the suggestions of Bartov and Bodnar, we 
considered it necessary to refine the sample by: 1) filtering out periods 
when the exchange rate was vacillating and not presenting a clear 
indication of either an appreciating or depreciating dollar, and 2) using  
lagged changes in the exchange rate and industrial production index.
Examining various filtering criteria produced two conditions we 
imposed upon the foreign exchange rate. The first condition w as the mathe­
m atical sign of the change in the foreign exchange rate for the current 
month and the two immediately preceding m onths m u st be the same. The 
second condition was the exchange rate had to change by more than five 
percent during the immediately preceding three m onth period. Applying 
these two conditions to the sam ple reduced the num ber of observations 
from 9 ,314  to 2,484.
Using these two filters produced consistently significant results for 
changes in both the foreign exchange rate and the industrial production 
index. Although there were consistently significant resu lts for the exchange 
rate, they were irregular in that occasionally the significant relationship 
was for the contem poraneous change, but more frequently for lags of one, 
two, and three months. The solution was an average o f the lagged change 
in the exchange rate with the average computed using the preceding three 
m onths (that is, lags of one, two, and three months).
The filtered sam ple, with the averaged lag for the change in the 
exchange rate, resulted in  a more stable and predictable model. The model
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displayed a  significant relationship for the exchange rate for the overall 
sam ple of 49 m onths and the third and fourth years preceding the bank­
ruptcy announcem ent, but not the first and second years. Changes in the 
industrial production index, likewise, were significant only for the third and 
fourth years preceding the announcem ent.
T hese results present two possible interpretations. One interpreta­
tion, consisten t with the hypothesis, is that investors sen se  the financial 
w eakness of firms up to four years preceding their bankruptcy announce­
ment, and the stock returns of these financially w eakened firms are influ­
enced by changes in the foreign exchange m arket and overall economy. The 
second interpretation, contrary to our supposition, is  investors do not 
necessarily anticipate a firm’s financial w eakness four years before the 
bankruptcy announcement, and the significant resu lts for the foreign 
exchange rate and industrial production index indicate all firms — not just 
the financially infirm — are sensitive to changes in th ese  two economic 
barometers. In either scenario, when it becom es obvious that bankruptcy 
is a strong likelihood, the influence of the overall econom y and the foreign 
exchange m arkets are eclipsed by firm’s forthcoming bankruptcy.
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Appendix A 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
Business-Cycle Chronology for the United States
Duration (M onths)
Peak Trough Contraction Expansion
Jun 1857 Dec 1858 18 22
Oct 1860 Jun 1861 8 48
Apr 1865 Dec 1867 32 18
Jun 1869 Dec 1870 18 34
Oct 1873 Mar 1879 65 36
Mar 1882 May 1885 38 22
Mar 1887 Apr 1888 13 27
Jul 1890 May 1891 10 20
Jan 1893 Jun 1894 17 18
Dec 1895 Jun 1897 18 24
Jun 1899 Dec 1900 18 21
Sep 1902 Aug 1904 23 33
May 1907 Jun 1908 13 19
Jan 1910 Jan 1912 24 12
Jan 1913 Dec 1914 23 44
Aug 1918 Mar 1919 7 10
Jan 1920 Jul 1921 18 22
May 1923 Jul 1924 14 27
Oct 1926 Nov 1927 13 21
Aug 1929 Mar 1933 43 50
May 1937 Jun 1938 13 80
Feb 1945 Oct 1945 8 37
Nov 1948 Oct 1949 11 45
Jul 1953 May 1954 10 39
Aug 1957 Apr 1958 8 24
Apr 1960 Feb 1961 10 106
Dec 1969 Nov 1970 11 36
Nov 1973 Mar 1975 16 58
Jan 1980 Jul 1980 6 12
Jul 1981 Nov 1982 16 92
Jul 1990 Mar 1991 8 n.a.
C om p arative  Statistics
A v era g e  length A v e r a g e  length
of contractions o f exp an sion s
Pre-World War II 21.2 28.9
Post-World War II 10.7 49.9
n .a .—Not available
Note: Length o f con trac tion  is th e  n u m b e r  o f m o n th s  from peak to tro u g h
Length o f expansion  is th e  leng th  o f th e  expansion  after the tro u g h  d a te
Source: VVynne-Blake (1993). p . 4 .
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Firms Making Bankruptcy A nnouncem ents
Firm SIC Date
1225 MAPLE CORP 3944 Aug 1978
A I A INDUSTRIES INC 4522 Feb 1986
AERODEX INC 3724 J u l 1976
AGUIRRE CO 6500 Sep 1980
ALEXANDER'S INC. 5311 May 1992
ALLECO INC. 6153 Jun 1992
ALLIANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS COR 3571 May 1992
ALLIED ARTISTS INDUSTRIES 3716 Apr 1979
ALLIED STORES CORP. 5311 May 1991
ALLOY COMPUTER PRODUCTS INC. 3566 Jun 1992
AMDURA CORP Apr 1990
AMERECO ENVIRONMENTAL SERVIC Feb 1990
AMERICA WEST AIRLINES 4512 Jul 1991
AMES DEPARTMENT STORES INC. 5331 Apr 1990
ANTONOVICH INC. Jan 1990
ARCS EQUITIES CORP 7389 Aug 1977
ARGONAUT ENERGY CORP 1311 Aug 1986
ARMAC ENTERPRISES INC 3944 Mar 1976
ASSOCIATED FOOD STORES INC 5141 Jun 1975
AT&E CORP. 3661 Jun 1991
AUTO-TRAIN CORP 4013 Feb 1982
AUTODIE CORP. 3540 Aug 1992
BALLY’S GRAND INC. Feb 1992
BANCOKLAHOMA CORP 6021 Feb 1992
BANK BUILDING & EQUIPMENT CO May 1990
BARRY’S JEWELERS INC. 5944 Feb 1992
BARTON INDUSTRIES INC 3490 Feb 1991
BEKER INDUSTRIES 2870 Oct 1985
BERKEYINC 5040 Mar 1991
BEST PRODUCTS INC. 5399 Jan 1991
BRANCH INDS 4213 Mar 1986
BRANIFF INTERNATIONAL AIRLIN 4512 Aug 1991
BRENDLE'S INC. Nov 1992
BRODY (B.) SEATING CO 2510 Jun 1980
Firm SIC Date
C V INTERNATIONAL CORP 4841 J u l 1980
CAPEHART CORP 3651 Oct 1979
CARTER HAWLEY HALE STORES IN 5311 Feb 1991
CASCADE INTERNATIONAL INC 5621 Dec 1991
CASTLE INDUSTRIES INC Feb 1990
CASUAL MALE CORP Apr 1990
CEDAR GROUP INC. 5072 Sep 1992
CELOTEX CORP Oct 1990
CENTENNIAL GROUP INC. 6552 Dec 1991
CHILD WORLD INC. 5945 May 1992
CHIPWICH INC. 5140 Aug 1992
CIRCLE K CORP May 1990
COLOROCS CORP. 3861 Sep 1991
COLT'S MANUFACTURING CO. Mar 1992
COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE CORP. J u l 1992
CONCURRENT COMPUTER CORP. 3571 Jan 1991
CONSUL RESTAURTANT CORP. 5812 Sep 1991
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 4512 Dec 1990
CONTINENTAL INFORMATION SYS 7377 May 1990
CONTINENTAL MTG INVESTORS 6798 Mar 1976
CYTOX CORP 5160 Aug 1986
DAISY SYSTEMS CORP Aug 1990
DATA ACCESS SYSTEMS INC 3575 Jan 1983
DATATRON INC 5045 Sep 1987
DE LAURENTIIS ENTMNT GROUP 7812 Aug 1988
DE LAURENTIIS FILM PTRS -LP 7812 Aug 1988
DELTAUS CORP 1381 Jan 1989
DISCOVERY OIL LTD 1311 Jan 1988
DOSKOCIL COS Mar 1990
EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES 3714 Jan 1991
EASTERN  A IRLINES 4 5 1 2 Jan 1991
EASTERN FREIGHTWAYS INC 4210 Apr 1976
EECO INC. May 1990






















ELBA SYSTEMS CORP 8200 Aug 1975
ENSTAR GROUP INC. Jun 1991
EQUITEC FINANCIAL GROUP INC 6282 Apr 1992
EVEREX SYSTEMS INC 3571 Jan 1993
FABIEN CORP 2200 Nov 1979
FAIRFIELD COMMUNITIES INC Oct 1990
FAMILY ENTERTAINMENT CNTRS 5812 Mar 1986
FEDERATED STORES INC Apr 1990
FINANCIAL CORP-SANTA BARBARA 6036 Mar 1992
FINEVEST FOODS INC. 5140 Feb 1991
FIRST CAPITAL HOLDINGS CORP. 6311 May 1991
FIRST HARTFORD CORP 2200 Feb 1981
FIRST REPUBLICBANK CORP 6021 Aug 1988
FLAGSHIP EXPRESS SERVICES IN 4512 Dec 1991
FLOATING POINT SYSTEMS INC. 3571 Oct 1991
FORT HOLDINGS INC 2870 J u l 1980
FRIER INDUSTRIES INC 3140 J u l 1978
FRIES ENTERTAINMENT INC 7812 Nov 1992
FRIGITEMP CORP 1700 Mar 1978
G.R.I. CORP. 5961 May 1992
GAC CORP 6500 Apr 1980
GARLAND CORP -CL A 2300 Apr 1980
GAYLORD CONTAINER CORP. 2631 Apr 1992
GEMCRAFT INC 1531 Mar 1989
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CORP Apr 1990
GF CORP 2522 Apr 1990
GIBRALTAR FINANCIAL CORP 6036 Feb 1990
GILMAN SERVICES INC 5122 May 1982
GLADDING CORP 3663 Apr 1977
GLASROCK MEDICAL SERVICES 7350 Jan 1983
GLOVER INC 2011 J u l 1980
GRAY MFG CO 3440 Dec 1975
GREYHOUND LINES INC. 4100 Jun 1990
GRT CORP 3652 Nov 1979
Firm SIC Date
GRUEN 1NDS INC 3873 Mar 1977
HARVARD INDUSTRIES INC. 3231 May 1991
HEALTH CONCEPTS IV INC. 8060 Jan 1992
HEALTHCARE INTERNATIONAL INC Oct 1992
HERITAGE ENTERTAINMENT INC Dec 1990
HIGHLAND SUPERSTORES INC. 5731 Aug 1992
HILLS DEPARTMENT STORES 5331 Feb 1991
HOME CENTERS INC. 5700 Mar 1992
HOMEFED CORP 6035 Oct 1992
HOMEFED CORP 6035 Feb 1994
HY-GAIN ELECTRONICS CORP 3663 Jan 1978
IMPERIAL CORP OF AMERICA 6036 Mar 1991
INFORMATION DISPLAYS INC 3571 May 1984
1NS1LCO CORP. 3585 Jan 1991
INTEGRA-A HOTEL & RESTAURANT 7011 J u l 1992
INTEGRATED RESOURCES INC Feb 1990
1NTERCO INC. 2510 Jan 1991
INTERMARK INC. Oct 1992
INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN HOMES Apr 1990
INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER BRAND 3540 Apr 1992
IROQUOIS BRANDS INC. 5500 Jun 1991
JARMEL FABRICS INC 2250 May 1975
JET AIR FREIGHT 4700 Jun 1979
JIFFY FOODS CORP 5812 Dec 1986
JONATHAN LOGAN INC Nov 1990
JUMPING-JACK SHOES INC. Feb 1990
KENNEDY & COHEN INC 5700 Jan 1976
KEYSTONE CAMERA PRODUCTS 3861 Mar 1992
KINDER-CARE LEARNING CENTERS 8351 Sep 1992
KOGER PROPERTIES INC. 1531 Sep 1991
LANDMARK LAND CO 6036 Mar 1993
LAWNAMERICA INC May 1990
LEISURE TECHNOLOGY INC 1531 Jun 1992






















LONE STAR INDUSTRIES INC Dec 1990
MACGREGOR SPORTING GOODS INC 3949 Mar 1989
MAGIC MARKER CORP 3950 Jul 1980
MALLARD COACH CO. 3716 May 1992
MARTECH USA INC 4955 Dec 1993
MAULE INDUSTRIES INC 3270 Jan 1978
MBI BUSINESS CENTERS INC 5734 Sep 1987
MCCORY CORP. 5331 Feb 1992
MCLEAN INDUSTRIES INC 1531 Nov 1986
MEGO INTERNATIONAL 3944 Jun 1982
METRO AIRLINES INC. 4512 Apr 1991
METROPOLITAN CIRCUITS 3672 May 1991
MIDWAY AIRLINES 4512 Mar 1991
MIDWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 5065 Aug 1991
MINER INDUSTRIES INC 3944 Aug 1977
MINISCRIBE CORP. Jan 1990
MISSION INSURANCE GROUP INC 6331 Feb 1987
MOHAWK AIRLINES INC. Aug 1991
MONARCH CAPITAL CP/MA 6411 Jan 1993
MORSE SHOE INC. Jan 1991
MUNSINGWEAR INC. 2320 Jul 1991
NATIONAL CONVENIENCE STORES 5412 Dec 1991
NATIONAL GYPSUM CO Oct 1990
NATL BANCSHARES CP TX 6021 May 1993
NELLY DON INC 2300 May 1978
NEW AMERICAN SHOE CO 3021 Sep 1991
NEWMARK & LEWIS INC. 5731 Sep 1991
NIAGARA SHARE CORP. 2590 Jul 1991
NICKLOS OIL & GAS CO 1381 Sep 1985
OFFICE PRODUCTS OF AMERICA I 51 10 Jul 1991
OLYMPIA BROADCASTING CORP Jun 1990
ORION PICTURES CORP. 7812 Jul 1992
ORMONT DRUG & CHEMICAL CO 5122 J u l 1977
OVERLAND EXPRESS INC 4213 May 1988
Firm SIC Date
OXFORD ENERGY CO. 4991 Aug 1992
PACIFIC FAR EAST LINE INC 4400 Feb 1978
PAN AM CORP. 4512 Jan 1991
PHARMAKINETICS LABORATORIES Nov 1990
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP. J u l 1991
PIZZA TIME THEATRE INC 5812 Mar 1986
PLAZA GROUP INC 7311 Dec 1974
POTTER INSTRUMENT INC 3577 Apr 1975
PRESIDENTS FIRST LADY SPA 7990 Mar 1975
PRIME MOTOR INNS INC Sep 1990
REGINA COMPANY INC 3630 Apr 1989
REVCO DRUG STORES INC Feb 1992
REXENE CORP. 2821 Mar 1992
RIVERBEND INTERNATIONAL CORP 2033 J u l 1991
RODIME PLC 3572 Aug 1991
ROYAL CASTLE SYSTEMS INC 5812 Apr 1975
SAVIN CORP. 5040 Aug 1992
SAXON INDUSTRIES 2621 J u l 1984
SEAMAN FURNITURE CO. Jan 1992
SHENANDOAH OIL CORP 1311 Nov 1978
SHULMAN TRANSPORT ENTERPRISE 4700 Aug 1978
SITKIN SMELTING & REFINING 3341 Mar 1978
SOLITRON DEVICES INC 3674 Jan 1992
SORG INC 2750 Jan 1991
SOUTHLAND CORP Oct 1990
SPROUSE-REITZ STORES INC. 5331 Nov 1991
STANDARD BRANDS PAINT CO, 5200 Feb 1992
STATEWIDE BANCORP May 1991
STELBER INDUSTRIES INC 3944 Mar 1976
STERLING OPTICAL CORP 5990 Jan 1992
STOTLER GROUP INC Aug 1990
STUARTS DEPT. STORES 5331 Apr 1992
SUDBURY INC, 3460 Jan 1992


















Firms Making Bankruptcy A nnouncem ents
Firm SIC Date
SUPRONICS CORP 2844 Oct 1976
TACOMA BOATBUILDING CO. 3730 Feb 1992
TELESPHERE COMMUNICATIONS IN 4813 Sep 1991
TELTRONICS SERVICES 5063 May 1980
TENNESSEE FORGING STEEL CORP 3310 Oct 1978
TEXAS AMERICAN BANCSHARES 6021 Aug 1989
TGC INC-OLD 3944 Aug 1978
TOBIN PACKING CO INC 2011 Sep 1981
TOTAL ASSETS PROTECTION INC. 8711 Sep 1991
TRANSCISCO INDUSTRIES INC. 4700 Aug 1991
TSL HOLDINGS INC 3571 Feb 1994
UNIMET CORP 3530 Mar 1986
UNION VALLEY CORP. 1531 Aug 1991
UNITED MERCHANTS & MANUFACTU Nov 1990
UNIVERSAL CONTAINER CORP 3412 Mar 1978
UNIVERSITY GRAPHICS INC. 2790 Jun 1991
USG CORP. 3270 May 1992
VALLEY INDUSTRIES INC. 3317 Sep 1992
VYQUEST INC 3716 Jan 1991
WANG LABORATORIES 3570 Aug 1992
WASHINGTON BANCORP Aug 1990
WESTERN HEALTH PLANS 6324 Sep 1989
WESTERN ORBIS CO 2451 Jun 1976
WESTMINSTER CORP 3140 Sep 1975
WILFRED AMERICAN EDUCATION C May 1990
WNS INC. 5190 Feb 1992
ZALE CORP 5944 Jan 1992
ZIMMER CORP 3716 May 1988
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